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In troduction .
What usually comes to ones mind when one thinks Qf  culture is more or less the 
arts and humanities, ie . film, architecture, theatre, the literary tradition, the folk traditions 
of a country and its national language. Each country has a strong belief in the importance 
of its own culture and perhaps the desire that other countries should get to know it and 
appreciate i t  The establishment o f  cultural centers, institutes, schools, the exchange of 
students, professors, teachers, and experts in various fields o f intellectual and artistic ex­
pression, the exchange of books and other printed material, as well as the organisation of 
lectures, concerts and exhibitions are some of the practices that countries usually use to 
familiarize other nations with their own culture.1 In some dictionaries, such as the Web­
ster’s and the Oxford Dictionary o f English, culture is defined as “the arts and other 
manifestations o f human intellectual achievement regarded collectively”, including their 
“attitudes, values, beliefs, arts, sciences, handicrafts agriculture, economics, music, tradi­
tions, language, and story7’.2 Along the same line, some historians, such as Hans 
Mommsen, use the term in a narrower sense, Le. “high culture, popular culture and 
working-class culture replete with their intellectual products”. Other historians, such as 
Luden Febvre, Marc Bloch, Michel de Certeau, define culture as “the production of 
meaning by individual actors in on-going, heterogeneous and contested processes o f rep­
resentation, discursive construction and appropriation”.3 *Nevertheless, why some coun­
tries desperately desire to expand or export their culture? When and why was culture first 
acknowledged as an important component of their foreign policy agenda? Does cultural 
policy provide communication and better understanding between peoples or its ultimate 
aim is to serve political, economic or other interests?
Before I place my work in the cultural discourse, I would like to give a general 
picture of how sciences, in particular natural sdences, have been discussed by historians 
with regard to culture, cultural practice and cultural policy. It should be noted, however, 
that the following account is not a detailed description o f the different approaches of the
1 RUTH EMILY M cMURRY, MunA Lee , The Cultural Approach. Another Way in International Relations, 
Washington 1944. New York/London 1947 (Reissued in 1972), p. 5.
2 See: The New International Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary o f the English Language and 
Encyclopaedic Edition, 1998; Oxford Dictionary of English, (Revised edition), 2005. See also: SIMON 
BLACKBURN, The Oxford Dictionary o f Philosophy. Oxford 1994, entry culture.
3 Q ted in: STEFAN BERGER, “Social History vs Cultural History. A German Debate”, in: Theory, Cuture &
Society VoL 18 (1), (2001), pp. 145-153, here p. 1^8.
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cultural dimension of science, but a su m m a ry of the extended and varied bibliography on 
the subject matter. In rough terms, many historians study the issue of cultural policy, and 
in particular foreign cultural policy, in political and/or sociological terms focusing on 
humanities while overlooking the role o f natural sciences, while some others view exact 
sciences as the product o f a specific cultural environment. It is striking, however, that 
despite the fact that natural sciences and technology had a large share in the economic 
and political establishment o f the world powers during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, and consequently in their international prestige, very few historians have sys­
tematically studied their cultural role and their significance in foreign cultural policy 
planning.
With the rise of imperialism in the nineteenth century, culture became an ex­
porting element “after traders have established their outposts, [...] foreign armies have 
decimated native hosts, [and] [...] new rulers have instituted a taxation system and police 
force”.4 Around that time, exact sciences together with technology acquired great signifi­
cance, because they supported the process of imperialism. France, Britain, the United 
States and, from 1884, Germany, put science in the service o f their colonial policies and 
their economic and political establishment overseas. Natural sciences became an essential 
part o f  foreign policy and they were employed by foreign cultural policy-makers, given 
the fact that they were acknowledged as certain cultural resources, moreover as “civiliz­
ing forces”.5 Culture alone, however, does not justify the eagerness o f the European 
powers to expand abroad, but it is recognized as indispensable means for world politics,6 
as it embodies strong political and economic connotations. “How can one separate the 
economic motive from political or cultural one?” queries Pyenson studying the relation 
of German cultural imperialism with exact sciences in the first decades o f the twentieth 
century.7
4 LEWIS P y e n s o n ,  Cultural Imperialism and Exact Sciences. German Expansion Overseas 1900-1930. 
New York 1985, p. 6.
5 Cited in; LEWIS PYENSON, "Pure learning and political economy: science and European expansion in the 
age o f imperialism”, in: R.P.W. VlSSER, H.J.M. BOS, L.C. PALM, HJLM. SNELDERS (eds.), New Trends in 
the History of Science. Proceedings o f  a conference held at the University o f  Utrecht, Amsterdam 1989, 
pp. 209-278, here p. 238.
6 RUEDIGER vom BRUCH, "Kultiirimperialismus und Kulturwissenschaften”, in: Bmchte %vr Wisscnschafts- 
gscbicbte 13 (1990), pp. 83-92, here p. 83.
7 PYENSON, Cultural Imperialism and Exact Sciences, p. 12.
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Focusing on the German case, which is the main issue of my thesis, many histo­
rians primarily concentrate on the use of language as the instrument par excellence for cul­
tural expansion, as well as on the neighbouring sciences.8 Others try to approach and 
historidse foreign cultural policy by applying sociological models while tracing ideologi­
cal principles that again leave exact sciences aside.9 This is perhaps because “among all 
branches of knowledge, the exact sciences are least obviously grounded in ideology”, as 
Lewis Pyenson remarks.10 Similar narratives have been suggested by the now more or less 
classic works o f Kurt Duewell, Werner Link and Ruediger vom Bruch that focus on the 
structure and principles o f Germany’s foreign cultural policy and the process o f its for­
mation within the German political and social environment.11 Other historians concen­
* See: REINHARD MERKER, Die bildenden Künste im Nationalsozialismus: Kultuzideologie, Kulturpolitik, 
Kulturproduktion. Koeln cl983; KLAUS BACKES, Adolf Hitlers Einfluss auf die Kulturpolitik des Dritten 
Reiches: Dargestellt am Beispiel der Bildenden Künste. Doctoral thesis Ruprecht-Kari-University, 
Heidelberg 1985; MICHELS ECKARD, Das Deutsche Institut in Paris 1940-1944. Ein Beitrag zu den 
deutsch-franzoesischen Kulturbeziehungen und zur auswaertigen Kulturpolitik des Dritten Reiches. Stutt­
gart 1993; FRANK-RUTGER HAUSMANN, “Deutsche Geiste suis senschaft” im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Die “Ak­
tion Ritterbusch” (1940-1945). Dresden-Muenchen 1998; Ibid (Hg.), Die Rolle der Geisteswissenschaften 
im Dritten Reich 1933-1945. München 2002; BIRGITTA ALMGREN, Illusion und Wirklichkeit. Individuelle 
und kollektive Denkmuster in nationalsozialistischer Kulturpolitik und Germanistik in Schweden 1928- 
1945. Stockholm 2002; KATHRIN ENGEL, Deutsche Kulturpolitik im besetzten Paris 1940-1944. Film und 
Theater. München 2003.
9 See: EMGE R. M., Auswaertige Kulturpolitik. Eine soziologische Analyse ihrer Funktionen, Bedingungen 
und Formen. Berlin 1967; KURT DUEWELL, Interne Faktoren auswaertiger Kulturpolitik im 19. und 20. 
Jahrhundert Stuttgart Institut fuer Auslandsbeziehungen, 1981; RUEDIGEK vom BRUCH, “Gesellschaftli­
che Initiativen in den auswaertigen Kulturbeziehungen Deutschlands vor 1914”, in: Zeitschrift Juer Kul­
turaustausch, lvj, 31 Jg. (1981), pp. 43 -67; Ibid, “Idealismus und positivismus. Die Grundspannung in Kul­
tur und Kulturwissenschaften um 1900”, im Berichte %ur Wisscmcbaßsgscbicbtc, 17 (1994), pp. 138-143; Ibid, 
“Kulturimperialismus und Kulturwissenschaften”, im Berichte %ur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 13 (1990), pp. 83-92; 
Max FUCHS, Kulturpolitik ab gesellschaftliche Aufgabe: Eine Einfuehzung in Theorie, Geschichte, Praxis. 
Opladen 1998, which is a general, theoretical work.
10 LEWIS P y e n s o n , “Why Science may serve poHtical ends: Cultural iraperialism and the mission to civi- 
lize”, im Berichte %ur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 13 (1990), pp. 69-81, here p. 71.
11 K u r t  D u e w e l l , Deutschlands auswaertige Kulturpolitik 1918-1932. Grundlinien und Dokumente. 
Koeln 1976; KURT DUEWELL, WERNER L in k  (Hsg.), Deutsche auswaertige Kulturpolitik seit 1871: 
Geschichte und Struktur. Vienna 1981; R uEDIGER vom B r ü CH, Weltpolitik ab Knlturmissiom 
Auswaertige Kulturpolitik und Bildungsbuigertum in Deutschland am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges. 
Paderborn u.a. 1982. A more recent work on the subject is that o f JÜRGEN KLOOSTERHUIS, Friedliche 
Imperialbten: Deutsche Auslandsvereine und auswaertige Kulturpolitik, 1906-1918. Frankfurt a.M cl994.
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trate on scientific institutions, particularly on those referring to the exchange and grant­
ing policies for the dissemination o f scientific knowledge beyond national borders, giv­
ing, however, little space to exact sciences.12 In the same vein, Frank-Rutgei Hausmann 
focuses on language teaching and the cultural activities when he studies the role of the 
branches o f the German Scientific Institute (Deutsche Wïssenschafîkchts Institut, DWl) in a 
number o f European cities, despite the fact that departments dedicated to natural sci­
ences operated or planned to operate there.13 In addition, studies on the main German 
institution for the support and promotion primarily of the exact sciences, namely the 
Notgemeimcbaft der deutschen Wissenschaften, -which in 1937 was renamed “Deutsche For- 
schungsgemeinschaft’-, hardly explore its cultural political aspect.14
A different approach to the science-culture question is suggested by Paxil Forman 
with his pioneering work, at the time it was published, on the impact of the Weimar cul­
tural environment on German physics.15 Unlike other historians, who occasionally and in 
a diffident manner try to give to science cultural credentials, Forman unfolds the way a 
field science is affected by a cultural milieu. Similarly, Jonathan Harwood explores the
12 Apart from  the relatively old but important work o f VOLKHARD LAITENBERGER, Akademischer Aus­
tausch und  Auswaertige Kulturpolitik. D er Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst, DAAD, 1923-1945. 
Goettingen 1976,1 name few o f the recent works: PETER ALTER (H g.), DAAD 1925-2000. Spuren in die 
Zukunft. 1) D er DAAD in der Zeit. Geschichte, Gegenwart und Zukünftige Aufgaben 14 Essays. Koeln 
2000; M a n f r e d  H e in e m a n n , DAAD 1925-2000. Spuren in die Zukunft. 2) Fakten und Zahlen zum 
DAAD. Koeln 2000; BERNHARD vom  BROCKE, “Internationale Wissenschaftsbeziehungen und die An­
fänge einer deutschen auswärtigen Kulturpolitik: D er Professorenaustausch mit Nordamerika” in: Ibid, 
Wissenschaftsgeschichte und Wissenschaftspolitik im  Industriezeitalter. Hildesheim 1991, pp. 185-242. An 
early version o f this essay was published by the author len years eaxlier. See: BERNHARD vom BROCKE, 
“Der deutsch-amerikanische Professorenaustausch”, in: Zeitschrift firn  Kulturaustausch, 31 (1981), pp. 128- 
182; KARL-HEINZ F ü SSEL, Deutsch-amerikanischer Kulturaustausch im  20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt aJvi. 
2004.
,J FRANK-RUTGER H au sm an n , “Auch im  Krieg schweigen die Musen nicht”. Die Deutschen 
Wissenschaftlichen Institute im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Goettingen 2001.
14 KURT Z ie r o l d , Forschungsfoerderungin 3 Epochen. Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft Geschichte -  
Arbeitsweise — Kommentar. Wiesbaden 1968; ULRICH MARSCH, Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissen­
schaft Gruendung und fruehe Geschichte 1920-1925. Frankfurt/Main 1994; NOTKER HAMMERSTEIN, 
Die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft in der Weimarer Republik und im Dritten Reich. Wissen­
schaftspolitik in Republik und Diktatur. Muenchen 1999.
15 PAUL F o r m a n , “Weimar Culture, Causality and Quantum Theory, 1918-1927: Adaptation by German 
physicists and mathematicians to a hostile intellectual environment”, in: Historical Stüdes in the Physical Sd- 
encesZ (1971), pp. 1-115.
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cultural and social elements that had driven German scientists to develop a specific ap­
proach to basic problems on genetics.16 In a different discipline, Paul Lemer analyses the 
issue o f how psychiatric treatment was used in the industrialized period and in World 
War I, adopting elements from mechanized destruction as well as models and techniques 
from industrial management.17 These are among the few studies that highlight the cul­
tural aspect o f  science focusing on specific disciplines, in other words, performing a case 
study analysis. Much of the literature that relates to science as cultural product o f a spe­
cific socio-political environment, deals with the issue theoretically using sociological tools 
and philosophical notions.18
In the last two decades, some historians have begun to view science not only as 
the outcome o f cultural agitation in a specific social, political and economic environment, 
but also as an active performer in foreign cultural-policy planning. It is not a coincidence 
that almost all of them focus primarily on the second half of the nineteenth century and 
the first decades of the twentieth century.19 This was the high industrial age, when sci­
ence had become an inherent part o f industrial production and therefore an important 
factor o f economic growth. It was also the period of colonialism, as the big economic 
powers of Europe were keen to expand overseas in quest o f new resources. Science was 
put in the service of colonial policy and a number of scientists went overseas to build and 
organise the infrastructure o f the regions in questions, while others became engaged in 
medical research for the fighting o f tropical diseases that threatened the settlers. In addi­
]t JONATHAN HARWOOD, Styles o f Scientific Thought The German Genetics Community 1900-1933.
Chicago 1993.
17 PAUL LERNER, Hysterical Men: War, Neurosis and German Mental Medicine 1914-21. Doctoral thesis, 
Columbia University 1996.
18 See: La t o u r  B. and WOOLGAR S., Laboratory Life: the Social Construction of Scientific Facts. London 
1979; Br u n o  L a t o u r , Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society. Open 
University Press 1987. These are now considered classic textbooks. See also: ANDREW PICKERING (ed.), 
Science as practice and culture. Chicago 1992; HANS ERICH BOEDECKER, PETER H a n NS REILL, JUERGEN 
SCHLUMBOHM (Hrg.), Wissenschaft als kulturelle Praxis 1750-1900. Goettingen 1999. One should not con­
fuse, however, the social, political and cultural impact on the scientific outcome with die committed or 
ideologically oriented science. In the latter case, sets of values that mainly serve political interests are in­
jected into science. The “deutsche Physik” in National Socialism and the “reactionary genetics* of 
Lyssenko in the UdSSR, are characteristic examples of this practice.
19 Such are the works of: DANIEL R. HEADRICK, The tools o f empire technology and European 
imperialism in the nineteenth century. O xford 1981; JURGEN KLOOSTERHUIS, FriedHche ImperiaHsten: 
Deutsche Auslandsvereine und auswaertige Kulturpolitik, 1906-1918. Frankfurt aAL c l994. See also foot­
notes 20 and 23.
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tion, a number o f scholars staffed research and teaching institutions abroad, exerting in­
fluence over the local scientific community.
Perhaps the most representative and systematic historian who deals with the role 
of science in cultural expansion is Lewis Pyenson. He investigates how exact sciences’ 
utility interacted with explicitly imperialist strategies of the European powers, namely 
Germany, France and the Netherlands.20 Along the same line, two German historians, 
Stefan Wulf and Wolfgang Eckart examine medical science as a cultural instrument in 
Germany’s foreign policy. The former gives a detailed account of the cultural political 
role o f  the Institute for Tropical Diseases in Hamburg overseas, but also in the Balkans.21 
This institute was Germany’s most important institution of this kind and one o f the very 
few worldwide.22 Eckart, explores the relation of tropical medicine with Germany’s colo­
nial policy.23 He argues that tropical medicine did not only serve Germany’s expansion; 
moreover it was transformed into a science for “colonial expropriation”, namely into a 
“practical instrument for optimizing colonial economy”, as medicine and hygiene was 
expected to make die indigenous labour forces o f the colonies more productive.24 The 
dissemination o f western culture is regarded as a new form o f imperialism, that is to say, 
“cultural imperialism”. This kind o f imperialism and international prestige followed by 
the economic enterprise. The expansion of the imperialists’ culture maintained their rule 
over the colonized peoples. “Export and institutionalization o f European ways o f  life, 
organizational structures, values and interpersonal relations, language and cultural prod-
20 L e w is  P y e n s o n , Cultural imperialism and exact sciences: German expansion overseas, 1900-1930. New 
York 1985; Ibid, Empire of reason: Exact sciences in Indonesia, 1840-1940. Leiden 1989; Ibid, Civilizing 
Mission: Exact Sciences and French Overseas Expansion, 1830-1940. Baltimore 1993.
21 STEFAN W u l f , D as Hamburger Tropeninstitut 1919 bis 1945: Auswärtige Kulturpolitik und 
Kolomaire visionismus nach Versailles. Be din 1994.
22 England was the first colonial power that founded such institutes only a year before Germany, in 1900. 
See chapter three.
23 WOLFGANG U . E ck a r t , “Von der Idee eines ‘Reichsinstituts’ zur unabhaengigen Forschungsinstitution 
-  Vorgeschichte und Gruendung des Hamburger Instituts frier Schiffe- und Tropenkrankheiten, 1884- 
1901” , im RUEDIGER vom BrUCH, RAINER A  MUELLER (Hg.): Formen ausserstaatlicher Wissenschafts- 
foerderungim 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Stuttgart 1990; Ibid, Die Medizin und das "Größere Deutschland": 
Kolonialpolitik und Tropenmedizin in Deutschland, 1884-1914, im Berichte syr Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 13 
(1990), pp. 129-140.
24 ECKART, Die Medizin und das "Größere Deutschland", pp. 130,135f.
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ucts” were the alternative weapons o f European imperialists in Africa, Asia and the Pa­
cific.25
After the end of World War I and the signing of the Versailles Treaty in 1919, 
Germany was forced to withdraw from the group o f colonial powers, as it was deprived 
from its colonies and all its acquisitions abroad. The sanctions of the Treaty dramatically 
affected the young Republic's international affairs. At the scientific level, the country lost 
all of its institutions that had been created or supported by the Germans since 1900, los­
ing at the same time its long-lasting influence on the local scientific communities. Ger­
man science and research was cut off from the international scientific community and 
was restricted to its national borders threatened with provincialism and backwardness. 
What was at stake was Germany's culture and its national image abroad. In other words, 
its economic and political hegemony.
In the inter-war years, Germany having nothing left to defend from its glorious 
past but its culture, focused on advertising it abroad by making it an essential part of its 
foreign policy planning. The Republic established a number o f institutions dedicated to 
the cultivation and promotion of its culture beyond its borders. The creation o f the Cul­
tural Section at the Foreign Ministry, in 1919, was the first decisive step towards this di­
rection. During the Weimar years, the Balkan region was o f particular significance for the 
Germans, as it seemed it could replace the lost colonies overseas and their resources. 
“Traditionally”, argues Danckelmann, “the foreign cultural policy of the German imperi­
alism concentrated to the Balkans, the Near East, the south-western Europe and the 
Latin America”.26 It was not a surprise, therefore, that during the Weimar years the focus 
of the Republic's foreign cultural policy became Bulgaria and Spain.27 German cultural 
and economic interests in the Balkans led to the establishment of a number of institu­
tions to serve as a tool for strengthening German presence there and, in particular, in 
friendly territory. These conditions were primarily met in Bulgaria, Germany's ally in the 
war. Educational institutions, such as the German Academy, created branches for dis­
seminating the German culture, primarily the German language. The cultural presence of 
Germany abroad was not confined, however, to the foundation of language schools or to
25 ANNABELUE Sr e b e r n Y-MOHAMMADI, “The Many Cultural Faces o f  Imperialism”, in: PETER GOLD­
ING, PHIL H ar ris  (eds.), Beyond Cultural Imperialism. Globalization, Communication and die New Inter­
national Order. London 1997, pp. 49-68, here p. 51.
26 OTFRŒD D a NCKELMANN, “Aus der Praxis auswaertiger Kulturpolitik des deutschen Imperialismus 
1933-1945”, in: ZatscbrijiJuer Geschicbtsvissenscbaft, Heft 6 (1972), pp. 718-737, here p. 724.
27 Ibid
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the creation o f philological and archaeological societies and institutes. Moreover, it took a 
practical and applied character with the establishment of research and experimental cen­
tres that turned out to serve the economic and military interests of Germany. In Europe, 
the only such institutes were the zoological stations in Naples and Rovigno. The former, 
was a model for international scientific co-operation and the latter was a branch o f the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology in Berlin-Dahlem since its establishment, in 1911. 
Both o f  them, however, were confiscated according to the provisions o f the 1919 Peace 
Agreement.
Nevertheless, language was the precondition for attracting young promising and 
from “good families” people to visit German universities, because a co-operative native 
elite, even a small one, was regarded as vital. “No imperial power”, observed Srebemy- 
Mohammadi, “could rely on its own national alone”28 and educating or training “teachers 
of technology, civil engineers, architects, mechanical engineers, mining engineers, and 
science teachers”,29 but also doctors, economists, lawyers and civil servants was crucial 
for Germany to re-establish political and economic influence abroad. Therefore, Ger­
many latinched a scholarship programme for those who were considered that they could 
facilitate its interests in their home countries. This policy was not a German originality 
and the Weimar Republic had to deal with the established French influence, not only in 
Bulgaria, but also in other Balkan countries, such as Greece.
Although Greece was not as favourably disposed towards Germany as Bulgaria 
was after the end o f the First World War, there was a strong affiliation between the two 
countries that dates back to the creation o f the modem Greek state and the arrival of 
King Otto to Greece, in 1832. Many Greeks, primarily from the local elite, decided to go 
and being educated in Germany. On their return, they staffed the most important ad­
ministrative institutions of the Greek kingdom and were apparently favourable to their 
intellectual “homeland”. Although this trend was n o t the result o f the German Reich’s 
well-designed foreign cultural policy, it created a fertile soil for a more systematic cultural 
effort in Greece in the years to come. Despite the fact that Greece was under the strong 
cultural influence of France after World War I, Germany was the indispensable leading 
technological and scientific power in Greece, having the absolute monopoly in some 
certain fields, such as engineering and medicine. Germany encouraged and promoted the 
germanophile climate in Greece basically through the German schools, the activities of
28 Sr e b e r n y -M o HAMMaDI, “ Faces o f  Im peria lism ” , p. 60.
29 PYENSON, "P u re  learning and political econom y” , p. 239.
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the German-Greek Society and a number of scholarships granted to teachers and young 
scientists. In addition, at that time, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, being the only German 
scientific and research institution remained that enjoyed international recognition, ap­
proached two Balkan states, Yugoslavia and Greece, in quest o f favourable conditions to 
continue the research projects carried out in Naples and Rovigno. However, it was only 
in the late years o f National Socialism and during the Second World War that the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Society succeeded to expand to the Balkan Peninsula establishing a network of 
research centres, which were also supported by the German Army. In addition to the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes, other networking institutions such as the German Academy, 
the German Scientific Institute and the South-eastern European Society contributed not 
only to the promotion of Germany’s culture, but also to the establishment o f its eco­
nomic control over the Balkans.
Ultimately, can we talk about German imperialism in the Balkans in the years of 
the Hitler regime? And if so, what characteristics did this kind of imperialism have? If 
imperialism is “in itself a multi-faceted cultural process”, “a means o f cultural transfor­
mation”,30 as Srebemy-Mohammadi argues, then it is legitimate to ask this question for 
the Balkans and try to unveil the hidden aspects of the German foreign cultural policy 
during the Nazi years. The case o f Greece is my tool to approach the whole problematic, 
which I believe casts some new light on the intertwined scientific, political, and cultural 
issues that conclusively go beyond the Greek borders. It should be underlined that my 
investigation is based on archival material that is fragmented and largely located in Ger­
man institutions. From my thorough and extensive research in Greece and Germany, the 
Greek archives proved to be poor, in regard not only with the cultural aspect o f science, 
but also with the cultural relations between Greece and Germany through science, par­
ticularly for the period from 1938 to 1945. Therefore, the thesis is not a detailed account 
of a specific scientific discipline, of an institution, or of important figures. It is a narrative 
that uses examples of all o f those aspects in an effort to understand Germany’s interest 
to promote its scientific relations with a country well known for its ancient culture and 
not its scientific achievements.
The thesis has two parts. The first part is dedicated to the period of the Weimar 
Republic, as it was during that time that the necessity o f an organised foreign cultural 
policy became Germany’s conscience and science was to contribute to this purpose. In
50 SREBERiiY-MOHAMMADI, “Faces of Imperialism”, p. 51.
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the first chapter I am exploring how the notions o f “nationalism”, “internationalism”, 
“culture” and “science” are interrelated giving the example o f the creation of the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Society and the two German zoological stations in Italy, which paved the way 
for Germany’s scientific expansion to the Balkans through the Society. The mechanisms 
used by the young Republic to save its international prestige and its science are the issues 
on which I focus in the second chapter. In the third chapter, I investigate the significance 
of the Balkans, particularly o f Greece, for the deprived o f its colonies German state.
National Socialism is the focus o f the second part o f my thesis. In chapter four, I 
study how the focus of discussion on internationalism was shifted to geopolitics and the 
expansion o f the German “Lebensrauvf’ eastwards. During this period, new cultural and 
scientific institutions along with the old ones were put in the service of Germany’s milita­
ristic plans. In the last two chapters I reduce the scale of my research bringing the general 
discussion o f cultural politics and science down to the case o f Greece. The final chapter 
of my thesis is based almost exclusively on primary sources and ultimately concentrates 
all the dimensions of the German foreign cultural policy as I highlight them throughout 
the thesis.
n m n M M n n n
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P A R T I.
1. Scientific internationalism and national culture
1.1. Bepinmnps of the German Foreign Cultural policy. Science as a cultural instrument
“The one who gives, dominates.
The theory o f the donor works 
not only for individuals and societies 
but also for civilisations.”31
Germany’s institutional cultural presence abroad dates back to the Kdserreicb. A 
large number o f cultural exchanges and activities were furthered through many private 
channels and were funded by Germans living abroad as well as by their clubs. The pro­
motion of German science outside the Reich was essentially a matter o f private initiative. 
Material support from the Reich was either non-existing or limited. In the latter case, it 
usually was the Prussian Ministry o f Culture that sponsored the cultural initiatives in for­
eign countries. This kind o f state-support was given to a number of teachers who were 
sent on their own request overseas, like Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Chile, to 
organise the higher and military education o f those countries. Japan, China and Turkey 
were also among the countries to which the Prussian Ministry of Culture not only sent 
teachers to contribute to the organisation of learning, but also established universities 
and technical schools there. The archaeological institutes in Rome, Athens, and Cairo, 
the Institute for Art History in Florence and the Bibliotheca Hergana in Rome, as well as 
the hospitals Germany built abroad, were all supported largely by private pockets rather 
than die public purse, although some money did come from the Prussian Ministry of 
Culture and Education. .
Despite those important acculturating efforts and the material support by the 
Reich, official German cultural policy abroad remained rather discrete. The fact that the 
Reich’s support came from the Prussian Ministry o f Culture and not from some depart­
ment of the Foreign Ministry, indicates the absence of an organised and systematised 
foreign cultural policy during that time. Moreover, German people, as it was often ar­
31 Fe r n a n d  Br a u d e l ,  The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean W odd in the Age o f  Philip II, died in: 
Lew is P y e n s o n , Cultural Imperialism and Exact Sciences. German Expansion Overseas 1900-1930. New 
York 1985, p.302.
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gued, were not very well aware o f their common culture as the French and Britons were. 
Thus, an official initiative for promoting a representative image of Germany abroad that 
would also unite the German minorities who lived there, who could then further cam­
paign for their homeland’s culture, remained a hesitant undertaking. The answer o f  the 
Reich’s Chancellor, Theodor v. Bethmann-Hollweg, on 21 July 1913, to the cultural and 
economic historian Prof. Karl Lamprecht, who was the first to use the term “foreign 
cultural policy” in 1908, was characteristic of this hesitant attitude. The Chancellor 
stressed the necessity of a systematic diffusion o f the German culture beyond its fron­
tiers:
“[...] We are not sure and conscious enough of our culture yet, our inner identity, 
our national ideals. It is due to the peculiarity of our individualised and still unbal­
anced culture that it has not the same suggestive power as has the British and the 
French one. This is the reason why every German abroad does not dream of his 
homeland as the French does for Paris and the Englishman for the island of Britain.
[...] We are a young nation and, perhaps, we naively believe too much in violence.
We underestimate the refined means ]feinere Mittel\ and we don’t know yet that what 
violence can conquer, violence alone cannot maintain.”32
A t the beginning o f  the twentieth century, Germany had already found its place 
in the Welîpoüûk, “a place in the sun”, gaining a reputation as a strong military and eco­
nomic power.33 Like every other great European power, Germany, exerting its imperialist 
authority, sought to control territories with sources o f raw materials in order to 
strengthen its own economy. Lewis Pyenson, however, rightly notes that, even though 
political economy was the driving force behind imperialist actions, not all discussions 
associated with imperialism should be restricted to political economy.34 Cultural expan­
sion, cultural influence or dependence is quite a complicated phenomenon to be exclu­
sively interpreted as the outcome o f  imperialism or the “ep¡phenomenon o f  imperial 
control”.35 If, in nineteenth century, the spread of cultural activity that follows the estab­
lishment o f  traders’ outposts in a conquered region, or the institutionalisation o f  a system
32 Vossiscbe Zeiiung (Morgenausgabe), 12.12.1913, reprinted in: RUEDIGER vom BRUCH, Weltpolititk als 
Kulturrmssion. Auswaertige Kulturpolitik und Bildungsbuergertum in Deutschland am Vorabend des Er- 
vten Wdtkrieges. Padebom 1982, pp.149-150, here p. 149.
33 See: W o l f g a n g  J .  MOMMSEN, Grossmachtstellung und Weltpolitik. Die Aussenpolitik des Deutschen 
Reiches 1870 bis 1914. Frankfurt a.M., Berlin, 1993, in particular pp. 107-206-
34 PYENSON, C ultu ral Imperialism, p . 3.
33 Ibid., p.6.
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of laws by the new rulers was typical of overseas expansion, at the beginning o f the 
twentieth century, cultural infiltration, in many cases and in particular in Europe, pre­
ceded military, political or economic domination, as I will try to argue later on.
The establishment o f  primary schools abroad held a particular place in the late 
nineteenth century German foreign policy. At the turn o f the century, the general per­
ception in other countries about the Germans was either that of “romantic dreamers” or 
of “imprudent militarists”, both unattractive models for imitation.36 In order to correct 
this unfavourable image, Germany had to adopt an official cultural policy that would 
systematically propagate its culture outside its boundaries and it turned to die French the 
British policy models to achieve its goal. School policy went hand in hand with language 
policy and a number of schools were built world-wide to foster and cultivate the German 
language and culture. Plans were drawn up and put into practice after the establishment 
of the German Reich, in 1871. These schools were primarily addressed to the German 
minority abroad and then to the local population.37 Soon they were turned into “propa­
ganda schools” and came to be associated with German political and economic interests. 
These schools were affiliated to and complemented by organisations already existed 
abroad, usually the German clubs.
Even though the promotion of schools was the oldest, most widespread, and ap­
parently an effective instrument for Germany’s foreign cultural policy, rapid industriali­
sation and the growing socio-political requirements demanded a parallel development of 
cultural strategies at another level. Science and technology were recognised as essential 
features for the national image on the world stage. Furthermore, paramount scientific 
and technological achievements became an “important ingredient o f national intellectual 
self-perception”.38 As Brigitte Schoeder-Gudehus puts it,
36 F r it z  von  T w a r d o w sk i, Anfaenge der deutschen K ultuipolitik zum Ausland. Bonn, Bad Godesbeig. 
1970, p. 11.
57 See: R u m  EMILY McMURRY, M u n a  LEE, The C ultural Approach. Another W av in International Rela­
tions. New Yorh/London 1947 (Reissued in 1972), pp. 39-47.
38 BRIGITTE SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, “Science, Technology and Foreign PoHcy” , in: In a  Sp ie g e l - 
Ro e s in g  and DEREK J. D e  SOLLa  P r ic e , Science, Technology and Society. A Cross-Disciplinary Per­
spective. London, California 1977, pp. 473-506, here p. 473 f.
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“There was in fact a growing tendency to evaluate and to compare the different na­
tions’ contribution to the advancement of scientific knowledge in terms of pre­
eminence and inferiority, ascent and decline.”39
Notwithstanding the recognition science and technology enjoyed as part o f Ger­
man culture and as valuable tools for foreign policy-making, there was still a reluctance to 
develop scientific relations with other states. It is true that some official scientific initia­
tives had already been taken overseas, - in China for example-, but this was a more one­
way traffic, a result of imperialistic policy, rather than scientific co-operation and ex­
change. Such reluctance was not only a German phenomenon. However, the increasing 
need for intensive flow o f scientific knowledge in the industrial era forced the modern­
ising countries to start planning scientific collaboration. Moreover, the need to exert sci­
entific influence demanded a well-organised foreign cultural policy and an appropriate 
science policy. Before World War I, the modified German foreign policy demonstrated 
the desire for a global peace-policy rather than the promotion of the German image 
abroad. Cultural propaganda, cultural prestige or the cultural imperialism that Germany 
aspired to, had to serve the ideals o f  peace and security as well as of a better and mutual 
understanding between nations rather than power control.40 In the first decade o f the 
twentieth century, Karl Lamprecht emphasized that even intellectual influence could in­
crease rivalries between states. In his view, the reason was that intellectual infiltration, 
usually preceding economic or political domination, might misuse the cultural initiatives 
for political interests. Lamprecht argued further that Germany, as opposed to other “big 
nations”, had to follow the peaceful way on practicing foreign cultural policy.41 He also 
believed that, if Germany wished to find its place ín world history and to play-an impor­
tant role on the international stage, it should promote the concept of international 
friendship that could unify the whole humankind.
“German historiography [...] has achieved in 19th century something great for the 
unification of our people. She should play the same triumphal and determined role
Ibid., p. 473.
40 Be r n h a r d  vom Br o c k e , “Internationale 'Wissenschaftsbeziehungen und die Anfaenge einer deutschen 
auswaertigen Kulturpolitik: Der Professorenaustausch mit Nordamerika”, in: lind, Wissenschaftsgeschichte 
und Wissenschaftspolitik im Indus triezeitallter. Hildersheim, 1991, pp. 185-242, here p. 185.
41 “Rede Kail Lamprechts, gehalten am 7. Oktober 1912 auf der Tagung des Verbandes fuer internationale 
Verstaedigung zu Heidelberg”, reprinted in: KURT DUEWELL, Deutschlands auswaerüge Kulturpolitik 
1918-1932. Grundlinien und Dokumente. Koeln, Wien 1976, pp. 255-167.
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for the unification movement of the humankind in 20* century, which becomes 
more and more prerequisite for the development of international relations "4-
Whether, and to what extent Germany actually exercised this kind o f foreign cultural 
policy at the beginning of the twentieth century, is an issue in question.* 43
The criteria a cultural undertaking or a cultural initiative had to meet, in order to 
be recognised as foreign cultural policy and not as a “form" or “type” of it, appear to be 
the following: first, the character o f those initiatives had to be official, i.e. the state 
should be very much to the fore, showing that any cultural initiatives represent the will of 
the state, as opposed to individual interests; second, the undertaking had to be systematic 
and organised in agreement with the broader foreign policy agenda.44 These criteria had 
already been drawn up by the German Reich before the First World War, but a systema­
tised and intensified foreign cultural policy was only practised under the pressure of the 
Versailles Treaty, in 1919.45
Two government figures stood out in Germany’s educational and science policy: 
the Minister o f Culture and Education, Friedrich Althoff, and his colleague and subse­
quently his successor, Friedrich Schmidt-Ott In 1905, Althoff set up an ambitious ex­
change programme between the teaching staff o f the universities of Berlin and Harvard 
in the United States. A year later, another exchange agreement with Columbia University 
in New York was signed at the highest political level. Thus President Theodore Roose­
velt and Kaiser Wilhelm II inaugurated an era o f scientific collaboration between the two 
countries, which had significant political overtones. The interchange of professors be­
«  Ibid, p. 267.
43 See: ROGER C h ic k e r jn g , Im peria l G erm any and a W odd Without War. The Peace Movement and 
German Society 1892-1914. Princeton 1975.
44 RuEDIGER vom BRUCH, Weltpolitik als Kulturmission. pp. 27-40. Vom Bruch argues that, apart from 
these two criteria, the lack of an explicit and coherent determination o f  the term ‘foreign cultural policy*, 
despite Lamprecht's efforts, indicates the absence o f such policy before the war. The question, one might 
ask, is what exactly does names or terms denote and what does their use mean? Do they denominate a fact 
that could be perceived as an entity worth to be studying as such or are they constructions that determine 
what should be included or excluded putting an order in nature? In other words, what comes first, the 
name or the meaning (to ar^dvov q tó orjpa&ópspopfi This is a nominalistic problem, however, that goes be­
yond the scope o f this project
45 Kurt Due well’s argument in his work Deutschlands auswaertige Rukurpolitik 1918-1932. Gmtdlimen und Do- 
kumtnte that the criteria were only met after WW1, is not acurate. The professorial exchange with the 
United States that began in 1905 and the number o f several scientific institutions overseas advocates the 
opposite view.
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tween Germany and the United States was “the first big cultural undertaking o f  Germany 
abroad”.46 It was the official institutionalisation o f the academic relations that had existed 
between the two countries since 1850. During the second half o f the nineteenth century, 
the Cultural Ministry in Berlin had followed with great interest and attention the scien­
tific and technological achievements in the United States and German scientists were 
sent there, either to study or to represent their country at scientific conferences. One 
such scientist was Max Sering, a young agrarian economist who was sent to the US to 
study American agricultural issues, while another was the mathematician Felix Klein. 
Klein was the German delegate at the international fair in Chicago in 1892/93, and he 
also participated in the congress for mathematics organised there at the same time.47 
Both A lthoff and Schmidt-Ott contributed to the realisation of scientific communication 
with the United States.
The tradition of academic exchange between the two countries was confirmed by the 
great numbers o f American students who visited German universities. In 1880, for ex­
ample, their number amounted to 1,088 students.48 In addition, several American profes­
sors who were appointed in American universities and had been educated in Germany 
contributed consciously or unconsciously to the German influence in their own country. 
This is evident by the fact that some American universities in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century -like the Johns-Hopkins University, founded in 1876- were estab­
lished on the German model.49 However, it was only in 1899 that scientific relations and 
science were recognised as a “political factor” in the rapprochement between the two 
countries. The employment o f this factor was slow and not yet systematic and, therefore, 
it did no t bring quick results.50
Few years later, the idea o f a systematic exchange of professors between the German 
Reich and America had found wide acceptance. The first step was taken by establishing 
the “Germanic Museum” in the US in 1903, an institution supported both by Germany 
and the United States. In the framework o f the museum’s activities, a number o f lectures
46 With these words described the undertaking the first director of the ‘Schulreferat —the early office of the 
cultural section ('Kuiturabtàlmgy- o f  the German Foreign Ministry. G ted  in: B. vom BROCKE, “Internation­
ale Wïssenschaftsbeziehungen”, p. 185.
47 Ibid, p. 195.
48 Ibid, p. 196.
49 Ibid.
50 Letters o f  the German ambassador in Washington, Theodor von Holleben, to the Foreign Ministry on 
21.3.1899 and 2.8.1901. Gted in: vom Brocke , “Internationale Wissenschaftsbeziehungeri*, p. 197.
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were given by German scholars on a regular basis. A year later, at the international con­
gress for scholars, organised on the fringe of the International Fair in S t Louis, the ex­
change issue again came to the fore and an academic exchange was finally agreed be­
tween Harvard and Friedrich Wilhelm University of Berlin. Professors would have a 
three-month teaching contract -o r  longer after special agreement- and they would teach 
in their own language. The exchange project was put into practice in winter semester 
1905/06. Adolf von Hamack, a prominent church historian and a major figure for the 
future scientific organisation in Germany, appraising this cultural initiative characterised 
it as “a big scientific business” that engendered new international scientific obligations, to 
which Germany had to respond.51 The costs of the “Roosevelt Chair”, as it was the title 
o f the American exchange professor in Germany, would partly be covered by “Speytr- 
Süftun¿\ The “Kaiser-Wilhelm Chair7’, the position for the German professor in the US, 
was sponsored by die newly established “Kriser-Wilhelm-Stjftun¿\ a foundation created by 
Americans in 1905/06, under the aegis of Harvard University.52 Furthermore, the Prus­
sian Ministry of Culture contributed to the travel costs with funds from the “Rappel- 
Súftun£ created specifically for this purpose and endowed by the banker Leopold ICop- 
pel, in 1905. A new era, in which industrialists and bankers would play an essential role in 
the advancement of German science, had just begun.
51 ADOLF von H aANACK, ‘Vom  Grossbetrieb der Wissenschaft”, in: Preussiscbe Jabrbutcber 119 (28.1.1905), 
pp. 193-201. See also: RUDOLF V ier h a u s , “In Grossbetrieb der Wissenschaft Adolf von Hamack als 
Wissenschaftsorganisator und Wissenschaftspolitiker”, in: Ibid., Vergagenheit als Geschichte. Studien zum 
19. und 20. Jahrhundert Goettingen 2003, pp. 423-445.
52 Vom B r o c k e , “Internationale Wissenschafts beriehun gen”, p. 200.
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1.2. Government industry and scientific research. The creation o f the Kmser W ilhelm  Society.
“Die Wissenschaft ist in ihrer Ausbreitung und in 
ihrem Betriebe an einen Punkt gelangt, an welchem 
der Staat aHein fuer ihie Beduerfmsse nicht mehr 
aufeukommen vennag. Eine Kooperation des Staates 
und private r  kapitalkraeftiger und fuer die Wissenschaft 
interessierter Buerger ist ins Auge zu fassen/*53
Economic and social developments in nineteenth century like the growth of 
population, industrialisation and the expanding world trade all provided an impetus 
called for systematic use o f scientific achievements and intensive research activity. The 
main concerns o f every modernising state were to ensure public health, apply scientific 
knowledge and technological achievements to industrial production, and develop agri­
culture, namely the quantity and quality of products in order to be competitive on the 
international market. These social and economic demands had become more acute by the 
turn o f the century and scientific potential began gradually to be recognised as “national 
resource”.54 In Germany, the main sites of scientific research were academies and univer­
sity laboratories, which employed professors, whose research activity was limited by their 
teaching duties. The increased need for practical applications o f scientific knowledge and 
technological development demanded specialised, accelerated and large-scale research, 
which could not be performed at university laboratories. The fact that entire disciplines 
could not fit in the contemporary research policy and, therefore, were not yet institution­
alised, was due to the lack o f modem and expensive infrastructure that no university in­
stitute could provide. In addition, the scientific problems that emerged were too compli­
cated to be dealt with by students at university labs. Universities and academies were in 
close relation with the state, which both sponsored them and exercised influence over 
their activities. Professors, researchers, even industry representatives, who were ap­
pointed to the existing research centres, were regarded as civil servants, committed to the 
so-called “state-oriented” research. These were problems that all industrialised nations 
faced at the end o f nineteenth century. To tackle them and to respond to the demands of 
the times, they began to foster knowledge and to modify their research agenda, creating
55 Adolf von Hamack to the Prussian Minister o f Education, Schmitt-Ott on 21.11.1909, cited in: VlER- 
HAUS, Veigagenheit als Geschichte, p. 418.
54 SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, “Science, Technology and Foreign Policy”, p. 474.
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boundary-spanning mechanisms. The traditional university-government relationship was 
to be reconsidered with the prospect of being replaced by a network of science-state- 
industry interaction.
Despite the fact that at the turn of the century the German Reich held one of the 
leading positions in the international scientific community, its authoritarian scientific 
policies in the years before 1907, which did no t leave any space for independence from 
public authorities, threatened the supremacy o f German science.55 It was also at that time 
that a new need, -in addition to teaching and research-, was emerging at universities 
world-wide. This need was the development o f  international relations, the so-called 
“third mission”56 of universities that aimed at collaboration and exchange o f knowledge 
among different academic communities but, above all, at the prestige and influence of 
the state in question. The United States and Great Britain were the countries, with which 
Germany primarily wanted to develop closer scientific relations, in order some of their 
most important universities would come to be influenced by the German intellect. Adolf 
von Hamack underlining the significance of the international character o f science, argued 
that, if science were an individual, rather than a collective enterprise, scientific problems 
would never have been solved.57 He also suggested that Germany should strengthen its 
ties with America arguing that even though “this cultural state was geographically very 
distant from Germany, intellectually it was the nearest and the most kindred nation to the 
Reich.”58 It is likely, argues Vierhaus, that in addition to the political power and scientific 
greatness o f  Britain and the United States that made Hamack talk about closer cultural 
relations with those countries, the Protestant character they had in common with Prussia 
played some role as well.59
Perhaps one of the most fundamental arguments for the reorientation o f German 
scientific and research policy was the belief that Germany had fallen behind in some im-
55 V ie r h a u s , V ergagenheit als Geschichte, p. 410.
56 HENRY E t ZKOWITZ, Lo ET Le y DESDORFF, The endless transition; A  ‘Triple Helix” o f University -  
Industry — Government relations’, in Minerva 36 (1998), pp. 203-208, here p. 203. Wilhelm von Humboldt 
regarded the establishment o f research institutes as the “third factor in all scientific foundations.” See: 
V ie r h a u s , Vergagenheit als Geschichte, p. 435.
57 G ted  in: V ie r h a u s , Vergagenheit als Geschichte, p. 412.
58 Ibid, p. 413.
59 Ibid
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portant areas o f  research, such as biomedicine, compared with other countries.60 It be­
came primary need, argued Hamack, for the research institutes to disengage themselves 
from the Prussian tradition o f state restrictions, if the country wanted to keep its place 
among other “cultured nations” (Kiifrumationen), like the USA, France, England, and 
Sweden 61 Almost all of the above countries, unlike Germany, had already formulated 
innovative strategies to foster research, focused on social imperatives but also on the sci­
entists’ interests. On the grounds that the performance of specialised research at univer­
sity laboratories was in question and because of the state weaknesses in raising and inten­
sifying its material support for large-scale scientific research, these countries had turned 
to individuals and, in particular, to industrialists and bankers. Private means had become 
essential for the creation o f research institutes, independent from university and state 
restrictions. Thus, at the beginning o f the twentieth century, the Carnegie Insitution and 
the Rockefeller Medical Institute in the United States and the Nobel Institute in Sweden 
were supported by private funds. In France, however, the Pasteur Institute, -also estab­
lished at around that time,- was handed by the state. Germany, argued Hamack, should 
follow the Anglo-Saxon example, developing closer ties between science and industry 
and creating similar scientific centres, in the search for greater competitiveness.
The establishment o f independent institutes in Germany and the heavy involve­
ment o f industrialists were alien to the German tradition. Education and research fell 
squarely into the competence of the state. Universities and academies were exclusively 
state enterprises. The participation o f  industrialists, who were becoming ever more influ­
ential, created fears among academic and governmental circles that the field of research 
would be dominated and controlled by some Maecenas, whose only interest would be in 
increasing their profits from the technological and scientific achievements.62 Hamack was 
explicit about the independence o f the new institutions, stressing that, if they had to be 
independent from the state, they had also to be independent from “clique and capital”.63
60 The advance in biomedical sciences in the United States and the creation of Carnegie Institution and the 
Rockefeller Medical Institute that promoted them were regarded by Hamack as especially impressive and 
threatening, cited in: KRISTIE MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika. Scientific Research in Nazi Germany.
New York 1993, p. 16. 
fil Ibid, p. 12,15 f.
62 Ibid., pp. 16, 21. See also: GUENTER WEND EL, Die Kaiser-Wilhelin-Gesellschaft, 1911-1914: Zur 
Anatomie der imperialistischen Forschungsgesellschaft Ost-Bedin 1975-
63 G te d  in: VlERHAUS, Vergagenheit als Geschichte, pp. 418 ,434 .
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Yet, how could the goal o f advanced research be achieved by strengthening on 
the one hand academic-industry relations while, at the same time, controlling the power 
o f capital? The only mechanism that seemed to respect the Prussian tradition and at the 
same time to satisfy the demands for specialised research, was the economic contribution 
o f both government and industry to the new undertaking. Some attempts to set up re­
search centres with private means had already been made successfully in Germany at the 
end o f  nineteenth century. Such example was the Union for Applied Physics and 
Mathematics created in Goettingen, in 1898. The Union was comprised o f  scientists as 
well as representatives from the business community. A  number of institutes focused on 
different fields, such as geophysics, technical physics, applied mathematics and aircraft 
construction were founded as a result of the work of this union. All o f them were linked 
to the University of Goettingen, namely the teaching staff and the institution’s infra­
structure. The rest of their needs were met by individuals. In 1899, the Institute for Se­
rum Research was created, which in 1906 was merged with the private Institute for Che­
motherapy funded by the "Georg-Speyer-HousAnother private initiative was taken by the 
“Koppel-Stiftun£7 a foundation established in 1905 and sponsored by the banker Leopold 
Koppel, as it has been mentioned before. This foundation apart from the intellectual ex­
change between Germany and the United States also sponsored the German-Chinese 
University in Tsingtau and die Medical School in Shanghai.64 Nonetheless, those insti­
tutes were not exactly what Hamack and several eminent scientists had envisioned as in­
dependent research institutes.
T he new research policy that seemed to be able to solve many o f the social and 
economic problems of the time should not only respond to the challenges o f the century 
but it also had to respect the German tradition. The main feature of this policy was the 
performance o f an intensive, broad-scale research, independent from universities. One of 
the strongest arguments for adopting Germany this policy, was the fact that rapid ad­
vancement in research could be achieved, only if the scientists of the new institutes were 
released from teaching duties. Therefore, the appointment process or the management of 
research personnel should not be determined by universities, but would be decided by 
another mechanism that was not yet clear.
Another feature o f the new research policy was its openness to the industrial 
sector. Industry represented the systematic and mass production of goods, the extensive 
use o f  machines and technological achievements, the economic growth, in other words,
64 Ibid, pp. 415 f. Also: MaCRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika, p. 19.
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the modernised state. Therefore, wide-scale research should go hand in hand with indus­
trial activity. Industry needed the aid not only of science and technology but also o f the 
cost-intensive research. This would provide enterprises with the necessary applied 
knowledge, which in turn, required material support from industrial o r other capital. 
Nevertheless, what troubled the scientific community was the contingency of being sub­
ject to industrial interests and performing applied research at the expense o f basic re­
search. It was the latter* s advancement, argued scientists, that led Germany to one o f the 
foremost positions in the international scientific scene. Neglecting basic research was like 
neglecting Germany’s culture. Its image abroad was a very important part of the research 
policy agenda The promotion of Germany’s hegemony in foreign territories through sci­
entific knowledge and research was fundamental to its political and economic role on the 
international political stage. However, one might ask, did not the “Koppel-Stijtun£\ for 
example, serve Germany’s foreign cultural policy by fostering the German-Amencan sci­
entific relations or by sponsoring scientific centres overseas? What more could Germany 
wish for increasing its national prestige abroad?
It appears that each of the initiatives at the beginning of die twentieth century re­
sponded only to some aspects of the new science and research policy. German modem 
science policy had to secure freedom in research, to promote both basic and applied re­
search, to become independent from universities, to have closer relations with industry, 
and to become internationally competitive. Goettingen and some other similar institutes 
as well as the “¥j3ppel-Sûftun£ could not fulfil these requirements. Moreover, despite the 
existence of a number of German scientific institutions abroad, like the Zoological Sta­
tion in Naples, the University and the Medical School in China, the Centre of Theoretical 
Physics in Argentina, and the Geophysical Observatory in Samoa, the German Reich still 
lacked an institution that would operate as an interdisciplinary organisation with all the 
features of die new science policy and, above all, with a significant scientific impact both 
within German borders and abroad.
In January 1911, the plans for a modem research centre were drawn up with the 
establishment of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society for the Advancement of Science in Berlin- 
Dahlem (KWG). The Society inaugurated a new era for the German scientific and re­
search policy adjusting itself to the changing imperatives. It was a semi-private organisa­
tion, under which a number of specialised institutes could function as pure research cen­
tres. Its foundation was the result o f long discussions between the government - 
particularly the Ministry o f Education-, scientists, and industrialists that lasted nearly two
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decades- The idea of the establishment of a research park in Dahlem, was put forward by- 
Friedrich Althoff, the Prussian Minister of Education, who was responsible for university- 
affairs. Before the end of die century, realising the needs o f the modem state, he formed 
a plan for the expansion o f universities by founding “new pure research institutes” that 
would represent fields not yet institutionalised.65 Fully dedicated to the Prussian tradition, 
he envisioned these institutes as state bodies, linked to universities but free o f  teaching 
duties. Although Althoff played a central role in the first discussions for the creation o f 
modem research institutes, it was the Berlin scientific community and particularly the 
Nobel laureate in chemistry Emil Fischer who drew attention to the issue and again 
brought it up for discussion in the first decade o f the twentieth century. Adolf von Har- 
nack was asked by the Kaiser to formulate a detailed draft on the new scientific organisa­
tion. The Kaiser himself had a vivid interest in science and wanted to present the draft in 
public on the occasion o f the forthcoming centenary of Berlin University in 1910. Har- 
nack turned to the associations o f  physicists and chemists to help him illustrate the needs 
o f modem science and their visions for an independent research.
The central argument o f  Hamack’s blueprint was Germany’s scientific backward­
ness compared with other advanced countries. This backwardness also affected the 
Reich’s cultural and economic position on the international stage, in other words, its in­
fluence over other nations. It was certainly an argument that struck a patriotic chord and 
in order to  support his argument, he stressed the achievements of researchers working 
abroad and the advancement in disciplines that were not yet institutionalised in Germany. 
“Science and military strength (Wissenschajt und Wehrkraft) [were] the two strong pillars of 
Germany’s magnitude”, he demonstrated.66 Consequently, scientific institutes moreover 
institutes that would house the non-institutionalised scientific fields was a national neces­
sity. Hamack underlined that this effort would be feasible and the institutes would be 
viable only with material support by the state and industry. Despite the strong nationalis­
tic prose, one could hardy argue that Hamack approached Germany’s elevation to a
65 G ted in; MACRAKIS, p. 12.
66 “Denkschrift von Hamack an den Kaiser ” 21 November 1909. G ted in: MACRAKIS, Surviving the 
Swastika, pp. 15,26. The recognition o f  science as a pillar o f German national greatness was not only re­
flected the cultural dimension o f  the scientific achievements, but also their contribution to technical excel­
lence and industrial success. See: BRIGITTE SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, “Science, Technology and Foreign 
Policy”, in: In a  Sp ie g e l -Ro e s in g  and DEREK J. D e  SOLLA P r ic e , Science, Technology and Society. A  
Cross-Disciplinary Perspective. London, California 1977, pp. 473-506- In the same vein, die author argues 
on national wealth and security.
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powerful and cultural state with chauvinism.6' On the contrary, he admired the achieve­
ments and scientific advancement o f  other nations and in particular o f the United States, 
which was the main model for the new institution in Germany.
Scientific development always had an eminent national and political value not 
only for Germany. However, the fact that science acquired a great economic significance 
in the late industrial period, made the reorganisation o f German scientific policy a re­
quest o f utmost importance. Many industrialists and bankers responding to Hamack’s 
appeal, donated large sums, which by 1910 amounted to six million marks.67 8 On 11 Janu­
ary 1911, donors, state representatives, Emil Fischer, and Hamack met at the Royal 
Academy in Berlin for the official inauguration o f the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. The ex­
ecutive bodies, i.e. the assembly (Hauptversammhm^ , the executive committee ('Verwaltung-■ 
sausschuss), and the senate (Senai), were composed of industrialists as well as members of 
the government. Nonetheless, it was guaranteed that die Society would be independent 
and free from any state influence.
The presence of the state in the administration was not only regarded as a safety- 
guard against capitalist manipulation as Hamack feared, but it was also indicative o f re­
sidual links with the German tradition. The “Americanisation” of German scientific pol­
icy with the state’s exclusion from the developing process of knowledge was foreign to 
the German society. Breaking with the Prussian tradition, according to which the state 
was the “concerned father” o f every endeavour, would probably have affected the whole 
social structure.69 Both social democrats and liberals criticised the tendency to adopt 
American elements incompatible with the German social and political conditions. Con­
sequently, the founding o f the Society brought forth a unique mixture o f traditional and 
modem features. It is interesting to note that at the inaugural meeting in January 1911, 
scientists were hardly represented. Only the chemist Emil Fischer was present. The ab­
sence of scientists from the major decision-making organs supported the argument that 
the Society was a creation of plutocrats, who were to shape the research agendas ac­
cording to their capitalist interests. This Marxist arguni«1* ’was not onty used by the so- 
cial democrats but also by the German Democratic Republic (GDR) after the collapse of
67 Verhaus, Vergagenheit als Geschichte, p. 439.
68 MaCRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika, p. 15.
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the Third Reich.70 However, it seems that this interpretation o f the Society’s character 
overlooks the complexity of its administrative structure and its operation,71
Perhaps the most important feature of the Society that protected its scientific 
freedom from any industrial or state influence, was the so-called “Hamack Principle”. In 
the founding memorandum in 1909, Hamack suggested that the research direction of 
every future Kaiser "Wilhelm Institute should not be preordained but should be deter­
mined by the director of the institute and would be formed in accordance with the out­
come o f  the research undertaken. Furthermore, the institutes should not be overspecial­
ised and the internal organisation of the Society ought to be flexible and should not pre­
vent the progress o f the research.72 The directors of the institutes were the central figures 
for the scientific operation o f die Society. Friedrich Glum, the general secretary o f the 
Society in 1930, demonstrating the leading role of directors underlined that “the Society 
should no t first establish the institute and then try to find the right man for it, but it first 
ought to find the right person and then to build up the institute around him”.73 The 
“Hamack Principle” gave scientists great latitude to practise basic research in addition to 
applied research, which was closer to industrial interests. Basic research was of central 
importance to Germany’s cultural and international status and it was this kind o f research 
that was to place Germany once more at the forefront of the international scientific 
community. Therefore, despite the initial absence o f  scientists from decision-making 
bodies, they turned out to play an active role in the Society, deciding the nature and the 
process o f  the projects. One might argue that this dimension o f the “Hamack Principle” 
was in part attributable to the German reluctance to break ties with its traditional culture.
70 See: W e n d e l , Die Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft, 1911-1914: pp. 75 ff; VlERHAUS, Vergagenheit als 
Geschichte, p. 419. O n science and technical progress on the capitalist economic system see: F r e e m a n  C., 
“Economics of Research and Development’*, in: In a  SPIEGEL-ROESING and DEREK D E SOLLA PRICE, 
Science, Technology and Society. A Cross-Disciplinary Perspective. London, California 1977, pp. 223-275, 
here pp. 239 ff.
71 Blanka Vavakova argues that “the promotion o f  better relations between academic institutions and the 
economic sector is no t a negative practice per si*. "The question” , she continues, “is how to prevent the 
effects on society o f  the reduction in the knowledge available as a public good”. Bla n k a  V a v a k o v a , 
“The New Social Contract Between Governments, Universities and Society Has the Old One Failed?”, in 
Minerva 36 (1998), 209-228, here pp. 226 £.
72 MaCRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika, p. 16; VlERHAUS, Vergagenheit als Geschichte, p. 446  ff. See also: 
BERNHARD vom BROCKE, H u b er t  L attko  (Hsg.), Die Kaiser-Wilhelm/  Max-Planck-Gesellschaft und 
ihre Institute. Studien zu ihrer Geschichte: Das Hamack-Prinzip. Berlin, New York 1996.
73 Gted in; VlERHAUS, Vergagsnheit als Geschichte, p. 447.
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In the same vein, another condition o f  the principle required all directors to be profes­
sors with teaching experience, even though they were exempted from such duties.
Hamack’s mastery was his ability not only to approach and convince different 
circles o f the German society, i.e. the administrative, the economic, and the scientific 
one. Moreover, he succeeded in bringing the interests of all the above together, in the 
name o f the nation’s magnitude. This mixture of traditional with modem ingredients 
shaped the unique character o f the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and gave to it a dynamic that 
allowed the institution not only to flourish under democracy during the Weimar years, 
but also to survive under a totalitarian regime and to continue to flourish until today.
The first Kaiser Wilhelm Institute that was set up was the Institute for Chemistry. 
Chemistry had been a well-established discipline since 1900 and plans for chemistry in­
stitutes were well underway even before the inauguration of the Society. The protagonist 
behind those plans was the Reich’s Chemical Association, the aims of which were to 
foster both pure and applied chemistry, in particular for industrial purposes.74 The Asso­
ciation merged with the Society, thereby partly fulfilling its goals, as the work performed 
at the institute mainly concentrated on basic research. The second Kaiser Wilhelm Insti­
tute was dedicated to physical chemistry and was created with the generous contribution 
from Leopold Koppel. The head of this institute was a professor at the Technical Uni­
versity in Karlsruhe, Fritz Haber, who became famous for his work on nitrogen fixation 
and the synthesis o f ammonia, an important element for fertilisation in agriculture as well 
as for the warfare. He was one o f die most enthusiastic scientists to hasten to offer his 
services to the state, soon after the Great War broke ou t His institute was almost trans­
formed into an industrial laboratory at the service o f the army and it became the centre 
for chemical warfare research in Germany.75 It should be noted that the initiative to use 
science for the war effort came from the scientists themselves and not from the state.76
The next priority after the two chemistry institutes was biology. In contrast with 
chemistry, biology was a young science and many fields had not yet been institutional­
ised. Soon after the inauguration of the Society, discussions regarding the determination 
of the institute’s profile began. A number of biologists —among them Anton Dohm, the
74 M acra kis, Surviving the Swastika, pp. 21 ff.
75 For Haber's contribution to the chemical warfare see: FRITZ L  HABER, The poisonous cloud: chemical 
warfare in th e  First World War. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986; F. J. Br o w n , Chemical Warfare: A  Study 
in Restraints. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press 1968.
76 MACRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika, p. 26.
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director o f the Zoological Station in Naples- introduced their plans, which despite the 
diversity o f opinion, converged onto supporting die study o f heredity, a highly significant 
field for agriculture and medicine.77 The Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology begun to 
operate during the war in 1915, two years after die decision of the establishment was 
made.
The close connection between scientific research and industry indisputably re­
flects Germany’s desire to maintain the economic position it occupied in the late nine­
teenth century. Chemical industries bore ample testimony to the Reich’s conspicuous 
economic power and drive on the world market; towards the end of the century and 
throughout the decades preceding World War I.78 Nonetheless, the choice o f chemistry, 
physics and biology as disciplines worthy of representation in the modem scientific in­
stitutes o f the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, did not just reflect the economic aspects o f the 
German WekpoMk. The conceptualisation for a new research centre for science emerged 
in a period in which three elements played a decisive role for its inauguration. The first 
was the growing interchange between science and technology, coupled with die need to 
strengthen ties with industry. The second was the specialisation in science and the emer­
gence o f  new scientific fields, and the third one was the increasing social requirements, 
like health care and food production. The three disciplines chosen for the first Kaiser 
Wilhelm Institutes had these technological, scientific and social merits, which Alvin M. 
Weinberg names “external criteria” for scientific choice.79 More precisely, parts o f basic 
research in chemistry and physics could be used in technological applications, while some 
basic research in biology, which was also embedded in other scientific fields and would 
contribute to a number of scientific problems of the other two disciplines chosen, justi­
fied the choice. However, the social merit; i.e. “the relevance to human welfare and the 
values for man”,80 has particular interest for my project, as it will be shown from now on.
Apart from the social values, like public health or nutrition, which science could 
contribute in order to be achieved and are relatively easily described, some others are
11 Ibid., p. 23.
78 This was the case particularly in the dye industry. See: FRITZ L. H aber, The Chemical Industry During 
the Nineteenth Century: A Study of the Economic Aspects o f  Applied Chemistry in Europe and North 
America. London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1958; BEER J. D., The Emergence of the German Dye Industry. 
Urbana, University o f  Illinois Press, 1959.
79 ALVIN M. Weinberg , “Criteria for scientific choice”, in Minerva 1:2 (1962), pp. 158-171, reprinted in: 
Minerva (Gassics) 38, (2000), pp. 253-269, here pp. 259 ff.
80 Ibid, p. 261.
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harder to define. National culture and prestige could be reckoned among them, which in 
the first decades of the twentieth century were already regarded as the society’s highest 
good. The Kaiser Wilhelm Society even though a semi-private scientific organisation, op­
erated as a national delegate for the German culture. Hamack’s argument that the new 
organisation could strengthen the Reich’s position abroad, proved to be more than a tac­
tical one. The “Hamack House” in Berlin-Dahlem, which was built in 1929, institution­
alised the Society’s scientific co-operation with other countries, hosting foreign scholars 
and international scientific meetings.
Promoting Germany its image within its own borders through an institution with 
an international character, was undoubtedly a significant cultural undertaking. Yet, ad­
vancing its scientific eminence beyond national frontiers, was an act of explicit political 
engagement. Hence, soon after its creation, the Society wanted to expand beyond the 
German borders, seeking territories which would offer favourable climatic conditions for 
research difficult to carry out in Germany. The nearest and most favourable destination 
for Germany’s scientific expansion was the Mediterranean coasts, where the first 
branches of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institutes made their appearance, also operating as cen­
tres of diffusion the German scientific greatness.
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1.3. The Zoological Station in Nahkt. Jtnk.
Towards the end of nineteenth century, the first international scientific centre outside 
Germany’s borders was founded in Naples by the prominent German zoologist, Anton 
Dohm. With his own funds and despite the opposition of his father and the city of 
Naples, Dohm brought his two-year-old plan to build a laboratory for marine biology to 
fruition, in 1872.81 The first contract with the city of Naples was signed in 1875. Two 
other complementary contracts were signed later, in 1885 and 1895. The latter gave the 
German scientist the right to use the “Villa Communale” as his laboratory, for a period 
of ninety years, i.e. until 1965.82 After that time, the city o f Naples could daim the own­
ership o f die institute.
The “Zoological Station in Naples”, as it was officially known, was a unique research 
center not only in Europe but also worldwide. Dohm's vision was to create a research 
institute that would promote international scientific co-operation in the field o f marine 
biology. Its location and a number of other factors very soon made the station an attrac­
tive place for many researchers and amateur observers from all over the world. The gulf 
of Naples thanks to its underwater volcanic rocks and warm streams offered ideal condi­
tions for the development o f rich fauna and flora. In addition, the building facilities, the 
unique aquarium, the technological equipment and the library of the institute that num­
bered in 1920 about 25,000 monographs and 250 journals,83 -not to mention the number 
of specialists in zoology and marine biology working there-, attracted scientists no t only 
from Germany and Italy, but also from the Netherlands, Switzerland, Romania, England, 
even the United States, and Russia.84
The international character o f the station was secured by a system of working spaces 
(.Arbàtsdscbè) that were available to scientists from several research institutes or university 
laboratories. The institutions in question could lease a limited number of working spaces
81 ARMIN von TSCHERMAJC “Die Zoologische Station in Neapel”, in: Aieertskunde, 8 Jahrgang, 2 Heft, 
(1914), pp. 1-40, here p. 5.
82 Report o f Reinhard Dohm entitled “Die gegenwaertige Lage der Zoologischen Station zu Neapel”. 
Zuerich, April 1920; Schaxel to Altesse le Prince DanHo de Monténégro, 20.06.1918, both in; Politisches 
Archiv des Auswaertigen Amtes (PAAA), R 64570.
83 Report of Reinhard Dohm entitled “Die gegenwaertige Lage der Zoologischen Station zu Neapel”. 
Zuerich, April 1920, in: PAAA, R  64570.
84 v. TSCHERMAK, “Die Zoologische Station in Neapel”, p. 10; Report o f Reinhard Dohm entitled “Die 
gegenwaertige Lage der Zoologischen Station zu Neapel”. Zuerich, April 1920, in: PAAA, R 64570.
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for their researchers for a specific period of time. Among those institutions were the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Society, as well as Oxford and Cambridge Universities in England. 
Needless to say that Germany and the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, in particular, leased the 
majority o f the working spaces, which in 1914 amounted to over twenty-two permanent 
places out o f fifty-three. Prussia leased over eight places, whilst Italy took twelve, Russia 
four, England three and the United States five.85 This system, together with the aquar­
ium, which also operated as a reservoir of marine organisms supplying many zoological 
laboratories and museums abroad with material, were the most important sources of in­
come for the station.
The station was divided into three sections: the morphological, i.e. zoological- 
botanical; the physiological; and the chemical section.86 Each one had its own director 
and a certain number of specialists as permanent staff. Significant work was conducted at 
the station on the physiological mechanism and the chemical texture o f protozoa, in par­
ticular o f sea-urchins, murexes, and amoebae. From 1879 until 1914, about thirty-three 
volumes were published with contributions o f both the permanent staff and the visiting 
researchers.87 In 1879, was launched the official journal of the station with the title “Mil- 
teilungen derNeapler Staüon'\ and was issued only in German. The success o f the research 
center in Naples was such that it no t only gained world-wide reputation, but also it be­
came a model for research institutes in many countries, including Germany itself.88 How­
ever, it was Anton Dohm -a convinced Darwinist- considered by many as the founder of 
marine biology who guaranteed the quality of scientific work in Naples.
Apart from the advancement o f basic research on marine biology, the Zoological 
Station also contributed to the development o f fishery and the trade in sea-products, 
providing a link between science and the economy for both Italy and Germany. On the 
other hand, the institute offered an environment where the exchange o f  experience and 
ideas among scientists from different countries could foster friendship between people. 
Despite the fact that the station boasted its international character and independence of 
any private or national interest that guaranteed it’s freedom in research, the German
85 V. TsCHERMAK, “Die Zoologische Station in Neapel”, p. 10.
86 MARGRET B o v e r i , “Die Zoologische Station in Neapel”, in: LUDOLPH BRAUER, ALBRECHT MEN- 
DELSSOHN-Ba r t h o l d y , ADOLF M e y e r  (Hsg.) Forschungsinsdtute. Dire Geschichte, Organisation und 
Ziele. Bd. II, Hamburg 1930, pp. 578-598, here p. 589.
p  V. TSCHERMAK, “ D ie  Zoologische Station  in  Neapel”, p. 11.
88 See: KARL JOSEF PARTSCH, Die Zoologische Station in Neapel -  M od ell international er 
Wissenschaftszusaminenarbeit, Goettingen 1980.
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presence and influence was apparently dominant Germany itself regarded the station not 
only as scientific enterprise, but also as a cultural undertaking, through which German 
achievements in the field o f marine biology could travel throughout the world and influ­
ence the scientific community. Therefore, the German regime and in particular the Min­
istry o f Foreign Affairs, decided to support Anton Dohm and to finance his institute. It 
was often said that even the Kaiser himself gave money from his own pocket89
No matter how valuable D ohm ’s station turned out to be for Germany or how much 
support from the German state it received, this was not the case at the first stage of the 
institute’s life. Dohm’s new idea o f creating a scientific center in Italy with international 
character was initially regarded by the German regime as an undertaking which did no 
merit support The Prussian Ministry o f Culture as well as the Prussian Academy of Sci­
ences refused to support Dohm ’s initiative90 and only after a series o f long discussions 
did he finally convince them of the national significance o f the zoological institute. It is 
noteworthy that despite the financial support the station received from the Reich, it 
maintained its freedom to choose and conduct research projects for its own and not for 
the Reich’s interests. Its independence from German and any other national intervention 
seemed to be an important reason that made the station attractive to scientists world­
wide.
In 1909, after Anton Dohm’s death, the Zoological Station passed to his son Rein- 
hard Dohm, who became the new director, retaining its international character. A year 
after the start o f World War I, R. Dohm left Naples, having entrusted the management 
of the station to the Italian professor o f zoology at the University of Rome, F. Raffaele. 
From that time on and for almost ten years, the station became an object of dispute be­
tween Dohm and the Italian state. What was at stake was the station’s national signifi­
cance for both Italy and Germany. In November 1915, with an Italian state order the 
management o f the station passed from F. Raffaele to a Government Commission 
(Commssione Govemativd), the head o f which was the professor o f zoology at the Univer­
sity o f  Naples, E.S. Monticelli.91 Despite the objections that were raised by Dohm, the 
Italians went even further and with a new order in May 1918 changed the status of the 
station to that o f a legal entity (“«rfc morale”), which meant that the station no longer be­
<9 Speech o f the Italian Minister o f  Education, B. Croce, on the Zoological Station in Naples, before the 
Italian Senate on 9 December 1920, in: PAAA, R 64572.
90 Ibid.
91 Report of Reinhard Dohm entitled “Die gegenwaertigp Lage der Zoologischen Station zu Neapel”. 
Zuerich, April 1920, in: PAAA, R 64570.
longed to Dohm but to the City o f  Naples.92 This decision derived, according to Dohm, 
from the mistaken presumption that his property was Germany’s property. Both Dohm 
and the German state objected anew claiming damages for the expropriation o f  Dohm’s 
assets.
The long discussions between Italy, in particular the Minister of Culture and Educa­
tion, and Dohm, as well as the proceedings the German scientist instituted for the resti­
tution o f his institute bring to the fore the fluidity between private and public, national 
and international. The rhetoric and interpretive alterability o f the above notions ema­
nated from the recognition of the station’s cultural influence, which was considered a 
national issue. Therefore, already in November 1915, Italy deprived Dohm of his rights 
to the station. Due to this development, the so-called neutral states, such as the United 
States, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Romania contacted Dohm and decided to 
withdraw their contribution from the institute. Moreover, when the status of the station 
changed to “ente moraU\ they rejected Italy’s official invitation to send scientists to 
Naples and refused to do so in the future, unless the institute regained its old status.93 
Russia and Belgium also withdrew their contributions and the only states that continued 
to support the station, amid the war, were England and France.
As soon as it became a national institution, Italy had to bear its financial burdens 
alone. This task proved to be very difficult and soon the institute started to vegetate and 
its scientific activity came to a standstill. Meanwhile, disputes among the Italians who di­
rected the institute had surfaced, making the preservation o f the station’s national char­
acter difficult and problematic. English but also Italian scientists started to argue that the 
station could become operational on an international basis, only if it regained its private 
character.94 Despite the fact that Italians wanted to disentangle themselves financially but 
also to mark their national presence in the administration and the scientific life of the 
station, they were eventually forced to accept their involvement in the operation of the 
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In 1920, and after R. Dohm  had brought an action against the Italian state demand­
ing to be reimbursed for the loss o f his property, the Italian Minister of Science and 
Education, Benedetto Croce, approached him and asked him, whether they could find a 
compromise. He proposed to give Dohm back the ownership of his station. In return, 
the German scientist would have to guarantee that in future the institute would develop 
closer relations to Italian biology. In addition, Dohm had to appoint Italian scientists as 
his assistants and the station’s publications had to be written in both German and Ital­
ian.95 Even though Dohm agreed to these conditions, the compromise proposal was put 
into practice only in April 1924, when he took back the management o f the station. The 
war and the Versailles Treaty intensified the national feeling, which was already strong in 
both countries. It was inevitable, therefore, that the ownership of the Zoological Station 
should become a national issue, a matter of national pride, which could give the Italians 
and the Germans international prestige.
Croce’s compromising proposal seemed to reflect the desire of a limited circle of 
Italian scientists rather than the demand of most Italians. A certain number of people 
were opposed, among them scientists who held high-ranking posts at the station. They 
argued that the station in the immediate years before the war had attained a strong Ger­
man character. That belief was reinforced when Anton Dohm replaced his Italian assis­
tant Prof. Lobianco after his death with a German scholar.96 The group of Italian oppo­
nents, therefore, demanded “emancipation from German science”.97 In the Italian press, 
in the scientific journals, as well as at the Italian Academy o f Sciences and the scientists’ 
associations, the return o f the most important biological institution in Italy to German 
hands was regarded an insult to Italian science.98 *It was clear that the opponents were 
eager to transform the station into a pure Italian institution. The Italian navy got also in­
95 Remhard D ohm ’s report to the Foreign Ministry in Bedin on 08.08.1920, in; PAAA, R 64570; Speech of 
the Italian Minister o f Education, B. Croce, on die Zoological Station in Naples, before the Italian Senate 
on 9 December 1920, in: PAAA, R 64572.
96 Speech o f the Italian Minister o f  Education, B. Croce, on the Zoological Station in Naples, before the 
Italian Senate on 9 December 1920, in; PAAA, R 64572.
97 Report o f Remhard Dohm entided “Die gegenwacrtige Lage der Zoologiscben Station zu Neapel”, Zu­
rich, April 1920, in: PAAA, R 64570.
98 Reinhard Dohm ’s report to the Reich’s Foreign Ministry on the future o f the Zoological Station on
14.02.1924, in: PAAA, R 64572.
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volved in the debate, arguing that for military and national security reasons, the institute 
should remain in Italian hands and threatened to veto the process in any other case."
Towards the end o f 1922, and while Dohm was waiting the final decision o f the Ital­
ian Supreme Court on his appeal about the ownership status o f the station and the reim­
bursement from the city o f Naples, the fascists came to power. Nationalism came again 
to the fore and a government official notified Dohm that “even if the decision of the 
Supreme Court were favourable, the government would n o t allow the station to regain its 
previous private status”.100 Under this pressure, Dohm finally signed a contract with the 
Italian government and the city o f Naples. According to the contract, he was recognised 
as the owner of the station, but he was bound to secure the Italian presence at the insti­
tute. This meant in practice that the Italians would be scientifically strongly represented 
at the station, having the right to lease the same number of working spaces with the 
Germans. Both Italy and Germany had serious reasons to increase their working spaces 
at one another’s expense. With the above agreement, each of the two states would 
equally share fourteen working spaces out of thirty-nine.101 Finally, it was decided that 
D ohm  should be the one to take over the station’s financial management.
Italy’s leasing of working spaces was its only financial commitment, whereas Ger­
many contributed a certain amount of money every year. According to the new statutes 
o f  the Zoological Station, it was advisable that the economic support o f the institute 
should come from a scientific institution rather than directly from governments.102 On 
the German side, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society was regarded the most eligible institution to 
mediate financially. Its involvement would guarantee die conduct of scientific research, 
independently o f any national interest Dohm counted on the contribution of states that 
had supported the station in the past for the revival of the international character of the 
station. These were Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Spain, Romania, Russia, the United 
States, Great Britain, and Japan. The new states that supported the Naples’ research 
center were the countries o f Latin America, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland,
» Ibid.
«» Ibid.
101 German consulate in Naples to the Foreign Ministry in Beilin on 08.07.1925, in: PAAA, R 64573.
102 German consulate in Naples to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 17.03.1925, in: PAAA, R 64573.
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Yugoslavia, and Greece.103 In 1925, the station offered thirty-nine working spaces and 
aimed to increase the number over fifty.104
Although Italy and Germany were both keen on having a distinct national presence 
at the station, their respective reasons for this desire differed appreciably. For the Ital­
ians, it seemed to be a matter of national pride to prevent Germany from using the Ital­
ian territory for exerting international influence. With the number of German institutes 
on their soil, (at least seven at this time),105 106they were not only jealous but also felt they 
were being culturally colonized by the Germans. It seems that Italy wanted to enjoy the 
international glory of the Zoological Station alone, transforming it from a private under­
taking into a national enterprise. The lack of money together with the ending o f the pri­
vate status o f the station, condemned the plans to failure. Italy did not seem to have an 
organized foreign cultural policy, in order to use the research center in Naples for cul­
tural purposes. The Italians were more interested in, if not removing Germany from its 
claim on the station, at least to control its contribution. After about nine years o f Italian 
occupation and failure to transform the station into a national enterprise, the Italian gov­
ernment decided to give it back to its German owner. That decision, which was made by 
die state and not by the Supreme Court, to which Dohm had turned for redress, was re­
garded a noble gesture and characterized by the Italians as a demonstration o f national 
ment.
Germany’s position on the issue o f the station was more complex. Before the war, 
the German Reich had a discreet presence at the station, watching its activities closely 
and, to some extent, sponsoring Dohm ’s undertaking. Having recognized the signifi­
cance o f all its scientific institutes abroad for the state’s cultural and political relations, 
Germany left nothing to chance.107 After the war, the Republic found herself in a very
103 Rcinhard Dohm 's report to Berlin on 08.08.1920, in: PAAA, R 64570; Reinhard Dohm to the Foreign 
Ministry in Berlin, *Die Wiederuebemahme der Zoologischen Station' on 13.09.1920, in: PAAA, R 64570; 
German consulate in Naples to the Foreign Ministry in Beilin on 08.07.1925, in: PAAA, R 64573.
104 German consulate in Naples to die Foreign Ministry in Beilin on, 08.07.1925, in: PAAA, R 64573.
105 Apart from the Zoological Station, there were the Zoological Institute in Rovigno/Istria, the Volcanic 
Institute in Naples, which belonged to the German Immanuel Friedlander, the Institute o f Art History in 
Florence, and four institutes in Rome: the Archaeological Institute, the Bibliotheca Herziana, the Institute 
of History, and the German Academy (Academia Tedesca).
106 Speech o f the Italian Minister o f  Education, B, Croce, on the Zoological Station in Naples, before the 
Italian Senate on 9 December 1920, in: PAAA, R 64572.
107 Apart from the institutes in Italy, eimans had found the Archaeological Institutes in Athens and Cairo 
and the Institute for Egyptology also based in Cairo. At the beginning o f  the twentieth century, Germany
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difficult position, being excluded from the international scientific community due to the 
restrictions o f the Versailles Treaty. The young Republic’s cultural relations with other 
countries became particularly im portant Industry, as well as the use o f technology, suf­
fered from the boycott the Treaty imposed. The continuity of research became a matter 
of national existence. Therefore, the return of the Zoological Station to German hands 
was essential for the country’s image abroad and therefore its exodus from the intellec­
tual isolation.108
Dohm  identified his institute with Germany’s national culture and he tried to con­
vince the German government to continue to support him, recognizing his country’s 
“national sacrifice”.109 Interestingly, his rhetoric mixed notions like ‘private’, ‘national’ 
and ‘international’. He argued that only the private status o f the institute could guarantee 
its international character and would provide friendship between peoples. He also em­
phasised that the private status would be secured only through the appointment of a 
German director.110 Dohm was aware that research, particularly after the war, was a na­
tional duty for Germany and he stressed this belief in order to convince the authorities to 
increase their financial support. The state, on the other hand, regarded Dohm ’s struggle a 
unique chance for the Weimar Republic to return to the international political arena. 
Germany acted very carefully and systematically in order to avoid being accused of na­
tionalism and violation o f the Versailles Treaty. The fact that the station was a private 
undertaking gave Germany some space to act under cover. The involvement o f the Kai­
ser Wilhelm Society in the institute’s financial and scientific activity provided excellent 
cover for the Republic’s interests.
What the case of the world-famous Zoological Station in Naples tells us, is that no 
matter what arguments Italy and Germany used to defend their commitment to univer- 
salism and global friendship after the war, it seems that their perception of intemational-
expanded natural sciences beyond the continental borders, setting up four scientific centres overseas: the 
centre o f  theoretical physics in La Plata, in Argentina, the geophysical observatory located at Apia, capital 
of b e s te m  Samoa in the South Pacific, the Gennan-Chincse University in Tsingtau, and the German 
Medicine School in Woo sung, a suburb o f  Shanghai, China. See: LEWIS PYENSON, Cultural Imperialism 
and Exact Sciences. German Expansion Overseas 1900-1930, New York 1985.
108 Report o f Reinhard Dohm, “Die gegenwärtige Lage der Zoologischen Station zu Neapel”. Zuerich, 
April 1920, in: PAAA, R 64570.
Ibid
110 Prof. Dr. Reinhard Dohm to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, tided T>ie Wiederuebemahme der Zoolo­
gischen Station’ on  13.09.1920, in: PAAA, R  64570.
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ism derived from mere patriotic feelings rather than from altruistic or humanistic ide­
als.111
111 BRIGITTE Sc h rOEDER-Gu d e h US, Deutsche Wissenschaft und Internationale Zusammenarbeit 1914- 




1.4. The institute fo r marine biobw in ’Rovivno d 'h tria . Italy.
" .. .  dereigendliche wissenschaftliche Grossbetrieb 
bei uns laengst von den Universitaeten zu den 
grossen Instituten abgewandert sei, wie z.B. von der 
Kaiser WUhelm-Gesellschaft eingerichtet waeren.......” lu
With these words the German ambassador in Rome, Kehr, refused the proposal 
of his Italian counterpart in Berlin, De Martino, for a regular professorial exchange pro­
gram between the two countries. The proposed exchange program would be a part of a 
broader rapprochement project suggested by Italy in 1920, in order to re-establish its 
cultural relations with Germany which had been shaken after the Versailles Treaty. Ac­
cording to the sanctions of the Treaty, Germany lost all its property beyond its borders. 
Every cultural or other institution the Germans owned abroad was confiscated by the 
country, in which the institution was based. German institutes in Italy met with the same 
fate, even though many of them were not state but private enterprises. This was the case 
not only o f  the Dohm station in Naples but also of the marine station in Rovigno. The 
latter was located on the peninsula of Istria, in the northern Adriatic.
The existence of the marine station in Rovigno dated back to 1899. It was a 
fishing-station created by Dr. Hermes, which provided the world-renowned aquarium in 
Berlin with experimental material. The station was Austrian property and it seems that its 
significance was such for German science that in 1911 it was purchased by the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Society, soon after its establishment. It should be noted that this acquisition was 
made before the creation of a Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology, to which the station 
was later affiliated.
Within a few years, the station developed into a high-quality research centre that 
attracted a significant number of foreign scientists, due to the favourable climatic condi­
tions for the study of the Mediterranean fauna and flora but also due to its easy access by 
train from central Europe. Apart from German and Austrian scientists, the station was 
host to Hungarian, Swedish, Norwegian, Russian, English, American and French schol­
ars.113 It was closely related to the neighbouring Zoological Station in Triest, which had a *15
112 The German Ambassador in Rome, Kehr, to the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs in Be din, on 07.08.1920, 
im PAAA,R 64570.
115 The director of the Zoological Station in Rovigno, Dr. Tilo Krumbach, on the history o f the station, on 
27.04.1922, in: Archiv zur Geschichte der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft (MPGA), A b t I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 1240/2.
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significantly rich library, but also with the famous Zoological Station in Naples. Perhaps 
the most important work conducted in Rovigno was the research on protozoa, the mi­
croscopic organisms, some of which related to the cause o f malaria. It was not surprising, 
therefore, that besides the scientists engaged in the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes or in uni­
versity laboratories, civil servants working at the Reich’s Ministry of Health also were 
among the researchers in Rovigno. This first Kaiser Wilhelm research centre outside the 
Reich’s borders fulfilled one o f the social values that stipulated by the new research pol­
icy in Germany, i.e. the safeguarding of public health.114 15In addition to its research char­
acter, the institute also operated as an educational centre for the German Popular Uni­
versities (Volkshochschule) and other institutions promoting popular education.113 A series 
of films on marine fauna and flora made a great contribution to the cultural and eco­
nomic significance of the institute.116
After the war, the fate of the station in Rovigno shared much with that of 
D ohm ’s station in Naples. In 1918, it changed hands, becoming property o f Italy. Due to 
its location in war territory, the governor of Venice, General Giulia Petitti and the Italian 
Admiralty occupied the institute and immediately appointed a director.117 The new di­
rector was Prof. Magrini, the vice-president of the R  Comitate Ta/assografico Itaiianoy and 
the institute changed its name to the “Istituto di biologia marina per l* Adriatico”. Magrini was 
not held in great respect by the Germans and was regarded as a very ambitious man who 
for years had coveted both German zoological stations in Italy, namely Naples and Rovi­
gno.
With a decree of 30 April 1921, Italy, having annexed the region o f Istria, offi­
cially announced to Germany that it had occupied the institute, practically terminating its 
relations with central Europe. Unlike Dohm, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, following the 
advice o f the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, did not go to law against Italy but preferred to 
get in contact with Italian officials in order to get die station back.118 The president o f the
114 Letter o f  the Reich’s Minister o f the Interior to the German Ministry o f Foreign Affairs in 25.05.1926, 
in: PAAA, R 64575; Reich’s Ministry of Health to the Kaiser-Wilhelm Gesellschaft, on 09.04.1920, in: 
MPGA, Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 1235/4.
115 Dr. Massimo Sella, director of the Institute in Rovigno to the German ambassador in Rome Baron von 
Neurath, on 23.10.1924, in: PAAA, R 64575.
116 7 bid
117 German Ambassador in Rome, Kehr, to die Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bedin, on 07.08.1920, in: 
PAAA, R 64570.
118 The President o f  the KWG to the Reich Ministry o f  the Interior on 17.12.1924, in: PAAA, R 64575.
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Kaiser-Wilhelm Society, Adolf von Hamack, was personally involved and got in touch 
with the Italian ambassador in Berlin, Grafen Bosdari, who subsequently contacted the 
Italian Ministry o f Education. In 1924, die occupied status o f the institute in Rovigno fell 
within the competence of the ‘International Dietary Court* Internationales Sckiedsgericht). 
The court would decide whether Italy had the right to confiscate foreign property in its 
newly annexed territories, or n o t Meanwhile, the Italian zoologist Massimo Sella was ap­
pointed director o f the institute. Unlike his predecessor Magrini, Sella was a committed 
scientist, who was interested in the institute functioning under its previous status. He had 
very good relations with the Germans, with whom he had worked many years in Italy. 
Sella wanted to make the institute an attractive scientific centre again, but he knew that it 
would be difficult to realise his wish without Germany's scientific or material contribu­
tion. Therefore, he tried hard to convince the Germans to send Victor Bauer, the assis­
tant at the physiological institute at the University o f Bonn, to represent Germany in 
Rovigno."9 Bauer had worked for ten years as assistant and as guest scientist at the 
Zoological Station in Naples and he had become an expert in Mediterranean fauna and 
flora.
Long discussions had took place a year earlier, in 1923, between the German am­
bassador in Rome, Baron von Neurath, Sella, and Bauer about the German scientific rep­
resentation in Rovigno. What Sella proposed in 1924, was that Bauer could visit the in­
stitute for some months each year, preferably during the university holidays, so that he 
could also meet his commitments at Bonn University. In addition, Sella believed that a 
closer relationship between the institute in Rovigno and Bauer’s university could be de­
veloped through a mutual effort to investigate theoretical and practical scientific prob­
lems. The Ministry of Education would continue to pay Bauer for his professorial duties 
at the university in Bonn, but also would cover some of the expenses of his stay in Rovi­
gno. Sella was going to try to get additional money from the International Education 
Board o f the Rockefeller Foundation, which eventually approved fund for this pur­
pose.19 20 This was the first step o f Sella’s project, planned together with the Senator o f the 
Italian government and Grassi, the member of the Comitato Talassografico. The next phase 
of Sella’s proposal was an offer to Bauer to get a position at the Comitato Talassografico.
119 Letter o f Dr. Massimo Sella, director o f the Institute for marine Biology, to the German ambassador in 
Rome, Baron von Neurath on 23.10.1924, in: PAAA, R 64575.
120 Wd On the approval o f die Rockefeller Foundation see the letter o f the German Embassy at Rome to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin on 02.03.1925, in: PAAA, R 64575.
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This move was recognised by the Italians as “a sort of German representation” at the
institute.121
Despite the political significance this project had for both countries, Germany 
rejected it. Hamack and the Minister o f  Education, Kruess, were very explicit about their 
decision not to allow Bauer or any other scientist to go to Rovigno, as long as the matter 
of the institute’s ownership remained in dispute. They argued that the appointment of 
German scientists to die marine station would not improve their position at the Interna­
tional Court; moreover, it would be considered as recognition o f the Italian manage­
ment.122 Germany’s rejection o f the offer seemed absolute to the Italians, leaving no lati­
tude for negotiations. Sella pointed out to the Germans that the issue demanded “a par­
ticular political delicacy” rather than the mere appointment o f a German representative, 
which he himself warmly recommended, but he could not impose i t 123 Meanwhile, on 
the German side the pressure for a solution to the institute’s problem had increased. The 
scientific section of the Ministry of Health, let alone the Berlin aquarium, depended on 
the material coming from Rovigno. The director of the aquarium argued that Naples, the 
other alternative supply centre, was too far away, making it impossible to transport fragile 
material to Berlin. In addition, the aquariums in Trieste and Fiume which also supplied 
Berlin by that time with sea organisms, no longer existed. Consequently, the only place 
that could provide Berlin with the desired sea material, was Rovigno, but since it was in 
Italian hands, the material had to be purchased from them. Another problem was that 
Rovigno’s material source had also started to dry up, due to the lack of funds and to the 
shortage o f staff. The best way forward, was either for the institute to be handed over to 
Germany or for another institute to be established on some other coast of the Adriatic or 
in the Mediterranean.124 While the Kaiser Wilhelm Society was seriously thinking of 
looking elsewhere for favourable conditions in order to set up a new institution, the first
121 Dr. v. Bauer to the German Ambassador in Rome, Baron von Neurath, in May 1925, in: PAAA, R
64575.
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fairs in Berlin, on 28.05.1927, in: PAAA, R 65806.
44
offer came from Yugoslavia. The local director of the newly established zoological sta­
tion in Split made a partnership proposal to die Kaiser Wilhelm Society and offered a 
management position to Tilo Krumbach, the former director o f  the station in Rovigno.125 
The president o f the Society, Adolf von Hamack, in accordance with the Prussian Min­
istry of Education, encouraged Krumbach to accept the offer, as it seemed unlikely, in 
1926, the Rovigno station to be returned to the Society.126
At the same time, another serious proposal came from a German making busi­
ness in Greece, Wilhelm Kraft. He was engaged in the Rovigno station before the war 
and in the period in question he was trading goods on the east Mediterranean. Kraft sent 
to the German Embassy in Athens a detailed plan for the establishment of a German 
marine institute in southern Greece. He had an excellent knowledge of the area and 
among the arguments he demonstrated were the climatic conditions of the region; the 
ideal temperature o f the waters, which was a precondition for the rich variety of fauna 
and flora; the big diversity of the coastline; and above all the fact that in the eastern part 
o f the Mediterranean there was no other institute of this kind.127 Germany would be the 
first nation, he argued, that would inaugurate the area with a research station, leaving 
France and Italy, who possessed first-class marine institutes in the west, one step be­
hind.128 Kraft regarded as the most ideal place of the whole Greek coastline the bay o f 
Koroni, on south-western Peloponnese between Kalamata and the small village of Pe- 
talidi. The second best place was, according to Kraft, the island o f  Corfu.129 Although the 
German Foreign Ministry as well as the Kaiser-Wilhelm Society were in favour of Kraft’s 
plan, both rejected it on the grounds that the still unsolved Rovigno issue did not leave 
any space for new financial commitments. In addition, it was argued that the location 
suggested by Kraft did not meet the geo-strategic criteria the German Foreign Ministry 
desired for an institute of that kind.130
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At the beginning of 1927, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in agreement 
with the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, filed an application to the Italian government asking for 
the lifting o f occupied status at the institute and its return to the Society. This application 
meant on the one hand how much important the institute was for the Society, on the 
other hand that Germany still wished to re-establish of closer relations with Italy. The 
Germans reassured Italy that, should the institute be returned to them, they would con­
tinue to co-operate with the Italian state and would be willing to discuss the best way for 
the station’s operation, in order to serve the common interests of both nations.151 
Nonetheless, Germany already knew that the full restitution was rather an optimistic sce­
nario, because the station was no longer a state but a military property as a holding o f the 
Ministry o f the Admiralty. The good news was that, according to a general agreement 
(Globalabkommen) about the Reich’s property in the new Italian provinces, Germany could 
be entitled to compensation o f eighty-five per cent of the institute’s value, in case Italy 
continued to claim the ownership o f the station.13 32 Although Germany’s application for 
restitution o f the station was rejected, as it was expected, the German government did 
not take up its reimbursement right immediately. The reason was that Italy, in a diplo­
matic manoeuvre, suggested collaboration with the Kaiser Wilhelm Society in return for 
its contribution to the costs o f the station.133 The Italian government, with the unfortu­
nate experience o f the Naples case still fresh in mind, was determined not to leave the 
institute in German hands, nor to pay the associated expenses all on its own. Italy also 
knew, how desperately Germany wanted to have the station and her suggestion appeared 
to be the best solution for German interest. It seems that what Italy had failed to do in 
Naples, it would eventually accomplish in Rovigno. If the German presence in the sta­
tion was a guarantee for attracting scientists from abroad, as it had been in the past, It­
aly’s proposal would help the isolated German Republic to re-establish its international 
relations. The accessibility of the institute to foreign scholars was announced by a decree 
of the Italian government on 29 April 1927.134 Scholars from different countries would 
have the chance to do research in an international environment. Germany, and in par­
ticular the Kaiser Wilhelm Society could, o f course, lease a certain number o f working 
spaces, but that number would be fixed by the Italians. Even though the Society recog­
131 German Embassy at Rome to the Foreign Ministry in Bedm, on 19.03.1927, in: PAAA, R 65806.
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nised Italy’s interest in fostering the international scientific co-operation, it could not ac­
cept the degree o f Italian control over the station’s status. It was not only a matter of 
losing its property. Germany’s research demands of the time could not be satisfied by a 
limited number o f working spaces. Therefore, President Hamack suggested the following 
compromise: the Society would waive its claim for restitution or reimbursement, on con­
dition that the Society would be recognised as Italy’s equal partner in the institute’s ad­
ministration.135 Hamack also preferred to collaborate with an Italian scientific foundation 
rather than with the government, in order to guarantee the institute’s flexibility and free­
dom. The new status of the station in Rovigno would be modelled upon the Biological 
Station in Lunz, in lower Austria. This station was founded in 1906 with the donation of 
Karl and Hans Kupelwieser, but in 1923 it became the property of the Academy o f Sci­
ences in Vienna and the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. In the period in question, the station in 
Lunz met the Society’s requirements, which, before the war, had been met by the insti­
tute in Rovigno.
Hamack believed that German science could have a greater impact on interna­
tional scientific scene, if research was conducted at institutes abroad. Hence, it would be 
in Germany’s scientific, cultural and political interest to play a leading role in Rovigno 
and not to compromise this with a mere contribution, leasing some working spaces. 
Hamack finally made clear to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin that, if Italy de­
nied her equal partnership, Germany should start thinking more seriously about the pos­
sibility o f creating another station in Yugoslavia, Spain, or Greece.136 His statement was 
far from what the director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology in Berlin-Dahlem, 
Fritz von Wettstein, was to campaign for fifteen years later, when he was talking about 
the creation of a scientific network in south-eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. 
However, Hamack did recognise the importance an institute for marine biology could 
have for Germany in that region, not only for German science but also for the country’s 
military interests.
At the end o f 1927, Italy, under the reimbursement pressure suggested one Ital­
ian and one German delegate o f  the respective Foreign Ministries to draw up a contract 
with regard to the station’s management Hamack authorized the General Secretary of 
the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, Friedrich Glum, to represent Germany, backed by a diplo­




the Comitato Talassografico, Prof. Magrini, agreed upon a first draft of the contract. The 
institute in Rovigno would be recognized as property of both institutions, i.e. the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Society and the Comitato Talassografico™ Like the station in Naples, the Rovigno 
station would have an international character offering working spaces to foreign scien­
tists. Hamack stated that “under the present circumstances, the contract was the best 
solution for Germany to once again exert its influence on Rovigno”.137 38 The contract was 
finally signed on 25 February 1930 and work began on 21 April 1931. The new name of 
the station was “German-Italian Institute for Marine Biology” and Adolf Steuer and the 
Italian Massimo Sella were appointed first co-directors.
Three elements, in particular, made the stations in Naples and Rovigno so im­
portant for Germany’s scientific and foreign cultural policy: their location, the matter of 
ownership and their international character. Both o f them were the first German re­
search centers located beyond the Reich’s borders and within die European territory. In a 
period when social and economic demands called for development in research, institutes 
situated abroad and dedicated to that end were regarded by the scientific community as a 
step head. The climatic conditions and the rich fauna and flora o f the Mediterranean Sea 
were no t only favourable in performing research that could not be carried out on the 
North Sea, but they also provided other research centers and aquariums within die Ger­
man state with important material. Many o f those domestic institutes were engaged in 
projects regarding public health and agriculture, both very important for Germany’s 
needs at that time.
Although both stations in Italy initially had a private or semi-private status, they 
were considered as German state property. The long debate on the ownership of the in­
stitutes after World War I and the Versailles Treaty bear witness to the prevalence of this 
belief. The boundaries between private and public were quite vague for both countries 
and jumping from one status to the other was more a function o f the argument in hand 
than any solidly based distinction between state and private property. It is true, however, 
that crossing the public-private line 'was more obvious on the German side, while Italy 
seemed to avoid the complications of the private-state distinction and preferred to regard
137 The only thing that was excluded from the common ownership and remained under Italian title, was the 
library o f  the former zoological station in Trieste, which had been assigned to Rovigno See: Article 14 of 
the 1929’s draft, in: PAAA, R 65806. This part, however, was no t mentioned on the official contract.
138 Adolf, von Hamack to the German Foreign Ministry, on 01.02.1928, in: PAAA, R 65806.
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the institutes as simply German. Nonetheless, what was really at stake was the national 
prestige o f both countries, regardless of whether it was the official state or some private 
enterprise that contributed to its promotion.
National prestige did no t appear to mean much outside the international context. 
What was unique in the two stations in Italy was not only the fact that they reflected the 
German scientific and cultural prestige abroad. This was also cultivated by the German 
scientific institutes overseas in China, Argentina and Samoa. Yet, unlike those institutes, 
the research centers in Italy had an international character, meaning, they were a sort of 
melting-pot, in which scientists from all over the world could come and do research ex­
changing experience and ideas. They were very different from all other institutes overseas 
subordinated to a colonial policy, imposed by the German central government Never­
theless, it is evident that after World War I the young Republic, being in no position to 
exert influence through the practices of political and territory domination, continued to 
do so through international scientific co-operation, exchange o f ideas, and knowledge 
distribution. Those strategies were simply indicative of an era o f  re-orientation and modi­
fication o f Germany's policy at all levels, including science policy.
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2. German science under threat and the Weimar Republic’s rescuing policies.
2.1. Scientific isolation from international community
In the years preceding World War I, international scientific competitiveness was 
at the centre o f foreign policy planning for every powerful state. It seemed that the im­
pending war was to be the first o f its kind, which was to consume “die major industrial 
nations o f the world”.139 Alliances, established in 1900, between research centres, gov­
ernment and industry had to accelerate their projects on science and technology, which 
were expected to meet economic and, in particular, military demands. Scientific suprem­
acy became synonymous with economic and military strength.
Germany, at the turn o f the century, could boast that its military and scientific 
supremacy were the reasons for its extraordinary might.140 Despite claims of scientific 
backwardness, Germany was a leading power in a number o f scientific disciplines, and 
chemistry in particular. Major discoveries in that field, such as the synthesis o f fertilisers, 
more precisely aniline and alizarin colours, were o f great importance for Germany’s 
economy and made huge expanses o f land suitable for growing wheat. Moreover, Fritz 
Haber, one of Germany’s leading chemists at the time, developed a process to syntheti­
cally produce liquid ammonia, a key compound for the extraction of nitrates, the main 
substance used in the manufacture o f munitions and fertilisers. This achievement not 
only contributed to Germany’s industrial and rural economic growth, but also gave the 
country an unparalleled advantage in chemical warfare. For his innovative work on the 
synthesis of ammonia, Haber was awarded the Nobel Prize in Chemistry, making him the 
ninth German, and seventeenth overall, awarded this honour between 1901 and 1921.141
By 1914, Germany had begun research on synthetic materials, which allowed 
them to be less dependent on other countries’ raw materials. Otto Hahn, the future di­
rector o f the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Chemistry, discovered mesothorium, a viable and
139 ROY MacLEOD, “Secrets among Friends: The Research Information Service and the ‘Special Relation­
ship’ in the Allied Scientific Information and Intelligence, 1916-1918.”, in: Minerva 37, (1999), 201-233, 
here p. 201.
140 See footnote 66.
141 The other eight laureates were from England (2), France (2), Sweden (1), the United States (1), the 
Netherlands (1), and Poland (a woman), in: Interpellation on 16 October 1922, included in: Reichstagsver- 
handlungen vom 15. und 16. November 1922, entitled "Die Not der Wissenschaft im Reichstag”, p. 9008, 
in: PAAA, R 65519.
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cheaper substitute for radium, while working for the Emil Fischer Institute at Berlin 
University.142 During the war, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Chemistry, with Fritz 
Haber and Emil Fischer at its helm, was transformed into a centre o f military science 
creating a menage-a-trois between science, industry and military technology. Germany’s 
achievements in chemistry forced the Allies to collaborate more closely on scientific 
knowledge and secret sharing, making this “the first war o f scientific information”.143
Britain, France, Italy, and die United States, who jointly declared war on Ger­
many on 2 April 1917, joined forces to promote research in four fields: submarine detec­
tion, chemical warfare, trench warfare, and aeronautics. Scientific missions, between 
these countries, were constantly moving across the Atlantic during the spring o f 1917. 
Meanwhile, US President Wilson was approving the creation o f the National Research 
Council, in agreement with the Council o f  National Defence, in 1916, mobilising science 
in the service of war.144 The inter-allied scientific collaboration during the war laid foun­
dations for the creation of an international scientific council, which would foster scien­
tific communication and the exchange o f information when the war was over.
The United States - represented by George Ellery Hale, then foreign secretary of 
the United States National Academy of Sciences in Washington, DC - played a central 
role in the co-ordination of information flow. In the summer o f 1918, on a draft for the 
establishment of an Inter-Allied Research Council, Hale underlined that the Germans 
“introduced and constantly improved new, powerful devices of offence and defence em­
bodying the most advance [sic] conceptions o f science”, which the Allies could only meet 
through “a similarly effective utilisation o f all the agencies o f scientific research at their 
disposal”.145 The future research council would not only contribute to current military 
needs but also, as Hale had envisioned, would become an institution for the post-war 
modification of international science, which would also further the creation of an organi-
142 KRISTIE M aCRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika. Scientific Research in Nazi Germany. New York 1993, p. 
21. For details on Fritz Haber's work see: STOLZENBERG DIETRICH, Fritz Haber. Chemiker, Nobelpreis- 
traeger, Deutscher, Jude. Wemheim 1994; MARGIT S z o e l l o e s i-Ja n z e , Fritz Haber 1868 bis 1934. Eine 
Biographie, GH.Beck 1998.
143 MacLEOD, “Secrets among Friends”, p- 201.
144 BRIGITTE SCHROEDER-Gu d eh u s , Deutsche Wissenschaft und Internationale Zusammenarbeit 1914- 
1928. Ein Beitrag zum Studium kultureller Beziehungen in politischen Krisenzeiten. (Dissertation), Genève 
1966, p. 104.
145 Gted in: MacLEOD, “Secrets among Friends”, p. 226.
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sation that would side-step the pre-war German-dominated International Association of 
Academies.146
Nonetheless, Hale opposed the position of his European colleagues who had 
adopted a rather hard line against Germany and its allies. At the first preparatory meet­
ing of the Inter-allied Academies in London during October 1918, French representa­
tives recommended that governments should not send delegates to international con­
gresses, in which the Central Powers were also be represented. Moreover, their nationals 
should be discouraged from attending such congresses as private citizens. The meeting, 
however, did not accept die French recommendation. Furthermore, Hale did not share 
the French and Belgian objectives to “shut the door squarely to the German men of sci­
ence and not make any compromise with them”, humiliate them by removing their 
names from the lists of honorary membership in their National Academies, or by at­
tacking them in other ways.147 The Royal Society of London was also wary of employing 
such measures against Germany, regarding them as superfluous.148
It seems that the Anglo-Americans did not think —at that time, in any case- to ex­
clude German scientists from future international research organisations and believed 
that radical measures against Germany might stand in the way o f international co­
operation, creating doubts and prejudices at the end of the war.149 Instead, they decided 
that the post-war organisation would allow Germans to join, but remain free o f their 
domination. In consequence, the existing order, based on the tradition and prestige of 
German academic leadership, had to be replaced with a new order based on scientific 
disciplines open to the world community. Ironically, the openness o f the new order was 
restricted to the winners of war, who created a close network of scientific organisations. 
These were usually headed by the same small number o f individuals. Despite the fact 
that, during the preparatory London meeting in 1918, officials suggested that the new 
international organisation be staffed with executives from the respective national re­
search committees, the absence o f these committees in most of the countries passed the 
ball to the academies, which were already represented in other international organisa­
146 Ibid, p. 225.
147 Ibid, p. 226. Also in: Académie Royale de Belgique. Bulletin de la dasse des Sàence, 1919, cited in: 
SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, Internationale Zusammenarbeit, p. 107.
148 “Conférence des Académies des sciences interalliées tenue à Londres en Octobre 1918. Compte 
rendu”. Academe Royale de Belgque, Bulletin de la dasse des sciences, 1919, cited in: SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit, p. 93.
149 Ibid, pp. 89 f.
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tions. Employing the same people in institutions with very different aims seriously weak­
ened the matter of order and representation within these institutions.150 The number o f 
tasks the new Research Council had to manage, such as organising conferences, drawing- 
up scientific reports, editing journals, contacting institutions, associations and foreign 
scientists, and organising the exchange o f scientific publications, demanded a larger circle 
o f scientists than the academies alone could provide. The creation of the new Interna­
tional Research Organisation should be done as soon as possible, for the Allies feared 
that the Germans might take over the organisation and eventually exert a strong influ­
ence over it after the end of the war.151 They believed that any further delay would bene­
fit Germany. The Secrétaire 'Perpétuel o f the Academie des Sciences of Paris, Emile Picard, 
characterised the immediate formation of the International Committee a matter of 
“capital importance”.152 153After two preparatory meetings in London and Paris during 
1918, the new International Research Council was officially approved by the Allies in a 
conference held at the Palais des Académies in Brussels from 18-28 July 1919. The aim of 
the Council was not to conduct research but, according to the first Article o f  the statutes, 
to stimulate, support and co-ordinate international scientific co-operation. The new Re­
search Council shaped the framework for future international scientific collaboration, 
encouraging the use of the English language, although its headquarters were in Paris.155 
Additionally, German and Austrian scientists were explicitly excluded by a vote called for 
by France and Belgium. Meanwhile, the Versailles Treaty was signed by the Allies and the 
Central Powers on 28 June 1919, inaugurating an unpropitious era for German science.
The most devastating Article for Germany's international scientific relations, 
which damaged scientific production within its own frontiers, was Art. 282 and those 
following. According to these Articles, all multilateral treaties, conventions or agreements 
o f  an economic or technical character that Germany had signed in the past, were de­
prived o f any legal force. The only exception made was for agreements concerning or­
ganisations, in which Germany’s co-operation was absolutely necessary, such as the Con­
vention for die Unification and Improvement of the Metric System and the Agricultural
» M ,  pp. 101 f f
151 E. Picard, Minutes of the 27. November 1918 meeting, held in Paris. Cited in: SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit, p. 108.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid., p. 228.
Institute in Rome.154 Interpreting the General Articles of the Treaty, the statutes o f the 
Council excluded the Central Powers and their allies from every scientific congress until 
1931, unless two thirds of the council should decide otherwise. Not even Albert Einstein 
could participate in physics congresses without the approval of more than the two thirds 
of the members o f the Council. This action ignored the voice of the international phys­
ics community and was reported with disaproval in an issue of the journal “Nature” in 
1921.155 Furthermore, German representatives would be struck from international com­
missions -die International Commission for Atom Weight, the Commission for the 
Teaching o f Mathematics, the International Electro-technical Commission, and so forth - 
and if necessary, the Council would announce new commissions to be established.
It is interesting to note that within the International Research Council there were 
groups dedicated to legal manoeuvres, which were specifically designed to leave the 
Central Powers shut out o f the international community. Such practices were also ap­
plied elsewhere, for example, to the Xlth International Congress for Geography on 1-9 
April 1925, in Cairo. Egypt’s precipitous accession to h e  International Research Council, 
on 26 July 1922, forced the country to withdraw the official invitations it had sent to 
Germany and Austria almost a month before, on 22 June 1922. Egypt, as a member of 
the Research Council, was no longer the official organiser o f the congress. The organisa­
tion was handed over to the International Geographical Union, founded on 29 July 1922, 
which was subject to decisions made by the International Research Council. In effect, the 
former Central Powers were excluded from the new, official invitations of Egypt.156 
From 1919 until 1925, Germany was barred from participating in roughly 165 out o f 275 
international meetings in the fields o f  the humanities, natural and technical sciences.137 
For the Germans, even though the discussions for their country’s admission into the 
League of Nations were on-goin^ the measures of prohibition were as tight as they had
154 See paragraphs 20 and 23 o f Artide 282 of the Versailles Treaty, in'.
h rtp: /  /4u s ro tv . ?: s n d i c ptx c d u /  n / re x r / vc rs dll c s trc: t r*Ai il 44' > - h rrr.
155 This is what Prof. Hardy (Oxford) strongly critidsed on an artide in Nature on 24 March 1921. G ted in: 
K arl K e r k h o f , Der Krieg gegen die deutsche Wissenschaft Eine Zusammenstellung von 
Kongressberichten und Zeitungsmeldungen. Wittenberg 1922, p. 12.
p. 124 ff.
»7 Ibid., p . 112.
been in the first years after the signing of the Treaty. The figures released by “Reich’s 




Human and Natural Sciences (incl. Medicine), 
Public Law, International Law 57 51
Social Sciences 08 02
Technical Sciences 20 17
Subsidiary Sciences 21 16
Sum: 106 86
As one might expect, filings were different when international congresses were organised 
by neutral states or the Central Powers. Germany was invited to all but one of the 
twenty-one international congresses, organised by the Central Powers from 1920 to 1924. 
However, the Allies, in particular France and Belgium, keeping true to the Articles o f  the 
Versailles Treaty, refused to send their delegates to thirteen congresses in which Ger­
many was also invited during this time.159
Immediately after the war, the International Academic Association for Humani­
ties, founded in Brussels in October 1919, as well as a number o f scientific organisations 
and institutions under the direction o f the International Research Council. These organi­
sations were created mainly to support natural sciences, the development o f which was 
particularly significant in post-war economic planning and national security. Central 
Powers were, again, explicitly excluded from all of them. The new institutions created by 
the Council were the International Associations for Astronomy, Geodesy, Geophysics, 
and for Pure and Applied Chemistry.160 Some o f the old associations were transformed 
into new ones, like the International Association for Mathematics and the International *180
158 “Denkschnft der Reicltszentrale fuer naturwissenschaftliche Berichterstattung vom 29. Januar 1925”, in: 
PAAA,R 64981.
Ibid.
180 These and the International Mathematical Union as well as the International Geographical Union were 
not developed beyond nominal existence. Cited in: BRIGITTE SCHROEDER-GLTDEHUS, “Challenge to 
Transnational Loyalties: International Scientific Organisations after the First World War”, Science Studies, 3 
(1973), pp- 93-118, here p. 101
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Association for Scientific Radiotelegraphy. Some other projects remained lay dormant to 
be revived in the future, among them the International Association for Biological Sci­
ences and the International Technical Union. It is noteworthy that, as a result o f the re­
strictions to Article 282, many unions or organisations that had previously had their cen­
tral offices in Germany, relocated their headquarters to other countries after the war.161 
This was the case for the International Seismological Association in Strasbourg (Interna­
tionale Association fuer Siesmologie in Strass burg), which was re-established as the “Interna­
tional Union o f Geodesy and Geophysics” {Union géodésique et géophysique internationale). 
Another example is the Central Office for International Earth Measuring in Potsdam 
(Zentralbuero der Internationale Erdmessung in Potsdam), the projects of which were mainly 
undertaken by the Japanese Latitude Station in Mizusawa.142
N ot surprisingly, by 1923 France housed thirty-seven international scientific or­
ganisations, societies and institutes, as opposed to only eighteen in 1914. During this 
same period, Belgium increased the number of international institutions headquartered 
on its territory from thirteen to twenty-one, England from nine to fourteen and Italy 
from three to four. On the other hand, the number of international organisations that 
had their head offices in Germany decreased from fourteen, in 1914, to six, in 1923.143 
Table 2.
European participation in international congresses 1914-1923
1914 1923
Germany 14 6 164
German-Austria 3 3




161 SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, Internationale Zusam m enarbeit, p. 115.
103 Ibid, p. 116, see also: „Denkschrift der Reichszentrale hier naturwissenschaftliche Berichterstattung 
vom 29. Januar 1925“, in: PAAA R 64981.
163 „Denkschrift der Reichszentrale fuer naturwissenschaftliche Berichterstattung vom 29. Januar 1925”, in: 
PAAA, R 64981.
164 Emphasis added. In other documents die figures are 15 and 3 respectively. See: Abstract of KaRL 
KERKHOF, Internationale wissenschaftliche Kongresse und Organisationen 1922-1923- Bedin 1923, in: 
PAAA R 64981.
155 Again, the figures, according to Kerkhof, are different, 13 and 21 respectively. Ibid
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Congresses and organisations were not the only scientific outlets from which 
Germany was shut ou t Probably “the most effective means used against the ‘domina­
tion’ of German science”, as Max Planck, secretary o f the Physics-Mathematical Depart­
ment of the Prussian Academy, wrote in a 1919 report, “ [was] the exclusion of Germany 
from international bibliographies, in which German scientific works [were] supposedly 
disproportionately represented”.166 Suffice it to say that the number of foreign journals 
the State Library o f Berlin could purchase in 1920, had dramatically decreased after the 
wan from 2,200 titles, in 1914, to a low o f only 140 acquisitions.167 Given these figures, 
German science might justifiably be regarded as provincial and backward in international 
scientific discussions. Until 1919, Germany undoubtedly had a profound presence in the 
international bibliographies o f many disciplines. Botany, zoology, anatomy, biology, and 
physiology were the fields in which German scientific progress was most apparent.168 
One measure that seriously damaged Germany’s international scientific prestige was die 
currency conditions of purchasing scientific works from abroad. Scientific books and 
journals were very expensive and represented a substantial ouday for even the largest o f 
cultural institutions, such as the Germanische Museum in Nuremberg, the German li­
brary in Leipzig and the German Museum in Munich, which at that time was under con­
struction.169 Rather than the international scientific community independently rejecting 
German output, a number of reviewing bodies were established by the Federation o f  the 
Societies o f Natural Sciences (Fédération des Sociétés des Sciences naturelles), an organisation 
founded in March 1919. These were engaged in driving the German review journals off 
of the international scientific stage, an undertaking that proved very effective. Nonethe­
less, Germany, through a number of salvage mechanisms and with gradual foreign sup­
port, had recovered about half o f her pre-war international periodical position by 1930 
and, by 1940, had impressively increased its share in international scientific production, 
especially in the field of chemistry.170
166 G ted  in: PAMELA SPENCE Rich a rd s , “The Movement o f Scientific Knowledge from and to Germany 
under National Socialism”, Minerva, 28,4 (1990), pp. 401-425, here p. 40Z
167 WINFRIED SCHULZE, Der Stiftervefband fuer the Deutsche Wissenschaft 1920-1995. Be din 1995, p. 50.
168 O n the eve o f  the First World War, German scientific periodicals held about 45%  of die wodd produc­
tion. SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, “Challenge to Transnational Loyalties”, p. 99 , footnote No. 15.
169 Interpellation on 16. October 1922, included in „Reichstagsverhandlungen vom 15- und 16. November 
1922“ , entitled “Die N ot der Wissenschaft im Reichstag”, in: PAAA, R  65519.
170 DEREK J . de SOLLA PRICE, “N ations can p u b lish  o r perish” , Science and Technolop, 70 (1967), pp. 84-90, 
here p . 90.
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Reflecting the strong anti-western feeling the “boycott movement” created in 
Germany, Karl Kerkhof, director o f the “Central Office for Scientific News Reports” 
(Reicbŝ entrale fuer jvissenschaftBche Benchterstattung), argued that the first initiative against 
German science was taken in 1915 by England.171 He claimed that the British Association 
for the Advancement of Science at a meeting held that year in Manchester, had planned 
to create a front against German science through a number o f natural science journals 
published by the allied countries. In the same vein, the Royal Society of Literature and 
the Italian publisher of the international journal “Sàenûd*, Eugenio Rignano, suggested 
launching journals, archives and yearbooks with an international character and in col­
laboration with the Entente states, in order to defeat what he described as Germany’s 
“hegemony” and “monopoly” in the scientific press.172
The ostracisation of the German language was another way their influence was to 
be restricted and the international scientific stage was to be liberated from the German 
authority. The use of German in congresses was also forbidden for members of the 
Council -such as Dutch and Scandinavian scientists- for whom German had been the 
international scientific language at that time. This reaction came from the belief, largely 
shared by the Allies, that German:
“had become pre-eminently the international language of science and that German pro­
fessors had set up a kind of scientific empire which covered the entire north, central, and 
eastern Europe and exerted considerable influence on Russian, American and Japanese
* science”.173
The paradox was that even the German-speaking delegates from neutral countries, like 
Switzerland, were forced to use French or English rather than their mother tongue, even 
in international congresses that took place in their own country.174 Despite the strict and 
uncompromising spirit of the Council, there were cases in which German was used by 
some of the conference delegates. For example, at the International Congress of Byzan- 
tinologists in Bucharest, in 1924, three Yugoslavian, two Romanian and one Greek par­
ticipant presented their work in German.175
171 K e r k h o f , Der Krieg gegen die deutsche Wissenschaft, p. 9.
172 Naturty 25 January 1917, cited in: KERKHOF, D er Krieg gegen die deutsche Wissenschaft, p. 9-
171 Gted in: SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, "Challenge to Transnational Loyalties” , p. 99.
174 This happened at the International Conference for Tuberculosis in Lausanne, in August 1924.
175 SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, Internationale Zusammenafbeit, p. 115- See also the report of the Greek dele­
gate in Bucharest, Z. B. KOYTEAI. “E vtjrwoeic ex Pou^avia;. AaôojtaCTfiat ex tou T^epoXoviou TT& MevàÀr,; 
EÀXàSoç.” ["Impressions from Rumania, by S-B. Kougeas. Abstract o f the diary of Great Greece”), 1925-
59
All the above measures that the Allies took in order to punish Germany, led the 
intellectual and political circles o f the defeated country to talk about a “war against Ger­
man science”.176 In 1922, Kerkhof blamed French imperialism as well as the English and 
American latent economic interests for Germany*s scientific isolation. France urged the 
expansion o f  its cultural domain through a number o f propaganda organisations, such as 
the Lingut française de Propagande, the Fédération internationale pour / ’ extension et la culture de la 
langue française, the Groupement des Universités et Grandes Écoles de France and so forth, making 
many nations notice that “after the Versailles dictate, the world’s scientific centre has 
been transferred to Paris”.177 English and American propaganda, on the other hand, 
aimed at the major contributors to Germany’s industrial growth, i.e. chemistry and phys­
ics.178 On 7 September 1921, for example, Françis P. Carvan, the president of the Ameri­
can Chemical Foundation, argued in a meeting of both the Society of Chemical Industry 
and the American Chemical Society at Columbia University in New York that the devel­
opment o f chemistry “at the dirty hands o f Germans is a history of crimes, fallacy and 
murderous attempt” and it was time to be passed on to the “idealistic hands of the An­
glo-Saxons”.179 Moreover, the English and American press complained about the award 
of the Nobel for chemistry to Fritz Haber and Walther Hermann Nemst, portraying the 
reward as a mistake.180 Propaganda and exclusion measures imposed on Germany, were 
of no benefit to science as a whole, as was to be realised by the scientific community later 
on. It was also to be recognised that co-operative research and congresses attended by 
representatives o f all nations o f the globe, had to be accompanied by mutual exchange of 
the results o f  long painstaking study and research and not to be restricted to few elite 
nations. Yet, by that time and until the year Germany joined the League o f Nations, in 
1926, even the states that remained neutral during the war did not seem to receive equal 
treatment in the international scientific community led by the big Entente nations, for 
fear they might share scientific results with Germany.
176 See the essays o £  GEORG K a r o , Der Krieg der Wissenschaft gegen Deutschland. Muenchen 1919; 
Ibid, D er geistige Krieg gegen Deutschland. Halle 1925; K a r l  K e r k h o f , Der Krieg gegen die deutsche 
Wissenschaft Eine Zusammenstellung von  Kongressberichten und Zeitungsmeldungen. Wittenberg 1922.
177 KERKHOF, D er Krieg gegen die deutsche Wissenschaft, p. 20.
179 lind., p. 3.
179 Ibid, p. 23 fiL
180 H abet was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1918 for the synthesis o f ammonia from its elements and Nemst 
in 1920 in recognition o f his work in thermochemistry.
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Democratic ideals did not seem to be represented in the International Research 
Council and the effort to keep it “between ourselves” advocates the “aristocratic charac­
ter of this academic corporation”.181 In addition, Germany’s cultural-political seclusion 
forced the country to develop ways o f supporting science and reforming its science pol­
icy. Moreover, the isolation created the conditions for the development of an ideological 
framework that instigated hostility to western countries, particular against France, also by 
distinguishing culture, with which Germany identified itself, from the western civilisation, 
represented by the French Enlightenment. This conceptual division was to find its radical 
expression some years later in national socialist ideology.
181 SCHROEDER-GlTDEHUS, Internationale Zusam m enarbeit, p. 103.
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2.2. Germany's damaged image abroad and its Foreign C utum l Policy after W orld W ar T.
In autumn 1922, long discussions on the status of German science and its impact 
on the Weimar Republic’s foreign relations took place at the German Parliament It was 
the first time in the history o f  the Reichstag that German science was discussed as the 
main subject o f a parliamentary debate. The discussion initiated by Prof. Georg Schrei- 
ber, a senior representative of the Central Party, brought up the issue of Germany’s for­
eign cultural policy, which was a subject of serious concern to the young Republic after 
the war. Schreiber also was a professor of engineering at Muenster University and had 
developed something of a reputation as the ‘‘eminence grise” behind the scenes, on the 
account o f the influential role he had played in the discussion on shaping the state’s for­
eign cultural policy.182 He stressed the strong relationship between German science, cul­
ture and the state’s economy, describing science as the “moral capital” o f Germany, 
which needed to be placed and developed abroad.183 German science and culture, argued 
Schreiber, was just as important for the country’s foreign relations as diplomacy, financial 
policy and commercial policy were. Lack of cultural exchange with other countries not 
only meant scientific provincialism and backwardness, but also threatened the country 
with total devastation. As an engineer, Schreiber used powerful metaphors arguing that 
not only industry depended on raw materials from abroad, but also science.184 This was 
evident for certain disciplines in natural science, such as bacteriology and medicine, but 
also history, art history, archaeology, language studies, in short, studies that depended on 
‘old texts’. The ‘raw materials* that both natural sciences and humanities required, were, 
for Schreiber, the participation in international congresses and organisations, the acquisi­
tion of scientific books and journals, the undertaking o f research missions, and the like. 
The German institutes abroad, which were more or less depended on Foreign Ministry’s 
money occupied the same ‘feeding’ role. Among these were the Archaeological Institutes 
in Rome, Cairo and Athens and the Zoological Station in Naples.
It seems that some economic circles of the Republic had realised that the old 
diplomatic means Germany had used, were inadequate for the new, multifarious de­
182 FRITZ von T w a r d o w sk i , Anfaengp der deutschen Kulturpolitifc zum Ausland. Bonn, Bad Godesberg, 
1970, p. 23.
183 Interpellation on 16 October 1922, included in “Reichstagsverhandlungen vom 15. und 16- November 
1922”, entitled “Die Not der Wissenschaft im Reichstag”, p. 8992, in: PAAA, R 65519.
184 Notice o f Ministry Director Heilbron to Prof. Dr. Schreiber, on 31 October 1922, ixr PAAA, R 65519 
Compare also: Interpellation on 16 October 1922, ibid.
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mands the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs was called to deal with in the post-war period. 
Schreiber acknowledged that Germany's devastating economy forced the country to fo­
cus on the economic dimension of its foreign relations, leaving aside the cultural-political 
problems. He stressed, however, that this neglect would seriously affect the state’s econ­
omy in the future.18S Nonetheless, the focus o f foreign policy, even of foreign cultural 
policy, on the Republic’s economic interests was not something new directly attributable 
to the war. The pre-war discussions on cultural influence abroad had been held along the 
lines of economic influence. What was new, though, was the cultural-political ideals with 
which the German ‘materialistic’ life, particularly German foreign policy, had to be nur­
tured. In 1919, the Prussian State Secretary and future Minister o f Education, Carl Hein­
rich Becker, on a draft for the National Assembly's Constitution attempted to define 
cultural policy stating that
“cultural policy, is the conscious establishment of intellectual values in the service of the 
state and its people, for inner consolidation and for negotiation (Ausdnanderset%un£) 
with other peoples abroad.” 186
The new Republic, unlike France, Britain and the United States, as the Germans argued, 
planned their new cultural policy in the same peaceful and non-aggressive spirit that had 
already been introduced by Karl Lamprecht, in 1912. However, that conscious idealism, 
which came to the fore primarily as a defence against French culture and its influence on 
the 1919 peace-text, only seemed to be a theory, as political and economic interests were 
always present in foreign cultural policy discussions.
The double dimension of that policy was illustrated by Prof. Eduard Spranger, in 
1923. In his view, cultural policy should aim either at “ethical cultural ideas” (“ethische 
Kulturidei*), at the cultural output itself, or at gaining power abroad.187 With regard to 
science, he stressed what had already been argued in the “International Association of 
Academies” in Wiesbaden, in 1899:
“Two conflicting conceptions for the purpose of scientific research prevail at the present 
day. According to one of them even the knowledge that is acquired and distributed by 
the nation is only an instrument to be used for promoting its own political power, 
greatness and renown. The other view says that this knowledge is the contribution which
185 Interpellation on 16 October 1922, ibid.
186 Gted ur KURT DCiWEUL, Deutschlands Auswärtige KuIturpoEtik, 1918-1932. Grundlinien und Doku­
mente. Koeln 1976, p. 29.
187 Ibid, p. 33.
as a matter of plain duty, a nation owes to the whole civilisation to be used for increasing 
die welfare and happiness of mankind [sic].” 188 
Spranger particularly emphasised what one might call die ‘altruistic* or ‘idealistic* 
character of German science and implying the imperious role of the Allies by excluding 
Germany from the international scientific community, he declared tha t
“German scientists [...] would consider it a great misfortune to mankind, if science no 
matter in what form, were to become a monopoly.”189 
One of the issues discussed in the Republic with regard to cultural policy planning, 
was what Germans called “hostile propaganda** (Feindprxpagandd) of the Allies in particu­
lar that of Britain and France. Campell Stuart, one of the leaders o f the hostile propa­
ganda, according to Germans, argued that in order for the propaganda to be effective, a 
favourable climate was needed. By this he meant creating an “atmosphere” favourable to 
the propagandists.190 Without an appropriate atmosphere, even the most sophisticated 
propaganda would fail. Everyone, who possessed the power to cultivate this climate, 
would be in a position to poison foreigner's minds against other nations using a number 
o f  intellectual weapons (geistige Waffai)}91 Germany considered itself a victim of this tac­
tic. To reverse the unfavourable climate was a particularly hard task for the young Re­
public. Producing anti-propaganda that would targets the French or English culture 
would not only be extremely difficult but would also be in conflict with German ideals. 
What they had to do was promote the inner values of German culture, without using the 
same aggressive means as their opponents. There was “no need to resort to intellectual 
imperialism, noted Becker in 1926, because national particularities know no boundaries 
in the scientific or cultural realm**.192
In die first years o f  the Bismark era, there was a lack o f  a jointly designed education 
policy with an international character, due to the vague boundaries o f responsibilities 
between the land-states and the Reich. At that time, while the other world powers began 
to develop and use education as a modem cultural weapon, in Germany it was still a
188 E d u ard  Sp r a n g e r , Deutschlands Ante3 an der Intemationalen wissenschafdichen Arbeit (Germany's 
work for international science), Leipzig 1926, p. 5. The essay was written both in German and English.
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land-state matter. H ie various interests o f  each land-state that designed its educational 
system were not yet privy to the Reich’s any foreign policy agenda. In addition, the 
authorities o f the Reich, to their discredit, did not pay enough heed to this fact. Conse­
quently, the end o f the war and the cultural propaganda against the defeated Reich left 
Germany unprepared to defend its image abroad. Its improvised counter-measures were 
not effective enough against the foreign, more precisely the French propaganda. As it 
was turned out; France had planned and prepared for a cultural policy for many years, or 
for the “continuation o f war with other weapons”, as a prominent French intellectual 
formulated it.193 Germany’s pre-war ‘arsenal’, i.e. the W ekm acht and the economy, were 
devastated by the Peace-Treaty. All that had been left was German culture and education, 
which had not previously been developed as weapons and were threatened with margina­
lisation and provincialism. To avert the danger of a total national catastrophe, the state 
had to work in two directions: first, to systematically observe the educational policy of 
other countries with regard to their foreign policy, and second, to give its own education 
system a clear foreign political character.194 German idealism, as was demonstrated by 
politicians and intellectuals, was still present in the recent years but only in theory.195 
Since foreign policy was, by definition, very closely related to economic and political in­
terests, idealism eventually found itself edged out by them. However, after the war, the 
belief that even the best economic propaganda abroad would not last long without com­
parable cultural propaganda, gained considerable ground among the economic circles of 
the Republic.196
Towards the end o f  the 1920s, Georg Schreiber demonstrated that the purpose of 
foreign cultural policy was to preserve national culture and retain its influence and world 
power in the process o f strengthening the state's relations with other countries. Taking 
care of German minorities abroad was an exceedingly important task as well, as the sig­
nificance o f maintaining close contact with them became clear.197 They were a consider­
able economic force beyond German borders that could provide the motherland with 
important information on each country, vital in the Republic’s foreign policy planning.
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The same role played diplomats, who were responsible for commercial issues, but also 
were advisors for all cultural-political issues. Germany’s cultural attachés (Ku&urbeiraete) 
were to be drawn both from the business class and the diplomatic corps and their task 
would be two-fold. They would be the “German eyes abroad”, reporting on the situation 
o f German people living beyond Germany’s borders, as well as on cultural activities ín 
the other countries, i.e. unions, schools, museums, the spread of the German language, 
literature, art, and science.198 Their duties were also to include reporting on the position 
o f local authorities towards the delegates themselves. The other task o f the Kukurbeiraete 
would be the observation of the cultural activity of those antagonistic to the German na­
tion. The main reason for this was that Germany wanted to learn from their strategies, 
fill in the gaps in its own policy, and to stay ahead of the game in cultural matters, or 
rather propaganda methods. Among these strategies, priority was given to the exchange 
o f professors and the awarding o f grants to foreigners. Grants would also be given to 
German students who wanted to study abroad, but priority of scholarship allocation was 
given to students wanting to study in countries considered important for German inter­
ests. North and South America, Japan, China, Iran, and Afghanistan were in the first 
rank, followed by Spain, the Nordic States and the Balkans.199 The international dimen­
sion of the Republic’s cultural policy could only be achieved through similar state cultural 
policies, which defined every modem democracy. Germany, as one such young state, 
followed the example of the Unites States and France, striving to shape its cultural policy 
by aiming at “big policy”. At the same time, it was recognised that cultural policy, more 
than ever, was attached to the nation and its history.200
This oratory, leaping constantly from 'national’ to 'international’ and vice versa, 
clearly shows the state in a transitional phase regarding both its domestic and foreign 
policies. The new era in German history, inaugurated by a democratic polity, which was 
short-lived, challenged old institutions through a continuous dialectic between tradition 
and modernity, German idealism and western materialism.201 Kurt Duewell rightly ob­
serves that Germany’s industrialisation and the strong technocratic nature of its society 
that developed almost simultaneously with the Reich’s establishment in 1871, caused a 
deep crisis in ancestral cultural values. A second crisis occurred, due to new technologies,
198 Dr. Gerh. Menz and Herr Selke to the Foreign Ministry Director on 22.10.1920, in: PAAA, R 64853.
199 Ibid.
200 Abstract o f the Cultural Minister's speech, Dr. C.H. Becker, on “Kulturpolitik in der moderner De- 
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when a national cultural state was about to come into existence. The crisis this time was 
the perception and definition of German traditional education.203
-02 D ÜWELL. Deutschlands Auswaertige Kulturpolitik, pp. 13 f.
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2.3. Supporting German science and culture. The establishment o f new institutions.
After the signing o f the Versailles Treaty, the general belief in certain economic 
circles in Germany that the Republic’s financial situation seriously threatened its scientific 
research and consequently the nation’s culture was apparent That juncture called for 
immediate drastic steps.
“The interests of trade and industry seem to be predominant. On the contrary, the cul­
tural-political issue runs the risk of being neglected. This harbours a serious hazard. In 
due course, all economic propaganda will be in vain without a meaningful and organised 
cultural propaganda. German goods and, more generally, all high-quality products that 
we want and can manufacture, will never conquer the wodd, nor dominate the interna­
tional market, if Germany, on the one hand, does not be kept abreast of the cultural cur­
rents and developing tendencies abroad, [...] and on the other hand, does not enlighten 
the foreign countries on German culture, intentions and the capability of German work 
in all fields.”203
In these words, two prominent figures of the economic circles in Leipzig summarised 
the problem and brought to the fore a dimension of culture, which was widely over­
looked by that time.
Until 1919, there was no Ministry o f Culture that represented the Reich as a 
whole, but only a Cultural Department initially subject to the Ministry of the Interior. It 
was usually the Prussian Ministry o f Culture that supported the cultural initiatives that 
had been undertaken abroad since the end of the nineteenth century, and not die Reich’s 
Foreign Ministry.204 In 1919, a section dedicated to cultural issues was set up at this Min­
istry. Nonetheless, the Cultural Section or Section VT, as it was also named, did not really 
operate until 1921, when the Ministry was reformed.205 During the Weimar years, the 
Foreign Ministry financed a number o f newly established institutions that aimed to sup­
port German science and-culture abroad.- The effort to retrieve Germany’s lost greatness 
was focused on the campaign and promotion o f its culture beyond its frontiers, because 
its military and economic power, which by that time were the Reich’s main means of in­
fluence abroad, had collapsed. Germany’s cultural political agenda had to be developed
203 October 1920, Leipzig, Ausarbeitung Dr. Gerh. Menz, Herr Selke. (Deren Vertretung an zustaendiger 
Stelle Herr Siegismund, der 2. Vorsteher des Boersenve reins, uebemommen hat.) to the Foreign Ministry 
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along two main lines: support of its people abroad and promotion and expansion of 
culture beyond its national borders. According to the Minister of Culture and Education, 
Carl-Heinrich Becker, :
“Cultural policy, as organisational strategy, should be sharply distinguished from culture, 
which must be freely developed. Modem democracy does not have a unified culture”, he 
declared
"In democratic France, for example, cultural policy [is] not a mere instrument, but re­
flects the aim of a big policy.” 206
And he concluded that the state cultural policy does not involve abstract goals, but rather 
a mechanism by which these goals can be realised.207
In 1917, the “Institute for Germans Abroad” (Deutsche Institutfuer das Deutschtum 
imAusland) was set up in Stuttgart The initiative was taken by the Union for Commercial 
Geography in Wuerttemberg (IVuerttembergscben Vemns fuer Handelsgeograpbie), but it was 
planned to operate for public benefit with the support o f the Ministry o f Culture of 
Wuerttemberg. It was not a university institute but a central service for German minori­
ties abroad, which provided them with the commercial and legal advice necessary for the 
industry, commerce and the Reich’s economy, in general.208 Among the institute’s aims 
was to strengthen the national, cultural and intellectual ties o f  German Diaspora with 
their homeland, and to remain in close contact with the “Association for Germans 
Abroad” {Verein fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland^. In 1927, a new organisation with the 
same purpose was established under the name o f  “Deutsche Stiftunf \  During the first 
years o f the Weimar Republic leading German personalities - intellectuals, economists, 
civil servants, press correspondents, artists and so forth-, who travelled abroad, were the 
country’s first unofficial cultural delegates. Without being aware of the cultural and 
propagandists importance o f their travels, these people who were usually good judges of 
the local political, social, economic and cultural conditions, did not keep in contact with 
the German consuls or embassies, but acted alone and for their own personal interests. 
To control those private initiatives, highly important at that time for the country’s for­
eign relations, the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs demanded advance notice o f such travels
206 Abstract o f the Cultural Minister's speech, Dr. GH. Becker, held on 2 March 1926 on “Kulturpolitik in 
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by the aforementioned people in order to give them guidelines for their visits abroad.209 
It was obvious that foreign cultural planning had become an urgent necessity.
Beginning in 1924, a number o f organisations were created one after the other, 
giving a remarkable stimulus to the German scientific presence beyond its national bor­
ders. Besides the institutes that already existed in China, Argentina, Samoa, Naples and 
Rovigno, a systematic campaign for German culture was planned. This involved im­
proving structured state organisations, which would henceforth comprise o f all die frag­
mented or private cultural initiatives had been taken by that time. This ambitious plan for 
rescuing German culture and correcting the state’s damaged image abroad, shaped anew 
the state’s post-war science and educational policy, as well as its foreign policy agenda. 
One of the first attempts at cultural promotion by the young Republic was centred on its 
history and language. For this purpose, the “German Academy for the Promotion o f the 
German Language” (Deutsche Akademie %ur Pflege der deutschen Sprache) was established on 5 
May 1925, to be superseded in 1932 by the Goethe Institute. It was inaugurated in Mu­
nich, being perhaps the most representative institution for the promotion o f the German 
language and culture abroad. This initiative came from the University o f Munich and 
found support from other universities in the region o f  Bavaria, as well as from industrial, 
commercial and banking circles, and various prominent figures o f the region.210 The aim 
of the Academy was to bring Germany’s intellectual and economic forces together in or­
der to promote and expand the appreciation of German culture world-wide.211 *Through 
numerous branches that were set up, from the Far East and Latin America to South Af­
rica and the Balkans, the Academy co-ordinated large-scale cultural activities, always 
holding the spread o f the language as its first priority.
By that time, Germany did not have a national representative institution for the pro­
motion o f its culture, as other big nations, like France, did. Despite the fact that the 
Academy was supported by private and regional funds, it did not seek to serve their in­
terests but rather the interests o f the entire nation. The idea o f creating an institution of 
this kind had existed since 1850 and, more importantly, it was not based on any foreign 
model. King Maximilian II had planned, together with Leopold von Ranke, the estab-
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lishment o f an institute with exactly the same name.212 Yet, despite the German origins of 
the idea, the Germans themselves had little experience of running such an institution.213 
Unlike Germany, other states, like England, Italy and France, did have this experience, 
having established cultural institutions a long time before. These institutions were the 
official carriers not only o f their national culture. Moreover, they were a vector o f propa­
ganda against Germany, as the Germans saw it, who to a certain extent, used their mod­
els to form its own Academy.214 Its establishment was very carefully planned and in the 
early stages was kept confidential. I t  was very important for the new institution to receive 
support from all other academies, as well as from economic and other organisations. The 
first institution that responded to request for support was the Bavarian Academy o f Sci­
ence, which along with the Prussian Academy o f Science, were the two excesivelly im­
portant cultural institutions in Germany. The “German Academy” was regared as a 
genuine and direct representation o f  the state’s national life and culture and would serve 
to protect and promote these attributes. The advancement o f what was described as the 
German nation’s intellectual culture would be the first, direct undertaking o f the Academy. 
However, the emphasis on German material culture had to be indirect and remain at the 
margins o f the Academy’s task.215 In other words, the Academy was designed to develop 
close relations with commercial, industrial, technical and other similar organisations 
abroad and support their undertakings, because:
“ [...] Wherever abroad, the German language, German schools, German boots, 
German music, and German art make their influence felt. There, would be fertile soil for 
the expansion of German material culture. [...] If material culture does not exert world 
influence nor have a wodd status, German intellectual culture will become poorer, be­
cause the material basis will be missing. Like intellect and flesh, body and soul, intellec­
tual and material culture belong to each other in the German people’s lives and work.”216 
This co-existence was translated into science-based ‘thinking’ and ‘bargaining’ (Denken 
und Handeh) for domestic and foreign policy-making and it became an integral part of 
Germany’s education focus on the state’s consciousness and communal feelings.217 To
212 Undated docum ent Akademie zur wissenschafdichen Erforschung und zur Pflege des Deutsch turns. 
Deutsche Akademie- Einfuehrung in der Plan der Deutschen Akademie (Vertraulich!), in: BAB R 43 1/ 
812.






fulfil these requirements, the German Academy planned to use the following methods: 
continually train speakers to be sent to lecture abroad; organise foreign missions with 
German doctors; expand German books and daily newspapers; increase the number of 
German acquisitions in foreign libraries; create branches for the expansion of language 
(Deutsche SchuU); organise language courses; disseminate German music, theatre, and fine 
art, support German clubs and unions abroad; participate in the expansion of German 
industry, handicrafts, technology and commerce, and so forth. In close collaboration 
with the administration of the state the Academy aspired to become a symbol for the 
Republic with the motto: “from the nation, through the nation, with the nation, for the 
nation!”.218
Since late nineteenth century, Germany’s h ig h e r  education had proven to be the 
most effective means for large-scale cultural influence over other nations. In 1900, the 
German Reich was the “uncontested Mecca” for foreign students who streamed in, from 
all over the world, to the German ‘temples of knowledge’.219 20In 1899, the foreign stu­
dents in German universities numbered 6,284. The equivalent figures for France in 1900 
(1,770) and for the United States in 1904 (2,673) clearly show the student traffic to Ger­
many at this time was of a different magnitude [See: Table 3]. The majority of foreign 
students at German universities in 1892, were Americans, accounting for 22% of the to­
tal number of foreigners. This figure, however, was dramatically decreased to 0.7% by 
1924 [See: Table S\.
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United States 10000
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American students at German Universities 22% 0,7%
The number o f students who had previously preferred Germany for their higher educa­
tion were now attracted by France, which intensified its cultural propaganda at the ex­
pense o f Germany. Paris, which in 1927 attracted four thousand foreign students, had 
already built student houses for each nation that had sent its promising young scholars to 
France. Plans were already well in hand to build new student residences for Belgium, 
Switzerland, Canada, Scandinavia, and Chile.* 223 Scientific investigation was in particular 
danger and, with it, all scientific, artistic and technical forces o f the state that depended 
on research. German production was, in consequence, cut back and this domino effect 
o f these cuts, as many Germans argued, entailed an unsettling o f  the "ideal and technical 
foundations” o f their culture.224 This and Germany's desire to regain its lost "place in the 
sun” on the international political stage was exactly what was at stake.
An effective medium that Germany had used to regain the large numbers of for­
eign students that it had had once before, and also to attract professors, researchers, sci­
entists and intellectuals to its universities and laboratories, was to grant them scholar­
ships. In fact, this was not a new or innovative strategy. Foreign students in Germany 
had already been accommodated with discounted fees, awards, and the like, which by
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that time had a more charitable than cultural-political character.225 In addition, the profile 
of the foreign students who visited the country’s universities was almost unknown.
“We hardly know anything about diem, exept their name, their country of origin and 
their educational background. [...] Their personality only occasionally becomes better 
known”,
reported the government’s advisor, Professor W. Franz, to the Minister o f Education, in 
1924.226 What was new though, was the careful restructuring o f the old grant-policy. This 
new policy suggested sponsorship for foreigners who were very gifted and favourably 
disposed towards Germany.227 It was believed that those people could stand Germany in 
good stead on political and economic plane, as soon as they returned to their homelands. 
Nonetheless, this elite selection o f foreigners was hindered by the limited budget avail­
able due to recession. In order for Germany to benefit from the students to whom 
scholarships were granted, Prof. Franz suggested that each university provide tutors for 
foreign students (.Auslandskuratoren), each tutor taking a specific group of countries. Their 
role would be to supervise the payment o f the grants, help them with their studies, and 
also introduce them to the German culture. The tutors would regularly report to the uni­
versity’s administration. It was very important for the tutors to stay in close contact with 
the students in their care, even after they had returned to their homelands.228 That par­
ticularly applied to technical experts and business graduates. These groups of students 
would become familiar with production areas in Germany, making it more likely that 
they would develop business contacts with those sectors, thus supporting German in­
dustry.229 It was very well-known that many foreign students, who were grateful for their 
education in Germany, were at the disposal of their tutors, who had advised and sup­
ported them for many years. What had been introduced by Prof. Frank was a kind of 
network among the students, their universities and professors, and particular economic 
sectors in Germany. Prof. Frank’s suggestion justified the belief that “cultural politics
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pave the way for foreign policy and trade policy”.230 The only institution that could and 
should take over the grant-project, was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its previous ex­
perience in the area was the most important credential for that choice. Nonetheless, it 
was very important for the role o f the Ministry to be kept secret, giving the impression 
that the whole undertaking was initiated by private citizens. In this way, Germany would 
no t fall foul of the Versailles Treaty and would not breach the provisions that prevented 
the country from signing any bilateral contracts.
The first organisation to provide foreign students and university teachers with grants 
was the “Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftun£\ the oldest German institution o f its kind, which 
founded in 1861 as a private initiative.231 hi 1925, with significant support from the For­
eign Ministry, it was re-established as a public corporation.232 There were two main rea­
sons why the foundation encouraged foreigners to study at German universities: first, 
those students who benefited (even a brief period) from the German education system, 
would, in the future, build bridges between their homelands and Germany. Second, they 
hoped to counteract student-propaganda from other countries.233 The allocation of 
grants to several German Universities and Technical Schools for foreign students was 
“the most important cultural undertaking” the Cultural Section had ever embarked on.234 
In 1927, the German Academic Office for Foreigners \Deutscbe Akademische AuslandssteUe 
(DAASt)] was created from the pre-existing Union of German Universities {Verband 
Deutscher Hocbschuleii). This service, located in Dresden, encouraged the establishment of 
similar offices for foreigners at all German Universities. The task of these services was to 
advise foreign students on their studies and any problems that might arise during their 
stay in Germany. Moreover, their task was to encourage foreign students to socialise and 
integrate into German student circles, and, above all, to introduce them to German cul­
ture. In the beginning, only eighty foreigners were granted yearly scholarships o f 1,500
230 Report on the first meeting o f  die Academic Service for Foreigners [Ueber die erste Tagung der 
Akademischen Auslandsstellen (AKA)], on 14-16-03.1931, Berlin, im Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAK), ZSg. 
137/ 16.
231 DÜWELL, Deutschlands Auswaertige Kulturpolitik, p. 171.
232 Confidential fetter o f the Ministry Director Friedrich Heilbton to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AA), 
on 16.05.1925, in: PAAA, R 64794.
233 Runderiass von Schubert an saemtliche Deutsche Missionen und Berufskonsularbehoerden im 
Auslande, 03.07.1925, in: PAAA, R  64794.
254 H-R-Poppe to Herrn Dirigenten on 23.06.1925, in: PAAA, R 64794.
76
Marks, but by 1930, over three hundred students from forty-seven countries received an 
Alexander von Humboldt grant235
If  attracting foreign students to  German Universities was vital for the new Re­
public’s foreign cultural policy, the presence of German students at foreign universities 
was just as important In die case o f the former, it was hoped that students would carry 
German culture and science back with them, when they returned to their homelands. 
Consequently, they were expected to influence the political and economic circles o f their 
own countries in favour of German interests. In die case o f the latter, most important 
was the fact that German students abroad were one of the few points o f contact the 
country had with the international scientific community. The experience of foreign aca­
demic life, the advancement of research, scientific achievements, and in short, the new 
knowledge on the international scientific community, from which Germany was shut out, 
could to some extent become accessible through its students abroad. In 1925, in order to 
promote the exchange of knowledge, professors and students o f Heidelberg University 
decided to establish an institution that could fund the exchange of their own scholars 
with those from foreign universities.236 This initiative was also supported by the Prussian 
Cultural Minister, Carl Becker. The “Academic Exchange Service” (“Akademiscbe Aus- 
tauscbdiensfr)t as it was renamed in 1929, merged with the Alexander von Humboldt Süftung. 
Soon, all German universities, following Heidelberg’s example, set up branches o f the 
above service. With Germany’s admission to the League of Nations in 1926, the activities 
of the Academic Exchange Service were intensified and branches were opened in many 
foreign countries. Among the tasks at these branches was the selection o f local students 
for grant assistance. It should be underlined that one of the most important criteria for 
the selection o f candidates was the social position o f their families. Candidates of “good 
descent”, i.e. o f prominent and powerful families, were more likely to become the future 
members of the elite of their own countries. Therefore, being favourably disposed to­
wards the country that contributed to their education, they were expected to become
235 Bulgaria was first on the Ust with 43 bursars, following by USA with 21, Turkey with 18 and Hungary 
with 16 bursars. AH figures cited in: DOWELL, Deutschlands Auswaerdge Kulturpolitik, p. 171.
236 Undated document “Akademischer Austauschdienst Deutsche Vereinigung foer 
staats wissenschaftlichen Studentenaus tauch e.V.”, in: PAAA, R 64794. In 1923, was created the “Deutsche 
Vereinigung foer staats wissenschaftlichen Studentenaustausch e.V.” in Heidelberg, which was the early 
form o f that created in 1925. See: DCWELL, Deutschlands Auswaerdge Kulturpolitik, p. 175.
77
Germany’s solid political and economic partners.237 Consequently, the criteria for the al­
location o f scholarships to foreign students seemed to be more socio-political than aca­
demic.
The Republic initially concentrated its efforts on the United States o f  America, with 
which it had been engaged in close scientific collaboration since 1850. Among the coun­
try’s priorities was to revive the exchange program for professors, which had been in ex­
istance since 1905. By 1925, soon after the Academic Exchange Service was established, 
twelve to fifteen German students were selected to be sent to America, the contemporary 
Mecca o f science in many disciplines.23* Despite the fact that, at this time, Germany 
could not find enough money for American students who wanted to study at its own 
universities, German students in America received great support. For a number of rea­
sons, German engineers, technicians (Tecbmker) and doctors were among the most fa­
voured scientists who were to visit foreign universities as exchange students. Before the 
war, German technical specialists and engineers abroad had enjoyed great respect, com­
paring to their foreign colleagues, because of their good education and wide training ex­
perience.239 English and American companies engaged in projects outside their own 
countries preferred to work with German technicians rather than with local scientists. 
Yet, this changed after the war, and induced the following problems: the war experience 
gave foreign engineers precedence over their German colleagues who were establishing a 
career outside their country, affecting Germany’s technical competitiveness abroad. In 
addition, the state’s impotence to support almost any building or technical project in 
Germany created unemployment in the field, discouraging many engineers from return 
to their homeland. Moreover, there was a fear that the country’s best engineers and tech­
nicians would be forced, on these grounds, to leave their country and look for a job 
abroad. Thus, the Republic would be left stripped o f its best graduates who were abso­
lutely essential for its reconstruction. Another serious problem was the decline in the 
quality o f training in German technical universities, which were also affected by the re­
strictions o f the Versailles Treaty. Germany had to intensify projects that persuaded stu­
237 Confidential letter o f  D. (?) to Wdd. Geh-Rat Herm  Dr. Willy von Diiksen, on 21.03.1925, in: PAAA R 
64794. See also: Report o f Prof W. Franz, Geheime r Regie rungs rat to the Minister £ Wissenschaft, Kunst 
und Volksbildung, on 12.07.1924, in: PAAA, R  64795.
238 Dr. R. Schlubach (Hamburg) to the German Foreign Ministry on 26-05-1925, in; PAAA R 64794.
239 Undated reports written by A  A  Schubert, Geheimer  Baurat, regarding 1) Ausbildung von 
Auslandsingenieuren 2) Betreuung der auslaendischen Studierenden an den deutschen Hochschulen., in: 
PAAA, R  64794.
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dents, scientists and intellectuals to travel abroad and to motivate them to experience 
foreign academic and research environments, but above all to attract as many foreigners 
as possible to its own educational institutions, hi 1931, the three biggest institutions for 
the support o f scientific exchange, i.e. the “Alexander vom Humboldt-Stiftung”, the 
“Academic Exchange Service” (Akademische Austauschdienst), and the “German Academic 
Office for Foreigners” {Deutsche Akademische Auslandsstelle (DAASt) joined hands and be­
gan to operate under the name of the “German Academic Exchange Service” (.Deutscher 
Akademischer Austauschdienst DAAD), and in close collaboration with the Ministry o f For­
eign Affairs.240
One might notice that a great number of systematic initiatives for the support of 
German science and culture came into existence and flourished in the mid 1920s. This 
was no coincidence, but rather due to the increased number o f  voices coming from sci­
entists from all over the world the Allies to lift the sanctions the peace agreement had 
imposed on Germany. Gradually, the Weimar Republic acquired greater latitude for ma­
noeuvre and the Allies seemed to be more tolerant towards Germany's struggle for inter­
national communication.
240 This organisation survives until today and still is Germany’s largest scholarhip institution.
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2A . The <cNotpmänschaß. der deutschen Wissenschaften.”
“Ernst und dunkel wie e b  Kembrandtbild Iiegt die Zukunft der 
deutschen Wissenschaft vor uns. Aber inmitten der dunkel 
Farbenmassen flutet jene Helle koesdichsten seelischen Lichtes, das den 
schier unerschoepflichen Tiefen des deutschen Idealismus entstammt.”  241
Germ an/s achievements in chemistry and its advances in chemical warfare not­
withstanding, in the years following the Great War the country found itself behind the 
big nations, in particular the United States, in disciplines where German science had been 
a leading power before the outbreak o f hostilities. Among those disciplines was plant 
breeding (Pflan^enemaebmng), in which Germany’s backwardness after the war was par­
ticularly evident The development o f this science demanded an interdisciplinary research 
that should have also included the theoretical fields of agronomy, physical chemistry, and 
physiological chemistry (physiologische Chemie), Research on plant breeding focused on the 
knowledge of elements like ground mineral salts, which is necessary for die rapid devel­
opment of green plants. One o f the most serious problems scientists had to deal with 
were what quantity o f elements each species of cultivated plant needed. The specification 
of the external and internal factors, i.e. climatic conditions, micro-fauna and flora o f the 
soil, plant physiology and so on, which affected the maintenance and absorption o f the 
nutritional elements, was also an important research question. The solution of these 
problems would allow large-scale cultivation, which was difficult at that time. Moreover, 
the systematic use o f fertilisers would boost the chemical industry, inaugurating a new era 
in German agriculture and improving its economic position.
At the beginning of 1920, the Germans realised that their country’s economic plight 
seriously threatened scientific research and, in a broader sense, their culture. Germany’s 
decline would not only mean the tarnishing of its image abroad and its intellectual influ­
ence upon other states, but also the downgrading o f German education, which threat­
ened with provincialism. Science and technology was regarded as the all-important in­
strument to remedy the country’s deficiencies. Fritz Haber emphasised the role science 
had to play in reviving German/s intellectual and economic pre-eminence:
241 “Grave and dark, like a Rembrandt picture, appears the future before us. But, amid foe darkness o f col­
ours, it suffuses with bright, endearing spiritual light that comes from foe pure, perennial depths o f  foe 
German Idealism“, in: Akademische Nacbricbten, V. Jahrgang, Nummer 9,01.12.1923, (Leipzig), in: PAAA, R 
65520. Translation is mine.
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“The destruction of our country as a great political power will remain what it is today: a re­
minder of our existence as a people depends on the maintenance of our great intellectual 
strong position, which is inseparable from our scientific enterprise/’242 
Similarly, Adolf von Hamack called science “the absolutely essential and necessary pillar 
of culture”, to which the “conquest o f nature” and “the conquest of humanity” belong.243 
These two forces had to be built up in harmony, making both natural sciences and hu­
manities inseparable elements of German culture.244 Consequently, the creation o f a sin­
gle national institution that would support German science became a priority. The idea 
was that the new institution would sponsor all German universities, academies, libraries, 
and research institutes. Scholarships would be given to every young promising scientist 
who could potentially contribute to the advancement of science and the country’s pros­
perity. Nonetheless, the relationship between science and culture was not the only moti­
vation behind the creation of a new funding organisation, but also was the alliance be­
tween science and the economy. Hence, the arguments regarding the promotion o f natu­
ral sciences, technology, and medicine rather than literature, archaeology and the similar 
disciplines, were more evident and much stronger.
The Kaiser Wilhelm institutes, which by that time had advanced research in natu­
ral sciences with extraordinary success, were also affected by the economic and financial 
crisis that succeeded the war. Difficulty in supplying experimental material caused serious 
problems for the normal running o f  some institutes, like the institutes for physical 
chemistry and electrochemistry, biology and experimental therapy, which were threat­
ened with paralysing.245 The money the Society was receiving from industrial and trade 
circles had proven inadequate and additional support for the survival o f the country’s 
most important research centre was as essential as ever. It was not a coincidence, there­
fore, that the same figures that played a leading part in the establishment o f the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Society were also engaged in the creation o f die new supporting organisation. 
The Prussian Minister of Education, Friedrich Schmidt-Ott, the State Secretary, Carl- 
Heinrich Becker, the physicist and assistant at the Prussian Educational Ministry, Hugo
Andreas-Kraess,. the, secretary o f the Prussian Academy, Max Planck, and Fritz Haber
242 Haber's announcement of the founding o f  the Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaften, cited in:
Macrakis, S urv iv ing  the Swastika, p . 33.
243 Adolf von H am ack , “Wissenschaft und Kultur”, Farlamentarische Abend on 23 November 1920, cited 
in: NOTKER HAMMERSTEIN, Die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft in der Weimarer Republik und im 
Dritten Reich. Wissenschaftspolitik in Republik und Diktatur 1920-1945. Muenchen 1999, p. 52.
244 Ibid, pp . 52 f.
245 "Bencht ueber Finanzlage der KWG, 3 Dez. 1923”, cited in: Macrakis, Surviving the Swastika, p . 32.
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dreas Kruess, the secretary o f the Prussian Academy, Max Planck, and Fritz Haber had 
frequent informal meetings between 1919 and 1920 on the formation of an organisation 
that could rescue German science. Although Adolf von Hamack was, once again, the 
person who used his influence to bring together figures from state, science, and industry, 
Fritz Haber was the spiritual founder o f the new organisation.
By the end o f 1916, Haber had set forth the idea of a new scientific foundation, the 
“Kaiser Wilhelm Foundation for War Technical Science” ("Kaiser Wilhelm Sttftungfuer 
kriegstechnische Wissenschaf?’). The money for its support came from die profits a German 
Company for gas lamps was making from the manufacture o f gas masks. The "Kaiser 
Wilhelm Foundation” aimed at the systematic promotion of scientific and technical re­
search at Universities, so that "a rationalised relationship between the military and Ger­
man science” could be established in times of both war and peace, argued Haber amidst 
the war.246 Few years later, in peacetime, he suggested a purely civilian organisation that 
would foster research in all disciplines o f universities and other institutions. He empha­
sised that Germany’s "technical and natural science-orientated education should not be 
deprived of the humanities’ weft”.247 Moreover, an education o f that kind, stripped of the 
humanities’ culture, would be confined to specialisation, which was poor in idealism.24*
Taking into account the war experience, when he was at the helm of the most im­
portant research institute of the time in Germany the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for 
Chemistry, Haber proposed a self-governing corporation of science, financed by the state 
and private capital. Nonetheless, his proposal met with opposition from some industrial­
ists, like Carl Duisberg, who tried to hinder the relations o f the new organisation with 
industrial capital by setting up competitive "counter organisations’.249 Despite the fact that 
the money would come from the state and some private enterprises, the new scientific 
organisation had to be independent As had happened with die Kaiser Wilhelm Society 
almost a decade before, the choice o f projects and scientists had to be made on the basis
246 Gted in: MARGIT SZOELLOESI-jANZE, ,fD er Wissenschafder aïs Experte. Kooperationsveriiaeltnisse 
von Staat, Mlitaer, Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft, 1914-1933”, in: D o r is  K a u fm an n  (Hsg.) Geschichte 
der Kaiser-WOhelm-Gesellsch aft im Nationalsozialisaius. Be s tand aufnahme und Perspekdve der For- 
schung. Goettingen 2005, pp. 46-64, here p. 55.
247 Gted in: H a m m er stein , Die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, p. 42.
248 Ibid, pp. 42,54.
249 SzoELLOESI-JANZE, “Der Wissenschafder als Experte” pp- 55 £; HAMMERSTEIN, Die Deutsche For­
schungsgemeinschaft, p p . 54 f.; WIN f r ie d  SCHULZE, Der Stifferverband fuer die Deutsche Wissenschaft 
1920-1995. Bedin 1995, pp. 76 ff.
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of the country’s needs and not on the special interests of some authority or personality.250 
In addition, “Hamack Principle” o f scientific freedom, which marked Germany’s most 
important and prestigious research organisation in 1911, would also place its stamp on 
the new scientific organisation.
On 30 October 1920, the German Academies of Sciences together with universities, 
technical universities, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, the Organisation o f Technological 
Unions, and the Union of German Natural Scientists and Doctors established the much- 
desired organisation under the name o f “Emergency Association for the German Sci­
ence” Ç'Notgemeinschafi der deutscben Wissenscbafteri’). After its establishment, the agricul­
tural and veterinary schools, as well as the Academies for Forestry became members of 
the Notgemeinschaft. Its aim was to prevent the increasing danger that German science 
would collapse.251 In it, Fritz Haber finally saw his vision fulfilled “in peace times”. Being 
one o f the instigators of the new funding organisation, he suggested that Friedrich 
Schmitt-Ott co-ordinate the organisation. Schmitt-Ott was eventually appointed presi­
dent o f  the organisation, while Haber together with Adolf von Hamack and the mathe­
matician Walter von Dyck were elected vice-presidents.
The main supporters o f the Notgemeinschaft were the Ministry of the Interior and the 
Ministry o f Finance, which by June 1920, had put up a sum o f  twenty million Marks.252 
Considerable contributions was also made by the Union o f  German Bankers, the indus­
trial and agricultural associations, the unions of small and wholesale merchants, and some 
germanophile organisations abroad. Combined, they collected the sum of 47 million 
marks by July 1921.253 The yearly budget was estimated at 2,4 million marks, half of
250 Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft Denkschriften (Kortekturabzuege) zur Mitgliederver­
sammlung am 12 Maei2 1926, Muenchen. (Als Handschrift gedrueckti Vertraulich!) Preamble by F. 
Schmidt-Ott, im PAAA, R 65522.
01 “Bericht d er Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenchaft ueber ihre Taeügkeit bis zum 31. Maeiz 
1922" p. 5, in: PAAA, R 65519.
252 “Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenchaft ueber ihre Taetigkeit bis zum 31. Maexz 
1922” , p. 6, in; PAAA, R 65519. Another source reports that the initial amount o f money came to 2.6 mil­
lion golden Marks. Akademische Nachrichten, V. Jahrgang, Nummer 9, 01.12.1923, (Leipzig), in: PAAA, R 
65520.
251 By 31 March 1922, the amount o f  money from abroad came to 3,260,143 Marks, let alone the two mil­
lion Marks the Japan Foundation, Hoshi, offered far chemical research. “Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der
Deutschen Wissenchaft ueber ihre Taetigkeit bis zum 31, Maerz 1922”, pp. 6 ff, 33, in: PAAA, R 65519.
84
which would be allocated to libraries, Technical Universities and Forest Academies.254 
The Notgemeinschaft would also cover printing costs for books and journals, expenses for 
foreign scientific literature, laboratory infrastructure, experimental material, and expenses 
for expeditions. Humanities received about 30% of the total budget, while medicine and 
natural sciences were allocated 50%. The equivalent figure for technical sciences and en­
gineering was 12%. The remaining 8% was allocated to various undertakings and agri­
cultural research.255 Additionally, an important initiative that was taken against Germany’s 
exclusion from the international scientific community was the establishment o f the 
“Reichs^entrak fuer udssenschaftliche Berichterstattun£\ a national office for scientific docu­
mentation. It was founded in 1920, supported by the Ministry o f  the Interior and admin­
istrated by the Prussian Academy of Sciences. Under the direction of Dr. Karl Kerkhof, 
the author of some of the most spirited essays about “the war against German sci­
ence”,256 the Rmchssgntrak used photocopying technology to became a clearing house for 
foreign scientific periodicals. In 1923, it supplied German libraries with 6,440 reproduc­
tions, and by 1929 the figure rose to over 100,000, which the Notgemeinschqft funded with 
90,000 marks.257
If  the scientific embargo deprived German scientists o f  die knowledge of scien­
tific ctivity abroad, the international scientific community also remained in the dark about 
what had been going on inside Germany. Karl Kerkhof, realising die cultural and politi­
cal importance of the dissemination o f  German scientific and technical achievements 
abroad, launched, in 1925, the periodical “Forschung und Fortschritti*. This journal became 
die official organ o f the 'Notgemeinschaft and, in 1927, was first published in Spanish, in an 
attempt to reach a wider public. Apart from its scientific contributions, the periodical 
also had a political mission. It informed German scholars about the scientific boycott 
and gave them guidelines in case they were invited to represent the country in intema-
254 “Bericht der Notgemdnschaft der Deutschen Wissenchaft ueber ihre Taetigkeit bis zum 31. Maerz 
1922”, p. 8, in: PAAA, R 65519.
255 H ammERSTEIN, Die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinsdiaft, p. 64.
256 Karl K e r k h o f , Der Krieg gegen die deutsche Wissenschaft Erne Zusammenstellung von 
Kongressbenchten und Zeitungsmeldungen. Wittemberg 1922; Ibid., Internationale wissenschafdiche Kon- 
gresse 1922-1923. Beiiin 1923; Ibid., “Die intemationalen naturwissenschafdichen Organisationen vor und 
nach dem Weltkriege und die Deutsche Wissenschaft”, in: Internationale Mtmatsscbriji, XV, 3, 0 an.-Feb- 
1921), pp. 225-242; Ibid., “Das Versailles Diktat und die deutsche Wissenschaft”, in: Monatshefte fuer 
Auswaerdge PoStik, VII, 11 (Nov. 1940), pp. 836-850.
237 SPENCE Richa rd s, "Die Movement o f Scientific Knowledge”, p. 404; H ammERSTEIN, Die Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinsdiaft, pp. 69 f.
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tional congresses or other scientific undertakings abroad. Gradually, the journal was 
transformed from a pure scientific instrument into a cultural propaganda publication. 
This anti-boycott initiative not only enforced the national character of German science 
policy, but also instigated nationalist, anti-western, and even vindictive feelings.258
Most o f the research projects the Notgemetnschaft supported were proposed by sci­
entists rather than institutes. Large-scale projects that demanded contributions from sci­
entists of different disciplines were limited to expeditions on the Atlantic (1925-27), 
Greenland (1930-31), and the Russian mountains on the borders with Afghanistan and 
China.259 These expeditions also had an obvious cultural-political aim, not only interna­
tionally championing Germany’s achievements, but also giving the country the chance to 
collaborate with other scientific communities, for instance the Russian, and braking the 
fetters of the country’s isolation. Nonetheless, what really determined the direction of 
Germany’s science policy and the promotion o f some disciplines over others, was the 
country’s concern about economic recovery and the welfare o f  its people. The Kaiser 
Wilhelm Society and the Notgemdnschafi were the chief constitutional elements o f the 
German scientific reform, complementing and supporting one another. The Society was 
the major vehicle for the advancement o f German scientific research, while the Notge- 
mdnscbqft̂ rss its financial supporter. In its first report of 1922, it announced immediate 
support in five major disciplines: chemistry, physics, technology, medicine, and biol­
ogy.260 Chemistry was at the top of Germany’s priorities and research on enzymes, as well 
as on the constitution of cellulose, vitamins, chemical radicals, and colloid chemistry was 
to be generously financed. In physics, priority was given to research on problems o f rela­
tive and quantum theory, on particles and their movement, and on radiation. Scientists 
had to be provided with requisite apparati and other materials and to be financed with
258 Ibtd, pp. 70 £; See also: BRlGrrTE ScHROEDER-GUDEHUS, “Internationale Wissemchaftsbeziehungen 
und auswärtige Kulturpolitik 1919-1933. Vom Boykott und Gegen-Boykott zu ihrer Wiederaufnahme”, 
in: R u d o l f  V ie r h a u s , Be r n h a r d  V o m  B r o c k e  (Hg.), Forschung im  Spannungsfeld von Politik und 
G esellschaft Geschichte und Struktur der Kaiser-Wilhelm-/Max-Planck-Gesellschaft. Stuttgart 1990, pp. 
858-885.
259 HAMMERSTEIN, Die .Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, pp. 74  £ O n the German expedihon to the 
Atlantic Sea with the legendary ship "Meteor”, see the relevant publication im PAAA, R 65521.
260 “Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenchaft ueber ihre Taetigkeit bis zum 31.Maerz 
1922”, pp. 38 £, im* PAAA, R 65519.
considerable sums, if German physics were to match the achievements made in the field 
abroad and to resurrect the old glory o f its Nobel-prize laureates again.261
The 'Notgemeinschqft would also sponsor technological research despite its financing 
by industry, on the grounds that extensive and inter-disciplinary projects needed expen­
sive apparatus and techniques to make progress, equipment that industry alone could not 
provide. Medicine was a discipline o f particular importance, with a large number of proj­
ects conducted in related fields, like pharmacology and biology. The Notgemdnsckaft pro­
vided enough funds not only for the absolutely necessary supply o f test materials, but 
also for the projects on theoretical medicine, physiology, pathology, experimental therapy 
and pharmacology. Some of these projects focused on nutrition, albumen and carbohy­
drates -the  fundamental elements o f life- and on the biological effects of radiation. Last 
but not least, biological research, which was particularly poor in German institutes at that 
time, was also among the state’s priorities. The investigation o f  evolutionary mechanics, 
plant and animal-heredity, fertilisers and questions on cultivated plants, as well as on 
primitive and wild forms of plants were eagerly supported by the Notgmdnscbafi. In 1926, 
the institution financed projects on metal research, applied geophysics, geology, the 
properties of electrical currents and atmospheric research, in addition to existing projects 
on theoretical and practical medicine —like cancer and tuberculosis-, applied entomology 
and agriculture. The latter together with all the related fields, o f biology, botany, ento­
mology, zoology, and, to a certain extent, medicine, had great importance for Germany’s 
foreign policy agenda. Scientific missions, particularly to Asia, Russia, Eastern Europe, 
and the Balkans for studying the indigenous fauna and flora to launch improvements in 
German agriculture, as well as research excursions for the fight against tropical diseases, 
resulted in the gradual development o f  scientific collaboration between Germany and 
other countries. Needless to say, economic and political interests were concealed behind 
this collaboration, which later in the Nazi years, was transformed from a co-operative 
scientific interchange into an aggressive territorial expansion in the name of the state’s 
self-sufficiency.
An additional priority in the framework of Germany’s new science policy was re­
search on vitamins A and B. The need for vitamins for the nation’s nutrition was intensi­
fied as soon as trade ground to a halt in the war years, thereby blocking sources of foods
261 “Bericht der Notgemeinschaft”, ibid.
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rich in these vitamins and trace minerals, such as milk.262 At first, it was German industry 
that undertook and sponsored projects on vitamins A and B. The measurement o f vita­
min content in basic food from the German diet was essential for the state’s agriculture. 
In addition, proteins, albumin, and fat were also a significant part o f agricultural research 
in order to develop the country’s rural economy. Albumin, for example, was a  very ex­
pensive yet basic food element, which the human body could absorb almost exclusively 
from animal products. Therefore, the quality of cattle-feed, also rich in proteins, had to 
be very high, making cattle-breeding after the war a particularly expensive task. To tackle 
this problem, scientists suggested to shift focus from animal rearing to attempting to cre­
ate cheap synthetic albumin.263 To develop this and other similar projects in practice de­
manded close collaboration among scientists of different disciplines, if no t from different 
countries. Plant physiologists and agricultural chemists from various national institutes, 
who were ahead on practical issues, had to work together and find a way to deal with 
these new rural problems. Moreover, contact with research stations and institutes abroad, 
in particular with those in the United States and Russia, were needed more urgently now 
than ever.264
Germany’s admiration for American science existed since the beginning o f the 20* 
century. Its advancements in almost every field of life sciences made the United States a 
model for Germany’s research policy, and even more so with the foundation o f the Kai­
ser Wilhelm Society. It was no surprise, therefore, that on the other side o f the Atlantic, 
close co-operation between plant physiologists and agricultural chemists had already been 
established. Again, America became Germany’s model for the creation of agricultural 
research stations staffed with plant physiologists, who, by that time, were absent from 
the German research centres. Although Germany sought to create research institutes in­
side its borders, the possibility o f settingup branches abroad was not excluded. This plan 
was to be put systematically in place after Hitler’s assumption of power. Meanwhile, the 
Zoological Station in Naples, the Institute for Marine Biology in Rovigno, and the Bio­
logical Station in Lunz, in southern Austria, were the only stations outside the country 
that contributed to German agricultural and biological research.
262 Notge meins chaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft. Denkschriften (Korrektuiabzuege) zur Mitgliederver­
sammlung am 12  Maerz 1926, Muenchen. (Als Handschrift gedrueckt! Vertraulich!) Preamble by F. 
Schmidt-Ott, p. V I I 4, im PAAA, R  65522.
263 Denkschriften der Notgpmeinschaft, am 12 Maerz 1926, ibid.y p. VIII 3, im PAAA, R 65522.
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If America was the western model for modernising German research policy, in the 
east it was the Soviet Union, and in particular Ukraine, holding the huge grain reservoir 
that could provide material for advanced research. Moreover, Russia housed the institute 
of the prominent soviet geneticist, Nikolai Ivanovic Vavilov, which boasted the richest 
and most exquisite collections o f wild and primitive forms o f  plant life in the world. 
Vavilov’s experiments for the detection o f the characteristics o f  plants on varrying ter­
rains and temperature conditions were vital for German agriculture.265
In order to meet the new requirements in research, as described above, and to cope 
with the problem o f scientific movement, communication and co-operation, the Repub­
lic had to modify its research policy along the following lines: support the existing re­
search institutes, create new ones, foster new scientific disciplines, and strengthen its in­
ternational relations. The Notgmdnschaft was called upon for contributions to this plan­
ning. Among the first projects funded by the institution was research on malaria, as well 
as on mosquitoes and other insects o f importance for tropical medicine, located largely in 
the Balkan region. The Institute for Ship and Tropical Diseases in Hamburg was at the 
helm of most o f those projects, organising expeditions which had scientific, as well as 
cultural political character to better serve Germany’s foreign relations.266
Nonetheless, the lack of money was not always easily surmounted. In 1926, the 
money that all the new institutes needed in order to purchase only the absolute minimum 
of apparati amounted to 20,000 marks, while the state could only contribute 1,500 marks 
per year.267 The state’s inability to pay the subscriptions of important journals for institute 
libraries, like the American periodicals Journal of Agricultural Research, Phytopathologies, and 
Soil Science, as well as research reports o f the most significant American scientific centres 
made it difficult to find these publications in Germany at all. In 1930, the Notgemeinschcft 
decided to cut funds for interdisciplinary projects and to reduce the number o f research 
grants, employing strict criteria instead o f supporting every research proposal, as it had 
declared in its founding statutes. Excavations, expeditions and library acquisitions were
265 UTE DEICHMANN, Biologen unter Hitler. Portraet einer Wissenschaft im NS-Staat Frankfurt a.M-, 
1995, pp. 152 ff, SUSANNE H eim , "Forschung fber die Autarkie. Agrarwissenschaft an fCaiser-WUhehn- 
Instituten im Nationalsozialismus”, in: Ibid, (Hg.), Autaikie und Ostexpansion. Pflanzenzucht und Agrar­
forschung im Nationalsozialismus, Goettingen 2002, pp. 145-177, here p. 159. See also chapter 6.1. o f  the 
present work.
266 See chapter 3.3.
267 Denkschriften der Notgemeinschaft am 12 Maerz 1926, ibid, p. X 4, in: PAAA, R 65522.
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to be financed with less money and the support of new plans was out o f the question.268 
The Notgemdnschafi was, and continued to be in all the years o f its existence, an integral 
part o f Germany’s cultural political agenda remaining an independent and self- 
administrative scientific organisation. The advancement o f science after the World War 
II became a Machtersafy a power-substitute, for the loss of war and for the loss o f a great 
political power status.269
368 Ham  ME RSTE IN, Die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, p. 84.
269 PAUL Fo r m a n , "Scientific Internationalism and the Weimar physicists: the ideology and its manipula­
tion in Germany after World War I.”, in: Isis 64 (1973), pp. 151-180, here 161 f£
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2.5. German science and international relations
Given that the Peace Treaty left very little -if any- space for Germany to develop bi­
lateral, let alone international relations, one might ask, how did German scientific institu­
tions manage to develop their relations with other countries and what kind of relations 
were they? Was it a matter o f  preventing German science and research from becoming 
provincial and rescuing them from certain dedine, or was there a concept of scientific 
internationalism behind this effort that involved interests other than scientific?
The political and economic aftermath of the Great War forced the German Republic 
to develop foreign relations with two dimensions: to maintain the international prestige 
and influence Germany had before the war and to recover economically. The Peace 
Treaty seemed to have trapped the country within its own boundaries. However, this was 
not exactly the case. Countries that remained neutral during the war became the Repub­
lic’s first foreign partners in science and commerce after the war. The “danger” of devel­
oping relations with those states was already predicted by Emile Picard, one of the “big 
five” men of the International Research Council. At a conference of the Interallied 
Academies of Sciences on 27 November 1918 in Paris, the French delegate suggested 
closing these "small doors” which allowed Germany to enter into international interests, 
by leaving the neutral states out o f the International Research Council.270 However, there 
were certain misgivings by some British delegates about the effectiveness o f the measure 
suggested by Picard. They believed it was most likely to have the opposite effect, 
“throwing the neutrals into the arms o f Germany”.271 Among those countries that were 
finally accepted in the Research Council by the summer o f 1918, were Norway, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain, all retaining friendly relations 
with Germany.272 They also were one of Germany’s main sources of bibliographical ac­
quisitions. Switzerland, for instance, donated a collection o f Swiss scientific books to 
Germany, bought with money raised by former Swiss students who had studied in Ger­
man and Austrian universities. The initiative was undertaken by the rectors o f the univer­
sities o f Basle, Bern, Zurich, as well as of the technical universities and the director o f the
270 Br ig it t e  Sh r o e DER-Gu d e h u s : "Challenge to Transnational Loyalties: International Scientific Or­
ganisations after the First World War” , in: Science Studies 3 (1973), pp. 93-118, here, pp. 96 £
271 Ibid. p. 97. footnote.
272 Ibid
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central library of Zurich.273 Apart from Switzerland, Nordic states also contributed to 
German acquisitions. The libraries o f scientific institutions in Hamburg, for example, 
which suffered severely from the lack o f  foreign journals, particularly on research, man­
aged to acquire about 137 periodicals from those and other countries by 1923. The proj­
ect o f enriching the German libraries was generously supported not only by the Notge- 
meinschafi, as it is mentioned above, but also by a number o f  foreign organisations like the 
Swedish Aid Organisation, the Royal Scientific Society in Denmark, the Association o f 
Foreign Scientific Acquisitions based in The Hague, and the “Germanistic Society o f 
America” in New York.274 The latter donated about 133 o f the newest American medical 
works to both the State Library and to the library of Berlin University.275 Surprisingly 
enough, it was not only the neutral states that supported the young Republic. Some big 
nations, like the US, Canada and Japan became warm and generous sponsors o f German 
science. This stance was not only due to the distinguished record the country continued 
to have in science, but also to the enormous efforts made by Germans living abroad to 
influence authorities in their adoptive countries.
In its early days, the Notgemsinschaft acquired through personal contact with Dr. Lie- 
ber, the former president o f the Central Relief Committee (CRF) based in die United 
States, financial support for its organisational needs.276 The New Order Committee, sub­
ject to the CRF, sponsored the Notgemeinscbqft with 1,075,000 marks in 1921.277 278Perhaps 
the most ambitious plan the Notgemeinschaft had at that time, was to establish exchange 
agreements with Italian libraries, such as the Bibliotheca Hengana.11* Furthermore, one of 
the most important institutions of external help was the Emergency Society for German 
and Austrian Science and Art, based in New York. Under the directorship of a German 
professor at Columbia University, Franz Boas, it was developed into an organisation
273 "Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissen chaft ueber ihre Taetigkeit bis zum 31. Mae re 
1922”, pp. 32 f, im PAAA, R 65519. See also: “Dritter Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen 
Wissenschaft” from 01.04.1923 to 31.03.1924, in: PAAA, R 65520, and in R 65521.
274 Berüner Tageblatt 99,28-02.1923, im PAAA, R  65519.
^ Ib U
276 "Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenchafir ueber ihre Taetigkeit bis zum 31. Maere 
1922”, pp. 32-33, im PAAA, R 65519.
21 Jbid
278 G e o r g  Sc h r e ib e r , Die Not der deutschen Wissenschaft und der geistigen Arbeiter. Geschehnisse und 
Gedanken zur Kulturpolitik des Deutschen Reiches. Leipzig 1923, pp. 102 ff.
dedicated to promoting his country’s science and culture, with branches in Chicago, St. 
Louis, San Francisco, and Newark.279
Apart from die “Germanistic Society of America”, which in 1923/24 gathered more 
than 10,000 dollars, other big foundations sponsored scientific work in Germany gener­
ously. The eminent Japanese Hoshi-Foundadon for Chemistry, for example, had funded 
the Republic since 1922, giving 2,000 Yen monthly, while the American General Electric 
Company donated 15,000 dollars in the year 1923.280 Moreover, General Electric started 
to collaborate with the General Society for Electricity (AUgemeinen Elektrî itaets-Geseilscbafi 
AEG ) and the Siemens company for the advancement of electro-physics in Germany.281 
The involvement of German industry in the rehabilitation o f  science was not only re­
stricted to the national enterprises. Industrialists who were involved in business abroad, 
were voluntarily recruited for that purpose as well. In South America, the German com­
munity played a crucial role, more than anywhere else, in collecting a considerable sum of 
money for the advancement o f science in their fatherland. In 1920, the German Overseas 
Bank (Deutsche Ueberseeiscben Bank), through its branches in South America gathered about 
a 100,000 marks. In addition, the German Scientific Union in Buenos Aires, under the 
directorship o f Dr. L. Merzbacher, allocated about 200,000 marks. In Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil, Dr. Affis-Chateaubriand set up a committee for the support of German science, 
which, by February 1922, had raised 1,350,000 marks for this purpose.282 Finally, it 
should be noted that numerous Germanophiles in many countries, and in particular in 
the neutral states, also made a significant material contribution to German science.283 In 
addition, one o f the two most prestigious North American scientific organisations, the 
Rockefeller Foundation, was among the most generous supporters of German science, 
even from the beginning of its isolation. The foundation primarily supported young sci­
entists in the disciplines of medicine and natural sciences, and for the period o f five years
279 Ibid See also: "Zweiter Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft” from 1. April 1922 
unril 31 Maerz 1923, pp. 5 f-, in; PAAA, R 65519, and in 65521.
2W "Dritter Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaff’ from 01.04.1923 to 31.03.1924, 
pp.33 ff., im PAAA, R 65520, and in R 65521.
2«  Ibid.
282 AU figures im "Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenchaft ueber ihre Taetigkeit bis zum 
31. Maerz 1922”, p. 32-33, im PAAA, R 65519.
283 As such a case was recorded the “funs o f  German science” in Estland. See: “Zweiter Bericht der 
Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft” umfassend ihre Taetigkeit vom 1. April 1922 bis zum 31 
Maerz 1923, p. 5 £, im PAAA, R 65519 and in 65521.
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allocated a sum of 50,000 dollars for research on the above fields.284 In addition, the 
“Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial”, by 1925 had sponsored the German state and 
university libraries with 90,000 dollars for the purchase o f  books and journals in the field 
o f social sciences.285
It seems that the crusade undertaken by the Weimar Republic to rescue German sci­
ence was mainly based on personal contacts initiated by eminent German businessmen 
or scientists. Fritz Haber also was among those men. He travelled across the US to dem­
onstrate the threat over scientific production and research in his country and to ask for 
aid. Albert Einstein, on the other hand, made a series o f journeys, in 1922, to China, Ja­
pan, Spain, and even to Paris, although he stood aloof from any political propaganda in 
favour o f  the Republic’s government. On the contrary, he criticised Germany’s pre-war 
foreign policy and he resolutely declared his pacifism.286 In 1923, the systematic campaign 
to convince the international community about the “lies o f  foreign propaganda against 
German science” started to bear fruit.287 England, Switzerland, Denmark, Spain, the 
United States, China, and Brazil increased their financial contributions as well as ship­
ments o f books, journals and experimental material. The main co-ordinator o f  the anti­
propaganda campaign and managing body of all the money coming from abroad was al­
ways the ’Notgemdnscha/t. However, this umbrella-organisation was responsible not only 
for the “incoming” aid o f philanthropic or charitable character, but also for the “outgo­
ing^ undertakings of international character, such as the publication o f the Forschung und
284 "Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenchaft ueber ihre Taetigkeit bis zum 31. Maerz 
1922”, pp. 32-33, in: PAAA, R 65519. See also: “Zweiter Bericht der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen 
Wissenschaft”  urn fas send ihre Taetigkeit vom 1. April 1922 bis zum 31 Maerz 1923, pp. 5 £, in: PAAA, R 
65519 and in 65521, and “Dritter Bericht der Notgemeinschaft”, ibid O n the medicine projects sponsored 
by the Rockefeller in the first years o f  1920s see: article written by Dr. Ercih F. Dach entitled 
“Deutschlands und die Rockefeller-Stiftung. Die groesste wissenschafdiche Stiftung der W elt Die 
ermoeglichten Forschungsarbdten.”, in: *'BerUnerBomtn-Comer28.01.1925, in: PAAA, R 65521.
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65521.
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Fortshritte. In that way, it was believed, the national status o f Germany’s science would 




3. The emerging interest in the Balkans and the significance of Greece.
3.1. The impact of World War I  on Germany's relations with southeastern Ettmbe.
Among the countries with which die new Republic sought to strengthen its ties, 
were the Balkan states that were to occupy special place in the German foreign policy 
agenda in die following years. But what did the Balkans mean for the Germans? Was the 
interest an old one or was it newly emerged? What was the nature of the German inter­
est? It should be noted that as Balkan states were usually regarded the following Yugo­
slavia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and a part o f Turkey.
The region dominated by the massif of the ‘ancient Haemus’ -as it was called by 
western travellers before the nineteenth century- running parallel to the Danube river 
and stretching between the Adriatic and the Black Sea, began to  trouble western Europe 
in the second half o f the seventeenth century.288 The Ottoman Empire, to which the re­
gion belonged, started to wane, raising die hopes to its neighbours for expansion towards 
east and to the Mediterranean Sea. The growing wealth o f Habsburg Austria and Russia, 
which came from foreign trade, enabled these empires to modernise their armies and to 
threaten the Ottoman rule. At first, the Habsburg army captured Hungary, Croatia and 
the adjoining territories were subdued and repopulated with Christians for security rea­
sons.289 In the nineteenth century the concept of “Balkans” signified an agrarian, back­
ward, primitive, uncultured and uncivilised land, but even the lawless, violent, and savage 
territory that linked the Danube Monarchy with the Ottoman Empire. Constant insur­
rections, among which were the 1804 and 1815 Serbian uprisings and the 1821 Greek 
revolt for independence, as well as the increasing repression imposed by the Ottomans, 
justified the western image for the region, which was gradually filled with political con­
notations. In Europe, the labelling of the Balkans as “Orient” clearly signalled that they 
did not belong to the western civilisation. Despite the acknowledgement that this ‘un­
civilised’ region was seen as “the Volksmuseum o f Europe”,290 the civilising -o r  even, the 
‘europeanisation’- of the Balkans, became a priority for the European Powers in their 
foreign policy agenda. The involvement o f the ‘civilised* Europe in the Balkan affairs was
288 Maria  TODOROVa , Imagining die Balkans. Oxford Univ. Press 1997, pp. 21 ff.; M a r k  M a z o w e r , 
The Balkans. (2000), Phoenix Press 2001, p.8.
289 Ma z o w e r , ibid.
290 F ra nz  THIERFELDER, D er Balkan als kulturpolitisches K raftfeld. Zwisdienstaadiche Propaganda u n d  
geistiger Austausch in Suedosteuropa. Berlin 1940, p. 7.; TODOROVa ,  Imagining the Balkans, p. 63.
97
accelerated by the war o f independence that all the peoples in the region gradually de­
clared on the Ottoman Rule. Despite the fact that the religious and ethnic homogeneity 
was what those peoples wished for their new states, by 1914 ethnic minorities were very 
present in all o f them. It was inevitable that these ethnic and religious groups should be­
come a bone o f contention between the neighbouring new states, which were eager to 
expand their borders-291 The end o f  World War I left the mountainous peninsula no less 
fragmented as it had been before the outbreak of hostilities. The big European powers 
were very much involved in this. Ideologies like fascism and communism sharpened the 
rivalries between them transferring the tension to the Balkans, while the growing nation­
alism eventually pushed the strain to the extreme. When the Second World War broke 
out, only the southern part of Yugoslavia was regarded a Balkan state. For the Nazis 
Hungary and Turkey were ‘also-Balkan’ [aucb-balkamsch] states, implying that they were 
something else as well, by contrast to the other states which were ‘only Balkan’ \nur- 
balkanisch].292 Hungary, in particular, was held in great esteem by the Nazis, as it played a 
leading part amongst other Balkan nations in the independence war against the O tto­
mans and was regarded as “the middle-European bridge to the south-east”.293 The north­
ern parts o f Yugoslavia, i.e. Croatia and Slovenia, did not belong to the Balkans accord­
ing to the Nazis, who solidified the use o f the term ‘South-Eastern Europe’ for the pen­
insula.294 For them, the agrarian and mountainous region on the south-east fringes o f 
Europe was, to a certain degree, a rediscovery. The Balkans became an important con­
cept in the geopolitical views o f  the Nazis and they were seen as the Wirtschajtsraum 
Grossdeutscbland Suedost, “the naturally determined economic and political completion” of 
the German Reich.295 Perhaps the most interesting thing is that they stressed their his­
torical affiliations with the region or even invented them. The selective bonds the Nazis 
believed they had with some Balkan peoples, like the ancient Greeks, supported their ra­
cial theory o f the purity of the German race. “No other people had such strong blood- 
ties and so contiguous a presence on the Balkan ground as the Germans did”, empha­
sised Franz Thierfelder, the general secretary o f the German Academy of Sciences in
291 MAZOWER, T h e  B alkans, p. 102.
292 T h ie r f e l d e r , D e r  B alkan als kulturpolitisches K raftfe ld , p . 9.
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294 Ibid, p. 9; T o d o r o v a ,  Imagining the Balkans, pp. 28 f£
235 Gted in: TODOROVA, p. 28. See also: WOLFGANG SCHUMANN (Hg.), G riff nach  Suedosteuropa. Neue 
Dokumente ueber die P o litik  des deutschen Imperiaksmus und Mditarismus gegenueber Suedosteuropa im 
Zweiten Weltkrieg. Berlin 1973, pp- 29 ff.
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Munich and director o f  the cultural political department of the Foreign Ministry, in 
1940.2*6
Despite the fact that the borders of the small states of the Balkan Peninsula had 
been drawn up before the Great War, it was only after it that the term *balkanisation’, 
which was equated with tKMnstaatem\ was launched to describe the “small, unviable, 
mutually antagonistic and internally intolerant states”.2*7 This, was not exactly what the 
Great Powers had planned for the region. The nineteenth-century nationalism that led to 
the unification o f Germany’s and Italy’s “tiny antiquated statelets into larger and eco­
nomically more rational units”, had the opposite outcome for the Balkans.2** Yugoslavia 
was the exception to that rule, whose creation after World War I was “the reverse of bal­
kanisation”.296 7899 The fragmented territory in south-eastern Europe, as the Balkans were 
gradually called, could hardly represent the economic entity the foreign powers wanted to 
have under their control.
As for Greece, the frill impact of World War I only became visible some years 
after it had come to an end. The period was marked by the calamitous march o f the 
Greek army from the coast of Asia Minor into the interior of Anatolia and sealed by the 
‘catastrophe o f Smyrna’, as the burning of the city by the Turks lived on in the memory 
o f the expatriate Greeks. The greatest cultural and economic metropolis of the Ionian 
coast, where there had been a prosperous Greek presence for over two thousand years 
was reduced to ashes. Thousands of Greeks were forced to leave the coasts of Asia Mi­
nor and eastern Thrace, after the defeat of the Greek army in that territory. The enor­
mous wave o f Greek refugees arriving in the motherland changed not only the geo­
graphical map, but also the demographics o f Greece and along with it the country’s 
economy. The majority o f them, who only brought a few modest possessions with them, 
were settled in northern Greece in the regions of Macedonia and western Thrace, while 
many others found “temporary” shelter in the surrounding areas of the country’s biggest 
cities. Meanwhile, agricultural reform, essentially the land distribution to small farmers, 
which was described as “one of Europe’s most radical” was affected by the far-reaching 
repercussions on the country’s economy following die failure of the Greek army’s ad­
296 Thierfelder, p. 14.
297 TODOROVA, pp . 32 ££; MAZOWER, T he Balkans, p. 4.
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vance to Asia Minor.300 The reduction in the availability o f arable land in comparison to 
1918 was gradually became more marked, particularly in the provinces o f Macedonia and 
Thrace, where tobacco became the dominant crop.301 Together with grapes and raisins, 
tobacco was Greece’s primary export. Nevertheless, the exports o f raisins, which were 
largely cultivated in the Peloponnese, fell during the 1920s, giving way to the growing of 
tobacco, which was intensified due to the labour o f Greek refugees.302 On the other 
hand, according to the Supreme Economic Council the industrial production of Greece 
experienced rapid rates of growth during the interwar period,303 despite being affected by 
the Great Depression.304 After 1925, metallurgy, machinery, construction materials, 
chemicals, tanning/leather products, paper, textiles and clothing, foodstuffs, tobacco, 
and electricity were the major industrial sectors that recorded rapid rates o f growth. 
These developments were not unrelated to the Asia Minor catastrophe. The sudden in­
crease in population and consequently, the abundance of cheap labour which led to a 
decrease in wages, particularly in urban centres, the entrepreneurial skills o f the refugees 
contributing to an improvement of some sectors, e.g. the carpet-manufacturing,305 and 
the boost in demand from the increase in population were the three main factors that 
contributed to the country’s industrial growth.306 Nevertheless, in 1923, a year after the 
Asia Minor disaster, the country’s economic activity witnessed its first recession. The 
second was recorded in 1929, as a result o f the international economic developments.307 
Britain and Germany were the major importers of Greece’s agricultural products until 
1929, in light o f the recession. Greek exports were badly affected by this development 
and for the following three years, the country's foreign trade sharply declined.308 Tech­
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nology was another sector in which Germany sought to increase its market influence in 
Greece. Its main competitor was the British industry which had dominated the high- 
voltage electromechanical market in the country. Since 1925, die British company 
“Power and Traction Finance Company Ltd.” signed a contract with the Greek govern­
ment that was ruled by die dictator Theodores Pangalos. According to die contract, 
“Power'* -as it was known- had the absolute right to produce and supply electricity to 
the town o f Athens and run die trolley buses and trams.509 American capital competed 
with the British during the 1920s, when Germany was ostracised from the international 
economy. The “American Foundation Company” had begun negotiations with the Greek 
government for the draining of Axios valley, west of Saloniki in northern Greece, and the 
work was started in 1927. The project was expected to relieve the region from malaria 
and other water-related infectious diseases that had plagued the refugee camps set up in 
the area. Similar plans were made for Thessaly and the S trim on as valley in eastern Mace­
donia.510 Germany was, of course, absent from all of those major projects, as the Ver­
sailles sanctions were in force until 1926. The alternative explored by Germany was to try 
to re-establish its influence not only in Greece but also in die broader Balkan area, in­
voking historical or political ties with the new states and advertising its technical expertise 
and scientific advancement.
Up to 1914, Germany had been one of the biggest technological powers o f the 
world and its universities, technical schools and industries attracted many foreign stu­
dents who wished to be introduced to the German achievements. At the same time, was 
founded the Mitteleuropaeische Wirtschafhtag (MWI), an organisation aiming at intensifying 
Germany’s economic relations with south-eastern Europe. The MWT, established in 
1924, was one of the most important instruments for the German Reich’s indirect and 
covert imperialistic penetration o f the Balkans.511 As the president of the organisation, 
Tilo Freiherr von Wilmowsky, explained in 1938, some circles o f the German chemical 3091
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and power industries, particularly in the region of the Ruhr, began in 1929/30 to shift 
their focus to south-eastern Europe and its economic possibilities for German inter­
ests.312 Germany should first intensify its trade relations with the region and then use part 
o f the capital for research on the most common minerals in the Balkans. Britain and 
France had already launched, argued von Wilmowsky further, major projects for the ex­
ploitation of lead, zinc, and copper sediments in Yugoslavia.313 Chromium, antimony and 
oil were other important minerals that could be found in the Balkans.
Nonetheless, the Germans were very much aware that the absolute conquest of 
the Balkans would be no easy undertaking, for the French influence was very strong and 
had become even stronger during the last hundred years, particularly in Greece and the 
Danube principalities. For Germans, however, French infiltration in the political, 
commercial, cultural, and scientific circles o f the region did no t necessary mean that 
France had contributed to the development o f the Balkan peoples in the above sectors. 
This was a German job and perhaps the most evident proof o f this was the political 
systems o f  the small countries in the peninsula, as the Germans and in particular the 
Nazis, interpreted it. The later argued that the whole nineteenth century had been 
marked by the battle between two political systems: the western ideal o f a rationally 
organised state, characterised by excessive individual freedom and the socialist model of 
central Europe, in which the individual will was an organic part of the whole.314 The 
symbol o f  the first one was the French Revolution o f 1789 and o f the second was the 
seizure o f power by the National Nocialists in Germany in 1933. For them, the creation 
of small independent states in the Balkans was not based on the French model, as was 
mistakenly believed by other Europeans. Its roots should rather be sought in the 
German-Austrian ideal, where the ‘principle o f the people’ [das voelkische Prinsip] stood at 
the centre o f  political life. In other words, the creation o f nation-states in the region was 
to be decided by the Balkan peoples and no t by some kind o f  administration or other 
similar institution. The feet that the French language was very important in the new 
Balkan countries and that they had adopted parliamentary democracy “of western type”, 
was no proof that the young states were “the child o f the Parisian Revolution”.315 
National Socialism and fascism put an end to the era o f ‘individualisation* in the Balkan
312 G te d  in: SCHUMANN, G rif f  nach S uedosteu ropa, p. 17.
313 Ibid
314 T h ie r f e l d e r ,  D e r  B alkan als kultu rpo litisches K raftfeld , p. 13.
315 Ibid.
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peoples, claimed Thierfelder in 1940.316 The end of Balkan ‘individualisation’ not only 
meant the end o f parliamentarianism in those countries, as one after the other their 
fragile democracies were turned into dictatorships. For the German national socialists it 
also meant the end o f  minorities, both metaphorically and literally speaking. The Nazis 
defined and treated minorities according to principles o f biological racism, which in the 
Balkans found only “a faint echo”, despite the political sympathies of their authorities to 
Hitler.317 The Slavs, for instance, were characterised as inferior to the German race, 
predestined to serve the Aryans. On the other hand, for the Nazis, Croats and Slovenians 
were not part of the still-stigmatised as ‘uncivilised’ Balkans, but belonged to the western 
‘civilised’ Europe. This selective exclusion contradicted the German policy for peace and 
equality in the region, as was enunciated by Thierfelder, inciting ethnic feelings o f 
hostility between the Balkan states.318 It seems that the political plans of the Nazis for the 
Balkans entailed a project o f “permanent demographic engineering” for south-eastern 
Europe.319 Encouraging its small states to remain neutral in the conflicts o f the big 
European nations, in order to avoid another splintering off of their region, the German 
National Socialists believed that their domination o f that edge of Europe with 
indisputable geo-strategic importance would be accelerated.
The Nazi authorities however, considering the experience of World War I, 
argued that diplomacy alone might well increase German influence over the region, but 
could hardly retain it. A well-organised and intensified cultural undertaking in the 
territory, would facilitate and support the geopolitical plans of the Third Reich. It was 
necessary, therefore, to develop strong cultural relations with the countries in south­
eastern Europe, because intellectual dominance clearly meant power. Unlike the other 
European powers, argued Thierfelder in 1940, Germany approached the Balkan area 
with respect and would continue to do so. Germany was not going to play the role all the 
other ‘‘cultural nations” (Kultumationen) -and he had France in mind- had played, in order 
to expand its influence. The Balkans were o f themselves a treasury-house o f culture, a 
place where western civilisation had been frozen in the course of the centuries and, 
therefore, should be treated with respect and caution, rather than brashly.320 When the 
war broke out; Germany established the “Cultural Institute for the Balkans and the
316 Ibid, p. 20 £
317 M a z o w er , The Balkans, p. 110.
318 T h ie r f e l d e r , Der B alkan als kulturpolitisches Kraftfeld, pp. 20 ££
319 M a zo w er , The Balkans, p. 111.
320 T h ie r f e l d e r , Der Balkan als kulturpolitisches Kraftfeld, p. 12.
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Danube-States”, in an effort to realise the idea o f creating a Big German Reich in 
southeastern Europe.321 In theory, what Germans expected to achieve by imposing 
cultural policy on the Balkans, was to revive western culture according to the German 
model by providing co-operation among all peoples. In practice, the ‘alternative’ German 
cultural project to southeastern Europe, proved very different.
321 See: Politisches Archiv des Auswaertigen Amts (PAAA), R 61270.
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3.2. Cultural and scientific relations with Greece.
The German presence in Greece dates back to the 19th century, when the young 
prince, Otto von Wittelsbach o f  Bavaria was appointed King o f Greece, in accordance 
with the provisions o f  the Treaty o f  London signed on 7 May 1832. Because of his youth 
(he was only 12 years old) the nascent Kingdom of Greece was put under the supervision 
o f Great Britain, France and Russia until O tto’s coming o f age. The control of political 
life in Greece by the Great Powers and their struggle to exert influence upon the Greek 
people became an integral part o f the country’s political development It was an 
unfortunate legacy for the small Balkan state to have to bear, heavy enough to be easily 
shaken off o f its shoulders and one that continued to irk well into the following century. 
Some ninety-one years later, in 1923, the prominent archaeologist at the German 
Archaeological Institute in Athens and future local leader o f the National Socialist Party 
in Greece, Walter Wrede, noted that Greeks knew very well they did not make their own 
policy or for their own interests, but they still were a play-thing, a marionette of the big 
European powers.322 The continuing presence of the German community in Greece 
congregated at that time at the “Philadelphia” club, which had become their pre-eminent 
social and cultural point of reference. However, it was only a few months before the 
outbreak of the First World War that relations between the two nations were officially 
consolidated through the establishment o f  the German-Greek Society. This new 
institution, based in Hamburg, was headed by Professor E. Ziebarih and enjoyed the 
patronage of Queen Sofia of Greece. The society was regarded as the first official 
bilateral cultural agreement with Greece. According to the Article Two of the Statutes, 
the aim of the organisation was to improve and strengthen cultural and commercial 
relations between the two nations through lectures, publications, excursions and the 
like.323 Soon the society set up branches in Munich, Leipzig, Dresden, Hamburg, and 
Vienna and by 1939 in Berlin, Frankfurt, Cologne, even Karlsruhe, whose members in­
cluded about thirty Greek students enrolled in its technical universities.324
322 Confidential report o f  Walter Wrede to the Union o f  Germanism Abroad (Verein filer das Deutschtum 
im  Auslande, Beilin), in June 1923, in: PAAA, R 60057.
323 Satzungen der Ortsgruppe Hamburg der Deutsch-Griechischen Gesellschaft e.V. (Undated document), 
in: Bundesaxchiv Koblenz [BAK], R 57 neu/1025- See also: Kataoiauxov EXXrivo-reppuxvtxr]C Eratpaa? 
A8y]vaiv 1925. A8f]va 1928. In: BAK, R 57/ 1063 [la].
324 In Dresden and Hamburg were initially based the largest Greek communities engaged in the manufac­
ture o f  cigarettes and import-export agencies. Later, the largest communities were found in Hamburg and
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In 1925, a Greek branch was established in Athens by Greek scientists who had been 
educated in Germany. The existing “Philadelphia” club was incorporated in the new 
branch, which in 1927 counted about 300 members.325 The Greeks who set up the 
branch in Athens had retained close relations with German culture and they wished to 
introduce their compatriots to the German science and achievements. Five years later, in 
1932, some o f the most prominent figures in the scientific and economic sectors in 
Greece, such as the director of the National Observatory in Athens, Prof. Nikolaos 
Kritikos, the professor of medicine, Konstantinos Mermingas, the professor o f theology, 
Nikolaos Luvaris, and the lawyer, Alexandras Kanellopoulos, became members o f  the 
society’s committee.326 All of them were to play a significant part during the occupation 
of Greece by the Nazis about eight years later.
Nonetheless, the society’s aspiration to strengthen the economic and cultural 
relations between Germany and Greece had been complicated after the end of World 
War I. The political development that occurred in southeastern Europe (and in particular 
in Greece) had a great impact on Germany’s foreign policy in the region. It had been 
realised that, if the so-called Eastern Question had been an interesting problem for the 
German Reich before the war, it had become an undeniably first-order priority now that 
hostilities were over. What should be done was to strengthen the Weimar Republic and 
foster its old cultural, economic and political bonds with the Balkan states and, o f course, 
with Greece. This policy was initially focused on the protection o f ancient Greek culture 
and the promotion o f trade relations between the two countries. It has already been 
mentioned that in 1920, despite the undeniable significance the promotion o f  industrial 
and commercial interests had for the young Republic, it was realised that its economy 
would be damaged, -if its cultural policy abroad were to be neglected. Economic 
propaganda should go hand in hand with cultural propaganda. The German ambition 
was to conquer the international market for high-quality goods, which the country was 
still able to produce. However, this would not be possible without the creation o f a
Munich. See: Mitteilungen der “Vereinigung zwischen staatlicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e .V ' 
01.02.1939, in PAAA, R 61274.
325 Undated note-letter, [1927?], in: BAK, R  57 n e u /1063.
326 Notice o f  the German-Greek Society in Athens in  1932. In: BAK, R 57 n eu /1063.
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“cultural current” in target countries, which would help Germany to pave the way for 
economic investment there.327 328
The war had dismantled Germany from all the intellectual and cultural threads the 
country had developed with other nations. This also affected the German minority 
abroad, as it had lost, to some degree, cultural contact with its homeland. The minority 
that had contributed officially or unofficially, consciously or unconsciously, to the 
dissemination o f German intellectual advances and culture, came to be seen as a dormant 
resource for the Republic's foreign policy and one that had to be re-activated as soon as 
possible. Nonetheless, the Republic’s efforts to restore its foreign cultural relations were 
hindered, as ihe Germans argued, by the propaganda die Allies disseminated against 
German culture. Therefore, Germany’s counter-propaganda should be carefully 
designed, avoiding any direct attack on the Allies. The Allies’ policies, particularly the 
French cultural policy, had always been used and continued to be used as a model for 
Germany’s cultural planning abroad. What was left aside, though, from that model, was 
its hostile’ connotation, the Germans argued. In order for the Republic to regain its 
cultural influence abroad, it had to revive its relations with the German minority and to 
maintain or to re-establish close relations with other countries. The promotion and 
propagation of language, the German schools, the scientific centres, in particular the 
archaeological institutes, the series of lectures, the musical events and other similar 
activities were undertakings that the German state continued to support and on which 
trie new cultural policy was initially focused. In 1923, the German Embassy in Athens 
reported that the limited influence Germany had on the political life in Greece was 
counterbalanced by the acknowledgement o f the German culture and science by the 
Greeks.32* The series o f public lectures organised in Athens, usually on the initiative of 
the German-Greek Society’s, had a two-fold significance: to strengthen the ties of 
Germans living there with their homeland and to give an opportunity to the Greeks who 
had learned or were still learning the language to test their skills and to broaden their 
knowledge of German culture.
In the past the group of scientists, academics, engineers, architects, artists, teachers 
and so forth in the entourage of King Otto in Greece, also were die bearers of German
327 Copy o f letter Dr. Gerh. Menz and Herr Selke sent to the Foreign Ministry Director, Friedrich Heil* 
bron on 22 October 1920, Leipzig. In: PAAA, R 64853. The same copy was also sent to the head o f the 
Stock Market Union (Boersenvereins).
328 Notice (Auizeichnung) o f  the Foreign Ministry Director, Friedrich Heilbron on 08.12.1923, in: PAAA, 
R 64853.
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culture, who had a profound influence on the scientific and cultural life o f free Greece. 
Meanwhile, universities, scientific institutes and technical and commercial schools had 
been established in accordance with the German model. German technical scientists 
were employed in a number of Greek companies, while many sectors of Greek 
handicraft production were run by German businessmen529 or by other who modelled 
themselves on German standards, thus, strengthening commercial relations between the 
two countries. Nevertheless, the German archaeologist Walter Wrede in Athens made 
clear that Germany should forget the golden period o f Otto, in which Germans had 
controlled Greek administration and were present in almost every aspect o f the Greek 
everyday life.329 30 In 1923, the German scientific activity in Greece was confined to the 
projects o f the German Archaeological Institute. Nonetheless, many young Greeks o f 
other scientific disciplines visited German universities to continue their studies or 
research, or to take up internships in German enterprises. The University of Athens, built 
by Bavarians in 1837, was a rather inadequate scientific institution at that time forcing 
many Greeks, usually wealthy, to go abroad for advanced studies. Before the war, Greek 
students abroad were divided equally between Germany and France. Only in the faculty 
of Law did French universities have a numeric advantage.331 Despite the increased 
number o f  Greek students in Germany immediately after the end of the war, the high 
cost o f  living in the Weimar Republic made many o f them register in French or Italian 
universities, where the cost of living and the registration fees were much lower. Thus, the 
"Parisian wave in orient”, always present in south-eastern Europe, with a number o f 
schools, hospitals, and the *Alliance Français? established in 1885, were strongly 
reinforced.332 The popular and dominant political figure in Greece, Eleutherios Venize- 
los, contributed greatly to the Francophile movement He was favourably disposed 
towards France, unlike the Germanophile King of Greece, Constantinos. For all these 
reasons, the German policy was mainly concentrated on the interception of the growing 
dominance of France in the region and the anti-German propaganda activity, as well as 
on the improvement of the image o f Germany.
329 For example the Fix brewery and the Achaia Claus wines.
330 Walter Wrede (Dr. Phil) from Athens to the ‘*Veiein fuer das Deutschtum im Auslande”, Bedin 
(Vertraulich!) June 1923, in PAAA, R 60057-
331 Note o f  Legation’s secretary Godius on the cultural relations between Germany and Greece, on 11 
March 1924, im PAAA, R  64853.
332 Confidential report o f  Walter Wrede to the Union o f Germanism Abroad (Verein fuer das Deutschtum 
im Auslande, Berlin), in June 1923, im PAAA, R  60057.
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The dramatic political developments in Greece in spring 1923 troubled some 
Germans about the future attitude o f Greece towards their country. Germany was deeply 
involved in the so-called Greek expedition to Asia Minor and in the theatre o f bloody 
fighting between Greeks and Turks, supporting the latter. In the name of the so-called 
"Great Idea* of “the two continents and five seas” Greece found herself in the vortex o f 
the clashing interests o f all European powers, who each tried to avoid casualties of their 
own. However, German fears about the future of their relations with Greece were not 
verified. As Walter Wrede reported from Athens in 1923, there certainly was a small 
number of Greeks who expressed antipathy to Germany. However, the majority o f the 
Greek people still had great respect for the Germans, often showing “an almost strange 
enthusiasm” and believing that Germany would again be able to display its greatness.333 
On the other hand, the educated circles having developed a strong national feeling had 
reservations about the Germans, as they were very much aware of the German 
sympathies towards Turkey. Taking into account all the above parameters, the Embassy 
Secretary, Clodius, who had spent a long time in Greece, argued that Germany’s plans 
for strengthening its cultural relations with the small Balkan country should be 
concentrated on the following issues:
to facilitate young Greeks that were choosing German universities for studies by 
abolishing the registration fees and all the additional complications a foreigner usually 
faced in Germany,
- to support the scientific, literature and art lectures held in Greece by German 
specialists,
to support the German-Greek Society and its branch in Greece, and 
to influence public opinion in Germany in favor of Greece.
The last point was considered to be the most important one.334 The very well organized 
cultural presence o f France in the country and the French sympathies of many Greeks 
were two big obstacles that Germany had to deal with. The varied means that France had 
at its disposal, like its hospital, the Pasteur Institute, the number o f books and journals of 
“Alliance Français/', and the organisations “Amis de la Langue Française” and “Ligue Franco- 
Hellénique”, challenged the German plans. Germans did not have any illusions about the 
obstacles they had to surmount or about their limits, but they were determined to make
«3 Ibid.
334 Note of Embassy Secretary Clodius on the cultural relations between Germany and Greece, on 11 
March 1924, in: PAAA, R 64853.
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their voice heard. The personal ties with some prominent figures of the Greek society 
who were German-educated, were the strongest weapon they had in their hands.
In 1923, during the administration o f Alexandras Papanastasiou, who also was 
German-educated, a law was passed which provided for certain number o f Greek secon­
dary school-teachers to be send to Europe at state’s expenses for advanced studies over 
the following five years. On their return, it was planned that they would educate other 
teachers.335 The law was o f great importance to the Germans, for they thought they could 
strongly influence the Greek educational system, which at that time promoted French 
ideals, attracting as many teachers as they could, funding them to some extent. The avail­
able names o f  Greek students show that Germany seem to have succeeded in attracting 
many teachers -not only for five years, but for much longer-, almost until the end o f  
1930s.336
Germany wanted to exert influence not only on the Greek secondary education 
but to expand it also on universities. In 1925, the German ambassador in Athens pro­
posed to the Rector of Athens University, Prof. K . Zengelis, to introduce a committee 
that would have the responsibility for recommending to Alexander von Humboldt Süjtung 
young promising scientists, who wished to go to Germany for advanced studies. Zen­
gelis, a professor of physical sciences, was favourably disposed towards Germany having 
studied in Heidelberg, Leipzig, but also in Geneva and Paris. He warmly supported the 
creation of an Alexander von Humboldt committee in Greece, underlining that the German 
organization should give the opportunity to “less wealthy but eager-for-knowledge Greek 
students to have access to die incomparable achievements o f  German science and re­
search”.337 Zengelis also argued that it would be of great benefit to Greek science, if  in­
stead of students would be funded young scientists, already engaged as assistants at the 
university’s laboratories.338 The reason for this was that studies in natural sciences at Ath­
335 Ibid
336 See: Legation de Grece a Be din to Auswaenigen Amt, Berlin. Verbalnote, 18.06. 1932, in: PAAA, R 
64064.; i.A- gez. y. Heinz in Abschrift dem Bayerischen Staatsministerium des Aeussem fucr Wirtschaft 
und Arbeit in Muenchen 26-11-1932, im PAAA, R  64064; List o f  Greek professors in secondary schools 
(Gymnasia) who studied in Germany from summer semester 1929 until winter semester 1931/32 in: 
PAAA, R 64064.
337 G ted  in the letter sent by rite German Embassy in Athens to die Foreign Ministry in Berlin on
30.07.1925. In: PAAA, R 64794.
338 Rector, K. Zengelis to the Legations rat, M. Inamelsen, o f  the German Embassy in Athens, on
27.08.1925. In: PAAA, R 64795.
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ens University were insufficient For example, it was impossible for someone who 
wanted to study the principles o f electrochemistry to do so in Athens. Some foreign in­
stitutions, like the Carnegie Foundation which offered scholarships to Greeks to con­
tinue their studies at any European university, did not support scientists older than thirty 
years old, which was usually the case in Greece.53’ Therefore, Greece’s gratitude to Ger­
many for its support to young scientists would guarantee the rapid diffusion o f German 
science in the country and with it the promotion of its cultural interests. The Alexander 
von Humboldt committee was eventually created in summer 1925. The committee con­
sisted of three eminent Greek scientists, i.e. Prof. Dimitrios Hondros, Prof. Marinos 
Gerulanos and the Rector Zengelis. All of them were German-educated. Hondros had 
studied physics in Goettingen and Munich, where he was granted the Doctorate in phys­
ics. Gerulanos was a prominent surgeon, who had been educated entirely in Munich. He 
was already famous in Germany, where he had began his career, when he went back to 
Greece in 1902. He had married a German and was one of the founding members of the 
Greek-German Society in Athens and its future president from 1938-194Z
The whole undertaking was planned to be carried out very carefully, leaving aside 
any political or propaganda aspect of the project but stressing “the pure scientific and 
cultural character” o f the Alexander von Humboldt-Sdftungl40 The first Greeks to travel to 
Germany with the Sdftung were a chemist, an assistant at the university's institute for in­
organic chemistry, Dr. D. Dalmas, and one assistant at the university surgical clinic, Dr. 
N . Miniatis.39 4041 The whole project seemed to work quite well at the beginning. However, 
by 1929 the number o f Greek students was reduced dramatically, especially in Karlsruhe 
and Freiburg, the universities which had traditionally attracted many Greeks. The reason 
for this was not only the economic crisis that broke out worldwide. It also was the pre­
condition die Greeks had to fulfil before their admission to German universities, namely 
the completion of at least one year of studies at Athens University or Technical Univer­
sity. Where this condition was not met, they were restricted to the status of guest- 
student, and were obliged to sit special exams in order to be registered as normal stu­
dents.342 In view of this complication, it was hardly surprising that many Greeks dropped
339 German Embassy in Athens to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, on 30.07.1925, in: PAAA, R 64794.
340 Ibid.
341 Rector, K. Zengelis to the Legationsrat, M. Immelsen, of the German Embassy in Athens, on
27.08.1925, in: PAAA, R 64795.
342 Greek Consulate in Gemsbach, Baden-Baden to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 21.02.1929, in: 
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out and chose to continue their studies in other European universities, particularly in 
France.
Another issue that interested Germans, apart from the increase o f Greek students 
at their universities, was the export o f  their language. The existence of German schools 
in Greece dated back to 1886, the year the first German school was established in Salo­
niki. Ten years later, a second school was set up in Athens. Both were initially created for 
the interests o f the German colonies in those two cities. From 1907 onwards, these 
schools following the French, Italian and American model, were transformed into 
“propaganda” schools, designed not only to educate the German-speaking children o f 
the colonies, but also to teach the language to young Greeks through an official institu­
tion.343 34By that time Greeks, usually o f  wealthy families, learnt the language either with 
German governesses or other private tutors. German politicians argued that the use o f 
language by Greeks not only for scientific reasons but also for more practical reasons, i.e. 
in business, industry and technology, was o f  the greatest importance for the permeation 
of German culture in Greece.544 In 1925, the promotion of language was put under the 
auspices of the German Academy. It seems that the success o f those schools in Greece 
was so great that by the end o f 1933 seven out of the seventeen branches o f the Acad­
emy world-wide had been set up in Greek cities.345
The expansion of German was a necessary pre-condition for Germany’s other 
big cultural aim: the expansion o f German books. The economic regulations o f the Ver­
sailles Treaty were a severe blow to the country’s trade, and not least, its book trade. The 
devaluation of German currency caused a reduction of demand for books, music records 
and other educational and cultural tools in Greece. The price o f German books was very 
high, compared with French titles. For example, a German novel cost eighty-eight 
drachmas, while one could buy a French novel with only twenty-five. Moreover, the 
German edition o f Greek and Latin classics cost three times more than the equivalent 
French books.346 Consequently, the Greeks preferred French literature, which they re­
garded closer to their taste. In addition, the knowledge o f French was very widespread, 
making French books very competitive in the Greek market. German technical books
343 H a g e n  F l e is c h e r , „Europas Rückkehr nach Griechenland. Kulturpolitik der Großmächte in einem 
Staat der Peripherie“, in: HARALD H e p p n e R /O l g a  K aTSIARDI-He r in G (H g.), Die Griechen und Europa. 
Außen- und Innensichten im Wandel der Z eit Wien 1998, pp. 125-191, here p. 131.
344 Ibid, p.132.
345 Ibid, p.141.
346 German Embassy in Athens to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 23.09.1926, in PAAA, R 65401.
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and books about architecture, chemistry, medicine, political science and law were still 
much sought-after in Greece.34' In addition, the lack of German books and journals in 
the libraries o f Athens University and Technical University was more than evident The 
German cultural work in the country became, therefore, very difficult, while the cultural 
plans of other powers, as the Germans argued, like Italy, particularly benefited from the 
prevailing circumstances.34® The promotion of German science in Greece was restricted 
to the considerable numbers o f German scientific acquisitions, already held by almost all 
disciplines. To those numbers should be added the big collection of books that had been 
gathered in Germany for the projected university in Smyrna. As the project was never 
completed, the collection consisted of old German and other foreign books, a significant 
number of books about natural science and a valuable microbiological equipment, even­
tually came to the property of Athens University.347 849
As long as the prices of German books remained high very little could be done 
to improve Germany's share of die Greek book-market However, it was very important 
to retain its printed cultural presence in Greece and to keep the readers' interest as keen 
as it could possibly be under the circumstances, hoping that soon things would be better 
for German concerns. One initiative that could help, as it was believed, the expansion of 
German printed culture, was the creation o f a book-store on the model of the already 
existing international book-store “Eleftheroudakis & Barth” in Athens, initially under 
joint Greek-German ownership. It was thought hat the idea was more likely to succeed 
in Saloniki. The central figure pushing the project was Professor Nikolaos Luvaris, a 
theologian, who was teaching at die town’s seminary at that time. Luvaris was to play an 
important role in the political life o f Greece few years later. Educated in Germany, he 
was appointed general secretary of the Ministry of Education in 1926 and retained that 
post until 1928. In 1936, he served again for a short time in the same post, to which he 
was reinstated in 1943- The German Consul in Saloniki reported that Luvaris was en-
347 Ibid.
348 Confidential report o f Walter Wrede to the Union of Germanism Abroad (Verm Jver das Dextscbium im 
Auslande, Berlin), in June 1923, in: PAAA, R 60057.
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gaged in the expansion and propagation of German books like no other.350 Luvaris guar­
anteed the German Consul that some people from his own circle were interested in get­
ting involved in setting up a book-store, minimising in that way the risk for German 
businessmen. For the success o f  the project, though, the bookstore had to develop close 
relations with a German enterprise, which could supply the store.351 It was also important 
the book-store to sell not only German books and periodicals but also Greek, French, 
English and Italian. The reason, according to the Consul, was primarily the fact that the 
number of Greeks who knew the language was not big enough to support an exclusively 
German book-store. Therefore, wGerman books should only be the decoration”.352 It 
seems though that this tactic was part o f  Germany’s prudent foreign cultural policy that 
was due to the restrictions o f the Versailles Treaty. Nevertheless, it was expected that the 
establishment o f the University o f Salonika, which was eventually opened in autumn 
1926, would meet the German interests in the Greek book-market.
So far, one might argue that it is not clear, how the German government would 
or could control die book-business and use it for cultural propaganda purposes. It was 
possible, the business to have the fate o f the “Eleftheroudakis & Barth” international 
book-store in Athens, in which the German Wilhelm Barth was no longer a business 
partner but just an employee with no influence on the orders.353 To diminish the danger 
of such unfortunate complication in Saloniki, the German Consul suggested the creation 
of a some kind of committee that could monitor the progress o f the book-business. The 
German side would be represented by a member or members o f the city’s German Club, 
while from the Greek side Luvaris reassured the Germans that he was “ready to co­
operate with such an institution”.354 The exercise of cultural propaganda in the northern 
regions o f Greece, namely Macedonia and western Thrace, had acquired a special im­
portance for Germany’s foreign policy during 1920s. The French influence upon the 
northern part o f the country during the Ottoman Rule continued undiminished in the 
years after the collapse of the empire. More evident was the dissemination o f the French
350 German Consul in Saloniki to the section for foreign affairs o f  the bookstore of Walter Bangert in 
Hamburg on 21.07.1924. In: PAAA, R 65401.
331 Ibid.
3» Ib id
353 Note o f Legation’s secretary Godius on the cultural relations between Germany and Greece, on 11
March 1924, in: PAAA, R 64853.
354 German Consul in Saloniki to the section for foreign affairs o f  the book-store of Walter Bangert in 
Hamburg on 21.07.1924. In: PAAA, R 65401.
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culture among minorities, primarily the Jewish community, which formed a significant 
minority in Saloniki. In 1929, die German Consul reported that the foreign language 
mostly spoken by the population was French.355 The bookshops sold great numbers of 
French books which were favoured by Greeks for their low price. Nevertheless, after the 
establishment of the University o f Saloniki, the exchange o f professors with German 
universities strengthened Germany's scientific and cultural relations with northern 
Greece. German professors were invited to lecture in Saloniki and vice versa. In 1927 the 
university consisted o f only one faculty, the Faculty of Philosophy. The Faculty o f Natu­
ral Sciences and Mathematics was planned for the following years. The departments of 
agriculture and veterinary medicine were to come on stream in 1928 and 1929 respec­
tively.356
What should be underlined, though, is that the movement o f  intellectuals was ba­
sically activated by individuals rather than by the institutions they represented. More pre­
cisely, Greek professors, who had been educated in Germany, invited their German col­
leagues with whom they had retained contact, to lecture at their university. From the 
German side, the process was slightly different. It was also based on personal contacts, 
but it was organised and supported by organisations, such as die German-Greek Society, 
the German Academy or the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). In both 
cases, though, the personal networks were the main channels through which relations 
between the two scientific communities were built and would continue to exist in the 
future. The establishment of personal networks, however, was not German-Greek exclu­
siveness. It was rather an international phenomenon that, to a great extent, survives until 
to the present day. The use of this kind o f network was intensified by Germany after 
1918, as it appeared to be the only remaining way, through which the Republic could 
gradually re-establish its international scientific relations. It also appeared that personal 
networks could work better than institutions in some countries, and Greece was one of 
them. Nonetheless, some gestures indicating the effort to develop the two countries 
close cultural and scientific contacts had an official and ceremonial character. The nomi­
nation of six Germans out of twenty-one scientists from abroad as members o f die
355 Gentian Consul in Saloniki to the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 20.06.1929, in: PAAA, R 
61191.
356 German Consul in Saloniki to die German Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 17.11.1927, in; PAAA, R 
64064.
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Academy of Sciences in Athens is one such example.357 The award was the first to take 
place in the Academy’s history. Among the scientists nominated were the physicists Al­
bert Einstein and Max Planck, the geographer Alfred Phillip son and the archaeologist 
Wilhelm Doerpfeld.358 It seems that towards the end o f  the decade of 1920s the relations 
between the two counties became closer and the German press reported that, if the rela­
tions with Greece were restricted to cultural before the war, it was time to expand them 
at economic, even at political level.359
The German-Greek Society with its branches, which constituted a network o f in­
dividuals affiliating scientifically, economically or personally to one of the two countries, 
organised cultural events that supported Germany’s foreign cultural-political agenda, in 
1920s. Most o f the events were primarily related to humanities, like history and literature, 
but also to culture narrowly defined, namely music, theatre and fine arts. However, some 
of them were closer to more practical issues, like justice, economics, as well as natural 
sciences and technology. In winter 1922/23, a series o f lectures were given in Athens, 
but only one o f them was related to natural sciences. The lecture entitled “The construc­
tion o f matter in the light of recent research” (DerAufbau derMaterie im Ucht der neuesten 
Forschung) and was given by Prof. Hardt at the German Archaeological Institute.360 It is 
interesting that occasionally some human scientists lectured on more practical issues. 
This was the case of A. Heisenberg, professor o f  science in Byzantium, who spoke at the 
first official event of the German-Greek Society in Hamburg, in 1918, about ‘T he  eco­
nomic importance of Greece”.361 This event was the first one after four years o f the soci­
ety’s existence and it seems that the choice o f  the subject was no t accidental. It was ad­
dressed to an audience that consisted mainly o f businessmen and other contributors to 
Hamburg’s economic life. Nonetheless, this first invitation of the German-Greek Society
357 German Ambassador in Athens Dr. Eisenlohr to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 29.03.1933, in: 
PAAA, R 64064; rioooraxá AxaSr][jLta? AQttvqjv,- ZoveSgia Trj? 16 Magmou 1933, 'Eta; 1933, Tojao? 80s 
(Minutes o f  the Academy o f sciences o f  Athens, meeting on 16 March 1933).
353 See: rTQaxxtxá AxxSrpdag Adrivwv, ZuveSgta tt¡? 25 Mocqtíou 1933, E ro? 1933, Tó fio? 80s (Minutes of 
the Academy of sciences in Athens, meeting on 25 March 1933); German Ambassador in Athens, Eisen­
lohr to the Foreign Ministry o f Foreign Affairs in Be din 29.03.1933, im PAAA, R 64064.
355 rgarpeio Ttkou ngeapria? BegoXívou (Press Office o f  the G reet Embassy in Berlin) to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Athens, “O regiiovixó? toteo? jku r¡ AvoetoXti” AeXtiov uje’. aptQ. 48, ["The German Press 
and the Orient, Press Release Nr. 48], in October 1929, in: IoxoQtxó A@yeio YTtouQYetoo E£<aTeocx¿v, IAYE 
(Historical Archive o f the Greek Ministry o f Foreign Affairs), File: A /3 /II , Sub-file: A /II /1 ,1929.
360 German Embassy in Athens to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 29.06-1924, im PAAA, R 60057.
361 See: Invitation o f the German-Greek Society in Hamburg on 10.10.1918, in: BAK, R 57 neu/1025.
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to all its members was an undisputed cultural event, strongly indicative of Germany’s ef­
fort to regain its lost economic influence on south-eastern Europe through cultural rap­
prochement.
After 1925, all cultural undertakings of the German-Greek Society were organ­
ised under the auspices o f die German Academy. Personal references continued to play 
an important role in invitations. In 1932, for example, Professor Ioannis Spyropoulos, 
Dean of the Faculty o f  Law at die University o f Saloniki, was invited by the Academy to 
lecture at the University o f Munich and at the University o f Jena. Apart from the official 
lecture, Spyropoulos was scheduled to give a radio-interview. His name was suggested by 
Antonios Sigalas, the famous Byzantinoligist in Saloniki and an old familiar to the Acad­
emy.362 Sigalas also suggested Professor A. Keramopoulos o f Athens University to give a 
talk at the same time at the German-Greek Society in Munich. Some years later, during 
the Nazi period, Keramopoulos visited Munich, Hamburg and the University of Berlin 
for the same reason.363 Even though invitations were addressed to eminent professors of 
both countries, primarily to lecture, some German specialists were invited to take short­
term positions as directors at Greek university laboratories. The reason was to contribute 
to the advancement o f Greek science and research. In this context, the bacteriologist at 
the University of Neustadt Dr. H. Kordes was invited in 1931 by Ioannis Papadakis, pro­
fessor at the University o f Saloniki, to take over the laboratory o f  plant physiology and 
pathology of Athens University for about a year.364 However, his appointment as labo­
ratory director seemed very unlikely, because his financial demands were too big to be 
m et by the Greek University.365 Tlie case o f Professor Konstantin Karatheodory, the 
Greek mathematician with an international reputation, who had studied and made his 
career in Germany, is o f particular interest He had been employed by the Greek gov­
ernment in 1920 to organise die university that was planned to be founded in Smyrna, in 
Asia Minor. The war with the Turks and Greece’s defeat put paid to these plans and few
162 Letter o f the German Academy in M unich to P ro f Joh. Spyropoulos on 23-05-1932, in: PAAA, R 
64064.
363 IbicL.% Letter o f the German Academy in Munich to Prof. Keramopoulos on 23.05.1938, in: PAAA, R 
64064. See also chapter 5.2.
364 D r. H. Kordes to the German Foreign Ministry, Departm ent F, on 05.11.1931, in: PAAA, R 64064; see 
also: letter of Dr. H. Kordes to Prof. Koutsom itopoulos, University o f Agriculture in Athens on 




years later, in 1924, the Greek government offered Karathéodory the Rectorship o f  the 
Technical University in Athens. For personal reasons Karathéodory preferred the ordi­
nary professorship o f mathematics in Munich, which was offered to him that same 
year.366 Nonetheless, he retained his ties with Greece and particularly with the Frime 
Minister E. Venizelos, who in 1930 called upon him for a university matter. It seems that 
Karathéodory’s presence in Greece was so important that Venizelos used the diplomatic 
route to convince the Ministry o f Education of Bavaria to permit the scientist to travel 
and stay in Greece for two or three months.367 The historical bonds between the univer­
sity with the Bavarians were even stressed. It was they, who had established the institu­
tion and therefore it would be in their interest to see the university operating normally.368 
The official reason the Greek government gave to Munich for the summoning o f Kara­
théodory to Athens, was the reorganization o f the university, to which the prominent 
mathematician could contribute with his experience from his appointment in Smyrna. 
However, the real reason was the conflicts between the professors for some appoint­
ments that had been made, as Karathéodory confidentially reported to the Bavarian 
Minister o f Education.369 At the turn o f  the century, French influence among intellectual 
circles in Greece had started to increase and gradually a sort o f  “French faction” had de­
veloped at Athens University. It seems that the dispute between the French and die ex­
isting German faction, which still dominated the Faculty of Medicine, had damaged the 
smooth running o f the institution. Karathéodory was expected to reconcile the two 
“fronts”, exerting influence upon both sides. Despite his 'international conviction*, Ger­
mans hoped that his visit to Greece, which was repeated over some years, was o f great 
cultural-political significance for Germany*s interests.370 That hope, however, was never 
really fulfilled.
566 State Ministry o f  Education in Bavaria to  the Legationsrat o f die Foreign Ministry, Teidenge on 
10.02.1930, in: PAAA, R 64064.
367 Legation de G rèce, Bedin. Verbalnote to  the Germ an Foreign Ministry in  Berlin on 30.01.1930, in: 
PAAA, R  64064.
M  Legation de Grèce, Bedin. Verbalnote to the Germ an Foreign Ministry in Bedin on 15 Mai 1931, in: 
PAAA, R  64064.
369 M inistry o f  Education in Bavaria to the Legationsrat o f  the Foreign M inistry, Terdenge on 10-02.1930, 
in: PAAA, R  64064.
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The devastating impact of the “dictated” or “forced” peace i^Friedtnsdiktaf\ 
“Gewaltfriedeff*) -as the Germans usually called the Versailles Treaty- on their country’s 
economy, was primarily due to reduction of its export trade. Deprived from its colonies, 
Germany lost a great share of the international sea trade as well. The belief solidified in 
the first decade of the twentieth century that strong interdependence between economy, 
industry and science could guarantee Germany's leading position on the international 
scientific scene but also on die political stage, was reinforced in 1920s. During that pe­
riod, the young Republic had to reform its domestic and foreign policies and to reassess 
its priorities. Some o f diem, like the economic prosperity of the country, were to be seen 
through the old cultural lens that required, though, a new glance. Culture came to the 
fore after the efforts of the Allies, particularly France and Belgium, to damage, in the 
view of Germans, the image of their country abroad and to ostracise them from the in­
ternational chessboard.
If  the Zoological Station in Naples as we saw in the first chapter, represented Ger­
many’s international aspirations in science with some cultural and economic connota­
tions, medicine -more precisely tropical medicine- seemed to portray even better the 
strong interrelation between science, economy and culture that transcended Germany’s 
borders. With the loss o f colonies, tropical medicine in Germany seemed to have come 
to an end. The Reich’s medical organisations abroad had been confiscated by the Allies, 
causing serious shrinkage to the German medical culture overseas and consequently an 
immense foreign “cultural defiat”.371 372The “Institute for Ship and Tropical Diseases” in 
Hamburg, the Tropical Convalescent Ward IJrcpengmmngsheim) in Tuebingen and the 
Institute of Catholic Missionary Doctors (Kathoüsche MisHonsaengUche Instituí) in Wuer­
zburg now depended on the aid of the Noígmánschaft}'1 So did the expeditions abroad 
that were largely organised by the Tropical Institute in Hamburg, which was established
371 G eorg  SCHREIBER, Deutsche Median und Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wusenschaft 
Geschehnisse und Edebnisse deutscher Mediana!politik und Kulturpolitik. Leipzig 1926, p. 55. England 
confiscated during the war German medical stations and hospitals like the ‘'VItona-Krankenhauj der D u- 
konissenanstalt Kaiserswerth” in Cairo (established in 1885) and Alexandria, the "Koenig-KUhelm- 
H ospiz” in Coubech les Bains near Cairo created in 1912, and the “Hospital der Sudan-Piome emission” in 
A ssuan, established in  1906. In Iran, the Kristmicb contributed to the foundation of the National Hospital 
in Teheran in 1885, which since summer 1919 was directed by English doc ton. See: Ibid p. 51.
372 Ibid, pp. 54 £
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in 1901.371 *73 It was regarded as a “Ràchsimûtut’ and supported by the Colonial Department 
of die German Foreign Ministry. Since the very first days o f its operation the institute 
conducted research on topical diseases in German colonies and offered its services to the 
ship crews that travelled overseas. The economic dimension o f the institute and its im­
portance for the German trade was highlighted by the fact that even the first expeditions 
that its scientists made to Latin America and to north and east Africa, were sponsored 
both by the state and by some enterprises in Hamburg.374 The research conducted at the 
Tropical Institute focused on parasitic diseases usually caused by protozoa and spread by 
mosquitoes. When the Great War broke out, some o f the institute’s scientists were ap­
pointed health advisors in the Balkans and Turkey offering their services to the Reich’s 
troops and also became involved in health and cultural policy in the region. After the 
war, science and technology seemed to be the basic elements that could bind Germany’s 
two post-war aspirations together, i.e. economic strength and cultural influence. In that 
context, a confidential petition that appeared in Hamburg in 1921 declared that “science 
and technology, industry and commerce should go hand in hand”.375 In 1924, the Dean 
of the Faculty of Medicine in Hamburg University, Ludolph Brauer, argued that medi­
cine and in particular the Tropical Institute were both “the carriers of German culture” 
abroad. Brauer further stressed the new role the Institute was going to play by way o f 
compensation for the loss of the Kcdserreich’s colonies, promoting Germany’s “old tradi­
tions” in that regions.376 Despite the fact that one might argue that these were arguments 
developed by the scientists to defend the institute’s existence which was threatened dur­
ing the 1920s,377 they reflected the need to  change the Republic’s science policy. This 
meant, among other things, that science was to be included together with culture and 
economy in the state’s foreign policy agenda.
The first step the Tropical Institute took to adapt its activities to the political de­
velopments of the time, was to collaborate with the newly-created “German Society for 
the Establishment o f Hospitals Abroad” (Deutscben Gesellschaft ^ur Gruendung von Kranken-
371 The first two tropical institutes in Europe had been created in England a year before and these were the
Liverpool School o f Tropical Medicine and the London School o f Tropical Medicine.
374 STEFAN W u lf , Das Hamburger Tropeninstitut 1919 bis 1945. Auswaertige Kulturpolitik und Kolonial-
revisionismus nach Versailles. Hamburg 1994, pp. 1 ff.
375 The tide o f the petition was “Fuer das Institut fuer Schiffe- und Tropenkrankheiten’’. G ted in: WULF, 
Das Hamburger Tropeninstitut, p. 10.
376 Ibid, p. 8.
377 Ibid, p. 7.
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baeusem im A u skn d ), based in Darmstadt. The initiative was taken by the director o f the 
institute, Bernhard Nocht, in 1918, while the war was coming to its end.378 The hospital 
propaganda’ was neither a German idea nor an innovation. England and France had al­
ready used this kind o f cultural propaganda in their own colonies.379 This “demonstration 
of power”, as Stefan Wulf calls it; had a cultural and economic dimension. The provision 
o f medical treatment in the developing countries by a ‘civilised’, ‘superior7 nation caused 
a deep obligation in those who benefited from that treatment and this outcome was not 
without its economic benefits for the provider of medical care.380 By the end of World 
War I, it became clear that the role of the Hamburg Institute abroad should not be con­
fined to scientific tasks. Its mission should also be cultural and economic. In other 
words, the institute should be transformed into an instrument for Germany to convince 
the international community of its scientific competitiveness, all the while trying to cor­
rect its image abroad. In 1923, the director of the clinical section of the Tropical Insti­
tute, Peter Muehlens, who was to become the central figure for tropical research in the 
Balkans in the following decades, made his first post-war visit to Latin America as the 
Institute’s representative. It should be reminded that despite the restrictions of the Ver­
sailles Treaty, Germany kept its relations with scientists abroad, in particular with Spain 
and Latin America, where the Tropical Institute enjoyed unquestioned respect for its pre­
war medical research and its service to the local population. Muehlens’ visit to Buenos 
Aires, Montevideo, Santiago, Asuncion and Rio was essentialy o f a cultural-propaganda 
character. It is important to note that the German scientist visited Latin America on the 
invitation of the directors of the Medicine and Hygiene Faculties o f the local universi­
ties.381 *In Buenos Aires, he was invited to lead a malaria-expedition to north Argentina 
and in Montevideo to lecture on the latest German achievements on tropical medicine. 
The fact that Muehlens spoke Spanish on his mission, seemed to work in the Republic’s 
favour, promoting German intellect in a region, where French cultural propaganda had
378 lind, p. 8.
379 See; HAGEN FLEISCHER, “Europas Ru eckkehr nach Griechenland. Kulturpolitik der Grossmaechte in 
einem  Staat der Peripherie”, in: H arald  HEPPNER, O lg a  KaTSIARDI-He r iNG (H g.), Die Griechen und 
Europa. Aussen- und Innensichten im Wandel der Z e it Wien 1998, pp. 125-191, here pp.144 f, parbculady 
footnote 68.
380 WULF, Das Hamburger Tropeninstitut, p.9.
381 Report of the German Embassy at Montevideo to  the Foreign Ministry in  Berlin, on 10.12.1924. in:
PAAA, R 64680.
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been intensified the previous few years.38'  Muehlens* cultural-political mission to Latin 
America was not restricted, though, to the use of Spanish during his lectures. Reading his 
confidential report to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, one could ascertain his new role as a 
cultural missionary, rather than simply a scientific delegate, making discerning statements 
about the cultural, economic and political situation o f the countries he visited. This 
seemed to become his dominant role in all expeditions he made later on, not only to 
Latin America but also to the Balkans. In his revealing report o f 1924, Muehlens con­
centrated on Argentina, a country that traditionally was Francophile. The German scien­
tist brought to the fore die old well known issue of the respect German science enjoyed 
with regard other ‘cultured nations*, namely the United States and France. The invitation 
by the director o f the Department for Hygiene o f the Buenos Aires University to lead a 
malaria-expedition had particular importance for the Germans. By that time, the Rocke­
feller Foundation was the only institution to have undertaken research projects on infec­
tious diseases in Argentina. Rockefeller had established a great reputation by conducting 
medical research not only in Latin America but also in many European countries. The 
fact that the Argentinean administration rejected the offer that was made by the Ameri­
can organisation in favour o f the German Tropical Institute in 1924, was regarded by 
Muehlens as a triumph for German science over American scientific endeavours.383
It seems that this was also an indication that despite the boycott against German 
science, its great achievements in some disciplines could no longer be ignored by the in­
ternational scientific community. In 1921, two new drugs, i.e. Bayer 205 and Yarten 105, 
had been successfully tested in the clinical section of the Tropical Institute in Hamburg, 
for the cure of Trypanosomiasis and Amoebiasis.384 These infectious diseases, better known 
as sleeping sickness and dysentery caused by specific protozoa, are transmitted by insects 
vectors. Both were major killers in tropical countries. Acknowledging the undeniable im­
portance o f Germany’s medical advancement, many foreign scientists started to press 
their countries to lift the Versailles sanctions imposed on Germany and to allow the 
country to re-join the international scientific community. The prominent biologist Julian 
Hurley o f Oxford, for example, wrote on Daily Herald that it was criminal foolish to bring
^ I k 'd
3» “Aflgemem-wissenschafdiche, kulturpoHtische und wirtschafdiche Eindruecke aus Suedamehka.”, by P. 
M uehlens, 1924. The report was confidential and n o t for publication. In: PAAA, R 64680.
384 WULF, Das Hamburger Tropeninstitut, p. 8. See also: Dr. Muhlens’ lecture held in Argentina with the 
tide “Die Kiulturelle und wirtschafdiche Bedeutung der Gesundheitsfuersorgen in den wartnen Laendem”, 
published on the daily newspaper “Argentinisches Tageblatt” on 28(?).l 1.1924- In: PAAA, R 64680.
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a major scientific nation, like Germany, in a position in which its scientific achievements 
was difficult to be known. The discovery o f Bayer 205, noted Hurley, was apparently of 
great financial importance for the Allies, more than the whole reimbursement sum they 
had demanded from the defeated Germany after World War I.385 It is not surprising 
therefore, that for the Allies the “remarkable character” of Bayer 205 “opened a fresh 
vista of hope” to the Germans to restore their colonial empire.386 No matter how utopian 
these hopes and beliefs may seem, one thing was to be certain: the propaganda allega­
tions about the decline o f German science could no longer hold. Germany's competi­
tiveness in pharmaceuticals increased in Latin America after the success of Bayer 205 and 
Yarten 105, even though the German drugs were considerably more expensive than the 
French or American equivalents. This development had a direct impact on the Republic's 
economy and the country's growing pharmaceutical industry.
In spite of its dominance of pharmaceutical market in Latin America, Germany 
remained far behind in exerting strong influence in the Americas. The German medical 
and chemical industry, although growing, was not yet competitive comparing with the 
French, English or North American industries. These countries had dominated the Latin 
American market, not only offering low prices on drugs, but also providing high-quality 
medical equipment, like the X-ray machines which were better than the German, even by 
Muehlens’ own admission.387 38 He also emphasised that, “if we believed for a long time 
after the war that die numerous Argentineans who came to Germany were our “friend/* 
and they wished to know our culture better, then this is a “big mistaki\ 3<i He justified the 
Argentinean tendency, arguing that Germany had become a very cheap country after the 
war and, therefore, a good market for Argentineans to buy the necessary equipment for 
their laboratories. As soon as Germany’s gold currency had pushed up the prices of all its 
products, they returned to the countries they traditionally did business with, namely 
France and, to a limited extent Italy.389 The mission of the Hamburg Institute was also to
385 G ted in: Muhlens* lecture in Argentina “Die Knlturelle und wirtsehafdiche Bedeutung der 
Gesundheitsfuersorgen in den waxmen Laendem”, Ibid., in: PAAA, R 64680.
386 Article published on Times on 25 08.1922 with the title “Deutschland ueber AHes”, cited in  WCLF, Das 
Ham burger Tropeninstitut, pp. 156 £ See also: Muhlens’ lecture in Argentina “Die Kulturelle und 
wirtschafdiche Bedeutung der Gesundheitsfuersorgen in den warmen Laendem”, Ibid, in: PAAA, R 64680.
387 Muehlens’ confidential report about the “Allgemein-wissenschafdiche, kulturpolitische und 
wirtschafdiche Eindiuecke aus Suedamenka” in  1924. In: PAAA, R 64680.
388 Ibid The emphasis is his.
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try to attract customers for Germany’s medical products. It seemed that the Institute did 
not only brought Germany back to the international scientific community, but was also 
an institution in which tropical medicine, politics and economics intertwined. This inti* 
mate relationship, between science and wider political issues was to inaugurate a new era 
in the Republic’s science policy, where medicine, as well as exports of scientific material, 
became integral elements of the country’s cultural-political concept.390
The next target of this concept was the Balkans. Muehlens* first scientific expedi­
tion to the peninsula was made in 1915. He was appointed health adviser in Turkey and 
then in Bulgaria soon after the latter entered the war. This was the beginning o f 
Muehlens’ long relationship with the region and in particular with Bulgaria. On one o f  
his numerous trips between 1915 and early 1940s, he visited the Greek province o f  Ma­
cedonia twice to conduct research on malaria, a disease which was endemic in that area, 
decimating not only the local population but also weakening the Allies’ army. This dis­
ease continued to plague southeastern Europe for decades. The problem had to be tack­
led as soon as and as effective as possible to give Germany the chance to play an impor­
tant scientific and, consequently, a cultural-political role in the region. In other words, the 
Balkans seemed to offer fertile soil for Germany’s ambition to extent its foreign influ­
ence, pursuing almost the same policy as it had done for its colonies overseas in the past.
Towards the end of 1926, Muehlens made another long trip to the Balkan coun­
tries, this time to Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey. His mission was not only to 
report on the medical situation in the region, but also on the degree of its cultural and 
political inclination towards Germany.391 Even though Muehlens already knew that part 
of the Balkans very well, Turkey, as well as Bulgaria continued to dominate his interest in 
the region. He went to Turkey at the invitation of the Faculty o f  Medicine of the Univer­
sity in Istanbul to lecture on the results o f  chemotherapy used for diseases in tropical ar­
eas.392 His lecture was so well received that Muehlens took the chance to discuss anew 
the possibility o f German professors teaching at Istanbul University. It was known that 
Turks did not like foreign professors at their universities, even though there were seven 
French professors that were already teaching there. These appointments were according 
to the German Embassy in Ankara, the result o f the cease-fire between the Central Pow-
390 WULF, Das Ham burger Tropeninstitut, p. 11.
391 Muehiens’ confidential report entitied "K urzer Bericht lieber medizinische und kulturelle Eindruecke 
aus Jugoslawien, Griechenland, Bulgarien und der Tuerkei”, in 1926. In: PAAA, R 64680.
392 Deutsche Botschaft in Angara(sid) to A usw ärtigen Amt, 29.10.1926, in: PAAA, R 64680.
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ers and the Entente and the pressure die French High Commissioner in Istanbul put on 
the Turkish government39 495 396The Germans thought that Turks were particularly pleased 
when prominent German scientists went to Istanbul to lecture and these lectures stood 
out from the majority of the ordinary courses. Muehlens' visit, as well as the warm re­
ception Professor Erwin Baur of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology had received a 
few months previously, were indicative of the fertile soil for exerting Germany scientific 
influence in Turkey.394
The political and social upheaval that was due to the war led to large numbers of 
people moving into new areas where disease was spread more easily. Muehlens visited 
the refugee barracks o f those who were forced to move during and after the war between 
Greece and Turkey, as well as to camps in Bulgaria. According to the German doctor the 
situation was unremittingly appalling. In Greece, he visited Saloniki, where he tried the 
new drug, *Vlasmochinagainst malaria on new cases, as he did in Yugoslavia and 
Bulgaria.395 Saloniki, the biggest harbor in north Greece, had, by that time, become a 
refugee-city, as great numbers of Greeks who had been living for centuries in Asia 
Minor, eastern Thrace and in some of the biggest cities of the Black Sea, were forced to 
emigrate to Greece during and after the end of the Great War. The sudden increase in 
the population of Saloniki, which was unprepared to receive huge numbers of refugees, 
was one o f the causes o f the several epidemics that broke out at refugee camps. The lack 
o f readiness for the great upheaval was not unique to this area but was duplicated all over 
Greece. Unsurprising perhaps, malaria and typhus were now threatening the whole 
population. Muehlens as a well-known figure was not only welcomed warmly to the city 
o f Saloniki by both the local and state authorities, but he was also permitted to visit the 
local military hospital and to try the new drug against malaria on Greek soldiers.394 The 
health organization in Greece was primitive, reported the German scientist and 
compared unfavourably with arragements in Yugoslavia, where adequate equipment and 
supplies were in place. Greece was in a desperate economic situation and the impact of
393 Ibid.
394 Ibid. Erwin Baur became a year later, in 1927, director o f the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Plant Breed­
ing in Muechenberg.
395 Report o f the German Consul on Saloniki to the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin, on 07.08.1926. In: 
PAAA, R 64680; also: Muehlens* “Kuxzer Behcht ueber medizinische und kulturelk Eindruedce aus 
Jugoslawicn, Gnechenland, Bulgarien und der Tuerirei” in 1926, PAAA, R 64680.




the disease was immense, causing many lost days o f work. The word “crisis” was heard 
everywhere in Saloniki and the Greeks, observed Muehlens, no longer spoke in warm 
terms about their French allies.397
Even though one could argue for the “humanitarian” character of Muehlens* visit 
to the territories o f south-eastern Europe which were so desperate for medical help,398 
his trip was more than that It is a fact that the German scientist already knew the region 
of Macedonia and Saloniki front very well from his four-year posting in the Turkish and 
the Bulgarian army. His knowledge, though, was no t limited to medical issues, but went 
deeper to the mentality of the people, particularly the Bulgarians and the Turks, as he 
himself recalled in 1926.3"  As for the Greeks, he noted in the same report, they still held 
German science in high esteem, despite the allied propaganda against it during and after 
the war. Moreover, among the Greek doctors, there were many who had studied in 
Germany and who had succeeded in the state exams, a procedure through which for­
eigners were not only recognised as equal o f their German colleagues in scientific ability, 
but also entitled them to practise in Germany. Muehlens received an invitation from 
Greek physicians to participate in their national congress in Saloniki and to give a lecture.
This was interpreted by the German specialist as clear expression by the Greeks o f high 
regard towards German science as well as an acknowledgement o f his country’s contri­
bution to helping Greece cope with the serious problem of infectious diseases.
Muehlens, however, declined their invitation for health reasons and because o f his j
planned departure for Istanbul. The cultural-political significance of medicine in Greece |
was recognised by the German Ministry o f Foreign Affairs. In 1932, the Ministry made j
known its intention to the authorities o f  the Hamburg University to create “a firm tradi- |
tion of the education of Greek doctors in Hamburg”.400 Co-operation with the univer- I
sity’s administration, which would secure economic support for the young Greeks, as j
well as with the German Academic Exchange Service was demanded in order for the I
Ministry to bring its plan to fruition.401 One case, this of Basilios Malamos, will serve to
397 Muehlens’ “Kuxzer Bericht ueber m echanische und kultureUe Eindruecke au$ Jugpslawien, 
Griechenland, Bulgarien und der Tuerkei” in  1926, PAAA, R 64680.
398 German Consul on Saloniki to the G erm an Foreign M inistry in B edtn, on 07.08.1926. In: PAAA, R 
64680.
399 Muehlens’ “K uizer Bericht ueber m edizinische und kultuxdle Eindruecke aus Jugoslav ia , 
Griechenland, Bulgarien und der Tuerkei” in  1926, PAAA, R 64680.




illustrate the profile o f  Greeks who received this kind of aid from the German state. He 
was not only a good student who justified financial support He also was the son o f a 
Greek merchant in Hamburg and former admiral, who had been forced by the Entente 
to accept a discharge in 1917, as he had expressed germanophile feelings during the 
war.402 During the Nazi era, Malamos as a prominent parasitologist with an international 
reputation, who in the meanwhile had become a professor in Greece, became the link for 
die cultural-political plans of German scientists in Greece. The same expectations had 
the Germans for other Greek bursars as well.
Medicine in general, although recognised as an important tool for foreign cultural 
policy, did not seem to be particularly promoted by the German authorities in the Bal­
kans. Unlike Germany, France, the United States, even Italy, were less reluctant to use 
medicine for scientific, cultural and economic influence abroad. Greece became die re­
cipient of medical aid, and in particular hospital propaganda’, exerted from all the above 
powers. As mentioned earlier, hospitals were the institution par excellence through which 
an effective cultural policy could be exerted. Their effectiveness was on the one hand, 
due to the services that were offered to a large part of population, evoking feelings of 
gratitude to the benefactor, on the other hand it was due to their contribution to the ad­
vancement of the country’s interest in science and research. In this context, the effort for 
the establishment o f a German gynaecological and maternity clinic in Athens is of par­
ticular interest. The initiative came, however, from a Greek doctor, Constantinos Louros, 
who had studied in Germany. As Greece was lacking in medical institutions, particularly 
a maternity hospital, C. Louros created a private clinic in 1910 in Athens. A great and 
loyal admirer of the German culture and intellect he sent his only son, Nikolaos Louros, 
to Berlin to study medicine and train as gynaecologist Nikolaos during his stay in Ger­
many, where he had started his career, built close contact with Dr. von Cranach, Admin­
istrator (Geschaefisfmbnr) in the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, and with a number of other 
prominent scientists. Von Cranach would play the role of mediator in the following years 
for Louros’ plans. In 1926, Dr. Louros, Sr. made a proposal to the cultural department of 
the German Foreign Ministry to contribute to his plan to transform his clinic into a 
“German Gynaecological Clinic”, arguing that it would be a very effective tool in the
402 Hochschulbehoerde d. Univ. Hamburg, to H eir Terdenge, Minis tenaldirigent des Auwae rugen Amtes 
16.06.1932, PAAA, R 61147.
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German cultural propaganda campaign in Greece.403 His proposal however, did not meet 
with approval because of the lack o f  funds. Two years later, Dr. Louros, Jr. being on 
leave from the Friedrich-Wilhelm University of Berlin, in which he had part-time teach­
ing duties, came back to Athens and took over his father’s clinic. This time he ap­
proached the Kaiser Wilhelm Society asking for support for his project. On his side, he 
had Dr. von Cranach. At the same time he became member of the Society. His father 
was also encouraged to apply for membership.404 What Nikolaos Louros proposed was 
the creation o f a “German Gynaecological Clinic affiliated to the Kaiser Wilhelm Soci­
ety” (“Deutsche Fmuenkiinik in Aiken angeschlossen der Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft ^ur Foerderung 
der W'tssenschafieii*). According to the Greek doctor this basically meant support by the 
Society to build an extension to his clinic for about sixty to eigjhty new beds for the poor, 
who could not pay a first -or even second class- hospital expenses.405 The conditions o f 
his offer were ideal for the German side. Louros offered a complete and modem 
equipped clinic (i.e. operating theatres, auditorium, X-ray laboratories, policlinic etc.) and 
he committed himself to defray the expenses for the extra construction, making clear 
that his clinic would be at Germany’s full disposal.406 What he wanted was a relatively 
small contribution from the Germans o f  approximately 250,000 Marks for the extra in­
frastructure and about 80,000 marks for yearly expenses, while the price o f the site was 
estimated at 200,000 marks and the whole clinic with its expansion at 1,500,000 marks.407 
Louros, Jr. stressed the fact that the new ‘third class' department would operate as a phil­
anthropic institute, which would make the German propaganda even more effective.
What is striking is that die Greek scientist, in his effort to convince the Germans, 
showed considerable skill in marshalling arguments based on ideas of cultural propa-
403 Prof. Nikolaos Louros (Athens) to  the President of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society in December 1930, in: 
Arcbiv zur Geschichte der M ax-Planck-Gesellschaft (MPGA), A b t I, Hep. 1A, Nr. 317/1.
404 See: Prof. N . Louros (Athe_ns) to von Cranach on 01.11.1930, in: MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/1; 
General D irector o f  the KWG, Friedrich G lum  to  Nikolaos Louros on 15.05.1931, in: MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 
1A, N r. 317/2.
405 P ro f Nikolaos Louros (Athens) to the President o f the Kaiser Wilhelm Society in December 1930, in: 
MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/1.
406 Prof. N . Louros (Athens) to von Cranach on 01.11.1931, in: MPGA, A b t I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/1; Denk- 
schrift des D r. N .C  Louros, betrifft Vorschlaege ueber cine deutsche kulturefle Porpaganda in Griechen- 
land nam endich ueber die Gruendung ernes D eutschen Krankenhauses in A then, p. 9, (undated document 
presumably between 1933-35) in: MPGA, A b t I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/4.
407 N . Louros to  von Cranach on 01.11.1931, ibid; also undated and unsigned document presumably o f v. 
Cranach to die KW G, in: MPGA, A b t I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/1, paper numbers 4 ,5 .
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ganda that even an enthusiast statesman would be jealous of. For example, he argued that 
“the exact sciences served not only the general welfare, but were also an important ele­
ment for the nations rapprochement, promoting a propitious mutual intellectual influ­
ence”.408 He also demonstrated that his medical degree from Berlin University would be 
held in great esteem and for this reason his father was willing to make a considerable fi­
nancial sacrifice in order to promote German cultural policy in Greece.409 In the same 
vein Louros, Sr. noted that the hospital would have the “German imprimatur”, thereby 
expanding the German science and culture in Greece and it would be dedicated to scien­
tific work in the German intellect410 He argued further that the contact point o f cultural 
relations between the two countries was restricted to what he called the “dead area”, 
namely the Greek history, literature and archaeology. He acknowledged however, the 
importance o f the German Schools, as a great number of their graduates later studied at 
German universities, enrolling in faculties of medicine, law, and engineering or, in time 
becoming professors. Using arguments, common in Germany particularly in the Weimar 
years that aroused the German national pride, he compared the German cultural tactics 
to  those o f other big nations and claimed that German influence in Greece was not as 
strong as it used to be in the past. One important reason for this, underlined Louros, was 
the growing French influence, aided by their numerous cultural institutions, not to men­
tion the effort of Italians and the Americans to push their own cultural agenda.411
Ibid
409 Prof. Nikolaos Louros (Athens) to the President of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society in December 1930, in: 
M PG A  A bt I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/1.
410 C. Louros to  unknown recipient on 01.12.1930, in: MPGA Abt-1» Rep- 1A Nr. 317/1.
Denkschrift des D r. N .C  Louros, betrifft Vorschlaege ueber eine deutsche kultureUe Porpaganda in
Griechenland namentlich ueber die Gruendung eines Deutschen Kxankenhauses in A  th en , pp. 2 fif, (un­
dated document presumably between 1933-35) in: MPGA Abt I, Rep. 1A Nr. 317/4. France exerted in­
fluence, noted Louros, through 1) the French Schools, 2) a well organised French-Greek Union, 3) four 
French newspapers, 4) lectures o f prominent French intellectuals, 5) a French hospital, 6) a chair for phi­
lology and philosophy at Athens University, which according to Louros was occupied by a French profes­
so r, 7) the “Institute Pasteur”, 8) French missionaries, 9) organised visits of French tourists to Greece, and 
10) the strong campaign o f  the French diplomats. As for the Italians, Louros named the “Casa d’ Italia” 
and the lectures o f Italian scholars in Athens, while for die Americans he mentioned die organisation 
“N ear East R elief’ as cultural propagandists tool.
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Recruiting new foreign members and therefore establishing a network of eminent 
scientists abroad was one o f the Society’s cultural political activities.412 Therefore, his ar­
guments and his generous partnership offer at first convinced the administration o f the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Society, which drafted a provisional contract and the statutes o f the 
German clinic in Greece. Nevertheless, the development o f  the whole procedure was 
quite disappointing for the Greek gynaecologist. Despite the fact that his German col­
leagues with whom he had worked in Germany for many years were favourably disposed 
towards him and agreed to support him participating to the clinic’s committee (Kztnato- 
mm), the German Foreign Office had certain reservations about him personally and the 
timing o f the initiative. The reaction o f the Greek government troubled the Germans 
despite Louros’ assurances that there would not be any difficulties, for “there were al­
ready existing several French, American and Italian hospitals in Greece (sic)”.413 In addi­
tion, the Germans had information about the conflicts between Nikolaos Louros and 
Konstantinos Logpthetopoulos, another prominent gynaecologist in Greece who was 
deeply devoted to the German cause. The establishment of a German clinic, in collabo­
ration with Louros, might alienate not only Logothetopoulos from Germany, but also a 
number o f other German-educated doctors, or other sympathisers to Germany, such as 
Marinos Gemíanos, Valettas, Apostoiopoulos, who were closely related to the German 
colony in Athens and were influencia] in the Greek-German Union.414 It was obvious 
that the Germans did not want to risk their well-established relations with a number of 
important Greeks for Louros, no matter how much they might benefit from his clinic. 
Therefore, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society rejected Louros’ offer to his great disappointment. 
Apart from his deep knowledge o f  the importance cultural policy had for Germany, the 
cultural political activities of other nations in his country and his rhetorical skills, were 
also remarkable is his perseverance in seeking out German collaboration. After the rejec­
tion by the KWG, he addressed himself to the German Red Cross for financial aid and
412 Dr. von Cranach to Pro£ Dr. Karo, D irector o f  the German Archaeological Institute in Athens on 
21.01.1931, and reply o f Karo to v. Cranach on 24,01.1931 both in: M PGA, A bt I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/2. 
Von Cranach asked Karo to propose professor o f gynaecology K onstantinos Logpthetopoulos to apply for 
membership in the Society.
413 Prof. Nikolaos Louros, Athens to the President o f the Kaiser Wilhelm Society in December 1930, and 
Karo to  v. Cranach 14.01.1931, both in: MPGA, A b t I, Rep. 1A, N r. 317/1.
414 Germ an Ambassador in  Athens, H ebedein, to  D r. v. Cranach on 14.01.1931, in: MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 
1A, Nr. 317/2. See also the reply o f the President o f  the KW G, Max Planck to  N. Louros, on 04.03.1931, 
in: MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317/2. The relevant paragraph has been om itted.
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when the Nazis came to power he made a new effort without success. It should be noted 
that, even though the Rockefeller Foundation was very likely to finance his project, as he 
claimed, -and this does not seem to be a mere rhetoric to convince the FCWG-, he des­
perately sought German support This was perhaps due to his great affection for his in­
tellectual homeland o r because he believed he would stand higher in the esteem of Greek 
medical circles, which were German-educated for the most part, if had the German 
rather than the American backing.
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4. Science, culture and the econom ic interests of Nazi Germany in southeastern
Europe.
4.1. “Lebensraum”. geopolitics and cultural expansion.
From 30 January 1933 onwards, Germany’s place in the world political scene 
changed dramatically as the National Socialist Workers Party (NSDAP) seized power 
under the leadership o f Adolf Hitler. The party was created in 1919 and Hitler became its 
member within months. Within less than a year he had taken charge o f the party's 
campaign and in February 1920, in the first mass gathering of the party in Munich, he 
declared the twenty-fine points o f  the party’s program. The third point spoke of the 
“land and ground” (Land und Boderi) that Germany needed for its people food self- 
sufficiency and settlement eastwards, due to the country's overpopulation.415 416That meant 
that, having lost its colonies overseas, Germany had to seek new land where she could 
expand in order to survive. The bitter feeling related to the territorial loses after the 
Great War and the rise o f a strong nationalist sentiment were present in the political 
oratory of all post-war parties in the Weimar Republic. However, in the case of the 
NSDAP these concepts had a decisive significance for the construction of its ideology, 
which was composed of “very German”, anti-Semitic, anti-Marxist, and anti-liberal 
features.414 However, it was the biological and racial perception o f the world that 
epitomised the Nazi worldview (Weltanschauung). For Hitler, race was the key to 
understanding world history. Praising o f German race went hand in hand with the 
Voelkish thought, which was the most ominous expression o f German nationalism. 
Rooted in the second half o f nineteenth century Voelkish thought sought to bind 
together the German people through a deep love of their language, traditions and 
fatherland. Voelkish thinkers also regarded German culture as unique, innately superior 
and in opposition to the humanist outlook o f the French Enlightenment. They embraced 
the ideas o f H.S. Chamberlain, an Englishman who provided intellectual legitimacy for 
the National Socialists and whose fascination for ‘Germanism’ led him to adopt German 
citizenship. In the Foundations of Nineteenth Century, published in 1899, Chamberlain 
asserted in pseudoscientific fashion that races differed physically, but also morally and
415 W o l fg a n g  W ippe r m a n n , “Ideologic”, in: W o l f g a n g  Be n z  u.a. (Hng.), Enzyklopaedie des Nation- 
alsozialismus. Muenchen 1997, pp. 11-21, here 11 £
416 M artin  Br o sz a t , D er Staat Hi den . Gnmdlegung und Entwicklung seiner inneren Verfassung. 
Muenchen 1969,1‘*1995, pp. 33-49, here p. 33-
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intellectually, and that the struggle between races was the driving force o f  history. He 
held that the Germans, descendants o f  the ancient Aryans, were physically superior and 
bearers o f a higher culture. Catch phrases like “blood and soil” and notions like 
“Abmnerbi\ population “cleaning”, “repopulating” became propaganda battle-cries for 
the Nazis, which justified their radical strategies for the extinction of nations 
(Voelkemord). These concepts also justified their geopolitical plans to the east and south­
east. As a higher race, the Germans were entitled to expand eastward at the expense of 
the ‘racially inferior* Slavs, acquiring Lebensraum, supported and justified scientifically by 
geopolitics.
The notion of geopolitics was first used by Fridrich Ratzel in 1897. Influenced by 
Social Darwinism Ratzel used it as a central concept in a biological theory asserting that 
species migration was the most important element of social adaptation.417 In the Nazi era, 
however, the dominant figure was General Karl Haushofer, who developed the notion 
further trying to legitimise his imperialist theories scientifically, thereby exerting great in­
fluence over the Nazis. Haushofer was professor of geography at the University o f Mu­
nich and a sometime teacher o f Rudolf Hess, who apparently introduced him to Hitler. 
In 1934, Haushofer became president o f the German Academy, further influencing this 
major German cultural-political institution with his doctrines. He himself had contrib­
uted in the mid-1920s to the establishment o f the institution. Haushoferis views on geo­
politics, which combined traditional imperialism with the notion of living space (Lebens- 
raum), found fertile soil in the national socialist Weltanschauung. Using geographical criteria 
{geographiscken Grundlagen) he defined geopolitics as the science o f  world politics (lVehpoH- 
tik) and as a doctrine with practical application in foreign policy.418 Geopolitics, political 
science and foreign policy were intimately and enduringly intertwined. As for its relation­
ship with Lebensraum, geopolitics, argued the Munich professor, was the instrument for 
its conquest The Lebensraum struggle had two dimensions for Haushofer: one defensive 
and the other offensive. By ‘defensive* he meant the employment o f tactics and strategies 
for protecting the state from any foreign geopolitical influence. On the other hand, the 
expansion of Germany’s own power and the reunification o f its people cattered abroad
417 K r is t ie  M a c r a KIS, “The ideological origins o f  institutes at the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft in Na­
tional Socialist Germany”, in: MONIKA RENNEBERG, M a r k  W a LKER (ed.), Science, Technology and Na­
tional Socialism. Cambridge 1994, pp. 139-159, here p. 143.
418 H a n $-ADOLF J a c o b s e n , “Auswaertige Kulturpolitik als ‘geistige W afie’. Kail Haushofer und die Deut­
sche Akademie (1923-1927)”, in: KURT DUE WELL, WERNER LINK (Hg.), Deutsche Auswaertige Kultui- 
politik seit 1871. Geschichte und Stmktur. Koeln 1981, pp. 218-261, here p. 221.
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was defined as the Reich’s ‘offensive’ struggle for its leaving space.4'*9 The scientific ele­
ment of Haushofer’s geopolitics could also be traced to what he called “breathing space” 
(Atemraufri), an environmental factor that was essential for the existence of a nation.419 20 
Therefore, foreign policy should secure adequate Ltbensnmm for the people and, where 
this “living space became too narrow, the state was obliged to expand it. An adequate 
Lebensmum was for Haushofer the prerequisite for the state’s highest cultural develop­
ment, for its independence from foreign powers and for its economic self-sufficiency.421 
A piece of land that would secure to human beings autarky, namely a rich fauna and flora 
for their ‘provisioning freedom’ (Naebrungsfrdhdi), was how the German geographer un­
derstood sufficient bebensraum. For him geopolitics was also an endless interaction be­
tween theory and praxis, knowing and dealing, cognisance and performance. In other 
words, every political action was dependent on the enduring relationship with land con­
figuration (Bodengestafy.422 Geopolitics, he argued, was a sort of “fusing science” that 
combined the world o f nature with the world of intellect It was a synthesis, for example, 
of biology, agriculture, botany, zoology, medicine, sociology and political science, phi­
losophy and jurisprudence. These disciplines were for Haushofer the “main platform” 
for geopolitics, while all others were regarded by him as more or less “supportive sci­
ences” (Hitfsivissenschafteri). Reigning supreme above all other disciplines, however, was 
geography.423
Having served in the army, Haushofer related geopolitics to defence geography 
(Werbgeographie). Reccounting his own experiences, he argued that the martial- 
geographical Atemraum was of decisive importance for the state’s development for its 
future security. The restricted space ("KMnraeumgkdt) of central Europe with its numerous 
minorities made their enduring geopolitical existence impossible, let alone the existence 
of the so-called great nations, which were growing rapidly.424 Germany was in danger of 
becoming “a nation without space”. Trying to awaken the national feeling, Haushofer
419 m
420 Ibtd, p. 225.
421 See also: H a n s  H iss, “ Autarkie und Weltwirtschaft”, in: Zätsdmft fuer GeopoSsk, Jahrgang 5, Heft 4, 
(April 1928), pp. 302-306.
422 JACOBSEN, “Auswaertige Kulturpolitik als “geistige Waffe”, p. 219.
423 Ibid, pp. 219,260.
424 K arl  H a u sh o fer ,  “D ie Geopolitische Lage Deutschlands”, in: K arl L a n g e , E rnst Ad o l f  D reyer  
(Hg.), Deutsche G eist Kulturdokumente der Gegenwart Erster Jahresband 1933: Der Ruf Leipzig 1933, 
pp. 79-87, here: 80.
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argued that a small, weak and spatially confined Germany should not be called “Reich”, 
for it did not reflect the greatness o f  the term per se. “That name”, he exclaimed, “was 
[but] a noble remembrance and a glorious advancement to the future with unrivalled 
greatness feasible, however, only with the motto ‘all forces to be maintained in every te­
nacity*; otherwise the Reich could no t be revived”.425 Great Britain was, for Haushofer, 
perhaps the best model o f how geopolitics could be combined with military and foreign 
policy-making, particularly overseas. The Britons played a dominant role in the Asian Sea 
and its surrounding states, due to the empire’s wisely organised military resources, placed 
in positions o f greatest geopolitical importance.426 Japan was another such example, 
which Haushofer had experienced himself for about two years, from 1908 to 1910, when 
he served there as military observer. “I f  we want to live,” he stressed in 1934 in the 
auditorium o f Munich University, “Germany has to modify its military policy according 
to its geopolitical interests”. Controlling geo-strategic territories on land and sea, he con­
tinued, Germany would increase its power on die world scene, meeting the preconditions 
for the security o f the state, for the maintenance of the Volkslebensraum, as well as for its 
economic and cultural development427
Despite the fact that his concept o f Lebensraum became the core o f the national 
socialist foreign policy agenda, Haushofer believed that the Nazis never understood the 
essence of his ideas.428 For him, space was an organic political category and the notion o f 
Volk was defined by cultural, economic and geographical terms, representing in social 
terms the nation and in political terms the state. Unlike him, the Nazis associated the 
Volk with race and Lebensraum with biology and agriculture, cultural and economic impe­
rialism. Agriculture was regarded the science that appealed to romantic longings, like 
blood and soil (Blut und Boden), Lebensraum and people’s soil ('Volksboden), and therefore, 
was crucial for German society. For National Socialism agriculture was reactionary and 
modem at the same time: reactionary in its romanticism and modem in its technology.429
425 Ibid, p. 87.
426 See: K arl HAUSHOFER, W ehr-Geopolitik. Geographische Grundlagen einer Wehrkunde. Berlin 1941. 
Particulariy chapters B  and H .
427 KARL H a u s h o f e r , ‘'Erdkunde, G eopolitik und W ehrwissenschaft”, in* Muenckcner Umvmitaetsnden, 
H eft 28, (1934), pp. 1-15, he re p. 11. lind., “D ie Geopoli tische Läge Deutschlands”, p. 86.
428 JaCOBSEN, “Auswaertige Kulturpolitik als “geistige Waffe”, p. 223.
429 See: JEFFREY H e r f , Reactionary M odemism: Technology, Cultnre, and Polihcs in Weimar and thc 
Third Reich. Cambridge 1984.
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By expanding into the rich agricultural territories of the east and south-east Europe, the 
German Volk could achieve more economic autarky.
The National Socialists dressed Haushoferis views in the garb of the racial and 
cultural elements of their ideology relating geopolitics with the Voelkisk thought For the 
modem Reich hebensraum was not restricted to the state’s territory drawn by a natural or 
an artificial border. It was closely affiliated to a “common consciousness of German be­
longing” (Gesamtdeutsches 'Bewusstsein).*y> This idea embraced all German minorities living 
abroad, which were regarded by the Nazis as valuable tools for foreign policy at all levels. 
Germany, they argued, was neither a geographical notion nor was it confined to the state. 
Germany was, wherever Germans lived and regarded themselves as the bearers of a 
unique mission, namely to make the German soul the foundation o f a new world or­
der.430 31 What bound them with their fatherland was German culture, Arian descent, the 
sacred soil and traditions, as well as the technical, economic, scientific and military 
achievements were all conceptualised in this framework. The German Volk, wherever it 
was settled, should be enlightened with the ideals o f German culture and thus it should 
be diffused further, thereby expanding the German living space. Lebensraum was a dy­
namic notion dependent on the luminous physical and intellectual energy of the people. 
The cultural element, argued the Nazis, was exactly what differentiated the German Le- 
bensraum from the imperialistic definition o f space by the contemporary powers.432 Nev­
ertheless, what they themselves defined as Lebensraum was itself none other than imperi­
alism, albeit under slightly different guise. The expansion o f Germany’s living space was 
difficult to achieve overseas. Therefore, modem colonisation, believed the Nazis, had to 
be undertaken in an eastwards direction. The Danube, Rhine, Elbe, Weichsel and Oder 
Rivers were, in the nineteenth century the main communication and commercial roads of 
the Habsburg Empire, controlled by the metropolises o f Berlin and Vienna. Soon after 
the decline o f the empire, the newly formed states in the territory took the control of this 
network, restricting Germany’s free mercantile movement within central Europe and 
consequently limiting its economic influence. Expansion to the north-east did not only
430 HlLLEN A. ZlEGFELD, “Deutscher Lebensraum”, in: KARL LANGE, ERNST ADOLF DREYER (Hg.), 
D eutscher G rist 1935. Kulturdokumente der Gegenwart Z w riter Jahresband 1935: Gestaltung des Rei­
ches. Leipzig 1934, pp. 63-73, here p. 64.
431 ibid., p. 65. Compare also the definition o f “M itteleuropa” by Friedrich Neumann in 1915. Cited in; 
W o l f g a n g  Sc h u m a n n  (ed.), G riff nach Sueosteuropa. Neue Dokumente ueber die PoHtik des deutschen 
Imperialismus und Militarismus gegenueber Suedosteuropa im Zweiten Weltfcrieg. Berlin 1973, p. 16.
432 W d, pp. 69 f, 72.
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mean taking back control o f the former Habsburg territories, but also of Russia. On the 
other hand, south-east Europe was a valuable economic resource, moreover an access- 
point to the Mediterranean that would facilitate trade with the Near East. New forms of 
political order had to be adopted for Germany to win a place in world politics.
When the Nazis began to organise the stated foreign policy, they tried to differ­
entiate themselves from traditional imperialists by introducing a new type of expansion, 
giving emphasis to culture. Kulturpolitik was the euphemistic term employed for cultural 
imperialism and it was no more than a cover for the economic, political and military ex­
pansion plans o f the Reich. Culture, however, had a particular meaning for the Nazis 
which was shaped during the Weimar Republic. France was thought to be primarily re­
sponsible for Germany’s disgrace, but so also, by extension, was the entire western civili­
sation that derived from the ideals o f the French Enlightenment. Nazi culture rejected 
Enlightenment reason, which sought liberation from magic, but embraced modem tech­
nology, die advancement of which was precisely due to that same rationale. Nevertheless, 
the Nazi rationale was quite different from the French variety, mingling anti-liberal, anti­
capitalist and idealistic, romantic and magical elements with concrete thinking organisa­
tion and creative performance. This was influenced by the reactionary modernists o f the 
Weimar Republic and the cultural policy o f German engineers. This “cultural paradox”, 
as Jeffrey Herf calls it, became the backbone o f the Nazi worldview.433 The reactionary 
modernists, he specified, distinguished ‘culture* iKuitui) from ‘civilisation’ {ZiiiBsation}, 
identifying the first with the German tradition and the latter with the declining west.434 
To Kuliur belonged notions like community, blood, will, productivity, race, while Zivilisa- 
tion was related to reason, intellect, internationalism, materialism, and finance. What 
formed the national socialists’ culture was a mixed bag o f both ‘culture’ and ‘civilisation’. 
They rejected modernity as it had been shaped by the political values of the 1789 Revo­
lution, as well as scientific modernity. Science, in contrast to technology, was regarded as 
a product of the Revolution and a theory that was foreign to the German soul. Technol-
433 JEFFREY H e r f , Reactionary Modernism: Technology Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third 
Reich. Cambridge 1984.
434 O ne o f  the anti-m odernist dem onstrators par excellence o f the cultural crisis in Weimar Republic was Os­
wald Spengler. In his particular influential w o rt “D er Unteigang des Abendlandes” he tried to reconcile 
the rom antic and irrational feelings w ith the enthusiasm  of the technological progress and hoped that this 
reconciliation would make the new generation to turn to technology and politics rather than to poetry and 
philosophy. See: O sw a ld  SPENGLER, D er Untergang des Abendlandes. Umrisse einer morphologic der 
W eltgeschichte. (Ungekuerzte Sonderausg). M uenchen (1923), 1981,
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ogy on the other hand, not only held a fascination for the Nazis. It even became part o f 
the German national identity. In that peculiar modernity that was German National So­
cialism, in which reason and myth intermingled, as Horkheimer and Adomo pointed 
out,435 practice did not contradict Nazi ideology.
The concept of “Lebensrauxf* was also developed along the same reactionary 
modernist lines. It was deeply related to race, irrational and mythical elements, but it also 
became a matter o f Germany’s economic policy, which was planned and developed with 
the help of science and technology. As soon as the Nazis gained one victory after the 
other in Europe by Blitzkrieg tactics, “LebensraunT gave way to “Grossraurrf* and “Gross- 
raummrtscbafi’ (great space for Germany’s economy). In 1942, though, the public use o f 
these terms was prohibited. The geopolitical language of Haushofer that was enriched 
with the terms of the “Great Space”, threatened to jeopardise the Reich’s war propa­
ganda.436 This was a serious complication and it forced the Party’s chancellery to inter­
vene and give guidelines, suspending any public discussion or any written study on 
“Grosmmmpoliük” and “Grossraumwirtschaft* issues.437 438These were serious and sensitive 
questions, related to political and economic management, to the outcome of the war it­
self and thus only the Fuehrer had the authority to speak or to write about them.43* The 
party’s chancellery argued that discussion on the division of the globe into continental 
large territories was not in the Reich’s favour. For example, when the Germans said that 
N orth and South America make together a Grossraum or a GrosmmmniTtschaft, it was tan­
tamount to Germany encouraging the United States’ Pan-American aspirations. That 
would greatly damage the Reich’s interests, for South America under normal circum­
stances, the Nazis claimed, was culturally and financially affiliated more with Europe 
rather than with the United States. Likewise, the establishment of a “European Grvss- 
raummrtschaft under German leadership” could hurt Italy. In addition, the idea o f the 
Grossraumwirtschaft might not be well received by other states like Spain, Portugal or Swe-
435 M a x  H o r k h e im e r , T h e o d o r  Ad o r n o , Dialectic of Enlightenment New Y o i 1972.
436 L etter o f the Reich’s Broadcasting director (Leiter Rundfunk) to die Reichshauptamtsleiter Tiessler, on 
11.12.1942, in: Bundesarchiv Bedin (BAB), NS 18/615.
437 N otiz der Partei-kanzlei an die Abteilung Rundfunk, im Propagane!amimsrenum, on 04.12.19-12, in: 
BAB, NS 18/615; Ritterbusch. Notiz hier Pg. Tiessler on: 16.10.1942, im BAB, NS 18/615.
438 Ibid
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den, unless practical measures should follow German propaganda. It was stressed, how­
ever, that the importance o f the peoples should be fully respected.439
439 Richtlinien von der Partei-kanzlei an die A bteilung Rundfunk, im Pm paganrlaminkffri^m  ueber die 
Verwendung der Begriffe "Grossraum” und "G rossraum  Wirtschaft”, on 03.12.1942, ine BAB, NS 18/615.
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4.2. Science. culture and foreign pd ig  in the Third Riicb. Tht emndafor the Balkans,
Although a complete theory for the role of technology in Germany had existed 
since the last quarter o f nineteenth century and its significance for the state's reorganisa­
tion and rearmament was acknowledged by the Nazis, this was not the case for science. 
Having succeeded in integrating German engineers and technology into the German na­
tional culture and soul through “a process of selectively borrowing from past cultures”, 
they created the conditions for the full technological program launched by the Nazis af­
ter 1936.440 Scientists and modem German science, on the other hand, being theoretical 
in nature, clashed with Hitler's ideology, as theory was regarded as alien to the German 
soul. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that when the Nazis came to power they did not 
have any particular science policy agenda. The official texts of the Party441 did not give 
any guidelines as to what national-socialist science should be. Even the so-called ‘Aryan', 
‘Nordic’, or ‘German’ physics was not a closely defined set of beliefs, as Alan Beyerchen 
argues.442 The only thing that was explicitly proclaimed, was the denouncement of what 
the Nazis called liberal, Jewish, rational, theoretical, materialistic science and the rejection 
o f  objectivity and intemationality in science.443
“The Jews”, claimed Philipp Lenard, “are everywhere, and whoever today still defends 
the assertion o f  the intemationality o f natural science means probably unconsciously the 
Jewish science, which is o f course everywhere with the Jews and everywhere the 
same.”444
Aryan technology and science should be based on experiment and observation. That as­
sertion also advocated Houston Stewart Chamberlain:
440 See: K arl-H e in z  Lu d w ig , Technik und Ingenieure im Dritten Reich. Duesseldorf 1974, chapter three; 
H ER F, Reactionary modernism, p. 210. About the ‘cultural poEcy* or ‘cultural revolution’ of the German 
engineers, as H erf calls it, see chapter seven o f his book.
441 Some of the m ost propagandists: and influential texts were: Das Manifest zur Biechnung der 
Zinsknechtschaft des Geldes, (Munich 1919) by Gottfried Feder, Mythos des 20- Jahihundens (Munich 
1930 ff) by Alfred Rosenberg and o f course Adolf Hitler’s, Mein Kampf, (Munich 1925).
442 Beyerchen argues that Aryan physics was more politics than physics. Alan BEYERCHEN, Scientists un­
d er H itler. Politics and the Physics Community in the Third Reich. Yale Univ. Press 1977, pp. 123-140. See 
also: M ark  Wa l k er , German National Socialism and the quest of nuclear power 1939-1949. Cambridge 
1989, pp. 60-66.
443 BEYERCHEN, Scientists under Hitler, pp. 131,136.
444 P h il ip p  Le n a r d , Deutsche Physik. 4 vols. Munich 1936-37, here voL 1, p. ix, quoted by Bey er c h en , 
p. 135.
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“Experience —i.e., exact, minute, tireless observation- provides the broad unshakeable 
foundation of Germanic scholarship, regardless of whether it concerns philology or 
chemistry or anything eke. The capacity to observe, as well as the passion, self-sacrifice 
and honesty with which it is pursued, are essential characteristics of our [sic] race. Ob­
servation is the conscience o f Germanic scholarship.”445 
It is remarkable that even some works written by the pen o f  some distinguished ideo­
logues and despite the fact that they had all the requisite credentials to become textbooks 
of Nazi ideology, were rejected by the Ministry of Propaganda. This was the case with 
Ernst Krieck, a professor of education who was the author o f “Das Retch als Traeger Eu- 
ropaf*. Krieck was embittered by his rejection by foe Nazis and he decided to put an end 
to his scientific work confessing that he did no longer knew “what science can be, is al­
lowed to be, or must be”.446 Such incidents could not be avoided as long as there was no 
established institution that could provide guiding principles to foe fundamental problem 
of foe ‘Aryan isation’ of German science and research. Several attempts were made to set 
up such an organisation, but all proved unsuccessful. The main reason for these failures 
was the rivalries between foe state and the Party or within foe Party itself. In 1935, for 
example, the plans to establishing a “Reich Academy for Research” (Retchsakademe der 
Forscbung), drawn up foe Ministry o f Education, fell through because foe president o f the 
Deutsche Forscbungsgemdnschaft and 1919 Nobel laureate in Physics, Johannes Stark, strongly 
opposed them. The same fate befell the efforts o f foe NS-Professors Association 
(NSDDB) to give guidelines to all disciplines with foe support o f foe various Academies 
of Science in the Reich and other scientific circles. This time it was Alfred Rosenberg 
who hindered foe NSDDB plans for opportunistic reasons.447
Although foe Nazis ruled out foe notion of internationalism in science, they 
aspired to make German science and technology not only internationally accepted but 
also dominant. The lack of a systematic and coherent science policy, however, was to 
prove no bar to them putting that aspiration in the Reich’s foreign cultural policy agenda. 
As foe priorities o f  the Third Reich until 1936 were foe organisation of foe state and its 
economic recovery from foe depression, the Nazis made use o f  institutions established in 
the Weimar Republic to support and promote foe German culture and intellect abroad.
445 H o u s t o n  St e w a r t  C h a m b e r l a in , Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahfounderts, Munich 19002, p. 
786, quoted by: BEYERCHEN, Scientists under H itler, p. 132.
446 G te d  in: M ic h a e l  G r u e t t n e r , W issenschaft, in: Wo l f g a n g  Be n z  u.a. (Hg.), Enzyklopaedie des 
Nationalsozialismus. Muenchen 1997, pp. 135-153, here: p. 144.
447 Ibid.
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Despite the fact that the structure and personnel of the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs 
remained more or less the same until 1938, some changes were indeed made. Therefore, 
the director o f the ministry's cultural sector was replaced because o f the 1933 “Law for 
the Restoration of the Career Civil Service” (Gesetz %ur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtem- 
turns). A new director was appointed in March 1933, in the person of the historian Dr. 
Stieve, the former ambassador in Riga, who for ten years had been in charge of 
publishing the ‘‘Foreign Ministry Archives against the lies for Germany’s Responsibility 
in the Great War”. However, he was not a Nazi sympathiser, as his successor, Fritz von 
Twardowski reported in 1970.444 Additional small changes were made, when h e  Ministry 
for h e  People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda (Rricbsmimsterium fuer Volksaufklaerung 
und Propaganda) also wanted to get involved in the Reich’s foreign cultural relations.
It should be noted h a t the Nazis perceived h e  development and cultivation of 
those relations through h e  prism of h e ir  ideology, namely only as potential political 
propaganda.48 49 This perception was quite different from h e  rationale of h e  Foreign 
Ministry, which resisted Goebbels’ plans to transfer and incorporate h e  cultural sector of 
the Foreign Ministry into his own. Ultimately, h e  Reich Ministry o f Science, Education 
and Public Instruction (RfWEV or REM),450 was also involved in Germany’s foreign 
cultural affairs, seeking funds from h e  Ministry of h e  Interior intended for h e  Foreign 
Ministry’s cultural department In particular, h e  REM sought responsibility for h e  
Reich’s scientific, academic, student and educational relations abroad from h e  Foreign 
Ministry.451 In 1935, h e  ministry also took under its control part of h e  German 
Academic Exchange Service (Deutsche Akademische Austausch Dienst\ DAAD) and h e  
Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung -h e  two major academic exchange organisations,452 and 
went even further, signing cultural agreements with other countries, without h e
448 FRITZ v. T w a r d o w s k i, Anfaenge der deutschen Kulturpolitik zum Ausland, Bonn 1970, p. 29.
449 Ibid.
450 In May 1934 the Reich and Prussian Ministry for Science, Education and A rt (Reichs und Prtusstscbe Min­
isterium fuer Wissenschaft, Erhebung und Kunst -also as Pnussische Ministerium fuer Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volks­
bildung) incorporated into the Reich Ministry of Science, Education and Public Instruction (Racbsmimsterium 
fuer Wissenschaft, Ergebung m d Volksaufklaerung or Volksbildung and its head became Bernhard R ust
451 V o l k h a r d  L a it e n b e r g e r , Akademischer Austausch und auswaertige Kulturpolitik. Der Deutsche 
Akademische Austauschdinest (DAAD) 1923-1945. Goettingen 1976, pp. 81f (footnote 3).
452 Ibid, p. 82 (footnote 6). Under its auspices o f Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung were the ‘Deutschland- 
Stiftung des Mitteleuropaeischen Wirts chaftstages*, the ‘Stipendien des technisch-wirtschaftlichen Bera­
tungsdienstes’, the ‘Stipendien der Zwischenstaatlichen Verbaende’, die ‘Friedrich List-Stipendien der 
deutschen Wirtschaft*, and the ‘Deutsche Luftfahrt-Stipendien*.
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acquiescence o f the Foreign Ministry.453 After strong protests from the latter ministry, it 
was decided that academic exchanges should be organised, supported and controlled by 
both ministries, sharing responsibility for this area. Furthermore, the establishment o f the 
National Socialist Organisation for Issues Abroad \AuslandsoTganisaüon (AO) der NSDAP], 
in 1934, put extra obstacles in the path o f the Reich’s foreign cultural policy. The 
purpose o f the AO was to organise the German minorities into a solid and effective 
group for Germany’s political interests abroad 454 In the course o f time, the organisation 
intervened in academic travels to foreign countries and the selection o f lecturers, 
professors and researchers to be travel abroad, very often excluding foremost scientists. 
When the war broke out, however, the involvement o f the AO -and in particular its 
Cultural Service (Kutiuramt)-455 in propaganda abroad was increased. Southeastern Europe 
became the focus o f  that propaganda and a series o f scientific travels by prominent 
German scholars to major Balkan cities was organised in agreement with the Ministry o f 
Foreign Affairs.456 The propaganda plan intended to invite German and foreign scholars 
-  university professors, doctors, teachers, journalists, economists, and industrialists- to 
lecture on their area of expertise in local closed circles of ten to twelve people and, 
through the scientific interest that would be raised, to serve Germany’s political 
concerns. The reliability of the national socialist convictions of those people was, 
however, a prerequisite to any involvement, while personal acquaintances were essential. 
The propaganda-related thrust o f the whole undertaking should be kept secret.457 From 
April to July 1940, for example, about fifteen scientists were sent to Bulgaria, Greece, or 
both.458
453 This was the case with Hungary See; TWARDOWSKI, Anfaenge, pp. 32f.
454 EMIL E hrich , Die Auslands-Organisation der NSDAP, Berlin 1937, pp. 11-15. The author was 
Oauamtsiäter der A O  der NSDAP. See also: SEPPO KUUSISTO, Alfred Rosenberg in der Nationalsozial­
istischen Aussenpolitik 1933-39, Helsinki 1984, in  particular chapter IV.
455 For the structure and the several departm ents and services o f the A O  see: EHRICH, Die Auslands- 
Organisation der NSDAP, pp. 18ff.
456 The focus was set on Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania and Greece. See: NSDAP. Die Leitung der 
Auslands-Propaganda. (Heinz O tto) to H errn Gesandten A ltenburg A usw ärtigen Amt, Berlin on 
18.03.1940 (paragraph: ‘Entw urf), in: PAAA, R  60661.
457 Ibid1, (paragraph: ‘Aktion fuer Kulturpropaganda’).
458 Undated docum ent [1940}: Aufzeichnung. Bett.: Besucheraktion, in: PAAA, R 60661. About the lec­
tures held by Germ an scholars in the Balkans from  September 1940 until June 1941 see table A  o f the 




.Nam e Towns in  visit order D ate o f travel beginning
Baeumler Saloniki, Athens, Sofia 20.4.1940
Berve Athens 20.5.1940
Boehme Zagreb, Athens, Patras, Saloniki, Sofia, 
Budapest
2.5.1940. (That date was altered]
D oelg er Athens 2.5.1940
Fiala Sofia 15.4.1940
Kaftan Sofia 10.5.1940
Kindermaan Belgrade, Neusatz, Ossijek, Athens 2.5.1940
K roh Sofia, Plovdiv, Burgas, Vama, Russe, 
Saloniki, Athens, Budapest
15.5.1940
M uehlens Belgrade, Athens, Sofia 15.4.1940
Nordm ann Neusatz 15-5.1940
Schm idt Athens, Saloniki 20.5-1940
Staebel Belgrade, Ossijek, Saloniki, Sofia, Plovdiv 1.6.1940
U nveracht Zagreb, Athens, Patras, (Volo), Saloniki, 
Sofia
15.5-1940
V ogt Neusatz, Sofia, Plovdiv, Vama 1.6.1940
W eltzien Zagreb 10.5-1940
Source: Politisches Archiv des Auswaerdgen Am ts, R 60661: "NSDAP. Die Leitung der 
Auslands-Propaganda (Heinz Otto) to H errn Gesandten Altenburg A usw ärtigen Amt, Bedin on 
18.03.1940.
The Ministry of the Interior, which supported the German cultural institutes in 
Rome, the Archaeological Institute, as well as the Zoological Station in Naples and the 
Institute of Art History in Florence also participated in the German culture campaign 
abroad. These institutes were under the patronage of the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, 
which in 1934 handed over the direction to the above ministry. Last but not least, party 
organisations like the Archive Administration of the Mobilisation Echelon Rosenberg 
(Anhivevenvakung Einsat^stab Rosenberg) and the Ahnenerbe Office o f the Rdchsfuehrer SSt 
were also aspired to participate in the activities and research -whether planned or were 
already under way abroad.459
459 Vortcag von Twardowski, anlaesslich der Tagung der K ultuntfhenten am 13 August 1941 (Geheim!), 
in: PAAA, R 60608.
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It is clear that since the early years o f Hitler’s regime, there were differences 
among these various institutions. Those differences were developed in the following 
years into power ambitions, reflecting the profound antagonisms between the Party, and 
the State and the chaotic bureaucracy brought about by this dynamic. “Too many serv­
ices are working side by side usually without knowing o f each other’s existence”, noted 
the director of the cultural department o f the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fritz von 
Twardowski, in 1942.460 The pressure this situation exerted on the Foreign Ministry, 
which bore the main responsibility for cultural policy abroad, forced Twardowski to 
plead desperately with several party organisations to avoiding any intrusion in the minis­
try’s affairs, because this would create conflicts that would eventually damage the nation’s 
interests.461 In 1936, the “cultural desk” o f  the Foreign Ministry was renamed the “cul­
tural political sector”.462 That change indicated the fact that foreign cultural policy had 
begun to be recognised by the Nazis as a significant factor on the international political 
stage.
The year 1937 was the turning point in Nazi Germany’s foreign cultural policy. 
At the Party’s extravagant annual festivities in Nuremberg Hitler made his first speech 
about cultural policy, in which he placed this kind of policy in the framework o f the gen­
eral state policy.463
‘This state should not be an authority \hlacht\ without culture, a power \Kraft\ without 
beauty. The armament of a nation is morally justified, only when its shield and sword 
have a higher mission. Therefore, we do not aspiring to the brutal force of a Ghengis 
Khan, but the affluent power to create a strong social and patronage community as a 
bearer and guardian of a higher culture!”464
How seriously Hitler meant those words, as Hausmann remarks, remains in 
question. What is certain, however, is that die Nazis echoed Weimar Republic’s convic­
tion that Germany had lost the war because the country lacked intellectual rather than 
material weapons. “We cGd not lose the war”, claimed Goebbels, “because our cannons 
failed, but rather because our intellectual weapons did not fire”.465
460 Ibid.
461 Ibid.
40 Twardowski, Anfaenge, p. 33.
463 Iftd, p. 38.
464 Quoted in: Frank-RUTGER HAUSMANN, “A uch im  Kneg schweigen die Musen nicht”. Die Deutschen 
W issenschaftlichen Institute im Zweiten W eltkrieg. Goettingen 2001, pp. 19f.
465 Joseph Goebblels, Reden (March 25,1993), cited in: HERF, Reactionary m odernism, p. 195.
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In 1938, Joachim von Ribbentrop was appointed as the new foreign minister and 
one year later Fritz von Twardowski became head of the cultural-political sector. The 
distinction between ‘cultural policy* and ‘propaganda* present in Weimar Republic was 
now abandoned, despite Twardowski’s reservations.'466 ‘Cultural propaganda’ was now 
used as a synonym of ‘cultural policy* and the Ministry of Propaganda itself tried anew to 
take the cultural affairs o f the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under its control. The latter 
regarded “the lighter muses” as propaganda, namely the concerts, theatre, art and other 
exhibitions, and poetry reading.467 These undertakings, as well as sports affairs and radio 
broadcasts were the only areas that eventually came under Goebbels control and were 
sponsored by his ministry.46* Furthermore, the bilateral cultural societies, like the Ger­
man-French Society, the German-Bulgarian, the German-Greek Society and so forth, 
which for decades had been supported by private funds, were recruited by Goebbels for 
propaganda purposes.469 However, the most important issues, namely the German edu­
cation, language and scientific affairs abroad, remained in the responsibility of the For­
eign Ministry. In 1937, its cultural sector was further divided into eleven departments. 
Among them was the department Kult W, which was responsible for the promotion of 
German science abroad, i.e. congresses, travels, lectures and the German books; the de­
partment Kufc Uf responsible for university affairs, professors and students and their re­
lation with other countries, as well as scholarships; and the K ut I  department, in charge 
o f  the German institutes abroad.470 The Foreign Ministry, and in particular Fritz v. Twar­
dowski, strongly and explicitly emphasised that propaganda and cultural policy had to 
remain separate for the sake of Germany’s influence abroad. Twardowki in his revealing 
and forceful speech in the meeting o f  cultural councillors (’faltmrtfmnUntagmjfy, on 13 
August 1942, made a clear distinction between propaganda, cultural propaganda and 
cultural policy:
466 V ortrag von Twardowski, anlaesslich der Tagung der Kulturreferenten am 13 August 1942. (Geheim!), 
in: PAAA, R 60608. See also HAUSMANN, A uch im Krieg, pp. 20 £, (footnote 21). K urt Duewell made in 
his 1976 work a basic distinction between the notions regarding the foreign cultural relations. K u r t  
D u e w e l l , Deutschlands auswaertige Kulturpolitik 1918-1932. Grundlinien und Dokumente, Koeln 1976,
pp- 35 m
467 V ortrag von Twardowski, anlaesslich der Tagung der Kulturreferenten am 13 August 1942. (Geheim!), 
in: PAAA, R 60608.
468 T w a r d o w s k i, Anfaenge, p. 31.
469 Ib id , p .40.
470 lin d , p. 37.
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“ By ‘propaganda* I understand the effort to influence a country’s public opinion, in re­
lation with an acute political, economic or military situation. Propaganda works, there­
fore, in the short term. There is also, of course, the cultural propaganda — Kulturpropa- 
ganda-, but this is for the big cultural nations only a repercussion of a hostile propaganda 
that denies our [si<\ cultural achievements. [...] In addition, exerting cultural policy 
means presenting and establishing an intellectual leading ambition; it means organising 
an intellectual co-operation between nations; moreover, it means achieving an enduring 
intellectual influence over a select intellectual elite of other nations and making it, as fir 
as possible, dependent on the German intellect.”471
Warning about the damage a blunt cultural propaganda policy might cause to 
Germany’s influence, Twardowski stressed that the candidate country, with which Ger­
many planned to develop cultural relations, should decide of its own free will about any 
future cultural collaboration with the Reich.
“No political or economic pressure [should be applied] for the sake of cultural work of 
any kind. Equality and reciprocity, no violence but dialogue, cultural exchange at its 
broadest, not one-sided performance [should be our principles]. In short, we must exer­
cise our cultural policy with soft gloves [.. .]”472
In 1932/33, the dean of the faculty of philosophy at the University of Leipzig, Professor 
Weickmann, in his opening speech talked about a global cultural community and echoing 
the post-war trauma he stressed that Germans wished not only economic, but also cul­
tural relations with countries that could understand the German spirit. Nevertheless, the 
cultural exchange, he argued further, should have a national character and Germany 
should try to promote its own to the young foreign scholars, particularly to those sup­
ported by the Reich’s scholarship foundations, namely the DAAD and the Alexander von 
Humboldt SUjtung. Southeastern Europe should have priority, underlined the German pro­
fessor.473
In addition to the cultural infrastructure, the new regime also established a num­
ber o f new institutions involved in science policy planning, even though what was 
planned remained unclear until the launch o f the Four-Year Plan in 1936. The most im­
portant institutions between 1934 and 1936 were the University Commission o f the
471 V ortrag von Twardowski, anlaesslich derT agungder Kulturre ferenten am 13 August 1942. (Geheim!), 
in: PAAA, R 60608.
472 Ibid.
473 Akademische Auslandsstelle des Universitaet Leipzig. Taetigkeitsbericht, 16.07.1932 — 30.09.1933, in: 
PAAA, R 64028.
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NS DAP (Hocbschulkommissiôn der N  SD AP), the National Socialist Professors Association 
(Nationalso^aUstische Deutsche Dotgntenbund, NSDDB), and the Department of Science in 
Alfred Rosenberg’s Office {Amt Rosenberg, while others were created after 1936 in the 
framework of the Four-Year Plan.474 The co-ordination, however, of those organisations 
not at all systematic, for there was a total absence of official science policy, gave rise to 
conflicts between government and party institutions which prevented the smooth opera­
tion o f Germany’s scientific and research institutions. Only the Ministry of Education 
seemed to have a powerful voice in scientific planning, for it maintained good relations 
with the Wehrmacht and close contacts with the SS. However, the antagonisms and the 
unclear competencies of the newly established party institutions, which were eager to get 
involved, damaged Germany’s scientific and research production and consequently its 
image abroad. The fact, for instance, that both the Ministry of Education and the Party 
were striving to gain power and control over universities and the professorial appoint­
ments, had the result o f depriving professors of any power they may have had in the 
past, with unfortunate consequences for the country’s scientific production. The combi­
nation of appointments, Herf rightly remarks, based on ideological rather than on scien­
tific or technical criteria, along with bureaucratic conflicts over jurisdiction, hindered 
technical innovation and scientific research.475 476To this should be added the regime’s un­
willingness to understand the close and unbreakable relationship between science and 
technology, which according to Herf, was due to the lack of scientific background of 
people in positions of responsibility, leaving them unable “to grasp the implications of 
scientific advances for technical advances.”474
The Ministry o f Education, under Bernhard Rust, who had also been director of 
the Ministry’s cultural department since 1 June 1934 and founder of the Reich Research 
Council {Rdchsforschungsrat, RFR) in 1937, intensified its close relations with the 
Wehmacht, as the final countdown to the war outcome began slowly to emerge in 
1941/2. Nonetheless, the mobilisation of science for war purposes had already been 
started in 1936, when Herman Goering, the Minister of the Airforce, officially an­
nounced the Four-Year Plan. Goerring was also the head of that organisation, the aim of 
which was to prepare Germany for war, making the state self-sufficient in raw materials
474 GRUETTNER, Wissenschaft, p - 135.
475 HERF, Reactionary modernism, p. 201
476 Ibid, p. 203.
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and independent o f  foreign currency in four years.477 An additional aim was that G er­
many’s dependence on the world economy should be reduced through technical innova­
tion.47* There were three major institutions which collaborated towards these ends: the 
Ministry o f Education, the Office o f Military Weapons (Hemswaffenamt) and the Reich 
Research Council. All these, and some new institutions, like the Ahnenerbe established in 
1937, got involved in scientific research, which was expected to make Germany ready to 
wage a successful war. However, the research fever in the late 1930s did not justify a 
continuing interest o f the Nazis in science. Even in the Four-Year Plan period, the po­
lemic against science was very strong. In 1941, one could read in the “Schwang Korps \  
organ o f die SS:
“What we are, we know it from the Fuehrer. Everything else that has been written does
not concern us. The Fuehrer does not need any professors to conduct what he has already
considered expedient. We don’t need any theories”.479
The absence o f any official guidelines on German science and research policy did 
not, however, mean that the party officials did not try to indoctrinate existing scientific 
institutions with elements o f their ideology. O n the contrary, these efforts were system­
atic with devastating results. The 1933 “Law for the Restoration of the Career Civil 
Service” was to have perhaps the most catastrophic effect on German science in the 
years to come. More than fifteen per cent o f  scholars and scientists at universities and 
their laboratories were dismissed because o f  that law, which aimed at changing funda­
mentally the state’s bureaucracy without destroying its effectiveness in administrating its 
affairs.480 The concept o f race, but also political convictions, was the core o f that law. 
Specific civil servants were relieved o f their duties in order for a “national” civil service 
to be restored and for administration to be simplified. Those without proper qualifica­
tions, meaning those who had taken office since 9 November 1918 (i.e. political appoint­
ees); those, whom previous political activities did not guarantee, according to the Nazis, 
an unreserved loyalty to the new regime; and those o f  “non-Aryan” descent were all af­
477 See: PETZINA DIETER, Autaddepolitik im D ritten Reich. D er nationalsozialistische Vierjahresplan, 
Stuttgart 1968.
478 HERF, Reactionary modemism p. 201
479 Gted in: GRUETTNER, Wissenschaft, p. 143.
480 “Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums”, vom 7. April 1933, Retchsgeset̂ bkat I S, 175- 
Part of the law in: INGO von MUENCH (Hrsg.), Gesetze des NS-Staates. Dokumente eines Umechtssys- 
tems. Paderborn 1994, pp. 26-28.
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fected by the application o f that law.4®1 The legislation left gaping-holes to the academic 
and scientific community of Germany, for more than a thousand scholars were forced to 
emigrate, primarily to the United States and England.4*2 Some universities, which were 
regarded as liberal, suffered massive loss of their personnel compared to other more or­
thodox instituitions. The universities of Berlin, Frankfurt and Breslau, for example, 
which before 1933 were open to Jewish, liberal, even to Marxist scientists, lost one third 
o f  their academic staff. By contrast, universities, like those in Tuebingen and Rostock, 
with nationalistic inclinations, could hardly count a loss.481 283 Hitler, defending die law he 
stated provocatively:
“If the dismissal of Jewish scientists means annihilation of contemporary German sci­
ence, then we shall do without science for a few years.”484 
The “ Aryan is ation” o f German universities was accelerated by adapting their programs 
to the directives o f the Nazi regime. This practically meant prohibition colleagues left 
behind citing scientists who had emigrated. Moreover, it meant a ban on of quoting Jew­
ish scientists. Jewish scientific method, as it was called, was denigrated as alien to nature 
and science itself.485 German scientists found themselves hemmed in a double role: the 
ideologue and the expert.486 The issue of the ‘political’ and ‘apolitical’ scientist, which 
very much troubled contemporary historians and continues to trouble them up to today, 
was very closely related to that role. The criteria that portrayed and classified the scholar 
as belonging to one category or the other, were not explicit, however. Rather, they were
481 Ibid. Paragraphs 2, 3.4.
482 About die emigration o f  German scientists and its post-war impact particularly on American as well as 
on German science see: ClAUS-DiETER FCr o h n , "Deutsche Wissenschaftsemigratiofl seit 1933 und ihrt 
Remigradonsbarrieren nach 1945”, in  RUEDIGER vom BRUCH, BRIGITTE KaDERaS (Hg), Wissenschaften 
und  Wissenschaftspolidk. Bestandsaufnahmen zu Formationen, Bruechen und Kontinuitaeten im 
Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts. Stuttgart 2002, pp. 437-452 See also: Strauss HERBERT A, TlLMANN 
B u d d e n s œ g , K u r t  D u e  WELL (eds.), Emigration- Deutsche WissenschafÜer nach 1933, Endassung und 
Vertreibung. Bedim Technische Universitaet Be dm 1987. About die emigrated scholars in life sciences see: 
UTE D eic h m a n n , Biologen unter Htder. Portaet einer Wissenschaft im N$*Staat Frankfurt a.M., 1995, 
chapter one. Some data about the emigrated physicists there are also in ËEVERCHEN, Scientists under 
H itler, chapter three.
488 GRUETTNER, Wissenschaft, p. 138; ASH G. MITCHELL, “Scientific Changes in Germany 1933, 1945, 
1990: Towards a Comparison”, im Minerva 37 (19990, pp. 329-354, here: p. 332
484 G ted  in  Ala n  Be y e r CHEN, "What we now know about Nazism and Science”, in  Sodal Reseanb. 59 
(1992), pp- 615-641, here p. 618.
485 BEYERCHEN, Scientists under Hider, p. 132
488 GRUETTNER, Wissenschaft, pp. 145f.
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formed and transformed according to the political currents and the social circumstances 
of the time.4*7 In the Nazi period though, the elements that illustrated the ‘political’ or 
‘apolitical’ scientist, derived from the concept that the role of citizen and the role o f sci­
entist were inseparable. Unlike the majority o f citizens and civil servants, the “citizen- 
scientist” had the unique privilege of access to knowledge that could scientifically con­
tribute to the economic, military, and social demands o f the time.4** It seems that in the 
end Hitler’s regime managed to achieve its plans for expansion o f every kind -however 
short-lived- with the help of science, which supported and justified them.
Nonetheless, the ideological accommodation that new type of scientist had to 
make trying at the same time to secure the necessary funds by all means, was to prove 
below the Party’s expectations. Bargaining with the polycratic Nazi mechanism, the 
scholars very often used a rhetoric they knew would convince the authorities to give 
them money for their projects, even where they did not seem to have any direct relation 
to the government’s plans. The “Krigsmchtigkeit\ that was the importance for the war 
planning, and the “Kulturwichtigkdf’, namely the significance for the state’s culture, 
epitomised the rhetoric the scientists used for the above purpose, particularly after 
1943.4*9 Despite the poor adaptation o f science in general to the Nazi ideology, some dis­
ciplines made the racial principles an essential part o f their existence. Public law and his­
tory, but also disciplines affiliated to biological racism, like race hygiene and eugenics, as 
well as the science o f defence (Wehrmssenscbaft), folk-history, prehistory and colonial sci- 4879
487 See: WALKER, The quest o f nudear power 1939-1949, pp. 4  fir, also PAUL F orm an , “Weimar culture, 
causality and quantum theory, 1918-1927: Adaptation by German physicists and mathematidans to a 
hostile intellectual environment”, in: HSPS, 3 (1971), pp. 1-115; Ibi<Ly “Scientific Internationalism and the 
Weimar Physicists: The Ideology and its Manipulation in Germany after World War I”, in: Isis 64 (June 
1973), pp. 151-180; CLIFFORD GEERTZ, The Interpretation of Cultures, New Y ork 1973, pp. 193-233; 
FRITZ St e r n , The Failure o f  liberalism. Essays .on die Political Culture o f  M odem  Germany. N ew  Y ork 
1992, pp. 3-25.
488 WALKER, T he quest o f  n u d ear p o w er, p. 5.
489 Even though what was characterised as l,knegswicbti£\ o r relevant to war, and what not has not yet been 
systematically studied by historians, as Helmut Maier argues, die excessive use of the term by die scientists, 
at least in some disripHnes, amid the chaotic research bureaucracy, leave us some space to consider the 
“Yjiegswichtigkaf as mere rhetoric. How convincing, however, was that oratory, is indeed an issue to be 
investigated as a “quasi-category of the historical analysis”. See: HELMUT M a ie r , “Wehrbaftmachung* und 
‘Kriegswichtigkeif. Z ur Ruestungstechnologischen Relevanz des Kaiser-Wilhelm-Instituts fuer Metallfor- 
schung in Stuttgart vor und nach 1945”, in: Max-Planck Gesellschaft zur Foerdeiung der Wissenschafcen 
e.V. (Ergebnisse 5: “Geschichte der KWG im Nationalsozialisraus”) 2002, pp. 7f.
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ence were areas representing not only the Aryan intellect but also its new epistemic ori­
entation. Hand in hand with this ideological adaptation went the so-called “alignment” or 
“tuning” (Gleichschaltun  ̂ o f  scientific institutions, primarily universities. This involved the 
centralisation of power by the organisation’s leader, in accordance with the Fuehrerprin t̂p, 
which proclaimed among other things authority of every leader to those subject to him 
and responsibility from the people below to the top.490 It also was a bargain between the 
regime and the scientific organisations and institutes. The latter, in return for their devo­
tion and support for the regime, would retain quasi-autonomy, allowing them to organise 
and run their programs. That typical autonomy, however, was in due course either re­
stricted or violated. The effectiveness of die Gleichscbatung varied from university to uni­
versity and from institute to institute. Here again, the state and the Party antagonised one 
another in appointing their men to leading positions. Those conflicts left scientists some 
latitude for manoeuvre through the chaotic polycratic structure of the regime. In prac­
tice, scientists sought alliances with particular centres of power that would secure the in­
dependent operation o f their own institutions. However, German scholars often an­
nounced “self-mobilisation” of their institution to the regime’s demands, in order to se­
cure state support for their ongoing research projects in addition to those they had to 
carry out for the warfare needs.491
The Nazi hostility to science and theory and the persecution of thousands of 
prominent Jewish scholars stripped the country's universities of some o f their best minds 
and damaged not only German science but also the country’s reputation abroad once 
again after the Great War. On the other hand, though, the German-Jewish academics 
who found new posts in foreign universities, -usually in high-ranking English and Ameri­
can educational or research centres-, fortified the reputation of the German scientific 
tradition in those countries. In certain disciplines, like physics, the departure of the most 
outstanding scientists like Albert Einstein, Max Bom, Victor Weisskopf, Lise Meitner 
and others, were a major set-back for Germany, and had the added (albeit unintentional) 
effect of boosting the advancement o f  English and American science.492 The picture in
490 WOLFGANG Benz  u.a. (Hg.), Enzyklopaedie des NationalsoziaKsinus. Muenchen 1997, entry: Fuehrer- 
prinrip. p. 475.
491 HERBERT MEHRTENS, “KoUabo rations verhaeitmsse: Natur- und Technikwissenschaftcn im NS-Staat 
und ihre Histone” , in: CHRISTOPH MEINEL, PETER VOSWINCKEL (H rg.), Median, Naturwissenschaft, 
Technik und Nationalsozialismus. Kontinuitaetea und Diskondnuitaeten. Stuttgart 1994, pp. 13-32, here: 
27 &
492 BEYERCHEN, Scientists under Hitler, chapters two and three.
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biology was similar. Richard Goldschmidt and Viktor jollos were two o f the most 
prominent geneticists who emigrated to the United States, while many others were dis­
missed and forced to emigrate for political reasons.493 German science suffered not only 
from the vast loss o f its most capable personnel at universities and research institutions. 
The purging of Jewish contributions from German scientific journals increased the dan­
ger of German isolation from the international scientific community. The prestige of 
German science abroad through publishing o f scientific works and the importation o f 
foreign currency by the purchase of journals from abroad were seriously threatened. At 
the same time, an emigration wave also affected the publishing sector, as many German- 
Jewish scientists were forced to resign from their editorial positions. Additionally, the 
dramatic increase o f the price o f German scientific periodicals in early 1930s, in combi­
nation with the devaluation o f the American dollar in 1933, made die purchase o f Ger­
man periodicals for American libraries a difficult task, so that the Amencan Library As­
sociation considered taking counter-measures or even boycotting German publications.494 
Meanwhile, the increasing distrust die Nazi authorities felt for the foreign scientific press, 
which was regarded as a vehicle o f “Jewish science”, was to prove yet another obstacle to 
German scientists seeking to stay up to date on the findings o f  their colleagues abroad. 
That handicap seemed to be greater for those based at universities rather than at Technis- 
che Hochschule or at institutes for defence research.495 The reason was that the latter two, in 
the framework o f Germany’s preparations for war, became the officially favoured insti­
tutions and the latest scientific works from abroad were purchased, whatever the cost. 
Therefore, the restrictions imposed by the regime in university libraries for economic or 
ideological reasons did not apply to institutions that in one way or another, related to the 
Four-Year Plan.
Fortunately, the situation at private or semiprivate scientific institutions seemed 
to be rather different than universities. The Kaiser Wilhelm Society, which was the most 
representative research institution o f that kind with a global reputation, managed, in gen­
eral, to secure considerable independence from the directives o f the NSDAP. Moreover, 
in some disciplines, like those related to life sciences, the basic scientific research contin-
493 DEICHMANN, Biologen unter Hitler, pp. 36-46, particularly tables 1 and 2.
494 P a m e l a  Sp e n c e  R ic h a r d s , "The Movement o f  scientific Knowledge from and to  Germany under 
National Socialism”, in: Minerva, Vol. XXVIII, Number 4, (Winter 1990), pp. 401-425, here: p. 409.
495 M , p .  412.
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ued freely and relatively unaffected by ideological considerations.496 For example, the 
Fuehrerprin t̂p took effect in the Kaiser Wilhelm Society only in 1937. In addition, the So­
ciety was put under die aegis o f the Ministry of Education. The Society’s presidential ap­
pointments during the years in question advocate the distance the organisation kept from 
die Party, as its heading personalities were elected by the academic and industrial circles. 
Even Albert Voegler, who served as president from 1941 until 1945 and was regarded as 
“Party man”, also kept aloof the NSDAP.497
Despite the chaotic situation in Hideds administration, some of the elements that 
shaped the general framework of the Reich’s higher education and science policy can be 
discerned. Apart from the scientific abilities o f scholars, their race, namely the Aryan de­
scent, and their political sympathies played a crucial role in die national socialist modifi­
cation of higher education and their research institutes. According to the Party’s guiding 
principles, the scientific and research centres had to leave aside their democratic structure 
and to follow the Fuehmprin^p. In addition, the disciplines that appeared to be politically 
important to the Nazis, like the Aryan physics and the racial biology, received consider­
able support, as they were considered to represent the national socialist intellect and ide­
als.498 Publications of some Nazi professors, for example, and in particular of the 1905 
Nobel laureate in physics, Phillip Lenard, illustrated the features of what was regarded as 
“Nazi science”.499 One o f the tenets of the new type of science was that it should not be 
separated from life. Therefore, science as an end in itself was denounced by the Nazis, 
who declared that any intellect, culture or education should serve the needs of German 
people. The utility of science for the state’s demands was proof of whether any scientific 
undertaking was in accordance to National Socialism. Another element that distinguished 
Aryan science from “liberal” science was the lack of specialisation that marked the for­
mer. Nazi scientists defended the unity of science and argued that the boundaries of the 
disciplines had to be transcended. In addition, every research project, they declared, 
should be driven by the notion of race. Last but not least, Aryan science had to have its 
roots to the people’s soul and therefore internationalism in science was condemned.
496 See: KRISTIE MaCRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika. Scientific Research in Nazi Germany. O x fo rd  1993, 
chapters 4,6.
497 See: ULRIKE K o h l , D ie Präsidenten der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft i® Nations]Sozialismus Max 
Planck, Cad Bosch und Albert Vogler zwischen Wissenschaft und Macht, Stuttgart 2002.
^  G rUETTNER, Wissenschaft, pp. 141-143.
499 In particular his four-volume work “Deutsche Physik*'. See footnote 444. Also: BeyerCKEN, Scientists 
under Hider, pp. 123-126 about the "Aryan canon” in physics.
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In 1934, Germany withdrew from the League o f  Nations, troubling the interna­
tional community for its future political role on the world scene. In science, the first 
alarming signs appeared, when German scientists gave lectures o f a national socialist or 
racial character at international meetings. In order for the representation of the German 
spirit abroad to be secured by pro-Nazi academics, a number o f bureaucratic processes 
screened the would-be delegates, applying a system o f political selection. Thus, only 
those academics who favoured the national socialist regime were promoted, while all 
others were left behind.500 This policy, as well as the state’s heavy criticism on scientists, 
who did not relate their findings to racial ideals, alerted many foreigners to the lack of 
freedom of scientific speech in Germany.501 In effect, the unwillingness of foreign schol­
ars to co-operate with their German colleagues increased, while German applications to 
join international scientific organisations, like the Astronomical Union in 1938, were 
turned down.502 Additionally, American foundations withdrew their support for German 
science and the Rockefeller Foundation, which continued to fund several projects in the 
Reich’s institutes, eventually stopped its contribution. The only exception was made for 
some projects on basic biological research, which the Foundation continued to finance 
until 1937.503 Germany’s prestige was again falling into decay and the German govern­
ment as well as the party tried to tackle the problem by increasing support to undertak­
ings which had existed since the 1920s.
The German Academy was among the first institutions that were recruited to 
spread German science beyond the country’s borders. With the support of the Foreign 
Ministry, the Academy became after 1933 an important proponent o f German science 
and scholarship abroad. It also supervised the German Academic Exchange Service 
(DAAD), the major organisation that co-ordinated the exchange activities and contacts 
with foreign scientific institutions. The DAAD had been re-established in 1931 and a 
couple o f years later it succumbed to Party’s involvement, more precisely die control of
500 SPENCE R ic h a r d s , ‘T h e  M ovem ent o f  scien tific  K now ledge” , p . 414.
™lbid
502 Ibid., p . 413.
503 The exception was made for Alfred Kuetin’s and Adolf Butenand’s co-joined woik on genetics. See; 
KRISTIE M a c r a k is , Surviving the Swastika, 112 f£; also: Ibid., “Wissenschaftsfoerderung durch die Rocke­
feller-Stiftung im “Dritten Reich”. Die Entscheidung, das Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut fuer Physik finanziell zu 
umeistuetzen, 1934-39” , in: Geschichte und Geseltscbqß (Sonderdruck), 12. Jahrgang, Heft 3 (1986), pp. 348- 
379.
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its publications by Goebbels’ Ministry.504 50However, its leader, Adolf Morsbach, who had 
directed the Exchange Service since 1927,503 largely succeeded in securing its cultural- 
political role as specified along the pre-1933 lines. In 1934, Morsbach enlarged the com­
petences of the DAAD, some of the most important of which were the exchange of 
young scholars, travels o f senior academics and philologists to and from Germany, so­
licitude for all foreigners who studied at German universities, campaign by senior and 
junior foreign scholars regarding German universities and summer courses organised 
there, occasional wide propaganda abroad about the scientific and academic environment 
through the DAAD periodicals and the like.506 507Correspondence between German schol­
ars and foreign scientists, particularly from the Balkan states, who had studied in Ger­
many or had just visited the country, was a strong propaganda tool during the war years. 
A t the University o f Bremen, dispatches of letters, periodicals and books sent to the Bal­
kan countries amounted to over 3.300 in December 1940, while a year later the number 
increased to 33.000.M'
Foreign scholars abroad constituted a very important capital for the Reich’s cul­
tural policy. Therefore, in addition to the DAAD organisation which granted scholar­
ships, a number o f  other supporting institutions, like the Professor’s Foreign Service 
{Auslandsamt der Do^tntemchajî)  ̂were established in order to help them during their stay in 
Germany promoting the exchange ideas with them through personal contacts. By ‘ex­
change’ the Germans meant introducing them to German achievements in cultural, sci­
entific, economic and educational areas. For that introduction the foreigners would be 
invited to workshops and meetings, as well as participate in touring several industries, 
scientific institutions, clinics and hospitals. The funds for this cultural political undertak-
504 L a it e n b e RGER, Akademischer Austausch, p. 51.
505 In  1927, it was named Akademischer Austauschdienst (AAD) and in 1931 it was incorporated together with 
d ie Deutsche Akademische Auslandsstelle des Verbandes der Deutschen Hochschulen, Dresden (DAASt) and the Alex­
ander von Humboldt Stiftmg (AvHSt) into die Deutscher Akademischer Axstausé&enst (DAAD). The institution 
survives until today in the same name.
506 L a tten b erg er , pp. 65 f.
507 H. Baatz. Auslandsamt der Dozentenschaft der deutschen Univenitaeten und Hochschulen. 
Jahresarbeitsbericht 1. Oktober 1941 bis 30 September 1942. Streng veraulich! Irr BAB, R 63/174. See 
also: Dr. Baatz (Leiter des Auslandsamts edr Dozentenschaft Universitaet und Hochschulen Berlin ) 
Taetigkeitsbericht ueber das Sommerhalbjahr vom 1.4 bis 30.9.37. Vertraulich!, in: BAK R 73/48.
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ing came from the Foreign Ministry as well as from the Ministry o f  Education (REM).508 
Besides the DAAD scholarships, exemption from tuition fees was another measure that 
was expected to attract foreign scholars to German universities. The decision on which 
student to fund was taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and only those nationals, 
whose governments had asked for the facility were eligible. In 1934, Greece was reported 
to have made the most applications o f all countries.509 The fee-exemption was estimated 
to be in Germany’s cultural-political interest^ for it was not only expected to increase the 
number o f foreign students, but also to weaken the anti-German propaganda abroad put 
about by emigrants.510 Foreigners were acknowledged as the “auxiliary troops for Ger­
many’s struggle for world prestige” and influencing them by all means possible was a 
major priority in the Reich’s cultural policy agenda.511
World prestige also meant economic influence and dominance. In die national 
socialist economic planning southeastern Europe was regarded as the “informal empire” 
of the Third Reich512 that would provide Germany with what had lost overseas in the 
First World War. Therefore, in addition to the several institutions -particularly the Deut­
sche Schuie- which were established in the area for advertising the German culture and lan­
guage, the “Deutschiand-SUftung des Mittekuropaeiséen Wirtschajistag was established in 
spring 1936. This was a scholarship foundation created for the financial support of 
young scientists from southeastern Europe, who were specialising in engineering, econ­
omy and medicine and who wished to visit German institutions for advanced studies. 
The foundation was affiliated to the Mittekurapaeische Wirtschaftstag (MWT), an organisa­
tion that had been set up in 1924 and aimed at intensifying the economic relations of 
Germany with south-eastern Europe. It was re-established in 1930/31 and during Hit­
ler’s era it became the link between German heavy industry, namely the IG-Farben, and 
the NSDAP. The MWT was one o f  the m ost important instruments for the Reich's indi-
508 Auslandsamt der Dozentenschaft Universitaet und Hochschulen Berlin to the Ministry o f  Foreign Af­
fairs (Herrn Konsul Roth). Undated document (probably on 3.61937], in: PAAA, R 64037 (Microfiche Nr. 
7325).
509 Auswaertiges Amt 6-A- gez. Oster) to Reichskultusministenum z.Hd. von Herrn Reg. Rat Butmeister, 
Bedin 20.11.1934, h r  PAAA, R 64065.
510 lind
511 Dr. Knapp, Deutsche Kongress-Zentrale. Jahresbericht 1935 to Auswaertigpn Amt u.a. on 15.01.1936, 
p. 7, kr PAAA, R 60598.
512 KlAUS THOERNER, Deutsche Suedosteuropaplaene, 1840-1945. Dissertation submitted at the Univer­
sity o f Oldenburg, 1999, see chapter 6.3, where he uses and argues about the term.
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rect and covert imperialistic penetration of the Balkans/11 Even though the Dcutschland- 
Stiftung was subject to the MWT, the DAAD, and in particular the Alexander von Humboldt 
Stiftung, was responsible for its administration, while the funds came from the industry, 
among others the Krupp Company and the I.G.Farben.su It is clear that the interests of 
the economic and industrial circles became an additional factor to the cultural political 
considerations for allocating grants to foreigners, and their influence on the DAAD in­
creased during the war years. Another instrument the Nazi regime used to enhance its 
prestige in international scientific circles was the scientific publications that were ad­
dressed to foreign public. These publications were considered cultural-propaganda in­
struments for disseminating German achievements abroad. On the top of all, stood the 
periodical “Forschungen und Fortschritte”, which had already been launched in Spanish, in 
1927. In 1935, an English and in 1939 a Chinese version of the journal increased Ger­
many’s chances to expand its influence over larger groups of the international scientific 
community.513 415
In 1939, though, when the war broke out; Germany’s scientific communication 
with the English-speaking world was interrupted. The Nazis turned to Europe, which 
they regarded as their future territory, where -among other things- they could impose the 
New Order of learning inspired by the national socialist ideals. In occupied countries, 
the existing organisations for the cultivation and promotion of German culture received 
additional state support for their propaganda purpose. The German Academy with its 
branches in several cities in occupied European countries was die leading organisation in 
co-ordinating and controlling the Reich’s cultural activities, focusing on the expansion 
and dissemination o f the German language. Planning documents drawn up in 1933 sug­
gest that the Academy should focus its activities on five geographical areas: Near and Far 
East, South Africa, Latin America and the Balkans.516 The numerous “German Insti-
513 Sch u m a n n , G riff nach Suedosteuropa, p. 52: See also: M artin G erhard  Bo n g a r d s , Raumplanung 
als wissenschaftliche Disziplin im Nationalsozialismus. Marburg 1995, chaper 4; THOERNER, Deutsche 
Suedosteuropaplaene, chapter 6.1,6.2 for the early years of the MWT, and chapter 63. Foe a detailed ap- 
roach about the undertakings o f  the MWT in Bulgaria and the scholarship policy sec MaRKUS W ie n , 
Markt und Modernisierung Deutsch-bulgarische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 1918-1994 in ihren konzeption­
ellen Grundlagen. Thesis submitted at the European University Institute, Florence 2005, chapter 5, pp. 284 
f£
514 Lahenberger, p. 110.
515 SPENCE Ric h a r d s , "T h e  M ovem ent o f  scientific Knowledge”, p. 414.
5W At the end o f  1933 seven out o f  seventeen branches of the Academy were located in Greece. HAGEN 
FLEISCHER, “Europas Ruekkehr nach Griechenland. Kulturpolitik der Grossmaechtc in einem Staat der
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tûtes” (Deutsche S  chu le) and the “Goethe Institutes”, which operated under the auspices of 
the German Academy, increased the number of language courses offered to the local 
population and scientists. In addition to propagating the German language, these institu­
tions promoted the German universities that young scientists could visit and become fa­
miliar with the ‘superior’ German intellect and achievements. Exchange programs for 
lecturing, as well as summer schools were organised for senior scientists. It is interesting 
to note that the Nazis were very eager to create professorial chairs for language and lit­
erature at foreign universities, even at technical institutes, as was the case in Greece, see­
ing these as the ultimate corroboration o f  their cultural influence abroad. This tactic was 
expected to ensure that German would gradually become Europe’s common language 
and also the international second language o f choice overseas.517 Nevertheless, the crea­
tion o f language and literature chairs abroad, and in particular in the Balkans, was not a 
policy pursued only by Germany in this regard. France, Britain, even Italy and Spain had 
the same ambition: to gain a foothold in the foreign academic elite and to influence as 
many as they could for their own interests and prestige, transforming the foreign learning 
and research institutions into cultural-political arenas.
Peripherie”, in; HERALD HEPPNER, O lg a  K a t s Ia r d i-H erlng (H g.), Die Griechen und Europa. Aussen- 
und Innensichten im Wandel derZ eit Wien u-a., 1998, pp. 125-191, here p. 141. As for the activities o f the 
German Academy in Greece see: F e d r a  K o u t s o u k o U, Die deutsche aus waerüge Kultur- und 
Sprachpolitik in Griechenland 1933-1944. Thesis to be defended at the Technische Universitaet Berlin in 
January 2006, chapter five.
517 Sp e n c e  R ic h a r d s  p. 416.
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4.3. Planning the cultural conquest o f south-eastern Europi
In 1940, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs inaugurated a network of insti­
tutes abroad, with the mission to champion German achievements in humanities in spe­
cific European countries. The German Scientific Institutes {Deutsche WissenschcftBche Insti­
tute, DWI), as they were named, under the cover of science aimed at exploring those 
countries, in which Germany was interested, and preparing them to align themselves with 
the Nazi regime. This overture clearly involved “space research” (Raumforschung) in order 
for these territories to be “repopulated and exploited” {Umvolkung md Ausbeutung).51* 
Nevertheless, the base o f this campaign was aimed at scientific collaboration with the 
countries in question and the development o f relations with the foreign elite.51* It should 
be noted, though, that the grade o f autonomy of each DWI branch, its alignment to the 
regime, and its collaboration with the host country depended on whether the branch was 
established in a country that was occupied, neutral or allied to Germany, on its geo­
graphical proximity to the Reich and the time of its creation.518 *20 During the following four 
years, sixteen branches o f Deutsche WissenschftBche Institute were established not only in 
major European cities, i.e. Paris, Brussels, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Stockholm, Lisbon, 
Madrid, Venice, Budapest, but also in the following Balkan cities, i.e. Sofia, Bucharest, 
Bratislava, Belgrade, Athens, Zagreb, and Tirana. The DWI co-operated with the Ger­
man Academy to arrange receptions, exhibitions and lectures. Even though a network of 
several institutions (state, industrial or private) existed in the disciplines of technology, 
medicine and natural sciences before 1933, a similar network in humanities was a Nazi 
creation and indicated the special role allotted to humanities by the Third Reich.5*1 The 
DWI was not another organisation with a number of branches spread over Europe, but 
it offered, as Hausmann notes, the means for an intellectual war in the “third front” 
{Dntte Front).522
The structure o f each DWI branch abroad consisted of at least three main de­
partments: the scientific department which was financially supported by the Notgemein- 
schaft and organised the exchange of professors, lecture trips, exhibitions, concerts and
518 H au sm an n , “A u d i im  K neg  schweigen die Musen nicht”, p. 9.
Ibid.
520 Ibid pp. 26£
521 Ibid, p. 13.
522 See: HERBERT SCURLA, D ie D ritte F ro n t Gastige Gmndlagen des Propagandakheges der West- 
maechte. Bedui 1940-
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book fairs; the academic department, supported by the DAAD and therefore responsible 
for exchanges o f  students, teachers etc.; and the department o f language issues, -which 
received funds from the Goethe Institute.523 However, none o f the above departments 
operated independently. The DWI was involved in joint research under the auspices o f 
academies or other institutions. The scientific results, though, o f those projects were very 
poor.524 Even though the scientific sector which, by definition, includes both the exact 
and the theoretical sciences, it was usually confined to activities regarding only the latter. 
In some cases, the agricultural science belonged to another separate section,525 but as far 
as the rest of natural sciences concerned, they did not seem to be seriously represented in 
any of the DW  Institutes. No matter how awkward it may sound, in the war years the 
Nazis seemed to have believed that the Htterae should not stand behind the arma. Moreo­
ver, the theoretical sciences should also become “fighting sciences” ^kaempfende Wissen- 
scbaften) and make their contribution to the final victory.526 The Aryans believed their 
higher mission in this world would n o t be accomplished only through territorial but also 
through cultural expansion. It is interesting to note, though, that in 1942 the leader o f  the 
cultural department of the Foreign Ministry, von Twardowski, argued that the scientific 
societies o f lesser importance, such as the Union of Authors or o f Composers should not 
play a leading role in the international organisations and congresses. On the contrary, 
priority should be given to other more important disciplines like medicine and chemistry. 
The importance o f the language remained, however, in any case, very high and he under­
lined that “in the centre of every cultural policy stands the language”.527 Therefore, the 
director of the Deutsche WissenschaftBche Institute branch, appointed by the Deutsche 
Akademe in Munich, usually occupied the Chair o f German at a foreign university.
523 TWARDOWSKI, Anfaenge der deutschen Kulturpolitik ibid., p. 42; HAUSMANN, pp. 271; copy o f  letter 
containing die “Richtlinien fuer die Arbeit der Akademischen Abteilung des Deutschen Wissenschaftlichen 
Instituts” o f  gez. Schaefer-RuemeKn from cultural department o f  the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs to the 
Foreign Minister 30.11.1940, in: PAAA, R  64287.
524 Such was the case o f the Arbeitsausschuss fuer die Neuedegung der internationalen wissenschaftlichen 
Zusammenarbeit, which resulted little mote than a few French prisoners o f  war being used by the Prussian 
Academy for editorial work on the Jahrbuch ucber Fortschritte der Mathematik See: SPENCE RICHARDS, “The 
Movement o f sdentitif knowledge” , p. 416.
525 Vortrag von Twardowski, anlaesslkh der Tagung der Kulturrefeienten am 13 August 1942. (Geheim!), 
in: PAAA, R  60608.
526 H a u sm a n n , Auch im Krieg, p. 13.
527 Vortrag von Twardowski, aniaesslich der Tagung der Kulturreferenten am 13 August 1942. (Geheim!), 
in: PAAA, R 60608.
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Nevertheless, Germany, complained Twardowski, did not appreciate the political 
significance of purely cultural activity abroad during the war, even though everyone m 
the country admired the well-planned cultural policy of France and acknowledged how 
much damage it had made to Germany, after 1919. He stressed that cultural policy pre­
sented “missed opportunities” and Germany was about to miss one this cme as well. 
Everything in Europe was fluid and there were many areas, argued Twardowski further, 
in which Germany could get a foothold, provided the Reich could accurately assess and 
make use of the situation before its rivals took action.52* What Germany should do, ac­
cording to the German cultural specialist, was to invest time, money and qualified people, 
allowing for the fact that patience and understanding were also important elements in the 
war years.* 529 53012Despite the fact that no serious research was conducted in the Deutschen U"u- 
senscbaftlicben Institute, they were designed to play an important role in disseminating Ger­
man culture abroad, in Europe in particular. Nevertheless, it was not an easy task, as the 
DWI, like every other institution in the Third Reich, was subject to the “polycranc prin­
ciple”, according to which a number of ministries and offices were involved in and were 
entitled to have their say in its affairs.550 On the other hand, according to the Fuekrrrpnn- 
%ip, the role of the presidents of the Deutsche Wtssenschaftiicke Institute was strengthened, 
securing independence for their institutes.551
The campaign of German culture as such, was the task of a number of other sci­
entific centres in Europe that had been established before the Nazis* seizure of power. 
The Bibliotheca Herbaria in Rome, which the Kaiser Wilhelm Society owned since 1914, 
was one such example.552 Meanwhile, the Society became partner of a number of scien­
tific institutes abroad, which according to die official statutes, were created for the culti­
vation and promotion of cultural and scientific relations between Germany and their re­
spective host countries. In that framework, the Zoological Station in Rovigno, which had 
belonged to the Society since 1911, was transformed in 1930 into a German-Italian In­
^ Ib id
529 Ibid.
530 The different sources, from which the DWI departments were funded, advocate to the enforcement of 
that principle. In addition, the scientists of die DWI departments were appointed by the Ministry of Edu­
cation, while the language teachers (Lektomi) by the German Academy, who after 19-41 were administered 
by the Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs and the Propaganda Ministry. Last but not least, the DMT depended on 
the Foreign Ministry for the exchange of professors and other minot scholars. Set: HaUSManN, pp. 33f.
531 Ibid. p. 35.
532 In 1934, it was renamed the “Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute for Art and Cultural Sciences".
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stitute for Marine Biology. The Reich’s effort to establish similar bilateral scientific re­
search centres in Europe, was accelerated in 1940 against the backdrop of the continuing 
war. The eagerness to have Germany scientific bases beyond its borders in that particular 
time is obviously no t irrelevant to its political and military plans. The first such institute 
was created in Sofia, with the name “German-Bulgarian Institute for Agricultural Re­
search”. It followed by the “German-Greek Research Institute for Biology”, in Piraeus, 
while serious plans were made for the creation o f a “German-Hungarian Institute for 
Agricultural Research” in Budapest^ and a “German-Bulgarian Research Station for Mi­
crobiology” on tiie Greek island o f Thasos, which had been annexed by Bulgaria.
All the above feverish efforts to  make the Nazis’ cultural presence noticeable in 
Europe, were sealed by a number of cultural agreements between the Reich and some 
European countries, focusing on the south-eastern European states. The initiative for the 
accord was taken by the Reich’s Foreign Ministry. The main concerns o f these agree­
ments was the inclusion of German in the curricula o f  other countries as the main for­
eign language, the creation o f cultural institutes, the exchange o f  scholars, and the status 
o f German schools abroad.033 In other words, the bilateral contracts confirmed at the 
state level almost all the cultural initiatives Germany had taken in the past For the For­
eign Ministry, the dissemination o f German was the number one priority o f the Reich’s 
cultural policy abroad with scholarships following next in order of importance.53 34 In 
1936, the Third Reich signed its first bilateral cultural agreement with Hungary. The 
agreement was initiated by the Ministry o f  Education and it was the first (and also the 
last) such accord to be initiated by a Ministry other than the Ministry of Foreign Af­
fairs.535 The contract stipulated, among other things, the strengthening and intensification 
of scientific relations between the Reich and the named country. This meant in practice 
mutual creation o f “guest chairs” at universities in both countries to host short or long­
term lecture series. It also meant the exchange of university assistants, the creation of
533 H a u sm a n n , ibid.
534 Ibid; Vortrag von Twardowski, anlaesslich der Tagung der Knlturreferenten am 13 August 1942. (Ge- 
heimi), in: PAAA, R  60608.
535 The personal relations between die Minister o f  Education, Bernhard Rust, with his Hungarian counter­
part, Homan, was the main reason that the Reich’s Ministry o f  Education and not the Foreign Ministry 
represented the Reich in its first bilateral agreement That contract became, however, the model for similar 
agreements that the Reich signed with a  number o f  countries few years later. L a itENBERGER, Akademis- 
cher Austausch, pp. 86f.
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positions for scholars at local universities, and the granting o f scholarships for student 
exchange by the DAAD and the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung.536
Some years later, when the changes in the cultural section o f the Foreign Ministry 
were completed, a number of contracts were signed between the Reich and the Balkan 
countries.537 In 1938, Germany signed a cultural agreement with Greece, in 1940 with 
Bulgaria, in 1941 with Rumania, and in 1942 with Slovakia. Meanwhile, in 1938, the Nazi 
State had signed similar agreements with the Axis-countries, namely Italy and Japan, and 
in 1939 with Spain. The priority o f all these agreements was the promotion of German 
culture, i.e. music, theatre, literature, fine arts, and above all the language. Germany “dis­
covered” the cultural agreements, as Jan-Pieter Barbian notes,538 in a period in which the 
state was intensifying its foreign policy, thereby securing its alliances with countries that 
were ideologically affiliated to the Reich. On the other hand, the Nazis aspired to create a 
larger Europe under their control, where German would be the dominant language. 
South-eastern Europe had a particular importance in the Reich’s foreign policy agenda. It 
had a great geographical, political, economic, and cultural significance for German inter­
ests in territories far beyond that region. The National Socialists regarded the Balkan 
states as bridge to the Near and Middle East and beyond.539 These were territories influ­
enced by the British, while the Balkans, were in general influenced by the French. To a 
certain extent Nazi Germany saw the Balkan Peninsula both as colonial territory as well 
as the threshold for its future colonial plans, when the Reich would annex the posses­
sions of its defeated enemies, namely France and Great Britain. The occupation of 
France by die Nazis in 1940 did not, however, mean that its cultural dominance in the 
Balkan states was ended and that the Germans would continue their cultural propaganda 
undisturbed. In 1942, die number o f  French nationals travelling to southeastern Europe 
for cultural-political reasons, the Germans believed, increased. Therefore, they decided to 
prohibit French travellers from entering to any Balkan state, even if  they tried to do so
536 J aN-PETER Ba r b ia n , ‘“Kultrurwerte im Zeitkampf. Die Kulturabkommen des ‘Dritten Reiches’ als 
Instrumente nationalsozialistischer Aussenpolitik”, im Archiv fuer Kulturgeschichte, Band 74 (1992), pp. 415- 
459, here: p. 421
»7 See: PAAA, R 61415, R 61416, R 61417.
534 BARBIAN, ‘“Kultruwerte im Zeitkampf” , pp. 415 ff.
539 Kulturberichte des Ges. Johann Kirchholtes betr. Bulgarien u. Rumaenien 1939-1944, im PAAA, R 
60662.
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via Italy, where they could get the necessary documents.540 Germans were also aware that 
they were not popular abroad. “They respect us, they admire us for our achievements, 
they are afnud o f  us, but they don’t  want to be like us”, noted Twardowski in 1942. The 
ideal German life resembled the military life, characterised by discipline, work, efficiency, 
and sacrifice. It was not surprising, therefore, that such way o f living was not attractive to 
other nations, which preferred the French and the English lifestyle.541 Nevertheless, 
Germany continued to champion its culture through language propaganda in the several 
institutions abroad, scholarships and new types of research institutes. Two such devel­
opments were the institute for seed research in Bulgaria and the institute for marine bio­
logical research in Greece, both branches o f the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. In addition, 
plans for the creation o f hospitals affiliated to German clinics in Athens/Greece and in 
Galatz/Romania for research in rare diseases was a cultural political undertaking that se­
riously troubled the German Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs.542
Apart from the DWI, Nazi Germany planned to establish a number of cultural 
institutes abroad, focusing on the Balkan region as well as on the so-called, Danube- 
states. From 1938-40, all cultural institutes abroad were also controlled by the Reich 
Ministry o f Education, which because o f its inexperience in such matters was a force for 
stagnation to Germany’s cultural-political work abroad. It should be noted that the Min­
istry o f Education, because o f its close relations to the Nazi Party and the Wehmacht, was 
able to get involved in the Reich’s foreign cultural policy, thereby by passing the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs, which was normally have played a leading role in these undertakings. 
In 1940, the Foreign Ministry tried hard to take tinder its auspices the “cultural” insti­
tutes, namely those focused on the promotion of the German language and culture 
abroad. In a compromise move von Twardowski suggested to the Secretary o f the Min­
istry o f Education, Werner Zschintzsch, that the cultural-political direction o f the insti­
tutes abroad should become responsibility o f the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, while their 
scientific activities would be supervised o f the Ministry o f Education. The economic part 
should, according to von Twardowki, belong to his own ministry, while the appointment
540 F. v. Twardowski to the German Embassy in Rom on Deutsche Botschaft in Rom 26.11.1942 (Ge­
heim!) [Date and m onth are noted with blue pencil by hand]. In: PAAA, R 60608.
541 Vortrag von Twardowski, anlaesslich der Tagung der Kultunefetenten am 13 August 1942. (Geheim!), 
iir PAAA, R 60608.
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o f the scientific personnel should be the responsibility o f the Ministry of Education.543 
Zschintzsch responded by separating the cultural institutes abroad into what he called 
“pure scientific institutes” subject to his Ministry, and the “pure cultural-political insti­
tutes” subject to the Foreign Ministry. To the first belonged the German Historical In­
stitute in Rome; the archaeological institutes in Rome, Istanbul, Athens, Cairo and Isfa­
han; the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute (KWI) for cultural science; the KWI for art science in 
Rome; the Institute for Art History in Florence; the German Academy in Rome (Villa 
Massimo); and the Institute for Marine Biology in Rovigno. Zschintzsch’s suggestions 
did not please the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs and it reiterated its position that every sin­
gle institute outside the Reich’s borders, even the purely scientific ones, were a significant 
factor for German cultural policy and could have a foreign political mission as well. 
Therefore, they had to be directed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs alone.544
It is true that this ministry had a great experience in the management of cultural 
affairs since the Bismarck era. Its greatest advantage was the specially trained personnel 
spread all over the world that the ministry had at its disposal. A number of people 
working at several embassies or consulates gathered valuable information about the local 
conditions that would facilitated or hinder a successful cultural policy. Very often, they 
used their personal networks in the country o f interest, something that demanded diplo­
matic skills and time for the development o f relationships o f trust with the local elite. 
The Ministry of Science and Education had none of these resources and its involvement 
could damage German interests. One striking example was the order the Ministry of 
Education gave to the management o f the archaeological institute in Rome to suspend its 
co-operation with the American archaeological institute in the Italian capital. This hap­
pened due to a misinterpretation o f information released by the Foreign Ministry in Ber­
lin and the unwillingness o f the Ministry o f Education to let the German Embassy in 
Rome to intervene to dear up the misunderstanding.545 This kind o f embarrassment had 
the result of promting the acknowledgement that some responsibilities should remain at 
the Foreign Ministry. Nonetheless, in a number of other undertakings the two ministries 
eventually shared responsibility and supervision.
543 Note o f F. v. Twardowski on 22.07.1940 regarding the “Unterstellung der deutschen Kulturinstitute im 




In 1938, an unsigned note addressed to the Foreign Ministry, with the title “Es­
tablishment of German Cultural Institutes Abroad”, presumably by the Ministry of Edu­
cation, gives some idea of the character and the guidelines for the institutes abroad, but 
also the rationale for their establishment. That rationale put forward was anti-French, not 
surprising perhaps as France was Germany’s oldest and biggest cultural rival, particularly 
in southeastern Europe. The note underlined that the German institutes should have a 
different profile from their French equivalents.546 547The latter were more or less affiliated 
to the French higher education system. This meant that the foreigners, who attended 
them had to follow a series of courses like French, literature, history, art history and so 
forth, and at the end of their studies gaining the appropriate certificate.541' Unlike France, 
Germany’s plans were to establish cultural institutes that were less academic and more 
adapted to the present.548 What was meant by “present” was quite clear. The mission of 
the cultural institutes abroad should not be the dissemination o f the German culture in 
general, but the promotion o f modem Germany. The institutes should rather try to 
spread the Party’s ideals, focusing on recent German history, the namely National So­
cialism. The French Revolution brought no serious change in the world, argued the Na­
zis, and “despite all the vague contemporary notions, like naturalism and materialism, as a 
result o f its strong formalism and logical intellectualism”, its content remained empty. In 
contrast to French cultural ideals, National Socialism transcended liberal thinking intro­
duced by the French Revolution, bringing a deep change, as it was claimed, to political 
thought.549 The rest o f the world new almost nothing about this change, however, and 
did not seem to understand it. Therefore, in order for the new political theory - which, 
according to the Nazis, was superior to the existing western political system introduced 
by France- to be further transmitted, they had to follow a different strategy from their 
rivals.
It is clear that what the Nazis understood by ‘culture’ was everything that derived 
from the National Socialist ideology and they believed that cultural policy should have 
political connotations. Consequently, the Reich’s cultural institutes abroad should not be 
limited to the propagation of language and science. They should provide other elements 
o f the German greatness as well, like the history o f the National Socialist movement, the





organisation o f young people according to the national socialist ideals, national, social 
and educational policy, as well as books, the arts, and sports.5“ The Nazis were very 
much aware of the possible resistance their views might meet in western democracies, 
like France and Britain. Therefore, they had to introduce those people to the merits of 
National Socialism gradually. As for those countries with similar political regimes, like 
Italy and Japan, they could act in a more open and direct fashion.50 51 However, the blunt 
political profile that the Nazis so strongly proposed for the Reich’s cultural propaganda 
abroad, seemed to be moderated in the following years, mainly because of the resistance 
o f  the Foreign Ministry and particularly its cultural political department Nevertheless, 
many of the Nazi elements penetrated the Reich’s cultural political agenda, even when 
the Foreign Ministry was in charge of most of the projects abroad.
Besides the “western democracies” and the “politically allied” countries, south­
eastern Europe had a different significance for Germany’s cultural plans. Unlike the rest 
o f  Europe, the Danube and the Balkan states were crucial for the Nazi geopolitical en­
terprise. This territory was seen as their “living sphere” (htbemsphaen) and the economic 
and political completion of the Reich in the Southeast.552 The economic significance of 
the Danube states was concentrated on the waterway network of the Danube River, 
through which Germany could trade products to and from the counties of the Black Sea, 
like Ukraine.553 The Balkan states were the second most important territory after 
Ukrainethat could provide Germany with agricultural products and could make the 
country self-sufficient for the planned war. However, this sort of colonisation would not 
be successful without a well-organised cultural policy. Germany would secure its political 
and economic hegemony over the south-eastern countries, only if it could dominate 
them culturally.554 The cultural initiatives that were taken to influence them after the First 
World War seemed inadequate for the Reich’s purposes in die region. And despite the 
historical links that some of the countries had had with the Habsburg Empire, these were 
no t enough for Germany to overcome its cultural stagnation in those territories caused
550 Ibid.
551 Ibid.
552 H.G.v.Studnitz, Beriin to die Foreign Ministry, "Expose ueber die Erriclitung ernes deutschen 
Kulturinstitutes fixer die Balkan — und Donau -  Staaten”, on 25.05.1939, in: PAAA, R 61270.
S5i It was believed that Ukraine alone could provide Germany with agricultural products, particularly grains, 
for some generations.
554 H.G.v.Studnitz, Berlin to die Foreign Ministry, “Expose ueber die Errichtung ernes deutschen 
Kulturinstitutes filer die Balkan — und Donau — Staaten", on 25.05.1939, in: PAAA, R 61270.
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by financial and bureaucratic deficiencies. I f  the Third Reich did not want to see those 
potential colonies turning towards Paris, Rome, or even London, then Berlin should in­
augurate a systematic and competitive cultural policy.555
One of the early important organisations created for these purposes was the “As­
sociation o f Bi-national Unions and Organisations” (Ver&nzgung ^nischenstaatBcher Ver­
baende und'Einrichtungen''). The Vemnigung was established in 1938 and brought under its 
aegis the existing bilateral societies. It was subject to the SS and its president was the SS- 
Obergruppenfuehrer Werner Lorenz. In November 1938, Lorenz demonstrated the purpose 
o f the Vemnigung) by underlining the Reich’s contribution to the preservation of world 
peace.556 *More precisely, Germany had committed itself before the other big European 
nations to promoting mutual understanding and friendship among peoples, to securing 
their rights and to contributing to an enduring balance of their interests. That commit­
ment was stronger than ever, declared Lorenz in 1938, and this was due to the creation 
o f the Vemnigung.557 The bilateral unions and societies Germany had set up many years 
ago were, according to him, better organised, while new ones were planned, primarily for 
neutral states, including Greece 558 Those societies, clubs and unions, like the German- 
French society, the German-Turkish, the German-Greek society and the like, were prac­
tically die standard cultural bearers and transmitters o f German culture, even though they 
were described as organisations o f cultural reciprocity. Their mission, further argued Lo­
renz, was the exchange o f cultural goods, through which the nations could understand 
each other. Education should have pride o f  place in those bilateral organisations.559 Lo­
renz’s argument sounds strange, even unreal, at a time that Germany was preparing for 
war and the Four-Year Plan had already been put into practice. So how can his peace 
declaration be reconciled with Germany’s war planning? Did he have his own vision for 
the state’s foreign cultural policy or something else hidden behind his peace rhetoric? It 
is interesting to note that his notification was confidential. Therefore, if it was not some 
kind o f diplomatic rhetoric addressed to the people or die authorities of some other na­
555 Ibid
556 Mitteüungen der ‘Vereinigung zwischen staatüicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.V.” by gez.: 
Lorenz, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer, (Geheim!), on 01.11.1938, in* PAAA, R 61274.
™ Ibid
553 LS-Dr. Gtosche. Taetigkeit der Zwischenstaatlichcn GeseUschaften im  Emstfall (Aufeeichnung) on 
02.09.1939, in: PAAA, R 61280.
559 Mitteüungen der “Vereinigung zwischen staatilicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.V.” by gez.: 
Lorenz, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer, (Geheim!), on 01.11.1938, in: PAAA, R 61274.
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tion in order to convince them of Germany’s good intentions, how could his language be 
justified in terms of Nazi ideology?
The National Socialist Party, which was attracted to the idea o f  cultural domina­
tion of the world, strove to get involved in areas of activity that at that time, were re­
sponsibility of the Foreign Ministry. After the hard and justified criticism had been made 
by the Ministry of the impact a Nazi-oriented cultural propaganda might have for Ger­
man interests, it is possible that Lorenz, as a senior party member, wished, in his note, to 
underline the ‘careful and smooth introduction* to the Nazi ideals. I t is also likely, that 
the Party authorities adopted a new moderate language as a concession to the demands 
made by the Foreign Ministry for a cultural policy abroad that steered dear of any overtly 
political propaganda. However, the cover o f “understanding other peoples and preserv­
ing world peace” provided by the party has proven to be a mere rhetoric, if one believes 
the reciprocity o f the “understanding” declared by Lorenz. I t seems, however, that what 
the Nazis desired was to be understood by other nations rather than to understand them. 
In addition, the way they perceived world peace and the means one should use to pre­
serve it, were governed by their Weltanschauung which incited hostile depending on the 
percieved status of the race concerned. The confidential character o f the “Mitteilungen der 
Vereinigung zwischenstaatlicher Verbaende und 'Einrichtungen e.V.*\ which were the official rec­
ords of the organisation’s activities, advocates the propagandist^ nature of the Vere­
inigung, as the material published in irregular basis was strictly controlled.560
Among the tasks of the Vereinigung was its engagement in several organisations in 
the Danube and the Balkan states. In 1938, for example, the Vereinigung got involved in 
the modification of the directorship of the Southeast European Institute in Vienna 
(Suedosteurvpa-Înstituî in Wien).561 The institute was of great scientific and economic signifi­
cance for the entire Viennese administration. It consisted of two departments, loosely 
directed by that time by Dr. Planner and Dr. Hermann Neubacher, the Mayor (Oberbuer- 
germeister) of the City o f Vienna and future special commissioner for south-eastern 
Europe.
560 Gez.: Dr, Heinevetter, Leiter der Pressestelle der ‘'Vereinigung”, in: Mitteilungen der “Vereinigung 
zwischen staatlicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.V.” by gez.: Lorenz, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer, (Ge­
heim!)» on 01.11.1938, in: PAAA, R 61274.
561 Bericht Nr. 5 der Vereinigung zwischenstaatlicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.V. 
(Geschaeftsfuehrener Vizepraesident), betr. Suedosteuropa-Institut in Wien, on 20.09.1938, in: PAAA, R 
61273.
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The extent, however, o f the Vereinigungs involvement in the directorship o f the 
Suedosteuropa-lnstitut is no t clear. What is certain though, is the role the bilateral societies 
had to play, as they were regarded as the unofficial vehicles o f  Germany’s cultural cam­
paign abroad.562 Nonetheless, the question that still troubled the foreign cultural policy­
makers was whether the ‘cultural vehicles’ should be engaged in a covert political under­
taking and, if so, to  what extent. In 1939, a working program for those societies was 
drawn up, in case they should eventually be used for political propaganda purposes. The 
program focused on the organisation o f  the two-sided leagues, the undertakings abroad 
and at home, and the affiliation with other institutions.563 As for the organisational part, 
the first thing to be done was the liquidation o f the organisations that were set up by en­
emy states, -implying essentially France-, and their replacement either by new societies 
with Germany as a partner or by old ones, which should be re-established. The external 
cultural undertakings organised by the Vemmgung, according to the working plan, should 
include the development o f propaganda material, and the promotion of exhibitions, lec­
tures of German politicians, the military and other personalities who were supporters of 
the Nazi ideology. Additionally, the two-sided societies and leagues abroad would be re­
sponsible for the promotion o f the institutes planned to be established in the countries 
where they were active, as well as for the creation of German libraries and the promotion 
of German, or rather Nazi, writings. The publication o f journals regarding cultural activi­
ties in the local community and the surveillance of the cultural developments of other 
countries, particularly o f those hostile to Germany, should also be among the compe­
tences o f the bilateral leagues. Equally important would be the influence they could exert 
on the public opinion o f the country in question. Ultimately, the bilateral unions, acting 
as an intermediary intelligence agency should develop close ties with the information de­
partment o f the Foreign Ministry, the defence section of the Webmacht, as well as with 
the Secret Police Office.564
At the beginning of 1939, the Vereinigung made an agreement with the “German 
Central Office for Congresses” \Deutscbe Kongress-Zentrale (DKZ)], the chief organisation 
for the support and control o f delegations for scientific meetings abroad.565 With the
562 Note about the “Taetigkeit der Zwischenstaatlichen Gesellschaften in  EmstfaD” by LS.Dr. Grosche to
the Foreign Office in Berlin, on 02.09.1939, in: PAAA, R 61280.
All the points discussed below are based on the above document
565 Rundschreiben von der “Veieinigung zwischen staatlicher Verbaende und Enrichtungen e.V.” von den 
Geschaeft$£uehrenden Vizepraesidenten Dr. Grosche und Dr. Springer, 18.02.1939, in: PAAA, R 61274.
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above agreement the Vemnigung increased its power to control and influence foreign 
delegations to congresses organised in Germany, while other institutions related to the 
V ’eràmgung were to be represented in congresses by their directors {Geschatftsfuthrtnda), so 
as to bring them into contact with the foreign guests.566 Finally, all information with re­
gard to the foreign participants should be registered with the DKZ.
The Deutsche Kongnss-Zentraie was established in December 1934 by the Reich 
Ministry of Propaganda in agreement with foe Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of the 
Interior. Its origins lay in was a branch of foe Medical Society of Berlin and its aim was 
to provide help in organising medical congresses. It was initially called “Central Office 
for Scientific Congresses” (Wissenschaftfiche Kongress-Zentrale). Soon foe organisation com­
prised all scientific disciplines and foe Ministry of Propaganda together with the Ministry 
o f  Education changed its name into Deutsche Kongress-Zentrale. The task of the DfCZ was, 
on foe one hand, to advise all foe existing scientific institutions that organised interna­
tional meetings in Germany and, on foe other, to assess foe experience of the undertak­
ing for future cultural-political planning. In this framework, co-operation with Germany’s 
bilateral organisations abroad was essential, in order for the DKZ to be informed about 
foe foreign participants who were going to attend the relevant congresses.567 *Foreign sci­
entists who had been educated in German technical schools or universities tended to de­
fend Germany’s prestige, not only in their own countries, but also in the international 
scientific community. The DKZ after 1938, was eager to revive and strengthen foe for­
eigners’ affection for Germany, which in the previous few years had been diminished as 
they had turned to Britain, France and foe United States. The reason, argued the Nazis, 
was foe anti-German propaganda by those nations that derived from a “ridiculous mis­
understanding [of German culture] that was due to their political economy”.561 On foe 
other hand, in cases in which Germany was invited to international meetings, the DKZ 
should come to an agreement with the ministries in charge and other institutions -  
whether state or party- and choose a “selected group of appropriate participants” to 
represent the Reich.569 Repeating the post-war arguments about Germany’s catastrophic
**lbid.
567 Rundschreiben von der “Vereinigung zwischenstaatilicher Verbaende und Hinrichtungen e.V ”, die 
Geschaeftsfuehrenden Vizeptaesidenten gez.: Dr. Grösche, gez; Dr. Springer, 18.02.1939, in; PAAA, R 
61274.
564 H.G.v.Studnitz, Beriin to Oie Foreign Ministry, “Expose ueber die Errichtung eines deutschen
Kulturinstitutes fuer die Balkan — und Donau — Staaten”, on 25.05.1939, in; PAAA, R 61270.
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the Reich.569 Repeating the post-war arguments about Germany’s catastrophic cultural 
collapse, the head o f the DKZ, Dr. Knapp, stressed the cultural-political significance of 
national and international scientific associations and their meetings.570 He argued further 
that the system o f congresses combined with high politics (“Kongress&esen und Hobe 'Poli- 
tik>T) would allow Germany to influence international organisations, as France had done 
at the end of the Great War.571 Nevertheless, G erm an/s cultural-political struggle, speci­
fied Knapp, aimed at having the foreign nations understand and recognise the Reich’s 
cultural achievements and at having them exchange experiences with them on knowl­
edge, ideas and values.572 *When the war broke out in 1939, the D K Z, the Vemnigung and 
the DAAD began to collaborate closely to increase die number o f foreign scholars in 
Germany and thus to activate what was called “supporting troops”.575 The cultural- 
political dimension o f congresses organised by national or international institutions had 
been very well known in Germany since 1919. So was the impact o f the country’s isola­
tion from them at France’s insistence. Their country, they argued, at that time had been 
completely undefended against the Allies’ strategy, which paralysed its voice and actions 
abroad. The DKZ was a response -albeit belated - to any potential similar threat for 
Germany’s culture, either by France or by any other would be imitator o f hers. About a 
thousand international organisations, reported the DAAD in 1940, from every possible 
field of human activity still presented a common front against German science and cul­
ture. A thousand more existed in Germany for its defence but they were weakened by 
their lack of manpower —a direct result o f  their downsizing by many authorities.574 The 
role of the DKZ was to centralise power by taking the organisation of congresses and
569 Dr. Knapp, Deutsche Kongress-Zentrale. Jahresbericht 1935 to Auswaertigen Amt a.o., on 15.01.1936, 
p. 1, in: PAAA, R 60598.
570 In 1936 the DKZ was planned to get involved in twenty-one congresses and in ten cases would be rep­
resented by its own leading figures. Ibid, pp. lOf.
577 Ibid, p. 6.
S72 Ibid See also: Vortrag von Twardowski, anlaesslich der Tagung der Kulturreferenten am 13 August 
1942. (Geheim!), in: PAAA, R 60608.
571 During 1939 seventy-eight scholarships o f the amount o f 42.000 Reich M arts in sum were given to
foreigners via the bilateral unions. See: Report o f the DAAD to the “Vereinigung zwischenstaatlicher Ver­
baende und Einruichtungen”, about the “Vodaeufigen Jahresbericht ueber die Verwaltung der Stipendien
der zwischenstaatlichen Verbaende und Einrichtungen im Rechnungsjahr 1939 (1.4.1939 bis 31.3.1940)”, 
on 28.03.1940, in: PAAA, R 61280.
574 Ibid.
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other external activities of the German scientific institutions under its control and thus 
mounting its defence o f German culture.
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4.4. Four-Year Plan. Science and technology in the war service.
Despite the feet that Germany’s foreign economic relations were severely com­
promised by the Versailles restrictions, after 1925 the Republic took advantage o f the 
post-war inflation to improve its financial status on the world stage. Thus, the Republic’s 
foreign trade was increased from nothing to 21,6 billion marks, a figure that continued to 
rise until 1929, when the world economic crisis occurred.575 Nevertheless, in 1933, the 
turnover of Germany’s foreign trade sharply decreased from 26,9 billion marks to only 9 
billion, thus plunging to the levels no t seen since 1898, as a German expert estimated.576 
Germany was poor in raw materials, like ores, oil, rubber, not to mention agricultural 
products. This insufficiency forced the country to import raw materials or semi-products 
from  abroad.
When the Nazis came to power imports of this kind amounted to fifty per cent 
o f  total imports.577 *Hitler’s economic planning in the first years o f his administration 
aimed at dealing with the depression and stabilising the country’s economy, by creating a 
self-sufficient state in the European Grossraum. Germany’s autarky, however, could not 
be achieved without a well-organised foreign economic policy, which since 1936 was 
transformed to serve the Reich’s plans for war, bringing to the fore the Nazis* desire for 
territorial expansion. Insufficiency in raw materials was not the only factor that dictated 
the Nazi expansionist foreign policy. They also regarded Germany as a densely populated 
state. Its population o f  66 million lived in a country of 471.000 square kilometres (1935 
figures), i.e. about 104 people per square kilometre, while in France the equivalent num­
b e r was seventy-six inhabitants per square kilometre.57* It was clear for the Nazis that 
Germany’s Lebensraum was not enough. The Nazis envisaged Germany, Austria and 
Hungary as a European Grossraum, taking in also the north and south Europe, in other 
w ords the whole territory from the North Sea across the continent and up to the coasts 
o f  the Mediterranean states. Germany should build a third zone in middle Europe, with 
Denmark, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Switzerland, the Netherlands and perhaps Italy, as
575 W a l t e r  K r u spig , “Deutschland und die Weltwirtschaft”, im Carl La n g e . ERNST ADOLF DREYER 
(Hg.), Deutscher Geist 1935. Kuiturdocumente der Gegenwart Zweiter Jahresband 1935: Gestaltung des
Reiches. Leipzig 1934, p. 92.
376 Ibid
377 Ibid, p. 93- 
57* Ibid, p. 96.
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economic counter-power to the Anglo-American and the Russia-Asian financial zone.579 
Germany’s agrarian underproduction and its industrial overproduction made the country 
dependent on foreign agricultural products and raw materials, which were the main fac­
tors, the Nazis argued, that shaped the Reich’s foreign economic policy agenda. The or­
ganisation of their economic policy went hand in hand with their agricultural policy, 
which demanded self-sufficiency in food production. By the end of the First World War, 
the Reich’s colonies offered the additional sources required for feeding die German peo­
ple. The English blockade, which, according to the Germans, was the main reason for 
famine in Germany, should not be allowed in a future war. After the National Socialist 
accession to power, the colonial policy o f  the Kczserreich was replaced by the Lebensraum 
policy that demanded food and raw material autarky for the state.580 The future “Kolomal- 
reich” should not be located overseas, where Germany once had possessions, but in East­
ern and Southeastern Europe.581
The Nazi aspirations for eastward expansion was put into action in 1936 with the 
Four-Year Plan. Among the competences o f the Office o f  the Four-Year Planning 
(Vierjahrespianbehoerde) was the co-ordination o f all the research institutes of the country 
along an autarky policy. In 1937, a new organisation was established which was entirely 
dedicated to the war research. By that time, the main state institution that sponsored the 
German scientific research was the Emergency Office for the German Science {Notge- 
meinschaft der deutschen Wissenschqft), which had been founded in the very first years o f die 
Weimar Republic. In 1937, the president o f the Notgemeinschaft, Rudolf Mentzel, renamed 
the institution die "German Research Society” (Deutsche Forscbungsgemeinscbaft D F G )582 
On 25 May o f  the same year, the Minister o f Education, Bernhard Rust, set up in addi­
tion to the D FG  institution that co-ordinated all the research projects related to the 
Four-Year Plan, either at university or non-university research centres. The new institu-
579 H ans-E r ic h  V o l k m a n n , Oekonomie und Expansion. Grundzuege der NS-Wrtschaftspolitik. Ausge- 
waehlte Schriften. Muenchen 2003, p. 21.
580 T h o m a s  W ie l a n d , “ *Die politischen Aufgaben der deutschen Pflanzenzuechtung’. NS-Ideologie und 
die Forschungsarbeiten der akademischen Pflanze nzuechter”, in: SUSANNE HEIM (Hg.), Autarkie und Ost­
expansion. Pflanzenzucht und Agrariers chung im Nationalsozialismus. Goetringen 2002, pp. 35-56, he re p. 
55.
581 IbitL, pp. 47 ff.; SCHUMANN, Griff nach Suedosteuropa, pp. 9-29.
582 See: NOTKER HAMMERSTEIN, Die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft in der Weimarer Republik und 
im Dritten Reich. Wissenschaftspolitik in Republik und Diktatur. Muenchen 1999, pp. 88 ff.
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tion was the German Research Council ('Rdchsforscbungsrat, RFR).!li The two organisations 
that operated under Mentzel’s orders worked closely together for the advancement of 
German science, sharing funds and research projects.5*4
The war preparations gave priority to certain scientific and research fields, not 
only to those related to technology and armament, but also to agriculture and food 
autarky. Germany mainly produced carbohydrates and had to import proteins and fat 
The lack of these kinds of agricultural products, as well as the lack of food plants resis­
tant to extreme climatic conditions, aggravated the country's dependence on foreign cur­
rency.* 58485 The agricultural and biological research was, therefore, considered a national 
issue and was supported by the DFG/RFR. A number of special projects regarding the 
conservation of soil fertility and the need for using fertilisers, as well as the farming of 
plants rich in fat and proteins along with animal breeding were launched in view of the 
immediate implementation -of the Nazi reserve- and agrarian policy.586 In 1940, the most 
important foods in the German diet were bread and potatoes. To avoid a drop dwindling 
in die potato and cereal harvest that was likely to be caused by a virus, frost or drought587 *
with catastrophic consequences for the German people and army, German scientists 
promoted research on species resistant to extreme climatic conditions and diseases. Ad­
ditionally, the lack of cattle feed rich in albumin which affected the human diet was an 
impetus for research on artificial proteins, like urea and Glykokol£t%
The Kaiser Wilhelm Society played a major role in the Four-Year planning ad­
justing its projects to the preparations for war. The Ministry for Nutrition and Agricul­
ture generously sponsored research in several Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes in order to re­
duce the importation o f food, semi-products and raw materials. The agrarian scientist 
Konrad Meyer and the secretary in the above ministry, Herbert Backe, played a key role
883 Ibid. pp. 205 £F.
584 In 1942 die Rachsforscbungsrat was re-established on Hitler's order and its new president became 
Herm ann Goering. See: Copy of a decree signed by Hitler on 09.06.1942 and published on die 
Reichsgesetzblatt Nr. 64, on 15.6.42, in: BAB, R 26111/186.
585 SUSANNE HEIM, Kalorien, Kautschuk, Kameren. Pflanzenzuechtung und landwirtschaftliche For- 
schung in Kaiser-Wilhekn-Instituten 1933-1945. Goettingen 2003, pp. 23-124.
888 W. Wuest, Vortrag A/63/1 on 03.11.1940, in: BAB, NS 21/ 281.
587 This was what happened in 1846/7 in Ireland, when the virus phytopbtbora, a water mould (oorryootJ) 
species caused the Great Potato Famine that killed nearly a million people. The water mould virtually 
wiped out the country’s potato crops, which were an essential staple in the Irish diet See also chapter 6.1 
and 6.3 o f die diesis.
888 W. Wuest, Vortrag A/63/1 on 03.11-1940, in: BAB, NS 21/ 281.
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in research regarding food autarky. Backe was the vice-president of the Kaiser Wilhelm 
Society from 1941 to 1945 and gradually became more influential than the minister of 
agriculture, Walther Darré.589 Meyer's efforts were concentrated on plant breeding and 
the social structure o f rural regions. He was one of the co-authors of the Generation Ost, 
according to which tens o f millions o f  civilians in eastern European territories were 
forced to evacuate large parts o f the occupied lands, which set aside for settlement by the 
Germans, while many others were killed or deported to concentration camps.590 Scientists 
in the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Breeding Research were also engaged in experiments 
with soya beans, rape-seed, turnips, alfalfa, clover, vetch, millet, sunflowers, potatoes, 
tomatoes, various kinds of fruits, and grapes. The aim o f these experiments was to make 
plants that were important for humans or animals as hardy as possible against vermin, 
diseases, aridity and frost591 In order to conduct research of that kind, scientists should 
have at their disposal large quantities o f seeds from which to make selection of the rigjht 
plants for cross-fertilisation. Therefore, Germany sougjht to control strategically impor­
tant scientific resources, i.e. genetic resources, which were available only in certain geo­
graphical zones, one of which was the eastern and southeastern Europe, namely Russia 
and the Balkans. Expansion to those regions would solve Germany's Lebensraum problem 
providing its people with enough food.
The war planning aimed both at the Reich's military and economic victory pri­
marily over other European countries. In practical terms, this meant a self-sufficient 
Europe in peace-time not for the needs o f  the local population but for the German peo­
ple and the settlers across the continent.592 Whether they were Nazi sympathisers or not,
589 Sus ANNE HEIM, “Forschung fuer die Autarkic. Agrarwis senschaft an Kaiser-Wllhelm-Institiiten ira 
Nationalsozialismus”, in: Ibid. (Hg.), Autarkic und Osterpansion. Pflanzenzucht und Agrarforschung im 
Nationalsozialismus, Goettingen 2002, pp. 146 f£ For the early version o f die paper in English see: Su- 
SANNE HEIM, ‘Research for Autarky. The Contribution of Scientists to Nazi Rule in G erm any” , in: Er- 
gebnisse 4. Vorabdrucke aus dm Emchungsprogramm “Geschicbte der Kaiser- WUhelm-Geseikchaft im Naûonaùogiaâs- 
musn2001.
590 See: ROESSLER MECHTILD, Sa b in e  Sc h l e ie r m a c h e r  (Hg.), Der “Genaralplan Ost”. Hauptlinien der 
nadonalsozialistischen Plannungs- und Vemichtungspolirik. Berlin 1993.
591 HEIM, “Forschung fuer die Autarkic”, pp. 149 f£
592 Compare die documents Nr. 13 and Nr. 83: “Aus dem Vortrag von Tilo Freiherr von Wilmowsky, 
Praesident des Mitteleuropaeischen Wirtschafstages, 2.09.1940” and “Aus dem Schreiben von Rudolf 
Kratz an August Heinrichsbauer, 04.06-1942”, both published in: WOLFGANG SCHUMANN (Hg.), G riff 
nach Suedosteuropa. Neue Dokumente ueber die PoHtik des deutschen Im perialism s und Mlitarismus 
gegenueber Suedosteuropa im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Berlin 1973, pp. 89 ff, 182 f. T.F. v. Wilmowsky and
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scientists had to adjust their research projects to the country’s war needs and the new 
economic planning. Their existence turned out to be dependent on the war and its out­
come. Alan Beyerchen, for example, argues that “the extent to which Aryan physicists 
could gain influence and power was therefore dependent on their views in regard to 
technology”, noting that “technology played a crucial role not only in peacetime agricul­
tural and industrial production but also in warfare”.593 Thus, scientists were forced either 
to shift focus of research or to adopt a rhetoric that would guarantee them the financial 
support of the authorities. It is not surprising, therefore, that most of the projects con­
ducted in the war period and particularly at the KW Institutes were classified “important 
for the warfare” {kriegsmchtij .̂ What seems to be more interesting, though, is that these 
projects were also characterised “important for culture” (kultumichug). As kritgsnichtig 
were described not only the projects related to Germany’s food self-sufficiency but also 
the armament research, which was also to a certain extent conducted at the institutes of 
the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. The Four-Year Plan policy was not only aiming at making 
the country independent from imported raw materials and agricultural products, but also 
at creating a self-sufficient “defence-state” (Wehrstaat) with war capabilities {kriegsfaehî . 
The armament research was a complex project directly related to the Four-Year Plan and 
the war economy, intertwining more obviously than any other project the interests of 
military, state and industry.594
The first concern o f the regime for Germany’s armament was die sensible use of 
the state’s existing resources, like coal, wood and ore, but also the investment in research 
for synthetic raw materials, primarily fuels.595 The whole industrial sector as well as the
Kratz see differently the development of agriculture in south-eastern Europe for the benefit of the local 
population.
593 A l a n  Be y e r c h e n , Scientists under Hitler, Politics and the Physics Community in the Third Reich. 
Yale Univ. Press 1977, pp. 135,138.
594 HERBERT MEHRTENS, "Kollaborationsverfaaeltnisse: Natur- und Tedmihmsefischaften im NS-Staat 
und ihre Historie”, in: CHRISTOPH MEINEL, PETER VOSWINCKEL (Hg.), Medizin, Naturwissenschaft, 
Technik und Nationalsozialismus. Kontinuitaeten und Diskontinuitaettn. Stuttgart 1994, pp. 13-32. Some 
historians argue that this project had many of the characteristics of the so-called "big science". See: HEL- 
MUTH TRISCHLER, "Wachstum — Systamnaehc -  Ausdiffexenzierung. Grossforschung im Nationalsozial­
ismus”, in: RUEDIGER vom BRUCH, BRIGITTE KaDERaS (Hg.), Wissenschaften und Wissenschaftspolitik. 
Bestandsaufnahmen zu Formationen, Bruechen und Kontinuitaeten im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts. 
Stuttgart 2002, pp. 241-252.
595 K arl-H e in z  L u d w ig , ‘T e c h n ik ”, in  WrOLFGANG Be n z  ua. (Hg.), Enzyklopaedie des Nationalsozial­
ism us. M ünchen 1997, pp. 270 ff.
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transportation network was dependent on the mechanical power o f the machines. Ger­
man scientists worked on creating a variety o f products from the indigenous resources, 
not only compatible with the machines in use, but also as profitable as possible. In the 
same vein experiments on different types o f  wood-products were also undertaken, some 
of them on the aviation research. Efforts were also made to substitute wood with alu­
minium, a light metal derived from bauxite ore. Bauxite could be found in almost all the 
Balkan countries and in most o f them in considerable quantities.596 Other industrial sec­
tors that had to be aligned to the autarky policy included the ceramic and textile industry 
as well as the electricity production and chemical industry which were the basis of all in­
dustrial research. The fabric industry was closely related to agricultural research and the 
cultivation o f plants, such as flax, hemp and cotton. “We will be satisfied”, stated a 
spokesman of the LG.Farben, “when [...] one day we have in our hands an artificial 
cotton-like fibre.” The big challenge, however, was the creation o f a wool-like fibre, as it 
was a material surrounded with still unsolved “mysteries of nature”.59' Silk and rubber 
cultivation was also parts of agricultural research.598 Experiments on artificial silk and 
rubber began to gain importance as soon as the efforts to increase production from natu­
ral materials proved unsuccessful. Those experiments, however, fared no better than 
those that had gone before.
N ot only did the Kaiser Wilhelm Society adjust its projects to the needs o f the 
Reich’s war preparations and the war industry, but so also did the university research 
centres, which at that time played a secondary role in the country’s scientific research. In 
1938, the minister for the Four-Year Plan, Hermann Goering, and the head o f the Board 
of Directors of IG-Farben and the representative o f the Office for Raw and Industrial 
Materials {Amtfuer Deutsche 'Rjob- und Werkstojje), Carl Krauch, together with the president 
of the Notgemeinschafi and vice-president o f the Ministry of Science, Education and Peo­
ple’s Enlightenment, Rudolf Mentzel, signed an agreement for the establishment o f the 
“Four-Year Plan University Research Institutes”. This was a plan concerned principally 
with the needs o f the war industry. Despite their relationship with industry, the new in-
596 On the exploitation o f  the bauxite mines in Greece see: Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB), R 6 3 / 84,106. On 
the involvement o f  the IG-Farben, see: BAB, R 8128.
597 I.G. Farben Hauptindustrie Aktiengesellschaft Ludwigs hafen a. Rh. Haupdaboratonum. (Ebel’s) 34 
pages ‘Y ortrag vor den Hochschulen bei Schaffung der gebietsmaessigen G ru p p e n le ite r1 Fassung 
21.10.1940, paper sheet 188, p. 33 in: BAB, R 4901/932.
598 See: HEIM, Kalorien, Kautschuk, Kameren, pp. 125-198; WiELAND, *Die poUtischen Aufgaben der 
deutschen Pfl anzenzuech tung', pp. 50ff.
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statutes would retain their autonomy, which was to prove more rhetoncal than real5* 
Nevertheless, only specialised universities would be affiliated to German industnal 
groups, like the IG-Farben chemical company, which was one of the most important 
pillars of the state’s war economy.59 600 Those universities would have to fulfil some pre­
conditions, like having tradition in particular disciplines and being located close to in­
dustrial plants.601 602*Examples of chosen universities were the Universities of Darmstadt 
and Heidelberg, where the first new type of laboratories were being created.601 In 1940, 
however, industry and universities did not work closely enough, even though the co­
operation between them was acknowledged as being absolutely necessary.60 The reason 
was, according to the IG-Farben, the reservations and a kind of distrust from both sides. 
The secrecy among industrial enterprises and other interested parts about the advance­
ment of research projects, in order to remain competitive, was another serious reason. 
On the other hand, universities that provided industries with scientific achievements and 
the know-how feared that these would be used, not in the public interest but for pnvate 
purposes. These reservations and fears from both sides, argued the spokesman of the 
I.G. Farben, should be set aside to be replaced by a common front for German science, 
as National Socialism had replaced the private concerns of the old economic model with 
the common interest604 German science was considered the means for the Reich to 
achieve two major goals: to take over the leadership in the new Europe and to present a 
defensive front against America.605
The organisation of the “Four-Year Plan Institutes” was the responsibility of the 
Office for Raw Materials. Directors would be university professors, who would not have
599 Reichsstelle fuer Wirtschaftsausbau. Vodaeufige Richtlinien fuer die Forschungsinstitute des 
Vierjahresplanes 18.02.1938, part Ilia. Verhältnis zur Industrie, in; BAß, R 4901/932.
600 See: FRIEDRICH STRATMANN, Chemische Industrie unter Zwang? Staatliche Einflussnahme am Bespiel 
der chemischen Industrie Deutschlands 1933-1949, Stuttgart 1985, pp. 41-137.
601 Prof. Dt. Mentzel to Dr. Krauch, Amt fuer Deutsche Roh- und Werkstoffe on 11.01.1938, in BAB, R 
4901/ 932. For the detailed guidelines of the new institutes see: Reichsstelle fuer Winschaftsausbau. 
Vodaeufige Richtlinien fuet die Forschungsinstitute des Vierjahresplanes 18.021938, in: BAB, R -VW1/932
602 Protokol ueber die Errichtung von Forschungsinstitute des Vierjahresplanes (Paragraph 1), 11.01 1938, 
iw BAB R  4901/932
601 LG. Farben Hauprindustrie Aktiengesellschaft Ludwigshafen a. Rh. Haupdaboratonum. (Ebcl's) 34 
pages ‘Wbrtrag vor den Hochschulen bei Schaffung der gebietsmaessigen Gruppenleiter.” 1 Fassung 
21.10-1940, paper number 157, p. 2 ia* BAB, R 4901/932
604 Ibid.
605 lbid.y paper number 162, p. 7.
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the status o f industrial employees, but would retain their position at their universities and 
consequently their affiliation to the Ministry of Education.606 The research would be 
conducted under the supervision o f  the Reich Office for Economic Expansion {Reich- 
sstelle fuer Wirtschajtsausbau) and should be kept secret.607 Therefore, the university insti­
tutes ought to operate exclusively for industrial research and the appointment o f foreign 
scientists was strictly forbidden 608 Financial support was to come primarily from the Of­
fice, but contributions from industry were always welcome.609 The research projects were 
focused on synthetic raw materials, like synthetic petrol, rubber and textile fibres.610 It is 
interesting to note that the Minister of Education suggested a “lecturing plan” between 
universities and the new institutes, in which scientific as well as financial issues could be 
discussed.611 This project was expanded during the war years and lectures organised by a 
sponsor or central university (Yatenumversitaet) to which Four-Year Plan institutes were 
affiliated were held for soldiers. The undertaking occasionally took place outside Ger­
many, in occupied countries, contributing to the Reich’s cultural policy abroad. This was 
the case with the University in Vienna, which was the Patenunivmitaet for southeastern 
Europe.612 It is noteworthy that these research centres, despite the fact that they were
606 Reichsstelle fuer Wutschaftsausbau. Vodaeufige Richtlinien fuer die Forschungsinstitute des 
Vierjahresplanes 18.02.1938, part I. Organisation. Dienstaufsicht, in: BAB, R 4901/932.
607 Ibid., part Illg. Geheimhaltung Also: Leiter der Reichsstelle fuer Wirtschafbausbau, Dr. Crimanis:
Vodaeufige Richtlinien fuer die Forschungsinstitute des Vierjahresplanes, 18.02.1938, in: BAB R 4901/932. 
604 Protokol lieber die Errichtung von Forschungsinstitute des Vierjahresplanes (Paragraph 2, 3, 4), 
11.01.1938; Reichsstelle fuer Wirtschafbausbau. Vodaeufige Richtlinien fuer die Forschungsinstitute des 
Vierjahresplanes 18-02.1938, part Illg. Geheimhaltung, both im BAB, R 4901/932.
609 Protokol ueber die Errichtung Ibid
610 IG-Farben Vortrag vor den Hochschulen bei Schaffung der gebietamaessigen Gruppenleiter, on 
21.10.1940, im BAB R 4901/932 It is a detailed presentation o f the work on synthetic raw materials. On 
the arguments for the need o f research on synthetic textile fibres see also: 1941 report of Dr. Joachim Loe- 
bering (Sueddeutsche Zellwolle A.G. Kelheim A-D.Donau) under the title “Ueber Grundlagen- und 
Zweckforschung auf dem  Fasserstoffgebiet", im BAB R 4901/932
011 Reichsstelle fuer Wirtschafbausbau. Vodaeufige Richtlinien fuer die Forschungsinstitute des 
Vierjahresplanes 18.021938, part IV. Unterrichts fragen, im BAB, R  4901/932
612 Lectures were also given to soldiers in Greece, in 1944, by two distinguished professors o f biology at 
the University o f Vienna and by the Kaiser Wilhelm zoologist O tto Schartau, who was the local director of 
the Getman-Gieek Institute for Biology in Piraeus. See: Letter o f  Schartau to Max Hartmann, director of 
the Institute for Biological Research in Bedin-Dahlem, on 5.4.1944, im MPGA, A bt III, Rep. 47, N r 1282
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designed for the Four-Year Plan project, could continue to operate as university insti­
tutes later on for the needs of a so-called “second Four-Year Plan”.613
It should not be forgotten that even though the university institutes recruited for 
war preparation and were engaged in exclusively practical problems, they were regarded 
as institutions that served the national socialist ideals, broadly defined. Even the industri­
alists themselves saw the systematic and pioneering work performed at those institutes as 
“national socialist research” that “promoted the national socialist Weltanschauung\ 614 The 
close co-operation between industry and the Ministry of Education advocated, it was be­
lieved, the Nazi ideal o f community and common work.615
613 Protokol ueber die Errichtung von Forschungsinstitute des Vierjahresplanes (Paragraph 6), 11.01.1938, 
in: BABR 4901/931
614 Letter of Dr. Joachim Loebering (Sueddeutsche Zellwolle A.G. Kdheim AD.Donau) to the Oberre­
gierungsrat Dr. Demmel, Reichsministerium £ Erziehung und Unterricht, on 11111941, in: BAB R 
4901/931
615 See: Broadcasting Speech of Prof. Mentzel’s on “Deutsche Wissenschaft als voelkische Aufgabe, July 
1943, in: BAB, R 2 6 III/174.
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4.5. The “Suedosteuropa Gesellschaft” and its cultural political role in the Balkans,
“Ein wesentlicher, ja, man wird ohne Uebertreibung 
sagen koennen, fuer die naechste Zukunft der voraussichtlich 
bedeutendste Wirtschaftsraum in dieser kontinentalen 
Neuorientierung Deutschlands duerfte der Suedosten werden/'616
With these words Anton Reithinger, the person in charge at the politico- 
economic section in the IG-Farben industry (Letter tier Volkswirtschaftlichen Abteilung der IG 
Farben Industrie AG) described in 1940 the role the south-eastern Europe could play for 
the economy o f the Reich, namely its war economy. Having occupied France, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Luxemburg, Germany was certain that the French and English 
competition in the Balkans would be eliminated and the Reich could almost exclusively 
exploit the mineral resources as well as the agricultural production of the region.617 
Wheat, com, olives, oil, wood and other forest resources, minerals and textile fibres 
made up the Balkans’ natural wealth, which was to prove essential for the Third Reich’s 
economy. The region, argued Reithinger, would be important as an investment market 
area that, after the end o f the war, would secure Germany’s export profits in the long 
term. In addition, Germany’s investment o f industrial capital in south-eastern Europe, 
particularly in transportation road, water or railway networks, would create the necessary 
technical preconditions for larger and cheaper exploitation o f its raw materials.618
Achieving that goal, Germany did not escape the complexity of distribution of 
duties and power by several institutions, complexity that was characteristic of the poly- 
cratic Nazi regime. What was also characteristic was the rivalries among those institu­
tions, often leading to the establishment of new umbrella organisations, transferring the 
tense onto another level. This was the case o f the two most influential organisations for 
Germany’s expansion to the south-east, that is, the Mittekuropaäsche Wirtschaftstag (MWT) 
and the Suedosteuropa Gesellschaft (SOEG), both of which had their central offices in Vi­
enna. Even though both were created for the same purpose, namely to establish eco­
nomic influence over the Balkans and to exploit its resources, they did little to co-
616 Anton Reithinger, Suedosteuropa und seine wirtschaftliche Bedeutung fuer Deutschland, in’ Schriften­
reihe der Finanzwochenzeitschrift “Die Bank”, H. 12, O.O.U.J., [1940] S. 21, d ied  in: SCHUMANN, Griff 




operate with each other towards their stated gpals. The Suedosteuropa Gesellschaft, unlike 
the MWT, was a newly established organisation. On 14 October 1939, within the frame­
work of the Economic and Commercial Fair in Vienna the Minister o f Finance, Walther 
Funk, and the Gauleiter and Governor o f Vienna, Josef Buerkel, made a speech about the 
initiatives Austria should take with regard to the Reich’s war economy and the role of 
south-eastern Europe.619 They further presented the foundations for the creation o f a 
department dedicated to the south-east European economy in Vienna. Austria was re­
garded the indispensable geopolitical area for Germany’s interests, the “bridge pillar7’ 
(Brueckenpfeiîer) to the south-east,620 which traditionally had close relations with the region. 
The department, therefore, was considered a “vein o f life” ÇLebensader) for Germany’s 
war economy.621 Its role was to put Austrian companies and Austrian economy, in gen­
eral, at the disposition of the Reich, taking measures to secure industrial production, the 
promotion o f exports and the tariff policy.622 At the same time, it was expected that the 
commercial exchange with the Balkan countries would help Germany to break Briatin’s 
efforts to blockade the Reich’s economy.623 Several months later, on 8 February 1940, 
those first plans to “decentralize the activities and the administration of Germany’s 
economy from Berlin to Vienna”,624 took the shape o f a new institution named “South- 
East European Society” Ç* Suedosteuropa GeseüscbqfF, SOEG).
According to its founding Articles, the role o f the SOEG was “to cultivate, 
strengthen and foster Germany’s relations with the south-eastern countries”.625 In fact, 
what was hidden behind this euphemistic declaration was the co-ordination o f research 
for the east on ulterior motives the unification and Germanisation o f the Balkan peoples 
and their economic exploitation, as the region was considered the “economic supple-
fil9 E. Pis tor’s report,”Die Schaffung einer ostmaerkischen Wirtschaftsstelle fuer Suedost” on 24.10.1939, 
p.l in: BAB, R 63/37.
620 SCHUMANN, G riff nach Suedosteuropa, p. 20.
621 E. Pistor’s re port,’’Die Schaffung einer ostmaerkischen Wirtschaftsstelle fuer Suedost” on 24.10.1939, 
p .l in: BAB, R 63/37.
«2 Ibid 
™Ibtd, p .2 .
624 Abstract o f  Minister Funk’s speech, quoted in Pistor’s report; "Die Schaffung einer ostmaerkischen 
Wirtschaftsstelle fuer Suedost”. Ibid. p.l.
625 Undated document (presumably o f 1941): Satzung der “Suedosteuropa — Gesellschaft”, paragraph 3 in: 






\ mentaiy space” for Germany.626 The organisation should be in close co-operation with all
|  authorities, unions, institutes, societies and other similar institutions that were connected
| to  the Balkan countries or aimed at establishing economic or cultural relations with
I them .627 In June 1941, in order to avoid further rivalries between the SOEG and the
| MWT, it was suggested by the latter and the Reich’s industrial circles that the SOEG
I should be engaged in the scientific preparation o f the industrial activities in south-eastern
I Europe. A committee with economic-scientific competencies was constituted in the
| SO E G  at the beginning of 1942. The Suedosteuropa Geselhcbaft was subjected to the Reich’s
| Ministry of Finance and worked under the auspices of the Minister o f  Finance and presi-
I den t of the German Bank, Walter Funk.628 Nevertheless, the organisation was not to be
I attached to any state, party, industrial or other economic organisation, but to be autono­
m ous.629 In addition, it was to take necessary action to avoid conflicts and rivalries with 
o ther organisations. Moreover, it should rather be careful, even wary o f co-operating 
w ith all of them, operating as an umbrella organisation.650 President o f the society was 
initially appointed the Reich Commissar for the Re-unification of Austria with the Ger­
m an Reich, Josef Buerkel and a year later the Governor and Gauleiter in Vienna, Baldur 
von  Schirach, w'hile the vice-president became the Reich Brigadier and Mayor of Vienna, 
H ans Blaschke*631
Despite the scientific role the SOEG was called on to play, it did not run any sci­
entific program of its own. It operated rather as a coordinating organization for a nu­
m erous other institutions focused on south-eastern issues, either engaged in theoretical 
science or in practical economy, without obstructing the execution o f their projects.632 620*
620 Sc h u m a n n , Griff nach Sueosteuropa, p . 10.
627 Undated document (presumably of 1941): Satzung der "Suedosteuropa -  Gesellschaft", paragraph 3 im
BA B, R 63/1. See also: "Der Aufbau der Suedosteuiopa-Geseïïschaft” December 1942, W en in- BAB, R
6 3 /2 .
628 [1941?] Satzung der "Suedosteuropa -  Gesellschaft", paragraph 2 im BAB, R 63/1.
629 Taerigkrit und Aufbau der Suedosteuropa -  Gesellschaft 01.03.1942, im BAB R 63/4.
630 T aerigkeitsbericht der SOEG to its President Baldur von Schirach 29.05.1942, im BAB R 63/4.
431 By 1944 were appointed two more vice-presidents, Kari Hermann Frank, who was the State's Minister
in  the protectorate Boehm en und Maehren and SS-Obergruppenfuehrer, and the engineer Walter Rafels-
b e rg , who was Ganwirtscaftsberater Stadtrat SS-Oberfuehrer. See document about the structure of the
S O E G , mid February 1944, im BAB, R 63/2.
652 [1941*5 Satzung der “Suedosteuropa — Gesellschaft", paragraph 3 im BAB, R 63/1; Geschaefts fuehrer
d e r  SOEG, Heinrichsbauer to the Sonderbeauftragten des Fuehrers General der Infanterie von Unruh on
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Many o f these programs conducted research on nutrition, export and import trade, in­
dustry, and transportation. The practical issues the SOEG supervised were focused on 
two major areas: agriculture and industry. A number o f leading enterprises became inter­
ested in the new organisation and among those that joined its projects were the I.G. Far- 
ben Industry, the Coal Syndicate, and the German-American Petroleum Society.* 633 After 
1938, the Nazi successive march to the east and the war developments in the following 
years increased the Reich’s interest in exploiting the raw materials of die Balkans. Iron, 
manganese, copper, chrome, bauxite, coal, liquid petroleum gas, and, above all, oil were 
the most important resources that Germany desperately needed, in order to buttress its 
war economy. Manganese, for example, was among the most important minerals re­
quired for the production of iron and steel, while bauxite was significant for the fabrica­
tion o f aluminium, a material used by Luftwaffe for building planes. The aluminium econ­
omy in the Balkans was very higji and therefore of great importance for Germany. The 
Italian exploitation o f Balkan bauxite deposits made German eagerness to gain a foot­
hold in the region ever greater. In 1942, European shortages in food supplies increased 
the importance o f the Balkans, as it was also a valuable agricultural and cattle-breeding 
resource, with great potential for farming plants rich in fat and proteins.634
The Society consisted o f the following eleven departments:635 
die Committee for Scientific Economic Planning (i.e. the industrial economy), 
the Working Group for Danube River Issues, 
the Sunscreen Institute (Pbotogrwnmetñscbes Institut), 
the Department for Supplies and Agriculture, 
the Committee for Com Production, 
the Institute for South-East Law, 
the Security Committee,
the Department for Cultural-Political Undertakings,
the Department o f South-East Union o f  the Vienna Universities,
- the Press Office, and
25.05.1943, in: BAB, R  63 / 3; “Der Aufbau der Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft”, Decemberl942, in: BAB, R 
6 3 /2 .
633 Heinrichsbauer to the Minister a.D.Dr.Hans Fischboeck, Creditanstalt — Bankveiein Wien 06.04.1940, 
in: BAB, R 63/33.
634 Protokoll der am 25. Maerz 1942,17 Uhr, un ter dem Vorsitz des Herm Karl Meywe2edt und im Beiscin 
des Herm Stellvertretenden Gauleiters SS-Btigadefuehrer Schañtzer, in: BAB, R 63/27.
635 “Gliederung der SO EG ”, mid February 1944 in: BAB, R 6 3 /2
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the Office for Literature, Theatre and Music.
As autarky in food supplies was one of the major problems of the German war economy, 
the SOEG established in 1941 the “South-east Agricultural Institute” {Suedost-Agrarinsütut 
der SuedosteuTOpa-Gesellschaft e.V)t also based in Vienna. The institute reported to the Uni­
versity for Agronomy (Hochsehule fuer Bodenkultui). It was underlined that the Suedost- 
Agrarinsûtut should not be engaged in economic undertakings of any commercial enter­
prise.636 On the contrary, it should carry out its own business, namely to consult the 
SOEG at a scientific level about the provision of supplies, agricultural and forest exploi­
tation issues. Among the competencies of the new institute were the agriculture and 
“space research” in the south-east. To these ends, the institute would grant scholarships 
to young scientists o f that region to study at the University for Agronomy in Vienna.*37 
The work carried out should be focused on practical applications, that is to say, to meet 
the war needs. If the institute was engaged in other projects than these, stressed the gen­
eral director o f the SOEG, August Heinrichsbauer, the Suedost-Agrarinstitut had no fu­
ture.638 Some of the experiments carried out at the agricultural institute were on soya 
beans, oil-reach pumpkins, olives, com, and even on different sheep breeds for milk 
production and other milk-based products.639 Other projects that were planned to be car­
ried out at the Suedost-Agrarinslitut had to do, among other things, with the so-called ‘in­
dustrial plants’, namely fruits and vegetables that could be canned, hemp, and above all 
Kok-Saghys, from which one could take rubber, so essential for the Reich’s war econ­
omy. Bulgaria had a highly developed canning industry; moreover it was regarded as the 
right place for potential rubber plantations.640 Even though the Kaiser Wilhelm Society 
was engaged in research on almost all the above problems, only some departments of its 
institutes, like the Department for Animal Pathology at the Institute for Heredity Re­
search contributed to the SOEG’s projects with its directors giving lectures to the Suedost 65
656 Undated document (presumably of June 1941), “Satzunbg des Suedost-Agrahnstitutes der 
Suedosteuropa-GeseHschafte.V”,paragraph2 ,in: BAB,R63/49.
637 Ibid.
638 A  Heiniichsbauer to Prof. Hausmann, Geschaeftsfaehrerdes SOagrarinsntut on 03.011943, in: BAB,
R 63/ 74.
639 “Kurzer Taetigkeitsbericht 1944” from Prof Hausmann Geschaefo fuehrer des SOagrannstitut to the 
SOEG on 08.08.1944, in: BAB, R 63/5.
640 Hausmann to the Suedosteuropa-GeseHschaft -Emachrung und Landwirtschaft* z.Hd. Herrn Dr. v 
R ischta06.01.1943,in: BAB,R63/74.
191
Agrarinsûtut in Vienna.641 All the above projects, whether carried out in the SOEG or in 
the Kaiser Wilhelm Society were classified important or decisive for the war (kriegsmchûg(  
kriegsentscheidend). Other important research institutes with which the organisation was 
involved were:
the Institute for Economic Research in Vienna, 
the Institute for Consume and Commerce, also in Vienna, 
the South-east Seminar organised by the SOEG and the German Academy, and 
the South-east Institute for Forest and Timber Research created by the SOEG.642 
Among the problems investigated by the first institute was that of bauxite exploitation, 
while the Institute for Forest and Timber Research was engaged in research on malaria, 
and particularly in mapping the malaria-infested areas and those in which the Anopheles 
mosquito reproduced. Experiments on fighting the Anopheles with healing herbs like qui­
nine in Bulgaria and northern Greece were also part o f the institute’s project643
The SOEG also planned to develop the industrial sector of the Balkans —that is 
to say to exploit its production-, and, in order to influence the region economically, po­
litically and culturally, it used the network o f authorities, unions, institutes, societies and 
other organizations that Germany had already developed in the Balkan states. The bilat­
eral friendship unions that had existed for many years between Germany and those 
countries, like the German-Greek Union (Deutsch-Griechische Gesellschafi), and the German- 
Bulgarian Union (Deutsch-Bulgarische Gesellschafi), created branches in Vienna for closer 
collaboration with the SOEG. The work performed under the supervision o f the SOEG 
soon transcended the borders o f Austria and the organisation set up branches in almost 
all the Balkan states, i.e. Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Croatia and 
Greece for gathering information valuable for the economic planning o f the area. 
Branches were also created in Berlin and Munich. It should be underlined that in its ef­
fort to exploit the wealth o f the Balkans, the Third Reich activated not only the full
641 Prof. Hausmaim to the SOEG z.H. des H erm  Min. Rat Dr. Hans Augenthalter 25.02.1944, in: BAB, R 
63/74.
642 <fD er Aufbau der Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft” December 1942, and "Gliederung der SOEG”, mid Feb­
ruary 1944: both documents in: BAB, R 63/2. See also Untided document o f  1943 about the institutes with 
which the SOEG was related, in: BAB, R 63/14.
643 Bericht ueber die im Rahmen der SOEG bearbeitete theoretisch-wissenshcaftliche Untersuchungen 
(Vtrtraulich) 01.08.1943, in: BAB, R  63/2; undated document (probably o f  1941): Aktenvermerk von Dr. 
Rischka, Amt fuer Agrarpolititk der Gauleitung der NSDAP, Wien, in: BAB, R 63/49; Schimitschek to the 
Suedos (institut filer Wald- und Holzforschung, Wien 06.02.1943, in: BAB, R 63/5.
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panoply o f the state economic mechanism, but also some of the bearers or representa­
tives of German culture, such as the German Academy. The number o f interdisciplinary 
projects the SOEG undertook, demanded co-operation with other scientific institutes. I f  
these institutes happened to have branches in the south-eastern countries, so much the 
better. The only such institution was the German Scientific Institute (DWI), with which 
the SOEG developed dose relations.
Vienna had great the potential to become the educational center of south-eastern 
Europe for the Nazis, as it had been in the past, particularly for agrarian studies. There­
fore, the universities o f the Austrian capital could play an important role not only for the 
promotion o f research on the Balkans, but also for the Reich’s foreign cultural policy.644 
Nevertheless, there were a number of problems that had to be dealt with, in order for 
Germany and Austria to be able to attract as many students, economists and other ex­
perts or interested scholars as possible, not only from the Reich but also from the Bal­
kans. In 1942, agronomic studies in Germany were neither as intensive or as broad as 
they had previously been, nor as they had been in south-eastern countries or Italy. In ad­
dition, the three-year courses in Germany was considered insuffident, as the Balkan 
countries offered four-year course of studies. As for the practical application of theory, 
this was something lacking in Germany in contrast to the Balkans. The high fees, com­
paring to France, charged at the Vienna University and its poor equipment also made the
* > 645institution unattractive.
Nevertheless, it seems that in order to meet die Reich’s wishes -at least to some 
extent- the SOEG took some measures for promoting Germany’s cultural relations with 
the Balkan states. The cultural-political undertakings o f the organization gained almost 
equal importance to the theoretical-srientific and the practical-economic projects. Most 
o f  these initiatives took place in the framework of the cultural activity of the rity of Vi­
enna, even though they had or they should have had their own character. One of the 
closest relationships the SOEG had developed with Vienna’s cultural organizations was 
with the “Sodety o f Friends of the German Academy”. In 1942, the dty of Vienna, the 
SOEG and the German Academy established the “South-east seminar” (Suedostseminar).646
644 Dr. von Rise h If a, Lei ter u. Geschaefts fuehrer der Abtedung Emaehrung u. Landwirtschaft to die 
SOEG, Geschaeftsbericht zurzweiten Tagung des Beirats der Gruppe ‘'Emaehrung und Landwirtschaft” 
der Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 30 Nov. - 1  Dec. 1942, in: BAB, R 63/262.
645 Ibid.
646 Geschaefofuehrer des Kulturpolitischen Arbeitkieises Felix Kraus Abschnft. Abkommen zwischen: 
Stadt Wien, Deutsche Akademie und SOEG, 27.10.1943, in: BAB R 63/175.
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The director o f  the seminar was Otto Kunz and its stated aim was to familiarize those 
who were interested in south-eastern Europe with the region through language courses, 
lectures, expeditions and other cultural and scientific, economic, activities.647 The exten­
sion of the program to foreigners was also anticipated. The SOEG affiliated with the 
Department o f South-East Union of the Vienna Universities (Abtdlung Suedostgemeinschaft 
der Wiener Hochschulen in derSOEG) and the laboratories of Vienna universities, in order 
for the scientific problems of the region to be studied.648 The department of South-East 
Union embraced about twelve universities in Austria and the Protectorate and its role 
was to centralize and manage scientific work of every kind related to the south-east and 
conducted at universities and institutes.649 The program of the J/w^tf-seminars that 
lasted a week, included a series o f lectures on agricultural and economic issues, but also a 
number of cultural activities dedicated not only to the Reich but also to one or more Bal­
kan countries at a time. Scientists from several German universities and research insti­
tutes usually lectured in front o f students but very often their audience also comprised 
military officers and soldiers. It is interesting to note that to cater to the needs o f the 
seminar the authorities of the city o f Vienna, the German Academy, and the SOEG 
singed an agreement for the establishment of another institute, the Eugen-Instituf. 
The role o f this new institute was to co-ordinate the scientific and cultural activities o f 
the above three partners, namely, to promote joint propaganda initiatives through 
courses, the organisation of big cultural events and other cultural-political and scientific 
undertakings.650 In the framework of the Prin% Eugen-InsUtut, the German Academy in co­
operation with the Ministry o f Education and the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, offered 
language courses for foreign students at Vienna universities and technical schools. The 
increase in the number of foreign students who took language courses from 1942 to 
1944 is quite impressive:651
647 Document o f December 1942 “D er Aufbau der Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft”, in: BAB, R 63/2.
^Ibid.
649 Taetigkeitsbericht der SOEG 29.05-1942, to the President o f  the SOEG, von Schirach, in: BAB, R 
63/4.
650 Geschaeftsfuehrer des Kulturpolitischen Arbeitkieises Felix Kraus Abschrift Abkommen zwischen: 
Stadt Wien, Deutsche Akademie und SOEG, 27.10.1943, paragraphs 3b,d, in: BAB R 63/175.
651 Taetigkritsbericht fuer Suedost-seminar, SOEG u. Deutsche Akademie 17-04.1944, in: BAB, R 63/5.
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T able 7.
October 1942 - February 1943 sum 138 foreign students
March 1943 - June 1943 “ 150 cc
October 1943 - February 1944 “ 227 4«
March 1944 - June 1944 “ 312 t€
The seminar was divided into two sections: one for foreigners and a second for Germans
and Austrians. The latter offered a  series o f  courses in almost all the Balkan languages,652 653
as well as introductory seminars on the land, culture, and the people o f the region. The 
foreigners, on the other hand, could take similar courses for language, organised by the 
personnel o f German Academy and the Ministry of Education,655 as well as for politics, 
economy and the culture of the “Great German Reich”. Language learning was the first 
step the SOEG should take in order to attract foreigners to enrol in the universities in 
Vienna and to continue their studies there subsequently, usually in trade and industrial 
economy, agriculture and the related sciences. These young scientists were expected to 
become Germany's “extending hand” after returning to their homelands, strengthening 
at the same time the ties with Germany and eventually being well disposed towards the 
Reich’s interests.654 The number o f  young Balkans who visited the Reich’s universities 
seemed to be quite big, given the fact that the war was in progress and Germany exer­
cised brutal occupation policies against some Balkan peoples. The cultural-political and 
the economic-political significance {kultur- und nirtschaftspolitisch) of granting scholarships 
to young scientists from the Balkans, basically to do Ph.D research at the University for 
Agronomy, was well acknowledged by the director of the SO-agrarinsütut and professor at 
the above university.655
652 There were organised Slovak, Bulgarian, and Rumanian, even Croatian, Hungarian and Russian language 
courses. Greek is not mentioned. Ibid.
653 Geschaefts fuehrer des Kulturpolitischen Arbdtkxeises Felix Kraus Abschrift. Abkommen zwischen: 
Stadt Wien, Deutsche Akademie und SOEG, 27.10.1943, paragraph 1, in: BAB R  63/175.
654 Suedost-Seminai, Wien. Anlage zum  Fragebogen 23.04.1943, in: BAB, R  63/3; Prof. Hausmann, 
Geaschaeftsfeuhrer der Suedostagrarinstitut der SOEG to Geschaeftsfuehrer der SOEG, Heinrichsbauer 
26.11.1942, in: BAB, R  63/74.
655 Prof Hausmann, Geaschaeftsfeuhrer der Suedostagrarinstitut der SOEG to Geschaefts fuehrer der 
SOEG, Heinrichsbauer 26.11.1942, in: BAB, R 63/74.
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T a b l e  8 .
Percentage of foreign scientists who visited German universities from 
October 1941 to October 1942
Bulgarians 22,9 % Japanese 3,84 % Ukrainians 2,15 % Indians 1,25 %
Rumanians 8,85 % Greeks 3,84 % Belgians 1,96 % Arabs 1,16 %
Chinese 7,33 % Spaniards 3,75 % Slovaks 1,8 % Peruvians 1,07 %
Hungarians 7,4 % Dutch 3,6 % Swedes 1,7 %
Croats 6,6 % Swiss 3,04 % Tuerks 1,6 %
Italians 6,08 % Persians 2,5 % Danes 1,34 % 7,24 % of twenty-four 
other states
Source: Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB), R 63/ 174 H. Baatz. Auslandsamt der 
Dozentenschaft der deutschen Universitaeten und Hochschulen. 
Jahresarbeitsbericht 1. Oktober 1941 bis 30 September 1942. (Streng vertaulich!)
Even though prizes and grants were funded for German students, like the Pritt^Eugen- 
Preis o f the Goetbe-Stiftung and the Prin^Eugen-Studienstiftung, that strong cultural propa­
ganda tool was not applied to foreigners, at least at the beginning, something that trou­
bled the authorities of the SOEG very early on.656 However, it is unlikely, that similar 
grants were later given to Balkan scholars directly by the SOEG. As the granting of 
scholarships to foreigners was the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry, the SOEG tried 
to avoid any conflicts with it. Thus, the cultural political program of the SOEG was only 
involved in occasional and carefully selected cultural activities.657
656 “Taetigkeit und Aufbau der Sucdosteuropa — Gesellschaft” 01.03.1942, part III, in: BAB, R 63/4.
657 Taetigkeitsbericht der SOEG to the President o f the SOEG Baldur von Schirach 29.05.1942, paragraph 
number 3, in: BAB, R  63/4. Grants were also allocated or planned to be allocated to young scientists who 
wished to work ou t a dissertation on south-eastern agricultural issues. In 1943, are reported two Romani­
ans who were doing such research in Vienna, while publication o f relevant dissertations was planned to be 
a financially supported by the. German Academy in Munich, for contemporary works o f that kind were 
lacking. That lack was well presented on the list o f  dissertations carried out at the University for Agronomy 
in Vienna, which m ost o f diem were quite old. Among those were the works o f  two Greeks: Orphee- 
Papadopoulos Dimitri: “Das griechische brachyzere Rind. Die Rindexschlaege von HeUasfesdand, der Insel 
Euboea, Peloponnes u.d- Insel Kseta.” Diss. v. 25. Apr. 1933. 67 S, and WTissidis Thrassybulos: “Studien 
ueber die Aufforstung Griechenlands.” Diss. v. 1. Apr. 1919. 41 BL, see: Verzeichnis der Dissertationen an 
der Hochschule f. Bodenkultur mit einer Beziehung zum SO, 1943 in: BAB, R 63/74. Wlissidis was ap­
pointed professor at Athens University in 1933. See: KATAZTAZIZ Epoctivoooa to aùvoÀov tuv 
a^oSo^ùv Tt«)v Extabadiv Ka&rfjn'iTwv XgrjoEwc, 01.04.1933 -  31.03.1934, in: Historical Archive o f Athens 
University (IAPA), 1-1 Appointments o f  Professors (Aiopiopot xaOrjyTjTÙv. npoxijeulfo nkriQiiioewc; ESgùv 
xat àXXec AiaSococatec), 1934-1935.
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4.6. The “Ahnenerbe” research program and the Deutsche Vmchunmemeinschaftprojects for the Bal­
kans.
Hitler’s obsession with the superiority of the Aryan race and his eagerness to 
pro v e and to spread this belief abroad had displayed ever since the establishment o f the 
National Socialist Worker’s Party. In “Mein Kampf he argued passionately for the 
uniqueness of the German by contrast to the Jew. Apart from Jews, the Nazi racial the­
ory considered the Slavs and the gypsies as inferior races. Political and social groups, like 
communists, homosexuals and people with mental illness o r other handicap also became 
targets of discrimination and threatened with extinction for the sake o f the purity o f the 
German race. The Nazis believed that as a “higher” race, the Germans were entitled to 
conquer and subjugate other races. Germany, therefore, should acquire Lebensraum by 
expanding eastwards at the expense o f the racially inferior Slavs. The whole plan had to 
be well organised and science — or rather pseudo-science- was called to play its part in it.
The racial issue, therefore, became the foremost problem addressed to a number 
o f  newly established institutions created to support “scientifically” die superiority o f die 
German race. The most representative one was the Research and Study Organisation 
“Das Ahnenerbê\ established in summer 1935 by the SS Reichsfuehnr Heinrich Himmler, 
the Minister of Nutrition and Agriculture, Richard Walther Darré, and the scholar Her­
man Wirth, specialist in German prehistory. The organisation aimed at investigating and 
rediscovering the ancient past o f the German people, its historic language and culture, 
and justifying historically the greatness o f the German race and culture and its continuity 
over time. Gradually, the Aryan heredity became the “practical-ideological” component 
for the National Socialist organisation o f the every-day life.658 In 1938, Himmler used the 
SS-Ahnenerbe as a mechanism for alignment and cultural political suppression within the 
Reich and later in the occupied territories. Chief Director (Kuratof) o f die Ahnenerbe proj­
ect was the professor for the Indo-Germanic language and Culture and deputy president 
o f the German Academy, Walther Wuest The organisation comprised about forty scien­
tific sectors and in the first years it focused on the Getstesmssenscbafien,, namely the Aryan 
history and folklore, and particularly on Germamsûk and the comparative study of lan­
guage (vergleichende Sprachmssenschaft),659 Just before the outbreak of the Second World
658 MICHAEL H. KaTER, Das “Ahnenerbe” der SS 1935-1945. Bcitrag zur Kulturpolitik des Dritten 
Reiches. Muenchen 2001, p. 7.
659 Ibid., pp. 47 ft
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War, natural sciences became the subject o f study o f the SS-Abnenerbe. Himmler"s major 
interest was the “Rassenkundd', namely the biological anthropology, and medicine. Re­
search on the human immune system occurred in concentration camps from 1942 on­
wards, where notorious experiments on inmates took place under the command o f the 
SS-Ahnenerbe and the support o f die German Research Society (DFG).660
The war was in any case, a turning point for the Reich’s science policy, but the 
shift o f focus in research from humanities (<Gdsteswissenscbaften) to natural sciences 
(Natumissenscbaften) indicated a more complex rationale than just meeting the war needs. 
Himmler had realised that despite the “scientific” justification the study o f German pre­
history gave to die racial theory, and by extension to the national socialist ideology, the 
status o f the Ahnenerbe remained precarious, as long as its project remained on the theo­
retical level. After 1939, when research in general began to take a practical turn (Zweckfor- 
scbung), the Ahnenerbe adjusted its projects accordingly. This happened for an additional 
reason: financial support coming from state institutions or even industry started to grant 
primarily projects classified as u krieg$wichti£\ Consequendy, the Deutsche Forscbungsgemein- 
schaft (DFG), which was the major contributor to the Ahnenerbe research, from 1939 on 
funded more and more war-related scientific work rather than the theoretical-ideological 
research.661 In general, natural sciences, without fail, were classified “ kriegsnicbtig', while 
humanities were only occasionally marked as such.662
Nonetheless, the cultural-political connotations o f the Ahnenerbe, were never 
abandoned and Himmler tried to accommodate the mission o f his institution with the 
immediate demands of the state. In summer 1939, for example, the Ahnenerbe together 
with die Ministry of Science, Education and People’s Enlightenment organised a scien­
tific week in Salzburg, during which Germany would “present to the world public, in a 
way that will be in full keeping with the dignity of the occasion, the achievements of 
German Science during the course o f her political renascence”.663 More precisely “nota­
ble representatives o f all branches o f learning [would] give a cross-section of German 
culture and its contribution to that o f Europe”.664 Lectures would be given on the disci­
plines o f folklore, history, history of literature, classic antiquity, German history, finance, 
chemistry and others. Apart from the GrossraumpQiitik that seemed to have taken shape
*° Ibid., pp. 98-104.
661 Ibid, p. 146.
662 Ibid, p. 191.
663 Pamphlet “1939, Saltzburger Wissenschaftswochen 13 Aug.-2- Sept 1939”, in: BAB, NS 21/ 163.
664 Ibid
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after the conquest o f the “germanische NorderT, i.e. Denmark, Norway, Belgium and the 
Netherlands, the quest of Lebensraum in the east and its exploitation, became the main 
concern of the Ahnenerbe. Himmler who had been a student o f Gustav Froelich, the fu­
ture director o f the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Animal Breeding Research, was engaged 
with great enthusiasm in the exact sciences, and in particular, in the breeding project He 
got also involved in the Reich’s foreign cultural policy with a number of other scientific 
projects. The cultural activity o f the Ahnenerbe abroad was not only restricted to archaeo­
logical excavations or cave-studies, in order to bring to light findings of the Germanic 
civilisation. The institution also got involved from 1938 onwards in recording, even 
“collecting”, the monuments of cultural heredity of die occupied countries. That mission 
was clearly cultural-political, as Germany, it was believed, would not only be acknowl­
edged as rescuer o f these foreign cultural treasures, but would also have at its own dis­
posal invaluable material for scientific study. The Ahnenerbe activities overlapped the am­
bitions of the “A m t Rosenberg*, which during the war years stripped the occupied territo­
ries from their cultural and historical possessions.665 This was the case of the religious 
relics, particularly the holy manuscripts o f the monastic complex on the mountain of 
Athos in north Greece.666 In 1944, another Greek mountain, Olympus, which is the 
highest massif of the country, became a subject o f research for Himmler’s organisation. 
The ultimately unsuccessful expedition, which met with stiff resistance of the local parti­
sans, had the full support of the Wehrmacht and it seems to have lasted about three 
months.667 The reason of the excursion is not reported in the available documents. It is 
very likely, though, that its purpose might have been die collection o f primitive forms of 
plants or indigenous animals as part o f the project to rescue, as the Nazis argued, die 
natural treasures o f the world’s reservoir zones.668 After the failure o f the Olympus expe­
dition, the same project was planned for the Pyrenees in Spain.669
665 See: REINHARD Bo l l m US,' Das A m t Rosenberg und seine Gegner. Studien zum Machtkampf im na­
tionalsozialistischen Herrschaftssystem, Stuttgart 1970, (Munich 21997).
666 “Abschlussbericht ueber die Tätigkeit des Sondeikommandos Rosenberg in Griechenland” 15.11.1941, 
in: BAB, NS 30/75. See also: BAB, NS 8/259. See also: FLEISCHER, "Europas Rueckkehr”, p. 153.
667 Deutsche Foerschungsgemeinschaft, Ausländsabteilung (Adams) an Reichs fuehrer-SS Pen. Stab. Amt 
“A” Lehr- und Forszchungsstatte fuer Innerasien und Expeditionen, 2.3.1944, in: BAB, NS 21/ 330.
668 Susanne  H e im , "Forschung fuer die Autarkie. Agrarwissenschaft an Kaiser-WUhelm-Instituten im 
Nationalsozialismus”, in: Und. (ed.), Autarkie und Ostexpansion. Pflanzenzucht und Agrarfoischung im 
NationalsoziaUsmus. Goettingen 2002, pp. 145-177, here p. 161.
669 SS-Stunnbahnfuehier an DFG, Ausländsabteilung z.H. von Herrn Dr. Adams, 13.03.1944, in: BAB, NS 
21/ 330.
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During the war years the Ahnenerbc research program went even further to pro­
mote the exact sciences with the zoologist Ernst Schaefer being the leading figure in the 
struggle for national autarky in textile and agricultural production. In this context, he led 
an expedition to Tibet in 1938/39, which had also a cultural-political significance.670 The 
enterprise lasted about sixteen months and for the first time, it was reported, Germans 
entered "die holy city of Tibet”, namely Lhasa. This privilege was regarded by the Nazis 
as an acknowledgement of the superiority of Aryan culture over the British, which ex­
erted great political influence in the region.671 The main purpose of the expedition was 
the collection o f wild and primitive forms of indigenous plants that could be used for 
cross-breeding experiments in Germany in the search of plants resistant to low tem­
peratures. Collection of animals was also among the aims o f the research mission. Eth­
nologists and anthropologists, on the other hand, measured the skulls and physical pro­
portions of the highland tribes and recorded their outer features in order to justify the 
origins o f the German race.672 Part o f  the findings in Tibet were exhibited in the "Week 
of Science” in Salzburg {Sah^bitrger Wissenscbafiswochen) in 1943 673 In the "Week o f Sci­
ence” the achievements of German Science during the course of her “political renas­
cence”, i.e. the National Socialism, were presented to the world public, with all the pomp 
and circumstance appropriate to such an occasion, in order to mark Germany’s contri­
bution to the European culture.674
In summer 1943, a gigantic enterprise took place in the Caucasus, which accord­
ing to the theory of classical biology was one of the bio-geographic bridges between the 
Asian and European fauna and flora.675 The expedition was mounted under the aegis of 
the Special Forces SS (SS~Sonderkommandd) and was headed by Heinz Btuecher. The en­
terprise turned out to be an extended pillage of the rare and valuable plant and seed col-
670 I t was his third personal expedition in Tibet but the first under the SS-Ahnenerbe. See: UWE HOSS- 
FELD, CaRL-Gustaf Thornstroem, “ Hasches Zupacken’. Heinz Bruecher und das botanischc Sam- 
melkoramando der SS nach Russland 1943”, in: Su sa n NE HEIM (ed.) Autarkic und Ostexpansion. Pflan- 
zenzucht und Agrarforschung im Nationalsozialismus. Goettingen 2002, pp. 119-144, here footnote 30 p. 
127.
671 KaTER, Das “Ahnenerbe”, pp. 211 £f.
672 About the expedition and its results see: BAB, NS 21/ 633. The file contains press cuttings. See also: 
BAB, NS 21/ 799, Heft 222.
673 KATER, ibid, p. 213.
674 The first event occurred in 1939. See: Advertising pamphlet titled “Saltzburger Wissenschaftswochen 13 
Aug-2. Sept 1939”, in: BAB, NS 21/ 163.
673 KaTER, ib id , p. 214; HOSSFELD and THORNSTROEM, “ *Rasches Zupacken', pp. 125-130-
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lections of Nikolai Vavilov, Russia’s most prominent plant geneticist who had an inter­
national reputation and wide influence in scientific circles. His unique collection was 
spread to over eighteen scientific stations and institutes across Russia.6'6 That unspeak­
able robbery also had a military purpose: to reduce Russia’s agricultural resources and 
consequently to cause starvation among the country’s population and thus, to annihilate 
it, for it was considered an inferior race. In addition, the food shortage would seriously 
weaken Wehrmacbfs hardy opponent, the Red Army.67' In April 1942, was created by 
Himmler’s command an institute for the study of wild species o f arable plants (Kul- 
turpflan̂ eTi) grown in the interior o f Asia. Expeditions to that region were an integral part 
of the institute’s project. The “Sven-Hedin-Reicbsinstituf', as it was named, was directed by 
Ernst Schaefer and affiliated to the Abnenerbe research program.67 78 Towards the end of 
1943, die Abnenerbe set up for war purposes another similar institution, the Department 
for Plant Genetics in Lannach, near Graz, (Deutsche Versuchsantalt fuer Emaehrung and 
Verpjkcbtung G.m.b.H, H of Lannacb) under the directorship of Bruecher.6'9 The depart­
ment was fully dependent on the Sven-Hedin Institute and was dedicated to the study of 
collections from Schaefer’s Tibet expedition in 1938/9 as well as from the SS- 
Sonderkommando expedition in Ukraine and Crimea.680
One of the German “achievements” in science that were never shared with the 
rest of the world in a celebratory way in any Sad^barger Wissenscbaftsmchen, was the ento­
mological research conducted under the aegis of Himmler’s organisation at the concen­
tration camp of Dachau. In January 1942, Himmler and the president of the RFR, Siev- 
ers, were planning to establish an institute for the research and fight of vermin insects.681 
Peter Muehlens, the epidemiologist who offered his services to the Bulgarian army dur­
ing the First World War and who travelled later to the Balkans as Germany’s medical and 
cultural delegate, had in the meantime become director o f the Institute for Tropical Dis-
676 HOSSFELD and ThornSTROEM, ibid, pp. 12S f.; MICHAEL Flitner, Sammler, Raeuber und Gelehrte. 
Die politischen Interessen an pflanzengenetischen Ressourcen 1895-1995. Frankfurt 1995, pp. 115 ff.
677 HEIM, “Forschung fuer die Autarkic", p. 167 ff.
678 Hossfeld and Thornstroem, “ Rasches Zupacken’, pp. 130; Rater, Das “Ahnenerbe”, pp. 213 f.
679 Ibid, pp. 130-135; Kater, p. 216.
680 See also: Gez. Sievers, Praes. d. Reichsforschungsrats Leiter d- Geschaeftsbeirats to Dr. Konrad Meyer, 
Leiter der Fachsparte Landbauwissenschaft und allgemeine Biologie on 30.09.1943, in: BAB, R 26 III /  
175; Das Ahnenerbe. Der Reichsgeschaeftsfuehrer, Waischenfeld/Orf. to Kad Becker, Leiter des 
Apparatenaus schusses der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft, Bcriin-Sceglitz on 09.12.1943, BAB, R 26 
III /  231.
681 Rater, p. 227.
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eases in Hamburg. At the beginning o f 1942, he was studying the insects that caused ty­
phus, while he was engaged in Himmler’s plan to create the institute for vermin insects.682 
The plan emerged after a severe outbreak of typhus at the concentration camp o f 
Neuengamme in Hamburg, in 1941. The medical aspect of the problem started to be in­
vestigated a year later in the concentration camp o f Dachau by Professor Claus Schil­
ling.683 In autumn 1943, an entomological institute for the study of behaviour and life 
circle o f the insects was set up at the barracks of Dachau. The institute was headed by 
the thirty-six year old industrial consultant Eduard May.684 The entomological laboratory 
was not designed to compete with the already existing research centres, like the Hygiene 
Institute of the Wajfen-SS or the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. Its purpose was to investigate 
the nature o f insects, such as lice, fleas, bed-bugs, flies, horseflies, mosquitoes, but also 
ants and termites that caused infectious diseases, to figjit them and, if possible, to exter­
minate them with chemicals. Unlike other institutes, which were already working on 
similar investigations, Himmler argued that the laboratory in Dachau would focus on 
problems that only specialised zoologists rather than experts in human medicine could 
deal with.685 Needless to say, co-operation between all institutes of that kind was more 
than necessary. In particular, the institutes o f May and Claus Schilling, which was 'work­
ing on malaria tropica in the same concentration camp, were regarded complementary.
Schilling, a distinguished scientist o f  tropical diseases reported to the Hygiene In­
stitute o f the Wajfen-SS and he was doing experiments exclusively with humans 686 His 
institute was established few months before May’s and his project was focused on the 
medical fighting against malaria infection caused by the mosquito Anopheles, the fever
682 Ibid ., p. 228. See also: Letter of Muehlens, Institut frier S c h i f f s -  und Ttopenkrankheiten, to Sie vers, 
Reichsgeschaefcs fuehrer des “Ahnenerbe", on 10.01.1942, in: BAB, NS 21/ 784.
683 E rnst Klee, Auschwitz, die NS-Medizin und ihre Opfer. Frankfurt a.M., 2002, pp. 117 ff. See: "Be­
richt an den RFR betreffend Studien ueber Malaria-Von Prof. Klaus Schilling” June 1938 to RFR, in: BAK, 
R 7 3 / 14290.
634 Kater, p. 228.
685 Anordnung des Reichs fuehiers-SS, Himmler vom 29,01.1942 ueber das Insitut zur Erforschung und 
Bekaempfring der dem Menschen laestigen und schaedlichen Insekten, in: BAB, NS 21/ 910.
686 Dachau 3. Bauinspekrion der Waffen-SS u. Polizei Reich-Sued an Reichsfuehung-SS -  Pers.Stab, Berlin- 
Dahlem, 30.10.1942, in; BAB, NS 21/ 33. Also: Der Reichsfriehrer-SS Reichsarzt SS an Reihsfuehrer H. 
Himmler (Abschrift), Betr.: Professor Dt. Claus Schilling -  Malaria-Forschung, 20.01.1942; 
Vierteljahrsbericht der Malariastation im KL.Dachau von C Schilling an Reich$artzt-SS und Polizei SS- 
Gruppenfuehrer Grawitt, 01.01.1943; Bericht fuer das I. Viertelsjahr 1943 von C. Schilling an Grawitz, 
01.04.1943, all documents in: BAB, NS 21/ 920.
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mosquito as it was known. That species was particularly spread across the Balkan coun­
tries and it became the number one enemy for the Wehrmackt. Therefore, a large enter­
prise for fighting the Anopheles pupas with an arsenic preparation took place in Greece 
under the commands of Dr. Daueberschmidt early in 1942.68 The Lrtfiauffe also became 
interested in the project and provided its planes for this purpose. A year later, Greece 
was again at the centre of interest. Schilling wanted to experiment on immunisation 
against malaria with new-boms. His experience had shown that infected children reacted 
differently than adults. In order to verify that observation, he planned to vaccinate babies 
coming from malaria territories against the virus and to expose them afterwards to natu­
ral infection in their countries.687 88 689Schilling believed that Greece was the nght country to 
do the experiments and he intended to ask for aid from Professor Marinos Gcroulanos, 
the most prominent and influential doctor in Greece, to whom he was related.680 It is not 
known, however, whether that particular project did indeed take place. What is known is 
that Schilling was charged with war crimes and was summoned before the Nuremberg 
tribunal. It is estimated that he used about 1.100 people as guinea pigs in the concentra­
tion camp, from which over 300 have died.690 He was eventually sentenced to death and 
executed.691
As mentioned above, the German Research Society (DFG)/ German Research 
Council (RFR) supported the Ahnenerbe projects that were classified kriegsnichtig. Schil­
lings work also received some help from the RFR, which provided him with necessary 
expensive equipment.692 Malaria research was a major issue for Germany dunng the war 
and in 1941 Peter Muehlens suggested to the colonial sector of the RFR to establish a
687 Letter o f the SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Sievers on 0304.1942. regarding his conversation with F-. May 
in Munich on 1.4.1942, in: BAB, NS 21/ 910. It was also known that there was a kind of a small fish on 
the island o f  Crete that was eating the pupas of the mosquitoes that spread malaria. See: H agen  FLEI­
SCHER, “Schwert und Olive”,.in: WILLI BENN’lNG (Hg,), Festschrift frier Klaus Betzen. Athens 1995, p. 
170.
688 Bericht fuer das I. Viertelsjahr 1943 von C. Schilling an Grauitz, 01.04.1943, in: BAB, NS 21/ 920.
689 m
690 January 1946, Berlin. Copy of the document sent to the Commending General 3rd L'S- Annv, APO 403 
Subject Procedure contra Professor Dr. Gaus Schilling, Dachau, Bavana, in: BAB, NS 21/ 920. See also: 
KLEE, Auschwitz, p. 123; Tux BASTTAN, Furchbare Aerzte. Mcdizinische Verbrechen iro Darren Reich. 
Muenchen 1995, pp. 77 f.
691 See: KaTER, Das "Ahnenerbe”, footnote 20 of chapter eight p. 419.
692 Qaus Schilling (Malariastation in Dachau) to the RFR on 12021944, in: Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAK), 
R 73/ 14290.
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research institute tor tropical diseases o f humans and animals in Bulgaria.693 Muehlens 
argued that the present circumstances were the best for an immediate application of his 
plan. In Bulgaria, particularly to the south of the country, a number of tropical diseases, 
like malaria, typhus, dysentery and other intestinal infections, were wide spread. 
Muehlens argued that the problem seemed to hold quite well since the years of the First 
World War. Meanwhile, the Rockefeller Foundation had established two very well- 
equipped institutes for the fighting of those diseases, one in Burgas, near the Turkish 
borders and a second in Petritsch on the borders with Greece. Both institutes enjoyed 
the respect o f the locals. Bulgana was Germany’s ally and it was in the Reich’s interest, 
argued Muehlens, to work together with its old friend on the military' hygiene, which re­
mained wretched. Bulgaria would not only offer research material to the institute in 
Hamburg, necessary for the training o f its doctors, who were going to staff Germany’s 
future colonial hygiene service. Moreover, it would provide an ideal held for the scien­
tists’ praxis on tropical and infectious diseases as well as on war hygiene.
Since the WAX’ I Muehlens had created an important and strong personal network 
in Bulgana that compnsed politicians, ministers, physicians, clinics, medical and hygiene 
institutes, including even King Boris, who was his personal friend. Hence, the creation of 
a tropical institute by the Germans was expected to be welcomed by the Bulgarian politi­
cal and scientific community. Muehlens did not forget his role as cultural delegate when 
he travelled to the resion in the 1920s and late 1930s. On his last visit he also went toO
Greece and one o f his cultural-political plans was to organise a week of tropical medicine 
in Athens and Sofia. The attraction o f these scientific events would be the mobile mu­
seum [Wanderffmseum) of the Hamburg institute. As for Greece, Muehlens underlined that 
this event would be the first cultural undertaking of the kind between the two countries 
since the time of the Versailles Treaty.694 It must be noted that Muehlens’ suggestion to 
create Germany a tropical institute in Bulgaria, in 1941, was no t new. On his last visit to 
the country as well as to Greece, in 1939, he discussed the idea with the respective 
authorities. In Greece he had prepared the ground the year before- He had presented the 
idea to the King o f Greece George II, who had agreed to support it. In his travel report 
Muehlens stressed the cultural-political significance o f  the institute. He argued that Ger-
693 P. Muehlens to RFR, Kolonialwissenschafdiche Abteilung zu Haenden Herm Dr. Wolff, on 14.02.1941, 
in: BAK, R 73/ 13257. The document was classified "Streng vertraulich!” .
694 Reisebericht Professor Muehlens. Griechenland (Auszug) (3-7.06.1939), in: Archiv zur Geschichte der 
Max-Planck-Gesellschaft (MPGA), Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/2. The date is not mentioned on this docu­
ment.
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many would exert sweeping influence, given the lack of interest in a similar institute by 
the British and french. However, the only “threat”, he warned, to the German prestige 
seemed to be the Americans with their Rockefeller Foundation.605 Apparently, his fears 
were to be soon con Armed.
Muehlens was not the only scientist to travel to the Balkan region. In mid-1930s, 
a group of botanists and zoologists headed to the mountainous area of south-eastern 
I'.urope to collect material for their laboratories. Hans Stubbe. a research fellow at the 
KWI for Biology and later director of the KWl for Research on Cultivated Plants made 
his first expedition with his group to the Balkan peninsula, particularly to the region of 
north Greece and Albania, in order to collect wild forms of plants cultivated in Germany. 
The K\V Institute for Breeding Research {Kaiser- {Vilhdm-Jr.stUnt f t  ter VjtechtHn îfonehnnfj in 
Muechenberg was also involved in the enterprise.606 A second expedition was organised 
again by Stubbe, in 1942. Like the first, the expedition was supported by die RPR as well 
as the scientific section of the Military I ligh Command {OberkommanAo Aer Wehrmasht 
OKIF). This time the destination was Peloponncsc and the island of Crete and die pur­
pose was also to map the population of wild animals and rare species and to collect 
specimens for genetic studies.69' Head of the mission in Crete was Stubbe, while in die 
Peloponnese it was Rudolf Freisleben of the Institute for Plants and Plant Cultivation in 
Halle. He alone received 17.000 RM from the RPR to develop, prepare and classify the 
material collected on his travels.* 6998 The German scientists met with prominent Greek
Ibid
696 File: Hoffmann Walter. KW Institut filer Zuechrungsforschung Muechenberg /  Mark "Dutchfuchrung 
ciner Expedition in d. zentrale Gebirgsmassiv d. Balkans zur Sammlung von Wildformcn unscrcr Kul* 
turpflanzen 1936-1941”, BAK, R 73/ 11757. See also: MPGA, Apt. I. Rep. 1 A, Nr. 2963/3,4.
^  1943. Stubbe’s report to the KWG Berichr about the second expedition ro Peloponnese and Crete in 
1942, in: MPGA, Apt. I. Rep. 1A, Nr. 2964/1. The collection of animals amounted to 77 mammals, about 
300 reptiles and amphibians, about 1000 smaller animals and 1000 snakes. This collection vent to the natu­
ral historical museum in Vienna, curator o f which was Otto v. We its tern, the father o f Fritz von Wemtein. 
who was director of the KW Institute for Biology in Berlin Dahlem. See: Letter of Dr. Dellbruegge, Min­
istry of Education (RfWEV) to DFG on 23.011943, in: BAK, R 73/ 15655. See also chapter 6.1.
698 Mentzel (Praesident der DFG) and Meyer (Leiter der Fachsparte “Landbauwissenschaft und allgemeine 
Biologie”) to Doz. Dr. Freisleben, on 07.05.1943; Mentzel and Meyer to Freisleben, on 01011943, both 
in: BAK, R 73/ 11095. For the purpose of his research and its results see: Freisleben’s reports to DFG on 
15.01.1943 and 21.01.1943, in: BAK, R 73/ 11095. Stubbe received for the £rst Balkan expedition from the 
RJFR 10-000 RM and for die second 16.000 RM see respectively: Mentzel and Meyer to Stubbe, KWI f. 
Biologe on 30.05.1941, in: BAK, R 73/ 15057, and Mentzel and Meyer to Stubbe on 19-03-1942, in: BAK, 
R 73/ 15058.
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politicians and scientists as well as directors of Greek agricultural institutes, representa­
tives of the chemical industry and local authorities. All of them were particularly friendly 
and co-operative with the German delegations, as Stubbe noted on his report. From the 
same report it is clear that the expedition’s aim went beyond the collection of primitive 
forms of plants and animals. The German scientists also mapped the agricultural condi­
tions of the areas they visited suggesting at the same time rural reforms for the Greek 
regions that could make Germany self-sufficient in many agricultural products.699
Apart from the biological and agricultural research in the Balkans, another im­
portant discipline for Germany’s future domination in the region was geological research. 
Scientific expeditions in the region sponsored by the Notgemeinschaft date back to 1924.700 
The aim of these and later expeditions was to collect information for geological and pa­
laeontological research in southeastern Europe, i.e. Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and 
Turkey,701 as well as for historical survey, namely the movement and exchange o f  popu­
lations and the settlements that took place in the eastern part of the Mediterranean ba­
sin.702 German scientists were particularly interested in the north and north-east regions 
of Greece, as it still was terra incognita in geomorphological, colonial and economic as­
pects.703 The region was notable for its cultivation o f “the best and most expensive to­
bacco on earth”,704 but it was also a region that was heavily infested by mosquitoes. Not 
only did this exact a heavy death toll o f  the local population, many of whom were refu­
gees from Asia Minor, Eastern Thrace, Caucasus, and southern Russia, but its impact on 
agriculture was correnspondigly severe. The geomorphology of the region was closely 
related to the malaria epidemic that had decimated not only the settlers of 1922/3, but 
also the European troops during the First World War. Perhaps this was the most impor-
699 1943. Stubbe’s teport to the KWG Bericht about the second expedition to Peloponnese and Crete in 
1942, in: MPGA, A p t I. Rep. JA , Nr. 2964/1. .
700 Hie: Panzer Wolfgang Prof Dr. U. Heidelberg. Geographisches Institut Studienreise nach Kreta 1924- 
1942, in; BAK, R 73/13529.
701 File: Leuchs K urt Prof. Dr. U. Wien. Geologisches Institut [Geologische Untersuchungen in Suedos- 
teuropa und Vorderasien 1941], BAK, R 73/12697.
702 File: Panzer Wolfgang Prof Dr. U. Heidelberg. Geographisches Institut Studienreise nach Kreta 1924- 
1942, BAK, R 73/13529.
703 Pnvatdozent Dr. Joachim Heinrich Schnitze, Jena University to the Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen 
Wissenschaft, Berlin, on 01.06.1933, in: BAK, R  73 / 16860.
7M Privatdozent Dr. Joachim Heinrich Schultze, Jena University to the Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen 
Wissenschaft, Berlin, on 02.09.1933, p. 3, in: BAK, R 73/ 16860.
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r
tant motive for the Germans in undertaking scientific expeditions in the area, for cul­
tural-political, not to mention die military reasons.
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2 0 3
5. Cultural propaganda in Greece during the National Socialism.
5. 1. Exploring Greece's economic relations with Germany and the invohtment of sdtnce and technoforv.
The vivid economic concern Germany had for Greece, as it has been described 
in chapter three, continued undiminished during die Nazi era. Despite the two recessions 
of 1923 and 1929, Greek industry showed signs of significant recovery after 1933. The 
increase of electricity supply in this period recorded high rates o f growth in the secon­
dary sector. However, industrial growth was not accompanied by signs of modernisation, 
such as technological improvement and structural change, and the main reason for this 
was the fact that Greek industry was still dominated by small, self-financed family enter­
prises.705 The industrial growth during the 1920s found few supporters among the Greek 
politicians, who viewed it with distrust Both the royalists of the Popular Party {Aaixov 
Kopfid) led by Panagis Tsaldaris as well as the Liberals (QtkeAsuOepoi) of Eleutherios 
Venizelos appears to be driven by anti-industrial feelings, each for their own political 
purposes, which reflected the problem of national division caused by the Asia Minor 
campaign.706 Greece remained an agricultural state with raisins and tobacco dominating 
the country’s exports, which were primarily headed to Germany and Britain.
Over the next two years after the Nazis came into power, Germany became 
Greece’s best trading partner leaving behind Britain, the other major importer of Greek 
products, particularly o f raisins. On the other hand, Germany enjoyed the lion’s share of 
all of Greece’s imports. The following table shows, according to Morgens Pelt, the distri­
bution of the Greek exports and imports among the three Great Powers: Germany, Brit­
ain and the United States from 1927 to 1940:707
705 MARK Mazower, H  EAAriSa wn rj Otxovo (it xrj Kgior; too MeocwtoXi^oo. A8rvoc 2002 (tram.), pp. I l l ,  
113, 130 [tide of the original: Greece and the Inter-War Economic Crisis. Oxford 1991]; OLGA 
CHRISTODOULAKI, “Industrial growth in Greece between the wan. A new perspective ” in: European Rniew 
of Economic History, 5,2001, pp. 61-89, here p. 78.
™ MAZOWER EXXaSa xai r\ Oi3tovo[itxri Kgtari, pp. 128-138.
707 MoGENS PELT, Tobacco, Anns and Politics- Greece and Germany from World Crisis to World War 




percentage index percentage index percentage index
X M X M X M X M X M X M
1927 21.4 7.5 91 72 11.4 13.5 90 103 21.8 16.0 149 102
1928 25.8 8.7 109 84 13.8 14.5 110 111 19.9 15.6 136 102
1929 23.2 9.4 99 90 11.7 12.7 93 97 16.1 15.7 110 100
1930 23.6 10.4 100 100 12.6 13.1 100 100 14.6 15.7 100 100
1931 14.0 122 60 117 15.5 13.2 119 101 10.2 13.8 70 88
1932 14.5 9.7 61 93 23.7 13.7 188 105 10.2 13.8 70 88
1933 17.7 10.3 76 99 18.9 14.4 150 110 123 5.8 86 37
1934 22.5 14.7 95 141 17.4 16.7 138 127 14.7 6.3 101 40
1935 29.8 18.7 126 179 12.6 15.5 100 118 16.9 63 115 40
1936 36.4 22.4 154 215 12.2 16.1 97 123 143 7.1 98 45
1937 31.0 212 131 262 9.7 11.0 77 84 163 4.3 113 27
1938 38.5 28.8 163 276 8.3 13.0 66 99 17.7 7.3 117 46
1939 27.6 30.0 116 288 13.9 12.0 110 91 21.6 7.0 148 45
1940 37.8 23.5 160 226 7.4 11.1 59 85 25.0 11.4 171 73
1940 27.1 13.9 115 133
Distribution o f Greek exports (X) and imports (M) according to Pelt (1998). {Emphasis added)
As mentioned above, tobacco and raisins were Greece’s main export products, 
with tobacco alone amounting to nearly half of the total revenue, as noted by the Ger­
man Vice-Consul in Kavala. in 1939.708 Kavala was the one o f the two major trading 
ports o f tobacco in northern Greece. In 1934, Greece received a visit from a high- 
ranking official o f the new German regime. The Reich’s Marshal and Ministerpresident, 
Herman Goering709 visited Greece within the framework o f his Balkan visits to the 
capitals o f south-eastern Europe, namely Belgrade, Athens and Bucharest. The German 
official was accompanied by the director of the German Railways, Julius Dorpmueller 
and the Secretary of State for Aviation, Erhard Milch, among others.710 Although Goer­
ing was not officially invited by the Greek authorities —in fact neither the Greek Minister
708 Ibid, p. 52.
709 Hitler appointed Goering as Minister Plenipotentiary for foe Four-Year Plan, which was launched in 
1936. In 1942, he became foe new president o f foe Reich’s Research Council (Racksforscbrngsrat, RFR), 
established in 1937.
710 In 1943-44 Milch became presidential m em ber (Praesidiaimtgdeder) o f foe RFR.
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of Foreign Affairs nor the German Embassy in Athens seemed to have been officially 
informed-711, his visit was perceived by the foreign observers “as an indication o f possible 
future developments of Germany [towards Greece]”.712 Two years later, in 1936, 
Germany was officially represented in the 11th International Fair in Saloniki for the first 
time, which was an important forum for campaigning for the scientific and technological 
advancement of the participating countries and for promoting their culture. It was obvi­
ous that Nazi Germany was trying to strengthen not only its economic position in the 
region including its participation in the Greek production of ammunition but also its 
cultural presence, inaugurating a new period of foreign cultural policy, which had been 
largely ignored in the early years o f the Nazi regime.
When the Greek Minister o f Defence Ioannis Metaxas came to power establish­
ing dictatorship on 4 August 1936 with the support of the King George II, Greek indus­
try did not receive greater attention than it had under the previous government.713 The 
only exception was the armaments industry. Metaxas laid particular stress on the coun­
try’s rearmament, which was one o f the most important goals of his political programme 
inspired by his authoritarian values. He was an enthusiastic supporter o f Mussolini’s fas­
cist party as well as Hitler’s National Socialism. In copying Hitler, Metaxas believed that 
the “restoration o f the state” resulted from his assumption of power, which he described 
as “the third Greek culture”.714 Despite his commitment to the principle of neutrality as 
ratified in treaties and agreements signed after the Balkan wars and the outcome of the 
Greco-Turkish war in Anatolia,715 the rearmament of Greece would not only boost the
711 PELT, Tobacco, Arms and Politics, p. 110.
713 British ambassador Watedow to Foreign Office 06.06.1934, cited in: PELT, p. 111.
71J Metaxas ruled Greece until 1941. He died unexpectedly o f a tu m o u r o f  d ie duodenum. See: H a g en  
FLEISCHER, xai Spdumxa. H  EAXaSa tr[C K oetoxtjs »»  WJ5 AvdaramK 1941-1944. T opoc A’.
Athens 1989, p. 67. (Enlarged Greek edition .of die original work: Im Kreuaschatten der Maechte. 
Griechenland 1941-1944. (Okkupation — Kollabo ration - Resistance) Frankfurt a.o, 1986].
714 See: G u n n a r  H e r in g , “Aspekte der FCulturpoIitik des Metaxas-Regjmes (1936-1940)”, in: REINHARD 
L au er ,  P e t e r  Sc h r e in e r  (Hgs.) *Die Kultur Griechenlands in Mittelalter und Neuzeit’. Bericht uebcr das 
^Colloquium der Suedosteuropa-Kommission, 28. — 31. O kt 1992. Abhandlungen der Akademie der 
Wissenschaften in Goettingen. PhiL-Hist Klasse, 3 Folge, Nr. 212, Goettingen 1996, pp. 285-321, here p. 
290 (footnote 20). Also: Magdeburg. Zezlung, 21.07.1939 “Die Dritte hellenische Kultur.” (newspaper 
clipping), in: BAB, R 4902/ 2090.
715 The Asia Minor campaign ended with the Treaty o f Lausanne signed in 1923 between Greece and 
Turkey providing inter a&a, the exchange of populations, which had an enormous impact to Greece’s 
social, economic and political development In 1930, die Prime Minister o f Greece, Eleutherios Venizelos,
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“pro-labour” image that he was trying to establish, but would also contribute to the 
country’s security, as it was widely believed, that it was vulnerable to a potential attack 
from Bulgaria or Turkey.716 Germany seemed to respect and acknowledge Greece’s 
commitment to neutrality, for its own interests of course, and criticised Britain’s efforts 
to weaken it, principally for the purposes of strengthening its naval dominance on the 
Mediterranean. For that and a number o f  other reasons regarding the country’s moderni­
sation and agricultural development, it was in Germany’s interest to invest in the country 
as quickly as possible.717 There were some suspicions among Greeks, which were indeed 
justified, that the government negotiated the tobacco exports with Nazi Germany 
through a commitment to increase its imports from the Reich, particularly industrial 
products and armament.718 The relevant law was eventually passed by the Greek govern­
ment on 19 April 1935 giving the green tight to Germany to become the major con­
tributor to Greece’s rearmament project.719 It was no coincidence therefore, that in the 
same year, Germany had already won a tender announced by the Greek government to 
several countries (Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy, Germany, Czechoslova­
kia, Poland, and the Netherlands) for the purchase o f forty-five war planes.720 In 1938, G- 
M. Schlagdenhaufen, a representative o f  the IG-Farben in the “SA. de Poudrieries et 
Cartoucheries Helléniques” in Athens, which was under the control o f the German
who was associated with die Asia Minor campaign, signed the Greek-Tiukish friendship Pact with his 
counterpart Isrnet Inonou in Ankara that ratified among other filings increased economic relations 
between the two countries. In the same Pact the thorny issue o f  property exchange between the Christian 
and Muslim refugees was also setfied. With this Pact and with the 1933 ‘Entente Cordiale' agreement 
Greece and Turkey affirmed that they did no t have any territorial aspirations. A year later, Greece, Turkey, 
Yugoslavia and Romania signed the Balkan Pact in Athens to protect their interests that they felt were 
threatened by the Soviet Union and Nazi policy, and also by Bulgaria. Finally, during the Metaxas regime, 
an additional agreement between Greece and Turkey was signed in Athens on 27 April 1938, according to 
which Greece would come to .the assistance o f  Turkey in case o f  conflict with any other Balkan state and 
vice vena. The two states were bound by a commitment to neutrality in case o f any international conflict
716 The Abyssinian Crisis in October 1935 added to the belief that Greece was unprepared for a modem 
warfare. See; PELT, Tobacco, Arms and Politics, pp. 65 £
717 Berà'ner Boersensntung, 28.12.1938 “Griechenlands Lage. Fester Wille zur Neutralitaet”, vom 
Schriftieituûgsmitglied Dr. Hermann Ullmann. Athen. (Newspaper extract), in: BAB, R 4902/ 2090-
718 PELT, Tobacco, Arms and Politics, p. 112.
™ Ibid.
720 (1935?) “Ankauf deutscher Flugzeuge dutch die griechische Regierung”, in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesand- 
tschaft Athen Nr. 22 [1. Ankauf deutscher Fluggeuge durch die giechiscbe Regierung 2. Entsendung deutscbe Offisjert 
nach Griecbmland (Major Babicht, Korvettenkapitaen M ints) 1935-1938\.
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chemical giant industry, reported that production in all types of munitions had been con­
siderably increased, satisfying the Greek War Ministry and the General Staff.721 Further­
more, Schlagdenhaufen noted that by the end of die same year, Greece had also become 
even more self-sufficient in war material and for that purpose, would also contribute the 
School of Engineers, which had opened in the previous year. The School was staffed 
with expert professors in the field and it operated in line with standards other schools set 
by abroad created for the interests of similar industries. According to the German repre­
sentative, the technical experts on the particular industrial sector of munitions, who were 
expected to graduate from the school, were “a great hope”, for the development of the 
country’s war industry.722
In the sector o f technology, Germany started to increase its influence on Greece 
during the 1930s. The German chemical industry IG-Farben, which was a member of the 
“ Vierkartet’ agreement since 1929 between the French dye industry, Centrale des 
Matières Colorantes (CMC), the Swiss IG-Farben and the Imperial Chemical Industries 
(since 1932), controlled 75 per cent of the dyestuff imported into Greece in 1938, while 
the Swiss IG-Farben controlled 11 per cent In addition, the IG Farben dominated the 
production o f artificial silk in Greece, which was traded by ETMA.723 Although Greece 
was relatively rich in certain raw materials, such as arsenic, bauxite, lead, chromium, iron, 
magnesium, nickel, silicon dioxide, emery, and tin, which were necessary for the devel­
opment of its chemical industry, it lacked raw phosphorus, coal and oil.724
721 “Anlage zu Bericht No. 57 vom 27.6.1938 von G.MSchJ agdenhaufcn, Athen an I.G., Buero des 
kaufinaennischen Ausschusses, Beriin NW 7.” [Translated], in: BAB, R 8128/ A 3849.
722 Ibid. It is not mentioned if the professors were Greek or German and it is not clear if the School for 
Engineers was under the country's Technical University, the Ministry o f War, or some other institution.
723 PELT, Tobacco, Aims and Politics, pp. 541
724 Report about "Die Chemiewiitschaft Griechenlands und wichtige Unternehmen der chemischen 
Industrie.” Nov. 1940, in: BAB, R8128/ A 421.
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T able 10.
Metal economy in south-eastern Europe, 1938. (The case of Greece)
Production in meter tons (Position of Greece with regard to other Balkan 
states)
Bauxite (crude metal) 179.900 Second after Yugoslavia with 404.600 mts.
Magnesium (crude metal) 168.200 First position






Chromium (crude metal) 42.500 Second after Turkey with 208.400 mts.
Manganese (crude metal) 7.000
Molybdenum (crude metal) 1560
Iron (crude metal) 348.600 Second after Yugoslavia with 607.100 mts.
Bismuth (crude metal) -
Ferric disulphide (crude metal) 244.000 First position
Source: Bundcsarvkiv Kühlen*, R 57 /  1392 /  1-13, (Band I.) 1942, Wirtschaftsdienst725
The Greek chemical industry, which was largely represented by the firm “Chemical 
Products and Fertilisers”, also known as “Oxea” or “Lipasmata”, became increasingly 
dependant on imports of both basic and heavy chemicals, particularly sulphuric acid, 
from Germany.725 26
Imports from Germany to Greece were not confined to chemicals. The former was 
traditionally Greece’s main provider o f  technological equipment and construction mate­
rials. It should not be forgotten that when the young prince, Otto von Wittelsbach of 
Bavaria, was crowned king o f the newly established Greek state in 1832, a large number 
of technical experts, engineers, architects, and other scientists came with him to Greece 
in order to assist in the reconstruction o f the country. The leading Technical University
725 It should be noted that die data was prepared between 1941 and 1942
726 R eport on “Die Chemiewirts chaft G nechenlands und wichtige Untemehmen der chemischen 
Industrie.” Nov. 1940, in: BAB, R  8128/ A  421; PELT, Tobacco, Anns and Politics, pp. 54 f. “Lipasmata” 
was founded in 1909 by Nikolaos Kanellopoulos and Leonteios Oikonomidis and focused on agricultural 
chemistry. During the period in question, the owners o f the company were Epaminontas Charilaos and 
Aggelos Kanellopoulos. The latter was the b ro ther o f the founder.
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of Greece, and indeed the only one in the whole country until the middle of the 1920s, 
was established by Bavarians and initially staffed with German scientists.27 The impact of 
German technology on Greece was enormous and following the end Germany’s interna­
tional isolation, the ties between the two countries were in the area of science and tech­
nology revived. Germany was regarded by Greeb as die country of scientific and tech­
nological advancement par excellence and the majority of Greeb who wished to study or to 
receive further training visited the German or Swiss Technical Universities. It did not 
come as a surprise, therefore, that many German enterprises were often given the task of 
carrying out technical works in Greece and exported the technological equipment for 
these activities. In 1934, for example, Germany took on the reconstruction of the Greek 
railways, despite pressure from the Austrian firm “Wiener LokomoEitn Fabrik" on the 
Greek government, during negotiations that lasted for some years.724 The German com­
pany that made the best offer, according to the Greek government, was the “Deutsche 
Wagenbau-Vereinigun£ o f Berlin, which was the main firm involved in the construction of 
the German railways. The work on the electrical infrastructure was planned to be under­
taken by “ Siemens-Schuckert-Werkd' or “Allgemeine Eiektriqtaets-Gesettscbafi, AEG”.72 829 It is 
interesting to note that in the relevant memorandum of the Greek government it is un­
derlined, among other things, that the materials of the German trains were internationally 
famous for their quality and thus they could guarantee excellent standards in construc­
tion. From a financial perspective, the German offer was the best not only because it was 
the lowest, but also because it was agreed that the payment would be made in Greek cur­
rency, rather than in a foreign one.730
727 On the history o f the Technical University in Athens until 1917 see: iC MniPHZ, Iorogia too EOvtxoo 
Msiooßiou rioXote^vetoo, AOrjva 1957. [The history of die Metsovio National Technical University ]
728 When the Greek government rejected the .trains offered by die Austrian firm as unsuitable, the 
Austrians threatened to boycott the im port o f Greek tobacco, unless the Greeks purchased the trains. 
Eventually, the Greek government bought two Aus nan trains. See: Confidential Memorandum 
“Prometheus” , [a German] Financial and Technical Corporation in Athens to Ambassador of Germany on 
18.10.1934. The docum ent classified “private and confidential”, in: P AAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen 
Nr. 54 (Deutsch-griechische Handelsbeziehungen: Lieferungen von Triebwagen, Eisenbahn- und Strassenbabnmaterial fuer 
den griechischen Staat, 1933-1938).
729 Memorandum (in Greek), 1934, in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen Nr. 54 (Deutsch-griechische 




Nonetheless, agriculture remained the main sector o f  the Greek economy of 
interest of the Reich, not only for its tobacco production. The Four-Year Plan prioritised 
Germany’s self-sufficiency in food, arms and currency, leaving little space for large 
imports of semi-luxury products, such as tobacco or raisins. Even before the entry o f the 
German troops onto the Greek soil, Germany was interested in the development o f the 
Greek agriculture, particularly in fruit, wheat, com and other basic products for export to 
the Reich.731 On the other hand, Germany exported not only raw material for the 
production o f fertilisers but also the know-how and technical expertise, on which Greece 
had already become dependent since the mid-1930s. This expansion “without 
currency”732 not only to Greece but also to the rest o f the Balkans was one o f Germany’s 
most effective weapons later on. A year after the Nazis had invaded Greece they 
launched a plan for the “mobilisation o f die Greek rural population”.733 In 1942, the 
country was occupied by Italians and Bulgarians, besides Germans. The Bulgarians had 
annexed the northern provinces, Macedonia and Thrace, which were among the most 
fertile parts o f the country. That loss o f fields as well as the reduction in the number of 
Greek farmers, due to their recruitment by the Greek army or their participation in the 
resistance, complicated the Nazis’ plan for food autarky for its army in the region. In 
addition, the deterioration o f food stocks among the local population during the harsh 
winter o f 1941-1942, which left tens o f  thousands o f dead, particularly in the urban areas, 
forced die Germans to impose drastic measures for the cultivation and exploitation of 
the Greek soil.734 As a result o f these measures, the Nazis started to move parts of 
Athens’ population to the provinces in order to cultivate the land. This was the beginning 
of what they called “agricultural mobilisation” which was planned on a large scale.735 *In 
addition, through the collaboration o f the government of George Tsolakogjou, a new law 
was passed, which enacted the plan for the complete cultivation o f agricultural land. In
731 N .F. AussenhanddL Griechenland -  Richtlinien zur Foeidening der Landwirtschaft, 21.05.1940, in: 
BA B,R 4902/2096.
732 G ted  in: PELT, Tobacco, Arms and Politics, p. 158.
733 “M obümachnung des griechischen Bauern. Streng Vorschriften fuer die Nutzung des Bodens. Deutsch- 
italienische Hilfe Eigener Auslandsdienst der Muenchner Neuesten Nachrichten”, im Muenchner Neueste 
Nachrichten, 7.07.1942, (Zeitungsabschnitt), im BAB, R  4902/ 2096.
734 See: FLEISCHER, Eteii^a xaa SSaermcac, chapter TIeiva %ai n^oitotvivSa’ pp. 193-216.
735 “M obümachnung des griechischen Bauern. Streng Vorschriften fuer die Nutzung des Bodens. Deutsch­
italienische Hilfe Eigener Auslandsdienst der Muenchner Neuesten Nachrichten”, im Muenchner Neueste
Nachrichten, 7.07.1942, (Zeitungsabschnitt), im BAB, R 4902/ 2096.
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the future, die owners of the non-cultivated fields were permitted to give them in 
tenancy to the farmers of neighbouring villages.736 The plan particularly encouraged rice 
and soya-bean farming, and were made further plans for the re-organisation of Greek 
fishery with the help o f foreign experts, mostly Germans.737 In order to ‘"rescue Greece”, 
as it was described by the Germans, it seemed necessary to provide economic aid from 
the Aids forces, namely Germany and Italy, and to boost the county’s exports to those 
countries.738 Italy’s role, however, in the Greek economy eventually turned out to be very 
limited.
To that purpose also contributed the “Suedosteuropa Gestllschaff (SOEG), which 
inaugurated a department dedicated to Greece in Vienna, in 1940. The purpose of this 
department was to encourage the economic and commercial relations between the Reich 
and Greece, and in 1942, Karl von Hervay was sent to the country to represent the 
organisation and to report back to it. However, regardless of whether they had the 
character o f expansion “without currency” or not, economic relations would not be 
successful without the "gtistigc Waffer?\ already known since the German isolation after 
the First World War. Therefore, on the initiative of the SOEG, a number o f cultural 
activities took place between the two countries after 1939. These activities were 
organised by the Vienna branch o f the German-Greek Society, which had been 
established a year earlier, in April 1938, just one month after the ‘re-unification’ of 
Austria and Germany739 The president o f  the branch was die E. Pistor, and its vice 
presidents were the big industrialist Baron Dr. A. Bachofen von Echt and the general 
director o f the Austria tobacco consortium, H. Rueff. Subsequent vice presidents were 
the university professor, C. Praschniker, and the bank manager, Leonhard Wolzt. Two 
Greek diplomats, K. Dumba and A A . Saktouris, were named honorary presidents, whilst 
Th. Petrocochino, prince E. Ypsilanti and two university professors, A. Wilhelm and E.
7«  Ibid
”37 Ibid Before the war, Greece im ported die majority o f its salted and smoked fish ftom Turkey. See also: 
Report o f Dr. von Rischka, the director of the Food and Agriculture Departm ent o f the Suedosteuropa 
Gesellschaft (SOEG), entitkd “Geschaeftsbericht zur zweiten Tagung des Beirats der Gruppe ‘Emaehrung 
und Landwirtschaft* der Sue dos teuropa- Ge Seilschaft’* from 30 November to 1 December 1942 to the 
Central Office o f the SOEG in: BAB R 63/ 262.
738 “Mobilmachnung des griechischen Bauern. Streng Vorschriften fuer die Nutzung des Bodens. Deutsch­
italienische Hilfe Eigener Auslandsdienst der M uenchner Neuesten Nachrichten”, in: Muendmer Neueste 
Nachrichten, 7.07.1942, (Zeitungsabschnitt), in: BAB, R 4902/ 2096.
739 See: “Gesetz ueber die Wiedervereinigung Oesterreichs mit dem Deutschen Reich vom 13.3.1938”, irr 
I n g o  von M ltench (Hg.), Gesetze des NS-Staates. Paderborn 1994, pp. 50f.
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Ziebarth were named honorary members. The latter also was the president o f the 
German-Greek Society in Hamburg. The Vienna branch was the last one o f a number of 
similar branches established in Dresden, Goettigen, Hamburg, Leipzig and Munich, while 
the central organisation was located in Berlin. In Greece, two Greek-German Society 
branches had already been existed in Athens and Saloniki. The creation of the "Great 
Germany* (Grossdeutschïand) was a product, according to the Nazi's, o f “the Fuehrer's 
intelligence” and of a well organised interaction between science, technology, production, 
consumption, and people’s welfare.740 Within this framework, the aim o f  the German- 
Greek Society in Vienna was to promote the “intellectual and material exchange and 
friendship”, in other words, the cultural and economic relations between “Great 
Germany and Ostmark, on the one hand, and Greece and Hellenism, on the other".741
It is important to note that Greek students in Germany played a significant role 
in all o f the society’s activities. Therefore, the meeting o f  the Vienna branch on 19 
September 1940 was in fact a meeting between the Greek students and professors and 
their German colleagues. In the presence o f the rector o f the university Prof. Knoll, they 
discussed, the society's twelve-month plan, emphasising the welfare of Greek students 
and scientists’ and the understanding o f  the Greek people and its cultural value.742 The 
most important activities organised in Vienna were the study o f the increasing movement 
of the population in the countries o f the southeastern Europe and the “south-east week 
in Vienna” {Suedostwoche Wiens). In addition to these activities, the creation o f a “working 
group” (Arbeitsgemeinsckcft), was planned between 1941 and 1942, which in the case of 
Greece, would not only be dedicated to cultural -usually glamorous- activities but also to 
specific practical works of particular disciplines.743 The working group would include the 
Union of Gymnasium’s Friends as well as a number of German and Greek specialists, 
who were expected to provide their services regularly in the interest of promoting links 
between the two nations.744 The scientific collaboration between Greece and Austria in 
the framework o f the Geiman-Greek Society in Vienna was supported by “Eranos
740 Undated docum ent entided “Deutsch-Griechische Gesellschaft, Zweig W ien”, in: BAB, R 63 / 37.
741 Ibid.
7«  "B rächt ueber die Tagung der Deutsch-Griechischen Gesellschaft am 19.Sep. 1940”, in  BAB, R 63/ 
37.
741 1941 Decem ber, Deutsch-Griechische Gesellschaft, branch o f Vienna. “Veranstaltungs- und 
Arbeitsprogramm 1941/42 und Gruendung einer Arbeitsgemeinschaft” , in: BAB, R 63/ 37.
744 Ibid.
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Vindobonensif’.74S The society was in dose contact with other institutions in Vienna, such 
as the Office for Agricultural Policy o f the regional NSDAP administration {Amt fuer 
AgrarpoMtk der Gauleitung der NSD AP, Wien) under the management o f Dr. von Rischka. 
This office was responsible for all of the agricultural-political activities in the southeast 
and it was recognised as a Reich’s office.746 Rischka later became responsible for the 
department o f Nutrition and Agriculture o f the Suedosteurvpa Gesellschaft.
Among the cultural activities that were undertaken by the Gemnan-Greek Sodety 
in Vienna, were the monthly lectures, which largely focused on ancient Greek culture and 
these continued until the end o f the war. For instance, in the spring o f 1944 Professor 
Hedwig von Kenner gave a lecture called “Die Betrachtung der antiken Kunst von 
Winckelmann bis heuti’, and Professor G. Stratigos, the director o f  the national gallery of 
Athens, gave a lecture on the modem Greek painting.747 *In the same year, Dr. A. 
Formosis from Saloniki was invited to Vienna to speak about the irrigation system in 
Macedonia, whilst a prominent professor at Munich University, D.F. Doelger, presented 
the findings o f the German excursion to the holy peninsula o f Athos in Chalkidiki in 
northern Greece, in 1941.743 The aim of the excursion was to draw up a list of all o f the 
Byzantine treasures and moreover, to study the largely unknown and precious 
manuscripts that would give great prestige to the German sdence, particularly for 
undertaking such an activity at that time. Dodger’s lecture was given in the framework of 
die so-called “University Week” (Hocbscbuhvocbe) in the two largest Greek cities, Athens 
and Saloniki, which had die same objective as the “Vienna week o f  the south-east”
('Suedostwoche Wiens). It should be noted, however, that the “University Weeks” were 
largely addressed to the Webmacbt soldiers and their officers, rather than the Greek 
public.749
The practical interests that were supported by the many cultural activities in 
Vienna and in Greece, could be epitomised to agriculture and the exploitation o f the 
bauxite mines in the country. Greece was a significant producer o f bauxite from which 
one could obtain aluminium, an important material for constructions and essential for
745 1942-1943, Deutsch-Gnechische Gesellschaft, Branch in Vienna. [Rneckblick], in: BAB, R 63/ 37.
746 Dr. Rischka to Suedosteuropa-Geseflschaft H eim  Min. Rat Dr. Augenthaler 28.03.1944, in: BAB, R 63/ 
253.
747 “Mitteilungen fuer die MitgUedei”, April and May 1944, in: BAB, R 63 / 37.
“Mitteihingen fuer die Mitgliedei”, beginning o f July 1944, in: BAB, R  63/ 37.
749 See: 27.03.1944 -  21.04.1944, “Bencht ueber S tad tier’s Griechenlandsieise in dieser Zeit”, sheets Nr. 
133-135, in: BAB, R 63/ 253.
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the war economy. In 1940» the German armaments industry need of aluminium 
amounted to 250,000 tons. Given that for the production o f  one ton aluminium was 
needed four tons o f bauxite, Germany turned to Yugoslavia, Hungary and Greece to 
exploit their bauxite recourses.'50 Despite the existence of several bauxite mines, Greece 
lacked serious infrastructure necessary to  increase the production of aluminium. In 1942, 
Professor Ludin, who also lectured on Greek affairs, referring to the need and 
importance o f waterfalls to supply power to Greece, reported that the country lacked 
financial means, rather than scientists or engineers. He underlined that the Greek 
specialists, m ost o f whom had been educated in Germany, already knew about the 
problem and its impact on the country’s industrial development.750 51 The first attempts to 
deal with this problem were made in the late 1920s by the British and Americans. In 
1938, American capital regained a strong presence in Greek economy. The Greek 
government signed an agreement with the American Cooper Engineering Co. and the 
Chemical Construction Corporation in the same year for the production o f hydroelectric 
power. The creation of an electro-metallurgical and electrochemical industry was also 
planned for the elaboration of aluminium from the Greek bauxite.752 By 1942, it was only 
the city o f Patras and its port that were still provided with power from the hydroelectric 
works in the region, therefore, it was clear that there were enormous perspectives for the 
Germans to modernise the country for their own interests, using waterfalls as a source of 
energy. According to the Suedosteuropa Gesellschaft official in Athens, von Hervay, by 
November 1942, some o f the most important mines in Greece were some way or 
another linked to German interests, either because they had been purchased by the 
Germans or because their production had been transported to the Reich. These mines 
included the following:
1. “Société de Parnasse” in the district o f Caniani, which belonged to Mr. Iliopoulos 
and traded the ore through the local small port o f Itea;
2. “Eleusis”, which was ihe property o f  the engineer D. Scalistiris in the district of 
Mandra Attikis, which also used the local port o f Eleusis for trading;
3. “Société des mines Bauxites Delphi” in Amphissa;
750 Wolfgang  SCHUMANN (ed.), G riff nach Sueosteuropa. Neue Dokumente ueber die Politik des 
deutschen Imperialismus und Militarismus gegen ueber Suedosteuropa im  Zweiten Weltkrieg. Berlin 1973, 
p. 10 and table 2, pp. 12 f.
751 Kari von Hervay to  the Suedosteuropa G esellschaft; on 17.02.1942, in: BAB, R 63/ 106.
752 Ibid
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4. “Crikelos” on the island o f Amorgos, which belonged to the engineer, S. 
Papasotiriou.
The Hansa Làchtmetall A .G . in Berlin was the main owner of the above mines.753 Wener 
Miehle was appointed the German chargé d* affaires for the mines in Pamassos and Delphi, 
however, he never took charge o f  his office as he was killed in a plane crash, while 
Freyberg was named the director for the mines in Mandra and Amorgos.754
Table 11.
Production o f bauxite in Greek mines from the outbreak of the WWII until 1941.
Name of the company Location Mine Year production
in tons in proportion






SA. des Mines des Bauxites 
Delphi
Delphi Amphissa 35.379 20%





S.D.Scalistiris Athens Mandra 21.937 12%
Total 179.868 100%
Source: Bundesarchiv Berlin, R 63/ 84: July — Oct. 1942, “Bauxit in Griec îenland”, Herr Dr. Kratz,
Bedin.
Apart from the mineral wealth o f the country, Germany’s major interest in 
Greece continued to be its agricultural production. By the end of 1942, the majority of 
the shares o f the largest Greek fertilizer-company, "Lipasmata” o f the Kanellopoulos 
family, became German property. In 1942, Greece had a number of institutions dedi­
cated to all aspects o f agriculture. There were agricultural state schools in Saloniki, Ath­
ens, Larissa and Patras, which each specialised in the products o f the region. These cities 
were the ‘capitals*, so to speak, o f the most productive provinces in Greece. For example, 
Saloniki was the trading centre of tobacco from northern Greece to Germany, Larissa 
was the productive centre of fruit and vegetables in the province o f Thessalien in central
753 Report of Dr. Kratz **Bauxit in Griechenland July — O ct 1942, H err, Bedin, in: BAB, R 63/ 84.
754 Report of Kari von Hervay from Athens to Suedosteuropa-Gesdlschaft, Vienna 09.11.1942 (arrived on 
27.11.1942), in: BAB, R 63 / 106.
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Greece and Patras specialised in fruit and vineyards. This port, however, was most im­
portant tor the trade o f raisins, which were produced in the province. In Athens, several 
institutes specializing in the area of agriculture, including soil research, plant diseases, the 
control of the imported seeds, meteorological and statistical research, animal breeding 
and animal diseases were located at Athens University, at Agricultural School and the 
Ministry of Agriculture. Two further institutes, the Benakeio Phytopathology Institute, 
which was semi-private, and the Institute for Chemistry and Agriculture attached to the 
“Chimika Iipasmata” of Kanellopoulos worked towards similar aims. Several other 
smaller institutes were spread across the country in Drama in Macedonia, Volos in die 
central-east, Herakleion in Crete, and Pirgos in Peloponnese.755 756It is interesting to note 
that almost all o f the Greeks who worked in the above institutions had been educated in 
Germany.™ Needless to say that these organisations already existed before the German 
occupation show that Greece was an agricultural country, which, together with other 
Balkan countries, was regarded by the Nazis as the main provider of food for the Ger­
man population and army. The most fertile regions of Greece were located in eastern 
Macedonia and Thrace, which were under Bulgarian occupation immediately after the 
Nazis invaded the country. Even though they could produce more than their population 
needed and could feed the whole country, the reduction o f the local population due to 
war meant that large parts o f these regions to remain uncultivated. The fact that these 
northern provinces remained under Bulgarian control troubled Germany greatly, as it 
threatened its own interests, particularly in tobacco. For example, the profits from the 
export o f tobacco were reduced by 67% after the annexation o f eastern Macedonia and 
Thrace.757 Moreover, if the Greece continued to be deprived o f the above territories, 
which led to its dependence on foreign food aid, the country’s future was deemed to be 
quite bleak.758
The economy of Greece was largely depended on agriculture. It was not surpris­
ing, therefore, that Sotirios Gotsamanis, the Minister of Finance in the ‘first collabora­
tive’ government o f Georgios Tsolakoglou, was also appointed Minister o f Food and Ag-
755 See: Hervav’s report to the SOEG on 17.03.1942, in: BAB, R  63/ 106.
756 Ibid.
757 Report o f Karl von Hervay from Athens to Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft on 19.03.1944, in: BAB, R 63/ 
106.
758 Hervay’s report to  the SOEG on 17.03.1942, in: BAB, R 6 3 / 106.
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riculture in the ‘second collaborative* government of Konstantinos Logothetopoulos.759 
In 1942, the economy of Greece was in a very bad condition with the black market set­
ting the prices o f the goods at will and with inflation rising at an enourmous rate. In o r­
der to deal with the catastrophic rate o f inflation, the Special Commissioner for eco­
nomic and financial questions in south-eastern Europe (.Sonderbeauftragterfutr Wirtscbafts- 
fragen in Suedosteuropa) and former Major of Vienna, Hermann Neubacher, was moved to 
Athens.760 In agreement with the Italian Special Commissioner,761 he issued a law re­
stricting the credit limit that the banks were allowed to give to wholesale and retail deal­
ers.762 In addition, on 28 November 1942 the "DEGRIGES” {Deutsch-griechische Wannaus- 
tausch GmUscbcft) was established by a decree of the Reich's Ministry of Finance and a 
statute o f the Greek Ministry of Economy and Finance. Its purpose was to control and 
normalise exports and consequently, the influx of currency from Germany to Greece.763 
The organisation was based in Berlin and had branches in Athens, Saloniki, Patras and 
Volos. The president of the organisation in Berlin was Otto Braun, while the director o f 
the “DEGRIGES” in Athens was the vice president of the German Chamber of Com­
merce in Athens, Fred Goecker, and in Saloniki director was appointed the Berlin lawyer, 
Kurt Zoepke.764
Nevertheless, Neubacher’s measures did not lead to any improvement in the 
economic situation in Greece.765 In January 1944, Greece was in the worst position
759 During the German occupation o f Greece three collaborative governments were formed by the N azi 
regime: from 8 May 1941 until November 1942, Prime Minister was Georgios TsolakogLou. K onstantinos 
Logothetopoulos served in the same post until 6 April 1943 and Ioannis RaHis until the end o f the war. 
The Greek government with its president Emmanuel Tsouderos went into exile on 21 April 1941, first, to 
die island o f Crete and soon after to Alexandria in Egypt and finally, to London.
760 FLEISCHER, D rip p a  xoa Z jiacm xa, pp. 327 f£
761 Italy controlled parts o f Greece at this time.
762 Report o f Kari von Hervay, Athens to Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft, Wien on 28.09.1942, in: BAB, R
6 3 / 106.
761 Fleischer, Zxeppa xoa Z^acmxa, p. 331 ff*, Schumann, Griff nach Sueosteuropa, pp. 61 f.; Mark 
MaZOWER, Etttv EXXa&a tod XlxXeg. H epjteigia trig Kxrop.v A&rjva 1994, [Inside Hitler’s Greece. The 
Experience of Occupation, 1941-1944. New Haven 1993], pp. 95 f£ See also; GOETZ ALY, SUSANNE 
H e im , Vordenker der Vermchtung. Auschwitz und die deutschen Plaene fuer cine neue europaeische 
Ordnung. Hamburg 1991, p. 43.
764 27.03.1944 — 21.04.1944, “Bericht ueber Stadtler's Gnechenlandsreise in dieser Zeit”, sheet Nr. 154, in: 
BAB, R 63/ 253.
765 Fred Goecker (Deutsche Handelskammer in Gnechenland) to Herxn Heinrichsbauer (Suedosteuropa- 
Gesellschaft, Wien) on 25.01.1944, in: BAB, R 63 / 114.
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among all o f the occupied countries in terms of its currency. For instance when Greece 
was occupied by the Axis powers, the country’s banknotes amounted to twenty billions. 
Within two years, in October 1942, the amount came to 1,500 billions and after that, they 
increased 300 billions per month.766 As for the rate of exchange, the equivalent o f the 
English pound to the Greek drachma was, according to v. Hervay, 550 to 660 times 
higher in the pre-war period, while in France it was twelve to fourteen times higher.767 In 
May 1944, the situation had dramatically deteriorated rocketing the value o f the drachma 
to the golden pound from thirty million to seventy million within a week and in just two 
days, to 105 million!768 The reason for this catastrophe was attributed to the communist 
movement by the Major-General v. Hervay, which he described it as “the land’s 
plague”.769 He recognised, however, that Greece was a poor country and that the occu­
pation by three powers had worsened the levels o f  food stocks, as Greece not only had 
to feed its people but also the occuping troops. In addition, great strains were put on its 
resources by the fortifications, which were necessary for its own security but also for the 
security o f the whole o f south-eastern Europe.770 In addition, the bombardment o f Pi­
raeus by the Allies in January 1944, which caused severe casualties to the local popula­
tion, destroyed the two railway stations and caused serious damage to the port, paralysing 
the transportation o f goods to and from the Greek capital.771
During the occupation, however, the Germans initiated a number o f measures for 
the exploitation o f the country’s agricultural production and to plan its future potential. 
Before the war, apart from tobacco, sultanas and currants (the country produced one 
third of the world production in currants at the time)772- Greece also produced grapes, 
figs, citrus fruit and almonds. According to some commentators, Greece had the poten­
tial to become, under certain conditions, “Europe’s California”.773 Since 1942, most of
766 Report of Hervay, [“Lagebericht G riechenland (fan. 1944)”] to  die SOEG on 05.01.1944, in: R 63/ 252.
767 Ibid.
768 Kari von Hervay to Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft on 14.05.1944, in: BAB, R 63/ 106.
769 Report o f Hervay, [“Lagebericht G riechenland (Jan. 1944)”] to the SOEG on 05.01.1944, in: R  63/ 25Z
770 ih i
771 In summer 1944, the products that Greece exported to  die Reich were restricted to ore, raisins, raw silk 
and untreated hides, since the o ther products could hardly cover the country’s needs. See: report o f Karl 
von Hervay to Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft on 18.06.1944, in: BAB R 63/ 106.
772 Zweite Tagung det G tuppe “Em aehrung uad  Landwirtschaft” der SOEG 30.11. — 01.12.1942. 
Pressecommunique, in: BAB R 6 3 / 28.
77J Fred Goecker (Deutsche Handelskam m er in Griechenland) to  Heinrichsbauer (Suedosteuropa- 
Gesellschaft, Wien) 25.01.1944, in: BAB R 6 3 / 114.
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the production had been exported to Germany and in the summer of 1943 there were 
daily flights between Athens and Berlin, which basically facilitated the trade relations 
between the two countries.774 The Smdostatropa Gesellsckaft advertised summer-school uni­
versity courses in Germany in order to strengthen Germany’s relations with the Balkan 
countries. In Greece however, a campaign of this kind was considered “more than un­
necessary”.775 On the other hand this was because many Greek was fully aware that his 
country depended on Germany’s industrial products and on Germany itself, and on the 
other hand, that it needed and would continue to need Greece’s agricultural products. 
Moreover, several Greeks who had studied in Germany, along with others who used to 
visit the Reich every year for various reasons were no longer able to travel abroad. There­
fore, it was quite difficult to advertise Germany as business, training and cultural destina­
tion.776 Nevertheless, in 1944, it was reported that there were about two hundred Greek 
students in Germany, of which thirty-six received German scholarships.777
774 See: “Merkblatt fiter Gnedmland', 1943 August; (Hsg. von der Deutschen Handelskammer in 
Griechenland. Athen), in: BAB, R 6 3 / 114.
775 Report o f Kad von Hervay to Suedosteuropa-GeseHschaft, Vienna on 22.11.1943, in: BAB, R 63/ 106.
776 IbitL
777 27.03.1944 — 21.04.1944, Bericht ueber Stadder's Griechenlands reise in dieser Zeit, BL 136, in: BAB R 




In Hitler’s regime, the use of foreign cultural policy as a mean of propaganda be­
came a valuable instrument for die dissemination o f the national socialist ideology 
abroad and in many cases, it was regarded as kriegswichtig, in other words, important for 
the war. About two years before the occupation of Greece by the Nazis, German cultural 
policy, which was mainly carried out through the branches of the German Academy, ap­
peared, according to the Nazi propagandists, to be rather weak in the Balkan region, in 
comparison to the achievements of the other significant “cultural nations” there. France 
and Britain, had an important and somewhat different cultural presence in Greece, even 
before the First World War, through the establishment o f hospitals. In 1933, the small 
French hospital in Greece was expanded and an amphitheater was also built for regular 
seminars on topics relating to physical sciences and medicine.78 79 Therefore, Germany be­
lieved that it should not delay any longer in promoting a similar activity in Greece and 
the Nazi authorities sought to intensify their cultural propaganda in neutral countries, 
giving priority to the Balkan states.780
Since the mid-1920s, the teaching of language became the primary instrument for 
Germany’s cultural expansion and was regarded a prerequisite for its economic expan­
sion into new markets. Its main rival had always been France, which at the same time, 
was often used as a model for the country’s foreign cultural policy design. France had a 
long tradition in the dissemination o f its language no t only in its colonies but also in 
other territories, which were o f political and economic importance to the country, such 
as the Balkans. In 1929, Franz Thierfelder, the secretary of the German Academy in Mu­
nich, which was responsible for the teaching of German abroad, reported that the inter­
est in German had increased in the multiethnic city of Saloniki, even though French was
5.2. 'Languagepropaganda and science.779
778 Fedra Koutsoukou in her dissertation elaborates the cultural political propaganda through language 
policy in Greece during Nazi period, by studying all aspects o f die phenom enon in detail and all o f  the 
language institutions involved. FEDRA KOUTSOUKOU, Die deutsche auswærtige Kultur- und Sprachpolitik 
in Griechenland 1933-1944, (chapter five). Thesis to be defended at the Technische Universitæt Be din in 
January 2006. Hexe, I am roughly describing the main mechanisms o f language propaganda for scientific 
influence on Greece.
779 HAGEN F l e is c h e r ,  ‘'Europas Rueckkehr nach Gnechenland. Kulturpolitik der Grossmaechte in einem 
Staat der Peripherie", in: H arald H e p p n e r , O l g a  K atsiardi-H e r in g  (H g.), Die Griechen und Europa. 
Aussen- und Innensichten im Wandel d erZ eit Wien 1998, pp. 125-191, here pp. 144 f.
780 Ibid., p. 150.
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still the dominant foreign language. As for Athens, Thierfelder remarked that the French 
language was the most popular foreign language in comparison to the other Balkans 
capitals.781 Nevertheless, in both o f the cities that hosted the country’s universities, the 
professors were well disposed towards the learning o f German, on the grounds that they 
considered it to be the most important for science.782 O f course, this conviction was not 
shared by all professors, as there were cliques o f Francophiles and Germanophiles, in line 
with their education. In 1933, it was reported that the German language teacher, Rudolf 
Helm, who was appointed by the Munich Academy in the Deutsche Schule in Saloniki also 
lectured at the local university.783 O n the other hand, at Athens University, a post for the 
teaching o f German had officially existed since 1929, but only on paper, as it remained 
vacant due to the reluctance o f  the Greek government to appoint any foreign professors 
at the time.784 The reason for that reluctance, argued Thierfelder, was that modem 
Greece wanted “to find its feet” as much as it could and that a foreign cultural presence 
migjht hinder rather than foster these efforts. The German Balkan expert further noted 
that the country’s poor economy resulted from an inadequate education system, which 
forced many youths to turn to German and other foreign universities in order to under­
take advanced studies. According to Thierfelder, it was in Germany’s interest to increase 
the number o f  Greek students and that language teaching would certainly contribute to 
this objective. It is not an exaggeration to say that from then on the complex mechanism 
of the Reich’s foreign policy agenda began to unfold and in order to achieved this aim, a 
number o f old methods were employed while some new ones were invented.
At first, former students o f  German universities, who had occupied important 
positions in Greek political, economic or scientific life at the time and continued to 
maintain links with their “intellectual homeland”,785 were invited to give lectures at the 
Academy o f Munich and some German universities. They became the mediators between 
the two countries creating the preconditions for stronger cultural ties between Germans 
and Greeks. This was the case o f Kyriakidis, a professor o f  ancient Greek and the Rector 
of the University of Saloniki. He was awarded the title of honorary correspondent mem-
7»i “Beticht von D r. Fran2 Thierfelder, M uenchen, ueber die Lage der deutschen Sprache auf dem Balkan”. 
Undated docum ent, probably on 26.08-1929. In; PAAA, R 64200.
™IIxd
783 Thierfelder an Auswaertiges Am t, Abteilung VI on 27.01-1933, in: PAAA, R 64200.
“Bericht von D r. Franz Thierfelder, M uenchen, ueber die Lage der deutschen Sprache auf dem Balkan”. 
Undated docum ent, probably on 26.08.1929, in: PAAA, R 64200.
785 Prof. Dr. A D . Keramopoulos to  Deutsche Akademie in M uenchen on 09.08.1932, in; PAAA R 64200.
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ber of the Munich Academy o f Sciences in 1933, for his services in the dissemination o f 
the German in Saloniki and his fight against the strong Francophile opposition at his 
university.786 A year earlier, the professor o f archaeology, A. D. FCeramopoulos, also be­
came an honorary member o f the German Academy in Munich. He was considered an 
“important factor for the German cultural undertaking in Greece” and the title he was 
bestowed was redeemed in the following years in the best interests o f Germany.787 
FCeramopoulos, who became the Dean o f  the faculty o f philosophy at Athens University 
in 1933, was completely devoted to German culture and worked intensively for the pro­
motion o f German in Greece, using his influence with the Greek authorities. He recog­
nised that the teaching of German at secondary schools should be intensified for eco­
nomic, commercial and industrial reasons788 and to become, as the Germans wished, a 
regular subject “as it had [already] been in most o f the other European cities”789 [sic]. The 
year of 1933 was regarded by the Senator of the German Academy in Munich and the 
president of the German Archaeological Institute in Athens, Professor FCaro (elsewhere, 
Caro) as particularly favourable for the expansion o f German to Greece. This was not 
only due to generally sympathetic climate for German culture, but also the new Greek 
juridical code790 which was based on German model, a feet that obliged every Greek law­
yer to read and understand German.791 FCaro argued that the creation of a chair for the 
teaching o f  German at a Greek university was a pressing need. By February 1933, there 
still was no chair for foreign languages or philology. Even the Spanish readership that 
had been established in the framework o f  the Spanish-Greek co-operation remained va­
cant792 *A few months later, Germany was surprised with the establishment of readership 
for French at Athens University by France, who bore all o f  die costs instead of the 
Greek Ministry o f Education and also sent a specialist from the Sorbonne. Germany was
786 See: Deutsche Akademische Auschtauschdienst to Auswaertiges Am t on 16.06.1933; German 
Ambassador in Athens Eisenlohr, to Auswaertiges Amt on 28,07.1933, both in: PAAA, R 64200.
787 Pro£ Dr. Karo, Deutsches Archaeologisches Institut in Athen [und Senator der Deutschen Akademie in 
Muenchen] to Thierfelder on 02.02.1933, in: PAAA, R 64200.
788 Keramopoulos to Deutsche Akademie in M uenchen on 09.08.1932, in: PAAA, R 64200.
789 Deutsche Akademie, Muenchen to  Keramopoulos on 26.01.1933, in: PAAA, R 64200.
790 It is not mentioned, if  it was the civil, penal o r other code.
791 Deutsche Akademie, Muenchen to Auswaertiges Amt on 02.10.1933; Prof. Dr. Karo, Deutsches 
Archaeologsches Institut in Athen [und Senator der Deutschen Akademie in Muenchen] to Thierfelder on
02.02.1933, in: PAAA, R 64200.
792 Thierfelder to Auswaertiges Amt, Abteilung V I Hemn Vizekonsul v. Heinz on 07.02.1933, in: PAAA, R
64200.
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once again one step behind its cultural rival. Herman Goering’s visit in 1934, was there­
fore, not only the German answer to the French initiative, but also an indication of 
stronger economic and cultural relations between the two countries, as the foreign press 
had underlined.793 His mission was also cultural-political, as he emphasised the need for 
German cultural propaganda in Greece and he recognised the progress that had already 
been made in this area.794 In the same year, Germany followed France by creating a posi­
tion with the same profile to promote German at Athens Technical University. The 
Reich seemed to have won this cultural round by convincing the Greek government to 
make German obligatory at this university, in which 95% o f its professors had been edu­
cated in Germany.795 A young historian from Leipzig, Gottfried Felix Merkel, occupied 
the chair. The following year, he was asked by the rector o f the Teacher7s Training Col­
lege, who also was General Secretary at the Ministry o f Education, to take up the newly 
established chair for German at his college.796 In addition, Merkel taught at the Greek 
Railway School.797 According to Merkel, a noteworthy incident which showed the signifi­
cance o f German at Greek universities was the comment o f  the rector o f  Athens Univer­
sity professor o f mathematics, P. Zervos, who followed a private course, that “his 
authority would be over, if someone finds out that he does not know German”.798 This 
sweeping propaganda of German culture in Greek academic life made the British, the
795 G reek Am bassador on Be din, Rizos Ragavis to the Greek Ministry o f Foreign Affairs in Athens on
31.05.1934, irr Iotoqixóv Açxéov Yzougryetoo EÇarceçtxùv (Historical Archive o f die Greek Foreign 
M inistry, IA.YE), A / l l /1 ,1934. EXX^vo-yeg^avixs^
794 G-F-Merkel, Athens to D t. Jueigens o f the Notgemeinschaft der deutschen W issenschaften on
06.06.1934, in: PAAA, R 64200.
795 Twenty-seven ou t o f thirty ordinary professors were educated in Germany. See: German Embassy in 
Athens on 04.07.1934. Also: N otgem eischaft der deutschen W issenschaften to Auswaerriges Amt, 
Abteilung VIW  on 08-03.1934; G .F. M erkel to Notgemeinschaft der deutschen W issenschaften on
18.05.1934, all docum ents in: PAAA, R 64200. In 1936, was reported that 178 Greek professor out o f 320 
had studied in either German o r Austrian univeristies. See: “llseitige Bericht ueber die deutsche Schule 
A then, Saloniki” on 31.11.1936, in BAB, R  4901/ 10526.
790 Merkel to A usw ärtigen Amt, K ulturabteilung on 15.10.1935, in: PAAA, R 64200.
797 German A m bassador in A thens, Prinz zu Erbach, to A usw ärtigen Amt on 28.02.1937, in: PAAA, R 
64200.
798 Merkel to A usw ärtigen Amt, Kulturabteilung on 15.10.1935, in: PAAA, R 64200.
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French, and even the Italians quite nervous.7” Merkel, however, emphasised the need to 
avoid any open rivalry with the other leading cultural nations.79 800
The year o f 1936 was crucial for Greece’s political life, but also for Germany’s 
culture policy in the country. On 4 August of that year, the dictator Ioann is Metaxas 
came to power backed by the King George II. Metaxas was considered by the Nazis to 
be a very active man, with great vision and experience.801 Given the fact that he had 
graduated from the famous Military Academy of Berlin in 1903 and his well-known anti- 
parliamentary feelings, the respect which he enjoyed among the Nazis was justified. In 
contrast to the Greek King, who was a British sympathiser,802 Metaxas was more affili­
ated to the German tradition. Combined with his commitment to the country’s neutral­
ity, Metaxas brought about a break in British propaganda in Greece, which was often 
turned against Germany, as the Nazis argued. The Minister of Education in Metaxas re­
gime, Nikolaos Louvaris, was a supporter o f the idea o f creating a chair for German lan­
guage and literature at Athens University. Louvaris, who was awarded an honorary doc­
torate from the University o f Heidelberg was a theologian educated in Leipzig and an 
admirer o f the German sciences. Apart from the Technical Univerisy, the creation of a 
German chair at Athens University was still in suspense, in 1936. In the academic year 
1935-36 the director of the Deutsée Schule Athen, Alfred Romain, was appointed profes­
sor of the German literature a t Athens University.803 However, the status o f his position 
was still unclear, as there was no law that would officially recognise the creation o f a 
German chair. The law that allowed the creation of foreign chairs at Athens University 
and the appointment of foreign professors was only passed in February 1938.804 The first
799 The London '“Times” dedicated a whole article to the success o f the German cultural propaganda and 
the dwindling influence o f English in  Greece. See: Merkel to Auswaertigen Amt, Kulturabteilung on
15.10.1935, in: PAAA, R  6420Q.
800 IHd.
801 BarSner Boersen^atung, 28.12.1938 “Griechenlands Lage. Fester Wille zur N eutralitaet”, vom 
Schnftleitungsmitglied Dr. Hermann Ullmann. Athen. (Newspaper's dipping), in: BAB, R 4902/ 2090.
802 He was in  exile for twelve years in  London and he only returned to Greece at the end o f 1935.
803 Romain succeeded Merkel at the Technical University in Athens in 1940. See: Ministry o f Education in 
Athens (N.I. Spentzas, the deputy Minister) to  die Greek Ministry o f Foreign Affairs in Athens, on 
15.10.1940, in: Ioxopixov Ag^aov Ysoopyetoo E5wtepixujv (Historical Archive o f the Greek Foreign 
Ministry, IAYE), 2 6 /1 / 1940, ASaottaXia reppavtxri yAwaoa; oro EMTL
804 Avayxacrnxoq N opo; 1100. «Tlegt t f i p o o E U ?  eSpwv i je v w v  Aoyoiexwwv ttapa nq OtAoooiptxii -xoArj t o o  
naveitionqptoo AOiqvwv». Etf^pept; nq? Ko^epvrjaeu; too BaoiAetou tiq; EAAocSog. (<t>EK) (Official Gazette),
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country, however, to establish a foreign chair at this university was France, which had 
created a readership since the academic year 1933-34.805 Germany, who was once again 
one step behind France was the next to create a position o f  that kind.806 Rudolf Fahmer, 
the future director o f the German Scientific Institute in Athens (Deutsches WissensckaftUehe 
Institute DWJ) occupied the chair.807 Britain followed almost immediately afterwards cre­
ating similar chairs.808 The latter hoped that the Athens chair would become the spring 
board for the dissemination o f British knowledge to the rest of eastern Mediterranean 
bringing commercial and educational success.809 In conjunction with the Senate o f Ath­
ens University the respective governments sponsored all o f  the above chairs810 As for the 
Greeks, they wished to participate in this cultural undertaking by introducing some type 
of exchange with the above countries, however, they did n o t have any concrete plan or a 
serious foreign cultural policy.811
Teu^oe ITgwiov, Aq. <X>6XXou 69, 23.02.1938. The law was republished in the Year-Book of 1939-1940 of 
the University o f Athens. See: EjieTiqgie too navExiarrjpiaxou ¿too? 1939-1940. A9*jva 1940, pp. 98 f.
805 Undated Notice (Notiz), probably o f 1938, h r PAAA, Deutsche Gesandschaft Athen, Band Nr. 63 
(Kulturpolitik: Schulen, Presse, Verschiedenes, W issenschaft, 1935-1939).
806 BctotXixov Ai ¿Tory pa «Tlegt iBguoeue eBqccc; ttji; Teppcxvix^g OiXoXoytae xat Acryotexviae itaga. tr,
OtXoootpoci] too riaveTucmqpioo A ötjvwv», Ecpiiiegig trje Kußegv^oetäe too BaoiXetou Trje EXXäSoe.
(C>EK) (Official Gazette), Teayoe LlguTOv, Aq. O uXXoo 31,24.01.1939.
807 The official appointm ent o f R. Fahm er a t the German chair was ratified with a Royal Decree: BaotXtxov 
Atitanyiia ‘Ttegi xugo>oe«e ao^ßaaeue peTat^j ty\e B. Kußegvf.oeue xrn too KaöriyrTri, Ty\ereQ{iavocry; 
<t>tXoAX>Yia? xai Aovoreyvta; aro Ilotv. AOrivciv x. R. Fahm er/' Eipjpegtc Trie Koßepvr|oe<*>e "tou BaotXeioo tyje 
EXXaSog. (OEK) (Official Gazette), Teöxoe npüiTOv, Ap. <t>6XXoo 31,20.10.1939. See also: “Abordnung 
des Prof. Dr. R udolf Fahmer, Heidelberg an den Lehrstuhl fuer Germ anistik der Universitaet A then 1938- 
1945”, in: BAB, R 4901/ 15141.
808 BaoiXtxöv Aiätorypa «IlEpt töguoewe eSgae trje AyyXixrie OtXoXoyiae xoci Aoyotexviae tzaga ttj 
O iXooapucrj ZyoXf] too IlavejiKrnnpioo Aörjvwv», Ecpr][iegie nje KüßegvroEtdg too BaatXetoo nie EXXiSog. 
(<t>EK) (Official G azette), Teoyoe üguTov, Aq. <5>6XXoo 31,14.12.1938.
809 Cited in a Scottish daily newspaper, the name o f which is no t m entioned in: Document o f the Greek 
Embassy in London to  die Ministry o f Foreign Affairs in Athens on 05.05.1937, in: Historical Archive o f 
Athens University (Iarogtxo Agyeio navejttoTrjpioo Afirpwv, LAP A), A gx^0 flgwTOXoXXou, 1-1 Aiogtojiot 
KaÖrivriTwv (ngoxijguip'i nXr]go)OEwe ESgwv xon dcXXee AiaStxaoiee) 1936-37 [Correspondence archive, 1-1 
Appointments o f Professors].
810 Eiteojgie too II(rvejtioni(UQDto6 etoog (Year-book o f Athens University) 1938-1939, Athens 1939, p. 17 
(footnote 1). Also: German Embassy in A thens to A usw ärtiges Amt on  09.07.1937, in: PAAA, R 64200.
811 Greek Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, N. M avroudis, to Ministry o f Education on 20.05.1937, in: IA PA 1-1 
Atogiopoi K tOtiŷ tuv (Tlgoxrigo^ri nXr.fxooewe Edgtiiv xott ¿XXeg AtaScxaote;) 1936-37; Avoryxacrnxoe 
Nopog 1100. «TTegi (Sgoocue e8gwv £evwv XoyoTeyvtAv”, Article 2, See also: G unnar H ering , “Aspekte
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Despite the intensive promotion of the German language in Greece, the presence 
o f German books, journals and other printed material was limited in comparison to the 
numbers o f French ones. In 1929, Thierfelder had already stressed the need to intensify 
Germany the export of books to the Balkans.812 The main reason for the low readership 
was the high cost o f the German books which made them unattractive to the Balkan 
readers, who preferred French ones as they were cheaper. In 1934, Merkel underlined to 
the “Emergency Association for the German Science” [Notgemeinscbaft der Deutschen Wis- 
senschaft) that despite the dominance o f the German language at Athens’ Technical Uni­
versity and in other Greek universities and third level schools, there was no library with 
scientific literature for students and professors.813 814Merkel’s appeal to the Notgemeinscbaft 
for support found a warm response. The organisation argued that “an old book is always 
better than no book” and promised to provide Merkel with a large amount o f scientific 
material including all of the issues of the official journal of the Union of German Engi­
neers {Verein Deutsche Ingénieurs), founded in 1856.su In addition, some new books, par­
ticularly books about the Third Reich, would also be sent to Greece. This cultural- 
political undertaking was expected to contribute to transforming Merkel’s readership at 
the Technical University of Athens into a German institute, which would campaign on a 
constant basis for the German science.815 In the following months, the Notgemeinscbaft 
helped with its own funds to build up the collection at Technical University library, con­
tinuing the tradition of the German donors to this institution dating back to its estab­
lishment.816 As for the book sales, perhaps the most serious attempt to support them
der Kulturpolitik des Metaxas-Regimes (1936-1940)”, im Re in h a r d  L a u er ,  PETER SCHREINER (Hgs.) 
D ie Kultur Griechenlands in M ittelalter und Neuzeit*. Bericht ueber das Kolloquium der Suedosteuropa- 
Kommission, 28. — 31. O kt 1992. Abhandlungen der Akademie der W issenschaften in Goettingen. Phil.- 
H ist Klasse, 3 Folge, Nr. 212, Goettingen 1996, pp. 285-321.
812 “Bericht von Dr. Franz Thiprfelder, Muenchea, ueber die Lage der deutschen Sprache auf dem Balkan”. 
Undated docum ent, probably on 26.08.1929, in: PAAA, R 64200.
813 Merkel to the Notgemeinschaft on 18.05.1934, im PAAA, R 64200. See also: Legationsrat des 
Auswaerügen A ntes, Roth, to the “Deutsch-Ausländischen Buchtausch” on 11.03.1937, im PAAA, R 
64279, [Microfiche N r. 7556].
814 Dr. Jueigens, Notgemeinschaft; to Merkel 28.05.1934, im PAAA, R 64200. A  similar collection o f books 
and journals was also sent to Shanghai in Hiina.
»« Ibid.
816 See: EAENH K aaaOATH, «O Qokcx; tuv Swpewv orr] ouy>cp6t7jo»i ttjc ßtj&ioftnxric too EM .n. (1836- 
1950)», im E©NIKO METEOBIO IIOAYTEXNEIO (ex8.) ‘BtßAioOrpo] twv AvoryxoioovTCiiv BtßAiuv xxi 
OpoXoyoopevox; KqcaaIotwv Eort;i.egt8oDv\ Oi traÄme; ooXXove? too EOvixoö Metooßtoo riokotexveioo,
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came, 'when Germany lowered the price of all books, journals, records and the like ex­
ported abroad by 25%, except to Palestine and Switzerland. This measure was taken on 9 
September 1935, making German books more competitive in the international market.817
In 1941, Nazi Germany intensified its cultural political propaganda abroad by in­
augurating a branch of the Deutsche Wissenschaft&ches Institut (German Scientific Institute 
DWI) in Athens, an institution that was established by and subject to the Deutsche 
Akadmne o f Munich.818 As with every other DW Institute, the Athenian branch became 
responsible for all of the existing cultural institutes in Greece, which consisted of the 
many Deutsche Akad$mie-hranches throughout Greece, from Crete and Peloponnese to 
the island o f Mytilene, Macedonia and Thrace. Even though these branches were focused 
on spreading the German language, the work o f  the DWI went beyond this task. It 
aimed at the diffusion of German science and culture in Greece and the promotion of 
intensified co-operation with Greek scientists focusing on archaeology and Greek philol­
ogy, as well as on astronomy, medicine, land planning and folklore. According to the 
Reich Ministry of Education, the new cultural institution should not serve any political or 
propaganda interests, but instead, would be exclusively focused on scientific work.819 
However, neither the idealistic aim o f  mutual scientific collaboration nor the apolitical 
activity o f the institute fully materialised.
A0rjva 1995, pp. 13-40 JEl e n i K aLAFATI, "T he role o f  the donors in the creation o f the Meisom National 
Technical University's library (1836-1950)”, in: E t h n ik o  METSOVio POLYTEXNEIO (ed.), lib ra ry  o f 
needed books and admittedly best journals'. The old collections o f the Metsovio National Technical 
University, Athens 1995J.
817 "Auslandsberichte über die Auswirkung des Buchexport-Ausgfcichverfahrem“ by D r. Hövel to 
A usw ärtiges A m t Abteilung y ill on 07.07.36, in: PAAA, R 65711, Bd.17. The document was classified 
„strictly confidential, for official use only "  (Streng Vertraulich! N ur fur den Dienstgebrauch bestimmt1). 
Also: German Embassy on Athens to Auswaertiges Amt Abteilung V III on 01.05.36, in; PAAA, R 65711, 
Bd. 17.
818 The archival material on the Deutsches W issenschaftliches Institut in  Athens is fragmented and the only 
study available so far is Frank-Rutger H ausm ann's work: F r a n k -Ru t g e r  H a u sm an n , “Auch im  Krieg 
schweigen die Musen nicht”. Die D eutschen W issenschaftlichen Institute im Zweiten Weltkrieg. 
Goettingen 2001, pp. 238-255. Fedra Koutsoukou works a t the m om ent on the history o f the DWI in 
Athens in her dissertation. Sec: KOUTSOUKOU, Die deutsche auswaertige Kultur- und Sprachpolitik in 
Griechenland 1933-1944, chapter six.
819 H aUSMANN, Auch die Musen, p. 245.
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The organisation had three departments dedicated to scientific, academic and lin­
guistic activities. The famous professor o f German language and literature in Heidelberg, 
Rudolf Fahmer, was appointed director o f the DWI in Athens on 1 October 1939, who 
also was an expert in ancient and modem Greek literature and held the chair o f German 
language and literature at Athens University. However, the DWI did not officially open 
its doors until two years later, in October 1941. In 1942, the gynaecologist and science 
historian, Eberhard Zeller, took over the directorship o f the department of science, while 
the academic and the language departments were taken over by Rudolf Grimm and Kurt 
Meyer respectively.820 Meyer was later succeeded by Alexander Steinmetz. Apart from the 
teaching o f German, the most important activities o f the DWI in Athens were, the ex­
change programmes funded by the DAAD and the Alexander von Humboldt Süßung, the 
organisation for lectures, concerts and exhibitions. In the scientific department, the only 
activity that was reported to have taken place was a series of lectures given by Greek and 
German specialists. For example, the director of the Athens observatory and Fahmeris 
friend, Stavros Plakidis, gave lectures on astronomy, while a number of well-known 
German scientists gave lectures usually relevant to the Greek affairs. As for natural sci­
ences and technology, Fahmer reported that some lectures were given in 1944 on the use 
of new materials, such as petrol and aluminium, on new mining techniques, nutrition, 
and the link between climate and forests in south-eastern Europe.821 The most prominent 
scientists, however, such as Sauerbruch, Max Planck, von Weizsaecker and Carl Schmitt, 
were never invited to Athens.822 The DW I in Athens was also used for organising the 
Wehrmacht's ‘University-Week* (Hochschuhvoche), during which a number of professors vis­
ited the Greek capital to lecture not only the Wehrmacht soldiers and officers but also 
Greeks students, and to meet their Greek colleagues. The Vienna University was the only 
one that sent scientists to the university-week of the Wehrmacht, as it was recognised as 
the ‘contracting university* (Vatenuniversitaet) for south-eastern Europe. By the summer o f 
1944, the faculties o f technology and agriculture, law and political economy o f the Vi­
enna University sent their scientists, who had not been mobilised by the Wehrmacht, to 
Athens.823 In the same period, the architect, biologist and environmentalist, Alwin Seifert,
820 There is very little information about Fahm er, Grimm, Meyer and Zeller contained in their files in the 
Politisches Archive des Auswärtiges Amts in Be din. See: PAAA, R 64394 d, e, k, q respectively.
821 This report is held in the private archive o f  D r. Stefano Bianca, which has been used extensively in the 
work o f F. R. Hausmann. See: HAUSMANN, Auch die Musen, pp. 248 £
822 Ibid., p. 248.
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was invited to Athens to give a series o f lectures on the problems relating to water sup­
ply, the construction of water mains in Greece and die use o f waterfalls as a source o f 
energy, particularly for industry. Furthermore, [Werner?] Zabel, a professor o f  medicine, 
gave lectures on biological aspects in medicine and on nutrition science.824 Both series of 
lectures were o f great importance to the Greeks, as they were attempting to reconstruct 
their country after the war, which had caused serious damage both to the infrastructure 
and the people's health, particularly after the bitter winter o f 1941/2 and the shortage o f 
food supplies afterwards.
The Balkan peninsula was regarded by the Nazis as the region o f exercising Gross- 
raumpoMk and applying Europe’s New Order. Therefore, a number of scientists worked 
intensively on the economic and political problems o f the region.825 Within this frame­
work, the geographer, Hugo Hassinger, a professor o f geography at Vienna University 
and the director of the Geographical Society in Vienna, made a four-week expedition to 
Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Croatia, and Slovakia. The main purpose o f the expe­
dition, as Hassinger reported to the Reich Ministry o f Education, was to make contact 
with geographers and research institutes, as well as with representatives of the key geo­
graphical organisations o f south-eastern Europe for the purpose of collaborating with 
their German colleagues.826 These contacts were very important for the geographical 
meeting which was planned to take place in 1943 on German soil, aiming at the future 
collaboration among the European geographers -o r  rather, between the Balkans and 
Germany- as a response to western propaganda.827 Exchanging journals and printed ma­
terial, as well as encouraging scientists and other individuals from the Balkan countries to 
contribute to specific journals, such as the “MitteHungeit' and the “AbhandlungefT -both 
organs of the German Geographic Society-, were among the means chosen to meet the 
above objectives. In the same vein, perhaps the most important undertaking within the 
sphere of cultural propaganda but also of practical use for the Germans was a collective 
work dedicated to questions about the “living space of European people”, (“Lebensraum- 
fragen eurvpaeischer Voelkef \  posed by non-Germans.828 Hassinger described two further
824 Ibid., p. 249.
825 Ibid., p. 46.
826 “Bericht Prof. Dr. Hugo Hassingets die in der Z d t vom 10-27. April 1942 nach Griechenland, 
Bulgarien, Serbien, Ungram, Kroatiea und vom 7-9. Mai 1942 nach der Slowakei ausgefuehrten 
Studienreise” , in: BAB, R 4901/ 2819.
827 Ibid* Part I. Reisezwccke.
828 Ibid
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aims of his visit to south-eastern Europe. The first was the expansion of the space re­
search project directed by Vienna University including the Balkans with particular inter­
est in Romania, and the other was the naming of candidates for the “Prin^Eugen Preif’ 
and a Vienna cultural prize for south-eastern Europe that had no t been set yet.829 830
In Greece, Hassinger visited the director of the DWI branch in Athens, Rudolf 
Fahmer, the German cultural attaché Erich Bo eh ringer, the director of the German Ar­
chaeological Institute and the leader o f the NSDAP in Greece, Walter Wrede, as well as a 
number o f  Greeks, who were mostly scientists. Apart from the gynaecologist^ Kostanti- 
nos Logothtopoulos, who also was the Minister of Education and Public Health at the 
time, Hassinger carried out interviews with scientists at the geographical, meteorological 
and geological institutes of Athens University, as well as with some intellectuals of the 
Academy o f Science in Athens. More specific, he met the economist in the Academy o f 
Sciences, Dr. Megas, the geographer Mistardis, who was a bank official but also lectured 
at the Agricultural School, the university professor o f geology and geography, Ioannis 
Trikallinos, the geologist, Máximos Mitsopoulos, the geophysicist and astronomer, 
Nikolaos Kritikos at Technical University, and the meteorologist, E.G.Mariopoulos. All 
of them, with the exception o f Mariopoulos had been educated in Germany to some de­
gree. Hassinger was also informed about the prominent scientists o f related disciplines, 
such as Xenophon Zolotas, a professor o f political economy, and the political scientist, 
Angelos Angelopoulos, the relevant individuals in the ministries o f economy and civil 
aviation, who were responsible for the geological and meteorological institutes, respec­
tively.850 Despite the existence o f eminent figures in all of the departments relevant to 
geography, Hassinger reported that the science of geography in Greece did not hold a 
prominent position. The institutes were primitively equipped, the libraries were poor and 
although the Greek Geographic Society was directed by the very well-known professor 
of geodesy Vasilios Lambadarios and the academic Antonios Keramopoulos, however, it 
did not have any publications.831 The German scientist also noticed that the situation in 
occupied Greece, primarily due to the lack of food that touched large parts o f the Greek 
population and the attitude o f the occupied forces, resulted in die Greeks becoming 
more reserved and less friendly towards the Germans. Nevertheless, as underlined by
829 Ibid
830 Ibid., Part III Reiseergebmsse, A. Griechenland.
831 7bid.
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Hassinger, they were never impolite and they continued to show respect for German 
culture and science, especially the educated people.832
Overall, Hassinger believed that the way for the meeting of European geogra­
phers scheduled for autumn 1943 had been more or less paved in all o f the south-eastern 
countries. Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovakia agreed to participate fully, as did Romania, 
whereas Hungary was only expected to respond in the summer of 1943. As for Greece, 
the situation was still unclear, as Hassinger noted. Mistardis was regarded as the only per­
son likely to foster the German-Greek geographical co-operation, even though he was 
not yet a professor and did no t have the weight o f the older and more established Greek 
scientists, such as Trikallinos, with whom he had poor relations. He was perceived, how­
ever, to be open minded and quite ambitious, virtues that seemed to be appreciated by 
Hassinger, who recommended the inclusion of his contribution entitled “Melioriemng und 
laendliche Inmnkolonisation in Grieckenland seit der Umsiedlung der kleinasiadschen Griecheri* in the 
collective work “Lebensraumforsckungen etavpaetscher Voelkeir .833 The 1943 geographers’ 
meeting would focus on the development o f the cultural landscape of European states 
and their colonies from the aspect o f  the supply o f  food and raw materials.834 It was ex­
pected that the participants would consist o f German geographers and some o f  the Bal­
kan states which were friendly towards the Reich. The section dealing with the issue of 
Lebensraum and the governing of its peoples was classified as “kriegswcbti£ . In other 
words, the economic exploitation o f the sources o f these countries, the studying of the 
natural elements o f the ground, the climatic conditions that could allow the growing of 
important agricultural products were among the key interests of the south-eastern coun­
tries and, moreover, of Germany. Another geographical issue which the Germans ex­
pected to discuss at the meeting was the relationship between the raw material centres 
for industry and the consuming urban centres. This issue was o f great importance for the 
applied economy and the achievement o f its goal o f self-sufficiency.835
The DWI in Athens was eventually closed towards the end of October 1944 and 
all o f the books and other material possessed by the institute were packed up and stored 
at the National Museum in Athens, whose director, as the Germans reported, was loyal
«2 Ibid .
834 Hassingpr, Geographisches Institut U nir. Wien to Rrichsm inister £. Wtssenschaft Erriehung u. 
Volksbildung on 02.02.1943, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2819.
«5 Ibid
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to the aims of the German cultural project836 The Technical University was also another 
safe place for storing the material of the other German cultural institution in Athens, 
namely the German Academy. The director of the Technical University not only offered 
a safe place to store the entire property o f the Academy but also recommended to ensure 
the safe-keeping o f the German materials and the building itself through a contract.837 
The German plenipotentiary for south-eastern Europe, Hans Dittmer, emphasised the 
“virtuous character” of the Greeks, who offered their help to the Germans during this 
difficult time, even those individuals who had not visited the institute before.838 It is 
questionable, however, if the Greeks* interest departed from their traditional respect for 
German culture and their regret at its future absence from their country or whether it 
was motivated by other concerns.






5.3. 'Bilateral institutions and cultural agreements.
As it is described in chapter four, Germany had not signed any official cultural 
agreement with any country until 1936. The reason was partly because the Versailles 
Treaty strictly prohibited any bilateral relations for the defeated Reich after 1919. When 
the new Republic joined die League o f  Nations in 1926, it was too early to institutionalise 
its cultural undertakings abroad on governmental level. During the early years of Na­
tional Socialism, the idea of a bilateral cultural agreement at an intergovernmental level 
was not a high priority. The only bilateral institution which also served cultural-political 
purposes was the relatively wide network of societies, unions and clubs abroad primarily 
established by and for the German Diaspora. These groups o f Germans who had settled 
abroad and also some foreigners, who in one way or the other were affiliated to Ger­
many, became the torch-bearers o f German culture abroad and their importance was of­
ficially recognised. These ‘societies’ (Gesellscba/teify, as they were usually called, gradually 
found support from the German state and developed a bilateral character with a cultural- 
political dimension.
Soon after the Nazis’ assumption of power the branches of the German-Greek 
society in Germany focused on promoting awareness about the new regime among the 
Greeks living there, particularly among the students. Students proved to be the most 
powerful weapon in Germany’s foreign policy agenda, especially these that had a scholar­
ship from the Reich. One of the most active Greek members o f the German-Greek So­
ciety in Hamburg was Vasilios Malamos who studied medicine in Hamburg University 
and became an assistant professor (Docent) at the same university in 1937.839 He also was 
the assistant of the famous doctor for tropical medicine and the expert in the Balkan re­
gion, Peter Muehlens for many years. Malamos had an active role in almost every cultural 
undertaking organised by the Hamburg D-G Society840 and was regarded as a valuable 
individual for German interests in Greece. He returned to his homeland in 1938 and be­
came an assistant professor at Athens University in the same year. At the same time, the 
so-called “German Revolution” carried out under Hitler’s leadership gave the German 
people living in Greece a great boost, according to the Nazis. There were various bodies
m  Greek Ministry o f Education to Athens University Rector (Notification o f the Greek Ambassador on 
Beilin Rizo Ragabe for the Greek Ministry o f Education) on 24.11.1937 in: IAPA 1-1 AoQtauoi 
Ka9iqY»}Tuv (TT̂ ox^qu^t] nXTjguoeus ESguv xati iXXrg AtatSwacie;) 1937-38.
940 See: Undated document entitled "M itteilungen aus dem Arbeitsgebiet der Deutsch-Griechischen 
Gesellschaft”, in: BAK, R 57 neu/1063.
241
responsible for this boost including the local organisation of the NSDAP under Karl 
Kudorfer during the early years o f the Nazi regime, and die newspaper “Griechische Posf\ 
which was "the first German newspaper in Athens” and the official organ of the NSDAP 
in Greece.841
If the Greek communities in Hamburg and Dresden were the biggest group in 
Germany during the 1920s, the Greek colony in Munich became the largest and one of 
the most important for Nazi foreign policy in the 1930s. Among the cultural activities 
organised by the German-Greek Society in Munich in collaboration with the German 
Academy, was the invitation o f prominent Greek scholars to give lectures emphasising 
the importance of close scientific relations between the two countries. In June 1932, the 
professor o f archaeology at Athens University, who was also a member o f Athens Acad­
emy and an honorary member of the Munich Academy of Sciences, AX). Keramopoulos, 
and a professor at Saloniki University and Dean of law faculty, Ioannis Spyropoulos, 
were invited to give lectures in several German cities and in Munich Academy.842 
Keramopoulos visited Berlin, Hamburg and Munich, while Spyropoulos, apart from his 
lecture in Munich, planned to give a radio interview and to visit the University o f Jena for 
the same purpose.843
During the war years, the Greek community in Vienna developed into the largest 
in Germany and it was apparently one o f the most important, as Vienna was the centre 
o f operations in south-eastern Europe. In 1938, the Austrian-Greek Society in Vienna 
had 155 m e m b e rs , twenty-five of which were "non Aryans” and its profile was strongly 
economic.844 It received 10,000 marks in funding each year and it was reported that it had
841 Undated document entitled “Mitteilungen aus dem Arbeitsgebiet der Deutsch-Griechischen 
Gesellschaft", in: BAK, R 57 neu/1063. In  1934, the name o f the paper was renamed “Neue Athener Zei­
tung" and in 1941 to “Deutsche Nachrichten fuer Griechenland”.
842 Muenchen. Akademie fuer,wissenschaftlichen Forschung und zur Pflege des Deutschtums -Deutsche
Akademie- D r. F. Tierfelder (LA. L. H om ngpr ?) to  H eim  Legationssekretaer Dr. Freudenbetg, 
A usw ärtiges A m t Berlin 23.05.1932, PAAA, R 64064.
844 Deutsche Akademie to Prof. D r. Keramopoulos, Mitglied der Akademie der W issenschaften zu Athen 
on 23.05.1938; Deutsche Akademie M uenchen to Univ. Prof. Joh. Spyropoulos z.Zt. Dekan der 
Juristischen Fakultaet an der Universitaet Saloniki on 23.05.1932, both documents in: PAAA, R 64064. The 
tide o f Keram opoulos' lecture was “Forschungen in Obetm azedonia und der dortige Zusammenstoss der 
Legaten von Pempeius und Caesar im B ürgerkrieg vom Jahre 48 v. Chr.”, while Spyropoulos would speak 
about die political efforts o f convergence on die Balkans.
844 Undated docum ent, presumably of 1938, also unsigned: “Bericht Nr. XIII. B etrifft Oestereichisch- 
Griechische Gesellschaft”, in: PAAA, R 61272.
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die best bilateral relations in the Balkans.845 The president o f the society was the former 
director of the Chamber o f Commerce in Vienna, Hofrat Dr. Kuester. Dr. Nicolo 
Dopelus was the director of its branch in Athens. The G reek-Austrian League, as it was 
named, was separate from the Greek-German Society in the Greek capital, however, it 
collaborated with it. As for die society in Vienna, it had close relations with the 
Evangelical Church. It was also suggested that it should change its name to “German- 
Greek Society/ Vienna” and at the same time that a new organisation should be 
established called “German-Greek Central Society” (Deutscb-Griecbischen Hauptgesellschaff) , 
which would be responsible for the operations of both societies.846 Although it was not 
stated in the available documents whether the Central Society eventually came into being, 
however, it should be noted that another institution came into being to assist Nazi 
Germany in the control of foreign policy-making in the Balkans. This refers to the 
establishment o f the “Southeast 'European Institute in Vienna {Suedosteuropa-Institut in Wien), 
in 1938. Members o f the board o f the institute were also representatives of related offices 
in both the party and the state. The institute was consisted o f  two main departments, 
namely science and economy, under the direction o f Dr. Plattner and Hermann 
Neubacher, the Mayor of Vienna, respectively.847 Neubacher later became the Special 
Commissioner for economic issues in southeastern Europe {Sonderbeauftragter fuer 
Wirtschaftsfrugen in Suedostmropà), in 1943. Nevertheless, it was highlighted in the 1938 
report on the drafting of the articles o f the institute that suitable experts had to be found 
for these posts.848
It is interesting to note that the idea of creating bilateral institutions or develop­
ing the already existing ones was seen by the Nazis in 1938 as part of the Reich’s new 
foreign policy agenda that would contribute to the preservation o f world peace.849 *In the 
same year, the director of the Mediation Office for the German People (Xeiter der Volks-
845 “Protokoll der Vorstandssitzung der Stiftung Deutsches Auslands werk vom 11. August 1938”, im 
PAAA, R 61273.
046 Undated document, presumably o f 1938, also unsigned “Bericht N r. X III. Betrifft Oestereichisch- 
Griechische Gesellschaft”, in: PAAA, R 61272.
847 Vereinigung zwischenstaatlicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.V. (Geschaeftsfuehrener 
Vizepraesident) Suedosteuropa-Insötut in Wien Bericht Nr. 5., 20.09.1938, in: PAAA, R 61273.
^ I b il
849 Mitteilungen der “Vereinigung zwischen staatlicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.V.” gezj Lorenz,
SS-Obetgruppenfuehier, Praesident der “Vereinigung zwischen staatlicher Veibaende und Einrichtungen” 
01.11.1938, in: PAAA, R 61274. The document was classified as “confidential” (Vertraulich!).
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deutschen Mittelstelld), Werner Lorenz, who was also the president of die Association o f Bi­
national Unions and Institutions ^Vereinigung ^mschenstaatilicher Verbaende und 'Einrichtun­
gen e.V.**) highlighted Germany’s determination to promote understanding among peo­
ples, to foster their rights and fulfill mutual interests. He also claimed that efforts to 
promote peace were undertaking by the Fuehrer and that the bilateral unions provided a 
cultural mean for interaction between nations leading “the security of our Fuehrer’s, Adolf 
Hitler, peace-project”.850 The results o f  these activities were announced in the ad hoc pub­
lication of the journal “Mitteilungen der Vereinigung zwischenstaatlicher Verbaende und Einrich­
tungen f.V.”, first launched in 1938, which were classified documents and only for admin­
istrative use.851 It seems to have been used as an instrument o f propaganda by the Party. 
The claim o f promoting peace contradicted the Four-Year Plan that had been announced 
two years earlier and was clearly aimed at Germany’s preparations for war.
On the “Mitteilungen” o f 1939, the director o f the German-Greek Society, Profes­
sor Erich Ziebarth, argued that Germany’s stance towards Greece was in fact different 
from its position towards other countries. The reason for this, according to Ziebarth, was 
that Greece owed her independence, the rebuilding of the state and the protection o f its 
people to the German kings, Ludwig I and Otto as well as to the Bavarian authorities 
that had settled to Greece. Therefore, Ziebarth argued that the Germans, and in particu­
lar the German-Greek Society, ought to develop and deepen this “natural relation” ex­
panding their efforts from science and economy to the cultural life o f Greece as the 
French influence over the country had increased since the beginning of the twentieth 
century.852 In short, it was in the Reich’s interest to nurture its friendship with Greece, 
which would be achieved through the mediation and collaboration with other institutions 
of the German-Greek Society and its branches in both countries. The official publication 
of the society was the “Hellas-Jahrbuch”, replacing the “H ella/’ journal, which was first 
published in Hamburg in 1921 and continued to be published until 1928. Its aim was to 
expand and strengthen the cultural, scientific and economic relations between Greece 
and Germany through relevant and original contributions.853
«so Ibid 
«si Ibid
852 M itteilungen der ‘'Vereinigung zwischen staatlicher Verbaende und Einrichtungen e.V” [u.a. Die 
Deutsch-G riechische Gesellschaft e.V. (Prof. Dr. E . Ziebarth)] 01.02.1939, ini PAAA, R 61274.
853 A fter its second issue in 1930, the “Hellas-Jahrbuch” was n o t published again until 1934/5 apparently 
for financial reasons. See: Undated docum ent entitled “Mitteilungen aus dem Arbeitsgebiet der Deutsch- 
Griechischen Gesellschaft” , in: BAK, R 57 neu/1063.
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As a number of activities relating to Germany’s foreign cultural propaganda were 
carried out through the German-Greek Society, it could be imagined that the institution 
would have been powerful enough and effective in promoting cultural policy abroad. 
While this might have been the case in Germany’s bilateral societies, clubs and unions 
elsewhere, it was not the case in Greece. The branch of the German-Greek Society in 
Athens only seemed to have a supplementary role in the Reich’s cultural propaganda 
programme, despite the fact -o r  perhaps because of it- that the branch in Athens was 
subject to the new guidelines for Germany’s bilateral institutions. In 1938, as it has al­
ready been mentioned above, behind the claims of promoting friendship and peace, the 
SS-Obergntppenfuebrer, Wemer Lorenz, understood the potential of these organisations 
created by German expatriates as an instrument of cultural propaganda. It was precisely 
this transformation that the Greek-German Society in Athens was trying to resist under 
Nazi party rule. In the summer of 1940, the professor of medicine and Head of h e  O f­
fice for German Professors at Universities Abroad (Letter des Auslands amtts der 
Do^entenschaft der deutscben Umversitaeten und Hochsehulcn), H. Baatz, reporting on his visit to 
Greece, he noted that the Athens branch of the German-Greek Union was no t 
determined enough to make an impact on the local society. He blamed the old 
committee for its lack of success, which remained rather inactive, despite its efforts to 
improve its friendly stance towards Germany.*54 It is true that the president of the 
committee (1938-1942), Marinos Geroulanos, the prominent surgeon with a bright career 
in both Germany and Greece, was one of the oldest members of the society. However, it 
seems that it was more his dislike of the Nazi ideology, rather than his age that made him 
reluctant to bring the society in line with Nazi guidelines. It is also true that the older 
members of the society had a different attitude towards it, treating it as a social club, 
rather than transforming it into a more political organisation, or moreover into a tool o f  
propaganda. The younger members, however, such as Professor Vlavianos, who was the 
secretary o f the society in Athens, seemed to be more willing to take on in a more active 
role. In his report on the Greek-German society in Athens, Baatz characterised Vlavianos 
as the driving force {tmbende Motor) behind the society’s activities. Vlavianos, who was 
awarded the Humboldt medal, tried indeed to invite German scholars to lecture in Ath­
ens. His efforts, however, do not seem to have been supported by the other members o f 854*
854 Bericht von P rof Baatz ueber seine Vortragsreise nach Gricchenland bctreffend die Gnechisch- 
Deutsche Gcsellschaft Auszug aus Bericht Prof Baatz ueber seine Vortragsreise nach Griechenland (Par-
tei 6102/40) 13.07.1940, in: PAAA, R 61271.
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the committee, as the Greek authorities apparently hindered these activities.855 The rivalry 
between other foreign societies in Athens, namely the Greek-English Society and the 
French Institute, were intensified in 1940. This time, it was the turn o f England to gain 
ground in Greece. The teaching o f English became more widespread and English schol­
ars were invited to lecture in the Greek capital. According to Baatz the lobbying of sev­
eral societies forced the Greek government to maintain a balance between these cultural 
nations, and therefore the number o f  foreigners that visited Greece also had to be bal­
anced.856 Three years later, during the occupation o f Greece by German, Italian and Bul­
garian troops, Germans reported that their cultural relations with the country were 
thriving, despite British propaganda against the philhellenic Germans!857 *The increasing 
interest o f the Greeks in German culture at the time apparently went beyond mere admi­
ration and respect for the German cultural and scientific achievements, hi many cases, 
opportunism provided an incentive for increased cultural co-operation between these 
countries.
Regardless of how effective these societies were in promoting Nazi propaganda, 
Germany sought official recognition o f its foreign cultural policy through high profile 
bilateral agreements. As it has already been shown, 1936 was the decisive year for the 
Third Reich’s foreign policy agenda. Among the changes, in the foreign policy planning 
was a series o f bilateral cultural agreements. The first o f  these agreements was signed 
with Hungary. Two years later, Italy, Japan, Spain became cultural partners with 
Germany, while the agreement with Hungary was renewed. Greece, Bulgaria, Romania 
and Slovakia joined the cultural partnership in the following years. It is interesting to 
observe that Greece was among the very first countries to ratify with Germany a cultural 
agreement, even though the country was not bound by any alliance pact to Germany as 
in the case for the other cultural partners. The reason behind this “early” agreement with 
a non-allied country was not solely the product o f Germany’s foreign policy agenda. The 
year 1938 marked a period o f Greek cultural rapprochement with France and Italy. On 
19 December 1938, the Greek state signed a cultural agreement with France following
ibid.
**Wd
857 Guenther Stein from Berlin reported on “Deutsch-gnechische K ulturbezieh im gen20.09.1943, in:
BAB, R 4902/ 11204.
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the initiative of the latter.858 The agreement provided for the exchange o f prominent 
professors and scientists who could produce original work, and it also recognised the 
existence o f two important French cultural institutions, namely the French School o f 
Athens and the Institute o f French Studies also in Athens.859 Soon afterwards, Italy 
approached Greece through the secretary of its embassy in Athens and requested a copy 
of this agreement on die grounds that it was also interested in signing a similar contract 
with Greece. Italy was also interested in knowing whether Greece had made cultural 
agreements with other countries, such as Germany.860 The Italian government was close 
to ratifying a cultural contract with Greece in 1937, however the negotiations fell through 
because the Italian authorities in the Dodecanese began persecuting the Greek islanders, 
closing Greek schools and dismissing the teachers in the summer of the same year. It was 
obvious that any cultural agreement that de facto recognised and respected the native 
language of the two participating countries could not be signed between Greece and 
Italy.861
While Italy made inquiries about the possibility of a cultural agreement with 
Greece, the latter approached Germany for the same reason, which had already signed a 
similar contract with its Italian ally. The German Reich welcomed the Greek initiative862 
even though it highlighted their contradictory attitude, in light o f the Greek 
postponement of “particularly important undertakings for the [German] cultural policy” 
over the past three to four years.863 The term “important cultural undertakings” referred 
to the failure to appoint Professor Rudolf Fahmer to the vacant chair o f German
853 AvayMwroxcK; Nopioc ox’ ocgi0 1608. ‘TTegt xuquoecik; tt£ ev Adipate UKOYgapeicnic ttj 19i  Aexe{iJ3gto» 
1938 Eufnpovtace ayeuxyic kqoc xa? rcveupatixat; xat xacAXiteyvtxdcs o^eoac fieta^o EXXaSoc xat TaAXiae” 
Etpjpege;; nj? Kopegvrjoeca; xou BaaiXetoo trj; EUuxSo?. (OEK) (Official Gazette), Teo^cx; I Iqojtov, Aq. 
OoXXoo 57,14.02.1939, See also: Auswaertiges Amt, (Stieve) to Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen 12.01.1939, 
in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesamdtschaft Athen File Nr. 63.
359 Avavwxoxixoc Nopcx; uir’ agt01608. ibid., Articles 1 and Z These were die only artides o f  the agreement
860 Unsigned notification on 0Z0Z1939 presumably o f  the secretary o f die Foreign Ministry in Athens to
the Minister o f Foreign Affairs , in: Icnogtxov Ag^dov Yaowpyeioo E&axeQLXuv (Historical Archive of the 
Greek Foreign Ministry, IAYE), A /10 /3 , 1939, 6. Supwpuvo IIveotJUXTUcrjc Suvepyotoia? jxexa$6 EMafkx; — 
IxctAiac.
862 Telegram o f the Greek Ambassador Rizo Ragabe in Berlin to the Greek Foreign Ministry in Athens on 
13.01.1939, in: IAYE, A / l l / 4 .23. regjiocvta — EXXa; oxeoei; 1938-1939.
863 Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen to Auswaertigen Amt 25.01.1939, in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesamdtschaft 
Athen File Nr. 63.
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philology that had been created in the previous year.864 865The German interest, however, in 
a bilateral cultural agreement with Greece differed from Greek expectations and also 
from similar agreements with their political allies, Italy and Spain.863 The basic aims of the 
cultural agreements with these two states included the creation of readership posts at the 
universities o f  the participating countries; the regular exchange o f students from 
universities and schools; scholarships and summer courses; the exchange o f school 
teachers; the creation o f  German schools; the translation of German books; the 
promotion o f film and radio propaganda; and exhibitions. Any activities that distorted 
the ‘‘historical truth” o f the countries in question were no t allowed.866 According to the 
German Ambassador in Athens, these provided a wide framework for cultural co­
operation with Greece, as Germany was more interested in the ancient culture of the 
country rather than modem Greece o r its contemporary language.867 As for the mutual 
character o f the agreement, this was regarded as largely rhetorical by the Germans, on die 
one hand, as the Greeks understood reciprocity only in terms of eagerness rather than 
action, according to the German Ambassador, and on the other hand, as there would 
never be an equal exchange o f  students, although he did no t provide any justification for 
this claim.868
The proliferation o f cultural agreements with the strong European countries only 
a few months before the outbreak o f war, could not be understood outside of the 
following context It seems on the one hand that Greece sought to secure its neutrality 
by making cultural allies. On the other hand, France, Italy and Germany wished to 
strengthen their cultural influence over the small Balkan country in order to encourage a 
political alliance in light o f the impending war, and perhaps even to control it by securing 
their own interests in the region.
864 See: BacnXtxöv Aiatoy^a ‘Tlegt /oocoascog au^ßäoEüjg try; B. Kußegwiaeu? xaa tou Kaöny^tTi ttj; 
regtiavucfi; OiXoXovtac!; xxt AcxyoTexvia? oxo Ilav. Aöyjvwv x. R. Fahrner.” Ecpr^egi? nqs Kaßegvrioeoii; xoo 
BaoiXetoo t EXXäSoc. (OEK) (OfScial Gazette), Tei^cx; IlgdiTov, Ag. OuWioo 31,20.10.1939.
865 Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen to Auswaertigen Amt 06.06.1939, im PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft 
Athen Füe Nr. 63-
866 Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen to Auswaertigen Amt 25.01-1939, im PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft 
Athen File Nr. 63.
867 Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen to Auswae rtigen Amt 06.06.1939, im PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft 
Athen FÜe Nr. 63.
868 lind.
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5.4. German propaganda. the Greek scientific community and the policy o f scholarships.
“Die besten Aktivisten sind zweifellos 
[die] gerade aus Deutschland zuxueckgekehrte 
junge griechische Wissenschafter.”*69
The increasing proximity and consequently, the growing influence o f Germany 
over the Greek state alarmed, -and even infuriated- its political rivals, particularly Britain. 
England was particularly displeased with the Greek leader, Metaxas, for his German- 
oriented policy, which jeopardised British interests in the broader region. England was 
most afraid of the prospect that Nazi Germany might seek to control the eastern 
Mediterranean, a strategic position for British interests in the Near East Germany had 
undoubtedly became involved in activities on Greek soil which gave British cause o f 
concern, such as the fortifications o f the Greek coasts, the construction o f which was 
taken over by military officials; the railway line between Athens and Saloniki; the plans 
for new stations in those towns; and above all the rearmament o f the Greek military 
forces.869 70 “Athens is suffering from German measles,” wrote a British admiral Usbome, 
in 1937, referring to Germany’s growing influence upon Greece since the seizure o f 
power by Metaxas and the dangers lurking behind the alliance with the Third Reich.871 “It 
is common knowledge,” continued Admiral Usbome, “that the trade agreement with 
Germany enables Greece to sell her tobacco to that country, receiving in exchange not 
cash but munitions, some o f them second-hand,” fearing that the Greeks might “invite 
future trouble”, if their alliance with the Germans went beyond commercial 
commitments.872 However, the British acknowledged the dominant position o f Germany 
in Greece not only in the economy but also on a cultural level as they admitted that it 
was “German, not French, [...] the foreign tongue most heard.”873 On the other hand,
869 Abstract from Prof. Baatz's report on his “Vortrags reise nach Griechenland betreffend die Griechisch- 
Deutsche Gesellschaft.” (Partei 6102/40) on 13*07.1940, in: PAAA, R 61271.
870 Political report o f  die German Ambassador in Athens, Prinz zu Erbach, to the Ministry o f Foreign Af­
fairs in Berlin, “Bericht des griechischen Gesandten in London” on 10.03.1937, im PAAA, R 61147. See 
also the political report “Die Achse Berlin-Rom und die Besserung der italienisch-griechischen Beziehun­
gen” on 29.05.1937, im PAAA, R 61147. Both reports were classified as secret (Geheim!).
871 Undated copy classified as Pol IV.2930 o f  the article o f Vice-admiral a. D. Usbome in die journal 




the Nazis proudly reported that their position in Greece had improved beyond expecta­
tion since 1936 and this was largely due to the sympathies o f Metaxas with the regime. 
Nevertheless, the British fears over German aspirations in the eastern Mediterranean 
seemed to be misplaced. It was precisely due to the lack o f direct interest in the region, 
argued the German ambassador, that the Greeks trusted Germans more than the British, 
Italians, or even the French.874 They admitted, however, that Greece regarded England as 
its “protector” {Scbut̂ macbt) in the case o f  conflict on the Aegean Sea, which was a con­
stant fear that had again come to the fore with the Abyssinian conflict in 1935.875
However, Metaxas’ appreciation of national socialist Germany did not leave 
much latitude for Britain to expand its influence over other aspects of Greek life. It was 
obvious that it was the golden age for Germany not only in business but also in terms o f 
its cultural influence over Greece. In 1937, Germany boasted that it was the leading im­
porter and exporter of goods in Greece, reporting that its business turnover had been 
increased from seventy-four million marks in 1933 to 132 millions in 1936, as a direct 
result o f its increasing cultural influence.876 This claim is corroborated by a number of 
institutions established not only for the systematization of the existing cultural under­
takings in Greece but also for the validation of its bilateral cultural co-operation. These 
activities were also aimed towards influencing higher education in Greece and attracting 
young scholars to Germany.877 More precisely, in 1934, a Greek-German Student Union 
was created at Athens University in order to promote student exchanges and to organise 
lecture evenings with German scholars based in Athens. A year later, G.F. Merkel, the 
tutor for German at Technical University, along with the German ambassador in Athens, 
Eisenlohr, set up the Mediation Office for the German-Greek Cultural Exchange (Mittel- 
stelk fu&r den deutscb-giecbischen Kulturaustauscb). It became the central organisation for stu­
dent exchanges, and, more precisely, for the campaigns to promote German Universities 
for advanced studies. The same office also organized and controlled the language propa-
874 Political report o f  the German. Ambassador in Athens, Prinz zu Erbach, to the Ministry of Foreign Af­
fairs in Berlin, “Die Achse Bedin-Rom und die Besserung der italienisch-griechischen Beziehungen” on 
29.05.1937, in: PAAA, R 61147.
878 Ibid.
870 Ibid.
877 Report o f Dr. Feist (Part I. Hochschulwesen) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 03.09.1938, in: PAAA, 
R  66599.
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ganda throughout Greece.878 H ie distribution of scientific literature that was difficult to 
obtain in Greece also was among the tasks o f the above office. In the framework o f this 
policy o f cultural mobility, the number o f prominent Greek academics who were invited 
to Germany, as well as the number o f scholarships, was increased.*79 The German-Greek 
Student Union and the Mediation Office operated under the auspices of the German 
Academy o f Munich. An agreement for the German-Greek students’ exchange was 
signed between the German Academic Exchange Office (DAAD) and the Athens Uni­
versity Club in 1937. According to the agreement, three students from each country 
would visit Greece and Germany each year respectively.880 As it has already been shown, 
a cultural agreement on an inter-govemmental level was signed between the two coun­
tries almost a year later, thus validating their long-standing cultural collaboration.
It is pertinent to analyse the nature of these long-standing cultural relations be­
tween Greece and Germany since 1933 and how they were advanced in die course of the 
following years before reaching their peak, just a few months before the outbreak of the 
war. In a ceremonial speech at the end o f  his tenure in 1933, Konstantinos Logotheto- 
poulos, the rector o f Athens University, admitted that the means for advancing of re­
search in applied pharmacology were very limited, thus hampering the capacity o f Greek 
scientists to work on issues o f practical importance. He underlined, however, that the 
situation would become worse, if Germany did not donate German journals to a number 
of laboratories such as anatomy, pathological anatomy, histology, experimental physiol­
ogy, pathological physiology, applied pharmacology, microbiology, hygiene, and anthro­
pology.881 This donation was made the following year.882 *Greek admiration for the supe­
rior quality of the advancement of the German scientific community was reflected in the
878 G.F.Merkel, Mittels telle fuer Deutsch-griechischen Kulturaustausch Athenr Mittelstelle der Deutschen 
Akademie Muenchen to Auswaertiges Amt Kulturabteilung, Berlin 21.02.1935, in: PAAA, R 64065-
879 Surprisingly enough the amount o f  800 maAs that was planned to become available for the Mittdstdle 
was suspended in 1935, as the German Ambassador in Athens considered that this expenditure was not 
essential. In die following year, the amount o f  money was reduced to 600 RM. See: Deutsche 
Gesandtschaft Athen to Auwaertigps Amt 21.03.1936, in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschafr Athen Nr. 63 
(Kukurpolitik: Schulen, Pnsse, Vmchiedenes, Wissenscbaft, 1935-1939).
880 Ibid.
881 Konstantinos Logo the topoulos, Professor o f  Gynaecology Report on the laboratory work on experi­
mental Pharmacology, directed by G. Joachimoglou [ExQeorj naga{jurutxft<; <t>otp[xaxokoYta; (Ateu6uvriic T. 
IttxncettiO'YA.oo)], in: LAP A, ngotavixoi Aoyoi (Rectors’ Speeches) 1932-33.
882 Speech o f  Stylianos Seferiadis, Professor o f  International Public Law, p.10, in: L5PA, riootavr/oi A oyot
(Rectors’ Speeches) 1933-34.
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efforts made by the Greek scientists to emulate German achievements not only through 
the journals but also through other means. In 1934, the professor of medicine at Athens 
University, Vlassios Vlassopoulos, made plans to establish a large laboratory for chemical 
medicine on the German model. Lacking experts to work at the lab, he contacted the 
“Reich’s Labour Society for the Social and Medical Service” (Reichsarbeiisgemeinscbaft der 
Berufe im sotgakn und aert̂ Bcben Diensti) and made a request for technical assistants.883 He 
avoided, however, having to sign a contract presumably for policy reasons, as the Greek 
scientific community might have been irritated at the official appointment of a foreigner 
at a Greek university.884 The need to be closer to the German sciences was not only due 
to the lack o f quality of Greece’s higher education. Certain ministries, such as agriculture, 
transport and public health also had an urgent demand for people with expert knowl­
edge, who usually came from the academic circles. In 1934, for example, Georgios Kara- 
kassounis, a civil servant in the Greek Ministry o f Hygiene, assistant at die Technical 
University o f  Athens and bursar o f the Rockefeller Foundation, was sent to the Techni­
cal University in Berlin in order to specialise in water and ship works.885 On the other 
hand, Georgios Joachimoglou, a professor of pharmacology and the director o f the 
respective laboratory at Athens University reported to the cultural attaché o f the German 
Embassy in Athens that it was more important on cultural political terms for German 
scholars to give series of lectures at the university, rather than an occasional lecture by a 
visiting professor.886 It was more likely that long-term lectures would encourage Greek 
students to choose a German university for advanced studies. Particular was the case of 
Vasilios Malamos, the son o f a Greek merchant in Hamburg. After studying medicine at 
the local university he received a one-year advanced research grant to work as an 
assistant at Hamburg University, which would apparently pave the way for a professorial
983 Rdchsarbeitsgerodnschaft^det Berufe im  sozialen und aertzlichen Dienste to Auswaetigen Amt on
23.03.1934, in: PAAA, R 64065.
384 See for instance the case of the entomologist Franz Maidl, the curator at die zoological department o f 
the Museum o f  Natural History in Vienna, who was applied to the zoological museum o f Athens 
University for a post in 1938 and the director's reply. In: Archive o f the Zoological Museum of Athens 
University (AZM), File Nr. 504-719, Jan. 1937 - Dec. 1938.
885 Verbalnote. Legation de Grece a Beilin to  Auswärtiges A m t on 26.3.1934, in: PAAA, R 64065. Also: 
List o f  “Studierenden (griechischen Gymnasial-professoren) in der Zeit vom Sommersemester 1929 bis 
Wintersemester 1931 /32”, im PAAA, R 64064.
886 ' ‘Aufzeichnung’’ o f die German Embassy in Athens to A e Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs in Berlin on
22.05.1934, im PAAA, R 64065.
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chair in Athens.887 8In addition, as an assistant and friend of Peter Muehlens, the director 
of the Institute for Tropical Medicine in Hamburg, Malamos later became his link to 
Greece, when the German doctor tried to establish a tropical institute in Athens.
Being aware o f the importance of these young scientists for both countries, 
Joachimoglou also raised the idea of following the French example of awarding prizes 
and diplomas to students which would give them prestige in Greece, and at the same 
time, promote the German cultural propaganda in this country. Joachimoglou, a German 
educated scientist himself with a strong career in Berlin, was regarded by many Germans 
as one o f the most significant Greek representatives of German science ” * Therefore, 
both of his suggestions, including the professors’ exchange and the awarding of diplomas 
to young scientists, were warmly supported by the German ambassador in Athens, 
Eisenlohr.889 Few months later, Joachimoglou was invited by the German Academy in 
Munich and the Friedrich-Wilhelm University in Berlin to become guest speaker, while 
Professor Borcherdt of Munich University was sent to Athens to give series o f lectures, 
in line with Joachimoglou’s proposal.890 In addition, as Malamos, another young Greek 
doctor, Antonios Valassis, was put forward for scholarship in Munich University in order 
to learn about the new advances in medicine, in particular the welfare of students. The 
proposal came from Kostantinos Zeggelis, the president of the Students’ Club of Athens 
University, professor of chemistry and a member of Athens Academy o f Sciences. 
Nevertheless, the number of Greeks who studied in Germany at die time on a German 
scholarship was very low. Eisenlohr reported to the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs in Berlin 
that almost thirty Greeks received grant from Alexander von Humboldt Sdftung in 1934, 
which was able to award only two scholarships a year, in addition to one for a student
887 IbuL\ Hochschulbehoerde Hamburg to Mi. Teidenge, Ministerialdirigcnt of the Auswaertigen Amt 
16.06.1932, PAAA, R 61147; Greek Ministry o f Education to the Recto rate o f Athens University. Signed 
notification by the Greek Ambassador in Berlin Rizos Ragabe, on 24.11.1937, in: Historical Archive o f 
Athens University {lorogoco Agjfdo navsmoTrjpLtou Afhjvuv, LAPA), Agy^do ngutoxoUou, 1-1 Aogtapoi 
KaBtiY^tuv (TIgoxr\gulft nXriQuoews E8quv xai dXXs; AiaStxaoie;) [Correspondence archive, 1-1 
Appointments of Professors] 1937-38.
888 He studied at Be din University and in 1918 until 1922 was appointed professor at this university.
889 German Ambassador in Athens (Eisenlohr) to Stieve, (Leiter der Rulturabtielung dcs Auswaertigen 
Amts) 02.05.1934, in: PAAA, R 64065.
890 Deutsche Akademie, Muenchen to Auswaertiges Amt z.H. von Heim Yizekonsul von Heinz, Berlin
12.06.1934, in: PAAA, R 64065; Der Preussische Minister fuer Wissneschaft, Kunst und Voflcsbildung, 
Berlin to Reichsministerium fuer Wissemchaft, Kunst und Volksbildung and to Auswaertiges Amt
11.08.1934, in: PAAA, R 64065.
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from the Technical University in Athens. It should be noted that in the early years of the 
Nazi cultural propaganda, priority for scholarships was given to human science 
candidates, while natural sciences and medicine regarded to be in the second place. In the 
field of technology, grants were only given exceptionally to candidates in disciplines of 
cultural political importance, such as engineering.891 In any case, the small number of 
Greek scholarships due to the limited budget available led Goering to admit during his 
visit to Greece that it put Germany's influence in the country at risk. He also promised to 
request the Prussian Ministry o f  Education to increase the number of grants to one 
hundred, not only for the two universities in Athens and Saloniki but also for the 
Technical University.892 More precisely, Goering promised to support an increase in the 
number o f scholarships given by the Industry and Commercial Chamber in Breslau 
leading a number of Greek students to study at Breslau University, which traditionally 
had close relations to the University o f Athens.893 In 1935, the number o f grants 
dedicated for students and assistants at Athens Technical University was increased from 
one to five.894 In the summer o f  1934, the students o f  Athens University created the 
Greek-German Union with the purpose o f bringing the Greek students closer to the 
German scholars who visited and lectured at the university and promoting student 
exchanges o f  German and Greek. At the inaugural meeting, representatives of the 
German Embassy in Athens were also present acknowledging the importance o f the 
Greek initiative.895 In the academic year 1935-6, the Athens University Student Club, in 
conjunction with the Deutsche Studentemcbaft in Berlin, sent twelve Greek students to 
Germany for a month within the student exchange programme in order to gain an in­
891 Central Office DAAD to the Deutschen Auslandsvertretungen. Zweigstellen der DAAD. 
Akademischen Auslandsstellen. (Den Mitgliedern des Auswahlausschusses der Alexander v. Humboldt- 
Stiftung und den Mitgliedern des Vorstandes und Senats des Deutschen Akademischen Austauschdienstes 
zur Mitkenntnis.) on 22.06.1935, in: BAK, ZSg 137/18.
992 German ambassador in Athens (Eisenlohr) to The Ministry o f Foreign Affairs in Berlin on 26.05.1934, 
in: PAAA, R 64065.
893 German ambassador in Athens (Eisenlohr) to the Ministry of Foreign A ff in  in Berlin on 27.06.1934, 
in: PAAA, R 64065.
894 German ambassador in Athens (Eisenlohr) to Stieve, Leiter der Kulturabtielung des Auswärtigen Amts 
25.10.1934; Reichs- und Preussischen Minister fuer Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung, Berlin 
(Rgmme) to DAAD, Bedin 14.12.1935, in: PAAA, R 64065.
895 German ambassador in Athens (Eisenlohr) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bedin on 20.07.1934, 
in: PAAA, R 64065.
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sight into the German culture. An equal number of German students was expected to 
visit Greece the following year.*9*
This euphoric climate between the Greek and German university communities 
was augmented following the German decision to reduce fees for all foreign students. 
The aim of this decision, on the one hand was to increase the number of foreign stu­
dents, and on the other, it was considered as “the most effective measure against the 
nasty propaganda of immigrants abroad”.*97 This measure had been introduced since the 
academic year 1932-33 for Greeks who did not yet have student status but were expected 
to receive it as they were attendants (Hoererov Gasthoem).89S The facilitation for the Greek 
students at Munich University, which attracted a large numbers of them however, was 
decided in the abovbe context but also because the Greek community in Munich was 
able to put some pressure on the local authorities which was impossible for the Germans 
to ignore. At the beginning of 1935, a decision allowed Greek students at Berlin Univer­
sity to obtain a full exemption from fees.*896 79 It is interesting to note here that scholarships 
for purely political “enlightenment” were given to foreigners who applied through their 
national official authorities that were sympathetic to the Nazi regime. The governor of 
Athens, Kostantinos Kotzias, was certainly among these individuals. On the occasion of 
his visit to the Fuehrer on 5 May 1936, he suggested that the Reich could support ten to 
twelve young Greeks of his choice that would be sent to Germany for national socialist 
training, particularly to forge links with the Reich’s Youth (Reichsjugend) and the Labour 
Service (ArheiitsdiensiJ.900 Kotzias* proposal was fully supported by Hitler.901 These kind of
896 Speech o f P. Zervos, professor o f geometry. International Student Relations p. 25, in: LAP A, nputowixot 
Aovot (Rectors' Speeches) 1935-36.
897 Auswaertigps Amt (i-A. gez. Oster) to Reichskultusministerium z.Hd. von Herm Reg. Rat Burmeister, 
Beriin 20.11.1934; Bayer. Staatsministerium fuer Unterrichtund Kultus, Muenchen to Bayer. Staatskanzlei
27.12.1934, in: PAAA, R 64065. See also: $  tie ve. from the Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs to the “Bayerische 
Staatsministerium fuer Unterncht und Kultus" in Munich on 23.12.1933, in: PAAA, R 64065.
898 See the correspondence o f  the Greek Embassy in Beriin with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Ministry o f Education in Athens, in: Iotopixov A Y z o u g y e o u  Egompixuv (Historical Archive o f  the 
Greek Foreign Ministry, LA YE), A / l l / 3 , 1935. EXXrjvo-yeppicrvtxEi oxeoeu;.
899 German Ambassador in Athens (Eisenlohr) to the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs in Berlin on 19.02.1935, 
in: PAAA, R 64065.
900 Kotzias was one o f  the few Greeks who was personally received by Hitler. See: Re n a t e  Me issn e r ,  H
eOvtxoooototMonxri Teeiiotviat xat t] EXXaSoc xata  ttj Stapxetat tn.c |xetix£ xtis 8txTocio£?ia<;, in: H a g e n  FLEI­
SCHER, N ik o s  Sv o r o n o s  (eds.), EXXaSa 1936-1944. Aixxatogia — Katoxn -  Avrioracnq. Flpaxtixi A’ 
AtE0vo6$ 2uve8gtoo ZuYX0°vri? Icrtopia^ A0fjva 1989, [Greece 1936-1944: Dictatorship-Occupation-
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scholarships, however, were neither part of the foreign cultural political project nor did 
they come from the same budget with Alexander v. Humboldt Stifim gj DAAD.
Although the awarding of grants was regarded as essential for the promotion of 
the German-Greefc cultural relations, there were some reasons for limiting the number o f 
scholarships given for graduates o f the Technical University in Athens. According to the 
central office o f the DAAD, this was due to previous experience which showed that the 
cultural-political effect was greater on the students o f humanities rather than those who 
studied technical subjects.* 90102 This explains why the grants from Alexander von Humboldt 
Stiftung were given exclusively to young scholars o f humanities including music.903 How­
ever, this statement was treated with particular skepticism in Athens. The ambassador, 
Eisenlohr, warned that Germany risked losing its leading position in the field of technical 
sciences in Greece. He argued further that there would be serious material losses for 
their economy, if the young generation of Greek engineers went to France or Italy in­
stead o f Germany.904 Therefore, the availability o f only five scholarships for technical 
subjects was two low and was recommended that it should be increased. It was not rare 
for young Greek scholars to apply for a grant through other channels rather than the of­
ficial ones, namely the Mediation Office of the German Academy in Munich. This was 
made up of Greeks who were on leave from a ministry or university. The patronage of a 
personal or a high-ranking political network was often necessary in order to receive a 
German grant. Needless to say that regardless o f the influence of the cultural propaganda 
on Greek society, the creation of a future elite in Greece that would be sympathetic to­
wards Nazi Germany would provide a guarantee for German interests in the country. It 
should not be forgotten that it was the prominent members o f all spheres of Greek soci­
ety that had initially given their support to the German cultural policy in the first place,
Resistance. Proceedings of the 1*' International Congress o f  Contemporary History, Athens 1989], pp. 50- 
58, here p. 54. Nevertheless, in 1941 Kotzias switched sides denouncing his affiliation to  Nazism and fled 
to the United States. See his correspondence with the Greek community in Chicago and the exiled Greek 
government in London during his stay in the United States from August 1941 until 1946, In: EU^vtxo, 
Aoyotexvixo xoci Ioroputo Aqx&o (Greek Archive for Literature and History, ELIA), Kostantinos Kotzias. 
File Nr. 2, Correspondence 1940-1945, Subfile 2.2 [1941].
901 Abschrifit der Deutsche Gesandtschaft A then to Herm Reichsminister des Auswaerrigen 06.05.1936, in: 
PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen Nr. 32 (Deutsch-Griechische Beziehungen 1933-1939).
902 DAAD, Berlin to Reichs- und Preussischen Minister fuer Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung, 
Beilin. 16.01.1935, in: PAAA, R 64065.
*» Ibid
904 Eisenlohr to Auswaerrigen Amt 10.05.1935, in: PAAA, R 64065.
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and it was indeed continued these individuals to support it- Candidates for medicine and 
related disciplines as well as candidates from certain ministries, such as the Ministry of 
Finance, Public Health and Agriculture, were regarded by the Germans as an important 
investment. Within the framework o f  this policy, grants were awarded to the above men­
tioned Greek scientists, Vasilios Malamos and Antonios Valassis. Furthermore, in 1935, 
Georgios Trimis, the inspector for labour issues in the Ministry of Finance applied for 
and received support from the Reich for almost eighteen months to study social and la­
bour issues in Germany. In his case, were Nikolaos G. Photias, a professor at the School 
of Commerce in Athens, and Stephanopoulos, the Greek Minister of Economy who 
acted as mediators.905 In 1936, at foe request of foe German Ambassador in Athens foe 
Humboldt-Stiftung and the Mitteleurcpaeiscbe Wirtschcftstag agreed to allocate grants to Greek 
students from the newly established faculty for veterinary medicine at Athens Univer­
sity.906 However, in the same letter to foe Ministry o f Foreign Affairs in Berlin the Ger­
man Ambassador suggested that foe cultural-political campaign in Greece should be sus­
pended for a while, despite its important role in Metaxas’ Greece. The justification given 
for foe suspension related to the currency shortage, which even threatened foe operation 
of the branches of the German Academy in Greece.907
If the suspension took place at all, it must have applied to the activities linked to 
the German Academy. It is certain, however, that, in 1937, on the occasion o f foe cen­
tenary of Athens University and Technical University, Germany donated a significant 
amount of books to the latter institution and the German ambassador in Athens re­
quested an increase of foe secret fund given to foe Embassy for the promotion o f foe 
relations between the two countries.908 A similar donation o f books was also planned for 
Athens University, whose festivities would be attend by the German Minister of Educa­
tion, Bernhard Rust909 In addition, at foe festivities of the Technical University, foe 
Siemens company planned to establish an electro-technical laboratory at foe university
9(5 Eisenlohr to Auswaertigen Amt 26.06.1935; DAAD, Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung (Dr. Goepel), 
Berlin to Auswaertigen Amt, Berlin 11.07.1935, in: PAAA, R 64065.
906 Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen to Auswaertigen Amt, Berlin 19.10.1936, in: PAAA, R 64065.
908 German Ambassador in Athens, Prinz zu Erbach to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Herm Geheimrat
Dienstmann), on 20.02.1937, in; PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Athen Nr. 50, Band 1. The document 
was classified as secret (Gehcim!)
909 Political report of the German Ambassador in Athens, Prinz zu Erbach, to the Ministry of Foreign Af­
fairs in Berlin, “Bericht des griechischen Gesandten in London” on 10.03.1937, in: PAAA, R 61147.
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and to donate it by the German Ambassador.910 The awarding of medals and die tide of 
honorary member to prominent Greek scholars was also among die German plans. It is 
interesting to note that Rust received an official invitation from the rector o f  Athens 
University to attend die festivities, an invitation that was not extended to the Minister of 
France, who was going to send a delegate from the Sorbonne University.911 This gesture 
was particularly appreciated by the Germans, which, combined with a last-minute deci­
sion of the Athens University senate to honour Bernhard Rust in a special ceremony 
before the official festivities, was a clear sign of the German cultural precedence over its 
rivals.912 It has already been shown, 1937 was the golden year for die strengthening of the 
German-Greek cultural relations, bolstered by a number o f organisations created in the 
same year. In the following years, Germany’s cultural activity shifted in favour o f the 
natural sciences. In August 1942, about a year after the German occupation o f Greece, it 
was reported that thirty-two out of seventy-six Greeks were enrolled at German technical 
universities while another thirty-two were students at its universities and academies for 
medicine.913 Shortiy afterwards, the first attacks on die laboratories of Athens University 
were reported.914 The confiscation o f venues, the atrocities o f the German troops and the 
lack o f food led the majority o f the Greek academic community to change its previously 
favourable attitude towards its “intellectual motherland”.915
910 Ibzd.
911 In the end, the French Minister attended the festivities and he was also awarded an honorary doctorate 
from the University of Athens like his German counterpart, Bernhard Rust
912ibid.
913 Report of the Buero fuer Studentenkulturaustausch, Berlin- Infonnatiomdienst, "Griechische Studcnten 
in Deutschland” 10.08.1942, BAB, R 4902/ 11204.
914 The incident related a collection of rare bird eggs held at die university’s zoological laboratory and 
museum. See: G. Pantazis, director of Athens Zoological Museum to the rector of Athens University on 
24.09.1942, in: Archive of Zoological Museum (AZM), File Nr. 901-1190, Jan. 1941-Dec. 1948.
915 See: GEORGE SKLAVOUNOS, “Aoyo? ot*iv Axa8r;pta to Xapuva 1942. «H Axa8«pia apwirai»”, in: 
EziBe&qtjoti Tiyyrfc, Year H ', Band IE ', Issue Nr. 87-88, March - April 1962, pp. 298-299.
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5.5. Scientific expeditions to Greece and their cultural mission.
If awarding grants to foreigners was an effective instrument that was expected to 
be redeemed in the near future in Germany's interest, the participation o f experts in 
international conferences was regarded a direct promotion o f the German image and 
prestige in the scientific circles abroad. Those conferences usually turned out to be 
cultural political arenas, particularly when their organisation was under governmental 
auspices. Recognising the significance o f  propaganda at foreign conferences, the National 
Socialists tried to ensure through bureaucratic mechanisms that only pro-Nazi scholars 
would be allowed to stand for the Aryan science abroad, often damaging the reputation 
of what was known as German science. This political selection of scientists was usually 
reflected in the official national delegations at foreign conferences, which were not, 
however, consisted of party’s favourites alone. The scientific expertise as a criterion of 
campaigning for the German intellect abroad could not be ignored. In addition, the 
eminent German scientists had already established their networks abroad and it was 
often the case the invitations for participating in international scientific meetings to be 
sent personally to them rather than the German authorities alone.
As the Balkans had become a ground of cultural political rivalry, particularly 
between Germany and France, the international meetings organised there did not only 
reflect the efforts of these two countries to advertise their national intellect. Moreover, 
they sought to increase their influence over the Balkan states, at first on cultural and then 
on political and economic level, because “a good precursor for economy and politics [...] 
is science”, as a German prominent scientist emphasised in 1936.916 It is noteworthy, that 
several scientific international meetings took place in the southeastern Europe during the 
1930s, most o f them with the initiative of the local governments, which were in a 
modernising process. At the same time, congresses were organised between the Balkan 
countries almost every year, aiming at the scientific and economic co-operation but also 
at strengthening the ties between them. Bulgaria and Albania however, tried to keep 
aloof from the Balkan Union due to their alliances with Germany and Italy respectively. 
It is no t a coincidence, therefore, that most of those conferences took place in Turkey, *23
916 Report of Friedrich Zahn (Praesident des Bayerischen Statistischen Landesamts und Prof, an der 
Universitaet München) to Reichsminister f. Wissenschaft Erziehung u Volksbildung on 16.12.1936 on the
23d Meeting of the International Institute for Statistics taken place on 27 September until 4 October 1936 
in Athens, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2996, BL 84 (pp. 7-8)
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which held a neutral position at the time and many Jewish scholars found refuge at its 
universities, particularly in Istanbul.91' Nazi Germany kept an open eye at those meetings 
and the role o f Jews with regard to its influence over the region’s scientific community 
and its image abroad. The Fourth Congress of Balkan Doctors took place in Istanbul on 
7 until 10 October 1936, in which, apart from Turkey, participated Romania, Yugoslavia 
and Greece. What the Nazis wished to know about this scientific meeting was the 
position o f the participants towards the German medicine and National Socialism. 
Moreover, they wanted to know through the official channel of the German Embassy in 
Ankara, whether the ‘Very shrewd Jews” were represented at the conference and if they 
dominated the meeting.917 18 This information was very important for the Germans for 
political and cultural-political reasons, as they knew about the intense struggle of the 
immigrants in Turkey against die Third Reich and the Nazi professors that had been 
appointed at Turkish universities.919 According to the Nazis, Turkey’s manipulations were 
very tactful in blocking the dominance of the Jewish specialists who lived and worked in 
the country and participated in the conference.920 In the next conference of the Balkan 
doctors organised again in Istanbul in September 1938, Turkey’s position towards the 
Jewish scientific community was even clearer. This time no Jew from the University of 
Istanbul was invited to participate in the medicine conference and their presence was 
restricted to that of the mere attendant.921 It should be noted that apart from Turkey, 
Greece and Yugoslavia did not include any Jews in their delegations.922 The explicit 
position o f the Turkish government towards the Jewish scientific community was due to 
the 1938 new migration policy. According to this policy, the emigrants who were coming 
to Turkey had to display a Christian identity, while ships with emigrants heading to 
Palestine were not allowed to stop in Turkey without the permission from the British
917 About two hundred scientists and artists were forced by political and racial reasons to leave Germany 
and to immigrate to Turkey between 1933 and 1938. Among them was the eminent scientist Ernst Reuter. 
See: ÖZDEN UZUNOGLU, Tuerkei’, in: WOLFGANG Be n z  e t  al. (ed.), Enzyklopaeidie des 
Nationalsozialismus, Munich 1997, pp. 768 £
918 Der Stellvertreter des Fuehrers, Stab, NSDAP Muenchen (Abschrift) to the Reichs- und Pieussischen 
Minister des Innern on 15.12.1936, in: BAB, R4901/ 2740-1.
919 Ibid.
920 German Embassy in Ankara to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beilin on 09.04.1937, irr BAB, R 
4901/ 2740-1.




administration in Palestine. These developments were due to Turkey’s economic and 
commercial rapprochement to the Third Reich and in particular its export of chromium 
to the Allies’ enemy.* 925
Medicine conferences also took place in Greece. Athens organised the Third 
International Conference for Comparative Pathology on 15 until 18 April 1936, inviting 
national delegates from around the world. Pathologists, veterinarians, parasitologists, 
microbiologists, and tropical hygienists took part in this interdisciplinary conference and 
discussed urgent problems o f  their field. The two previous conferences for comparative 
pathology took place in Paris, the first in 1912 and the second in 1931. At the second one 
Germany did not send any scholars due to its strained relations with France.924 As for the 
conference in Athens, Germany initially rejected the Greek invitation. The explanation 
they gave was that the planned period for the event was unfavourable for the German 
scientists, who u*ould still be engaged in teaching duties on the chosen date. The truth 
was, however, that the Germans were hesitant to participate in a conference, in which the 
French influence was expected to be overwhelming, barely leaving any space to Germany 
to make its voice heard. It is interesting to note that the Greek organisers sent personal 
invitations to some German scientists instead to the German government, namely to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Science and Education.925 One might 
expect that the scientists who personally received an invitation, in order to become 
members o f the delegation, would try to convince the official authorities for the 
importance o f their inclusion to the national delegation. In fact, what is recorded to be 
argued by the scholars was the importance of Germany’s participation as a nation for the
523 OzDEN UZUNOGLU, Tuericei', ibid.
224 R. Roessle (Biological Institute at Beilin University) to Prof. Dr. Behrens (Minister of Education) on 
06.07.1935, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935.
925 Among the scientists who received personal invitation from Bensis and A  Codounis and were 
requested to speak at the conference were R. Roessle at the Biological Institute at Berlin University, 
Professor Uhlenhuth, the director of the Institute for Hygiene at the University of Freiburg LBrsg., and 
Professor Friedrich Koch, the director of the University Hospital and Polyclinic in Tuebingen. However, 
when the Greek committee was informed that the prominent neurologist, B. Fischer-Wasels, was 
interested in participating in the conference, it replied that the invitation was officially sent to the 
government and not to individual scientists. This inconsistency of the Greeks perhaps indicates the role the 
personal networks played even in cases of state-formed delegations. See: Bensis and Codounis to Prof. B. 
Fischer-Wasels, Neurologisches Institut in 12.1935, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935.
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promotion o f  its scientific and cultural-political interests.926 However, this perception of 
the international scientific meeting in Athens, as it was expressed by some German 
scientists, is no t surprising. I t should be underlined, however, apart from the fact that the 
national feeling o f the German academia had been strengthened during the Weimar 
Republic, the argument that an international conference was o f great national importance 
was also made in order the scientists to get funds for their travelling expenses. However, 
after Hitler’s assumption o f  power, nationalism became the core of the state’s 
organisation. Scientists had to be aligned to a number o f guidelines that would secure, as 
the Nazis believed, the interests o f the Reich to ultimate degree. The arguments of the 
scientists, therefore, were in this line, in order to convince the Nazi authorities to permit 
them to travel abroad, despite the fact that many o f them were not sympathetic to the 
Nazi regime.
The significance o f the German scientific presence in Athens’ conference was 
underlined by the Greek scientific community, which was very disappointed at the 
German initial refusal. At the same time, Greek scholars exerted pressure on their 
German colleagues arguing that their absence from such an important meeting would be 
unjustified.927 It is also reported that the president o f the Greek organisers, Vladimiros 
Bensis, who was educated in France, would resign his presidency, in the case of a 
German delegation was missing from Athens’ conference.928 It seems that all the above 
led German scientists to change their mind and put pressure on the Nazi government 
and finally send a delegation to Athens. However, the number of national representatives 
initially permitted by the Nazi authorities was very small. The head of the delegation, von 
Bergmann, opposed the government’s decision to  allow only five scientists to represent 
Germany abroad, while France planned to send sixty to eighty people to Greece, 
indicating the “enormous cultural propaganda” Germany’s rival prepared for Greece.929 
Von Bergmann also criticised the fact that not a single German pathologist was on the 
list o f delegates for a conference dedicated to pathology. He suggested that at least ten
926 Prof. Uhlenhuth (Direktor des Hygienischen Institus der Universitaet Freiburg i.Brsg.) to Reichs- und 
Preussischen Minister £ Wissenschaft Erzie hung und Volksbildung on 03.07.1935, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935. 
527 V. Bensis, president of the Greek organisation committee and A  Codounis to R. Roessle (Biological
Institute at Berlin University) on 25.06.1935, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935.
923 Bencht des Letters der deutschen Delegation (Bergmann) ueber den 3- Intemationalen Kongress der 
vergleichenden Pathologie in Athen vom 15-18 April 1936, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935.
929 Prof Dr. G. von Bergmann, (Director o f the II. Med. Univ. Clinic) to Interior Minister Fricke on
27.1.1936, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935.
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scientists should represent the Reich and he named four eminent pathologists (Uhlen- 
huth from Freiburg, Fis cher-Was els from Frankfurt, Aschoff and Roessle from Berlin) as 
well as the well known in the Balkan region, Peter Muhlens from Hamburg, to be in­
cluded in the list. The exclusion o f those scientists, who were invited by the organisers in 
Athens, would make bad impression, argued von Bergmann, to the international scien­
tific community. He finally warned the German authorities that, should the matter of 
delegation were not to be changed, he would not travel to Athens.930 It seems that Berg- 
mann’s pressure brought the desired result and forced the Ministry of the Interior, to ap­
prove travelling permission for eleven scholars, including those suggested by the German 
scientist.931 It is rather peculiar that v. Bergmann was not assigned leader of the German 
delegation by the Ministry o f the Interior, which initially chose the four representatives, 
but by the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, whose cultural section the German scientist con­
tacted in the spring o f 1935. Von Bergmann had visited Athens at Easter o f 1935, and he 
was invited to the Prime Minister's office, Panagis Tsaldaris. The prominent German sci­
entist reported to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin that he was approached by the secretary 
of the Greek organising committee, Professor Anton Codounis, who made a personal 
request to him to create a delegation for the planned congress in Athens including Vol­
hard, Koch and Muehlens. The Greek organisers had already sent invitations to those 
scientists asking them to give lectures at the conference and expressing their wish that 
the German science would be strongly represented in Athens.932 As v, Bergmann could 
not reassure his Greek colleague at the time, whether he were to join the German dele­
gation or not, he advised Codounis to make the proposal to Berlin via the Embassy in 
Athens.933 *In the end, the German scientist went to Athens, presumably with the encour­
agement of the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs. V. Bergmann reported in 1936, that his
930 7b id
931 Apart from G- von Bergmann participated in the conference Friedrich Koch, the director of the 
University Clinic in Tuebingen; Dr. Uhlenhuth, the director of the Institute for Hygienics in Freiburg 
i.Brsg.; H. Miessner, the director of the Institute for Hygiene at the Veterinary School in Hannover, F. 
Volhard, the professor at the Faculty of Medicine at Frankfurt University and the director of the University
Clinic in Frankfort; R. Roessle from the Biological Institute at Berlin University, Professor Aschoff from 
Freiburg; Poppe, the professor for Animal Sanitation and Pathology in Rostock; the botanist O. Appel 
from Berlin; H. A  Gins from the Robert Koch Institute for Infectious Diseases, and the Balkan expert, 
Peter Muehlens, from the Institute for Tropical Diseases in Hamburg.
933 Bericht des Leiters der deutschcn Delegation (Bergmann) ueber den 3. Internationalen Kongress der
vergleichenden Pathologie in Athen vom 15-18 April 1936, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935.
933 Ib id
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choice as a leader of the German delegation was made in agreement between the Foreign 
Ministry and the Ministry for the Interior.954 However, it seems that the rivalries between 
these ministries as well as with the Ministry of Education, which was explicit about in­
creasing the number of the German representatives in Athens,955 played a role in this de­
cision.
The congress in Athens turned out to be a field for cultural propaganda for the two 
major cultural rivalries in the Balkan region, France and Germany, as it was often the 
case in those kind of international meetings at the time. The fact that the two previous 
international congresses for comparative pathology took place in France and the absence 
of Germany from the last one gave France some cultural precedence over the Reich. The 
Germans already knew that their presence in Greece would be outshone by France, who 
planned to boost her cultural influence by sending a large number of delegates in Ath­
ens.936 The use o f French by almost all scientists at the conference was certainly a strong 
evidence o f France’s cultural predominance in international meetings. In fact, French had 
been re-established as the language par excellence among intellectuals after the Versailles 
Treaty. It was not a surprise for the Germans, therefore, that the Greek King and the 
president o f  the committee, Vladimiros Bensis, used French as they opened the pro­
ceedings o f the congress, which was hosted at the building o f the Greek Parliament.937 
The representatives of all the other countries, which were about twenty, also spoke in 
French, except, o f course, from the German delegates, whom the majority o f the Greek 
doctors as well as many of other participants were able to understand very well.938
It should be noted that beside G. v. Bergmann who officially reported to the Reich’s 
Ministry o f Education on the congress, the director o f the Institute for Hygiene at the 
Veterinary School in Hannover, H. Miessner, also sent his remarks about the scientific 
event in Athens to the above ministry. Miessner was one of the first five scientists 
assigned by the Reich’s Ministry o f the Interior to travel to Greece and it appears that he 




937 “Beobachtungen waehiend des III. Internationalen Kongress fuer veigleichende Pathologie in Athen 
15-18 April 1936 von Dr. Miessner, Hygienisches Institut der Tierærztlichen Hochschule Hannover”,
5.5.1936, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935.
938 Ibid Also: Bericht des Leiteis der deutschen Delegation (B eigm ann) ueber den 3. Internationalen 
Kongress der vergleichenden Pathologie in Athen vom 15-18 April 1936, in: BAB, R4901/ 2935.
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from v. Bergmann’s. Both scientists focused on the Reich’s cultural supplanting by 
France, as well as on the friendly position of Greeks towards the Reich and their wish to 
strengthen their ties with German science* Both Miessner and v. Bergmann reported that 
there were disputes between the Greek doctors that were due to their educational 
background. The rivalry between the doctors who studied in Germany and those who 
were educated in France were, according to v. Bergmann, more intensive within the 
francophile Athenian society rather than in the Peloponnese, the sympathies of which 
with Germany were much stronger.939 Despite the fret that the majority o f the Greek 
professors o f human medicine were German educated, the discipline of veterinary 
medicine was dominated by French educated scientists. Miessner argued, however, that 
the French influence and cultural dominance in Greece was not well accepted by all 
Greek veterinarians and this was leaving some space to Germany to increase its own 
influence on the field in Greece. More precisely, given the lack of a veterinary faculty at 
Athens University, Miessner contacted the professor o f pharmacology, George 
Joachimoglou, and tried to convince him of creating a veterinary faculty in Athens.940 
Miessner also suggested that the new faculty could be organised in line to the similar 
faculties in Ankara Turkey and Iran, which had been established with German 
contribution.941 The German scientist noted further that Greece seemed to be “a good 
ground for the German interests and [the promotion of] friendship” and it would be for 
their concern to help young Greeks to study veterinary medicine in Germany granting 
them scholarships.942 Miessner’s recommendation found support from the German 
ambassador in Athens, Prinz Victor zu Erbach -  Schoenberg, who suggested the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin to include the scholarship foundations Alexander von 
Humboldt and the Mitteleuropaeische Wirtscbaftstag also Greek veterinary students in their 
lists.943
939 Bericht des Leiters der deutschen Delegation (Bergmann) ueber den 3- Internationalen Kongress der 
vergleichenden Pathologie in Athen vom 15-18 April 1936, in: BAB, R 4901/ 2935.
940 “Beobachtungen waehrend des III. Internationalen Kongress fuer vergleichende Pathologie in Athen 
15-18 April 1936 von Dr. Miessner, Hygienisches Institut der Heraerztlichen Hochschule Hannover”,
5.5.1936, irr BAB, R 4901/ 2935.
941 Ibid.
942 Ibid.
943 German Embassy in Athens to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Durchschlag) on 19.10.1936, in: BAB, R 
4901/ 2935.
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The “good ground” that Greece offered, as v. Bergmann argued, was due to the 
country’s strong sympathy with Germany, in particularly within the intellectual circles, 
which was expressed on every occasion. He explained this arguing that the educated 
Greeks were very proud of the German archaeologists, such as Schliemann, 
Furtwaengler, Humann, Doerpfeld, and Wiegand and their achievements in Greece and 
they regarded them as their “national cultural patrons”.944 The leader of the German 
delegation did not miss the opportunity to stress “die old interdependence between 
ancient Greece and Germany” in the opening and closure ceremonies o f  the conference 
that took place in the Greek Parliament and the ancient altar of Asklipios in Epidaurus 
respectively.945 It is obvious that v. Bergmann was very much aware o f his role as a 
delegate o f the Third Reich and he acted accordingly, emphasising the relation between 
the Arian and the ancient Greek culture also on the occasion of the Eleventh Olympic 
Games that were hosted in Berlin in the same year.
The promotion of Nazi Germany’s image at the conference in Athens seemed to 
have been crowned with success. V. Bergmann wrote that not only the Greeks expressed 
great enthusiasm about his speech on Germany’s cultural affiliation to the ancient Greek 
culture, but they also admired the fact that "Germany was ruled by a strong hand and, in 
contrast to Greece, the constant parliamentary misdeeds did not any longer exist”.946 The 
Greek sympathy with the Nazi regime was also expressed in an evening reception held by 
the King’s personal doctor, Anastasopoulos, who invited eighty personalities -primarily 
doctors- from the germanophile circle o f Athens in honour of the German delegation. 
The importance o f German presence at the conference was not only recognised by the 
Greeks, but also by the French delegation. More precisely, the oldest scholar at the 
meeting, the eighty-two year old French doctor, Achard, proposed the creation of a 
permanent organising committee consisted of three Germans, three French and one 
Greek scientist. The proposal was viewed as a triumph o f the German medicine by the 
German scientists, given that the number of their representatives was much smaller in 
comparison to the French delegation. Nevertheless, v. Bergmann tactfully avoided to 
accept the French proposal, on the grounds that the political tensions between the two 
countries were still strong at the time. It is not a coincidence that few months later, in
944 Bericht des Leiten der deutschen Delegation (Bergmann) ueber den 3. Internationalen Kongress der 




September 1936, Greeks and Belgians organised the tVLU Congris International des Haute 
Culture Medicaid in Athens, which basically was a meeting o f French-speaking and Greek 
doctors.947 It seems that France and Belgium acted very fast to gain back any ground they 
had lost from the Germans in April’s conference. On the other hand, Greeks also 
hastened to pre-empt Fmace’s disaffection towards them, as France was a good cultural 
ally to Greece.
However, the “23"* Meeting o f the International Institute for Statistics” that took 
place in Athens from 27 September until 4 October 1936, with the initiative of the Greek 
government, seemed to have a different purpose than a propagandistic one for 
Germany’s interests. At least, this was what the president o f  the International Institute 
for Statistics and the congress, Friedrich Zahn, argued for, who, like v. Bergmann, 
referred to the Olympic Idea in his opening speech, on the occasion of the Olympic 
Games. Zahn stressed the fact that the Olympic spirit o f the international co-operation 
should also be applied to the field o f science and in particular to the science of 
statistics.948 It is worth mentioning that Zahn was the first German who was elected 
president of an international scientific organisation after the First World War, in 1931.949 
It is also interesting that despite the fact that he could use the meeting in Athens in his 
country’s cultural political interest^ he did not seem to jeopardise his international 
scientific esteem transforming the conference into a political arena. Therefore, die 
working language of the conference was French, while interpreters for French, German 
and English also were available, as it was the case at previous meetings of the Institute, in 
order “to help the exchange of ideas”.950 However, Zahn stressed on his report to the
947 President of the Greek committee was again Vladimiros Bensis. See: BAB, R 4901/ 2740. Except from 
an advertising poster with the detailed program and the names of all o f the participants, there is no other 
relevant material in the file.
948 Report of Friedrich Zahn (Praesident des Bayerischen Statistischen Landesamts und Prof an der 
Umversitaet München) on the 23“* Meeting of the International Institute for Statistics taken place on 27 
September until 4 October 1936 to the Reichsminister £ Wissenschaft Erziehung u Volksbildung in 
Athens, on 16.12.1936 in: BAB, R 4901/ 2996, sheet SI (p. 2). A detailed report, including his speech, the 
conference’s proceedings and the opening speech of the Greek Munster of Finance, Hadjikyriakos, was 
published on the journal Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv, 26. Band, 1937, pp. 309-332, here 309 f.
949 The International Organisation for Statistics has been established more than fifty years before 1930 and 
its central offices were in Hague.
950 Report of Friedrich Zahn (Praesident des Bayerischen Statistischen Landesamts und Prof an der 
Universitaet München) on the 23rd Meeting of the International Institute for Statistics taken place on 27
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Ministry o f  Education that Greeks offered him and the German delegation great 
hospitality and they showed their affection for the German science and in particular die 
German statisticians.951 Zahn also described the political and economic situation in 
Greece and its efforts to be modernised under the authoritarian regime o f J. Metaxas and 
argued that “for the national regeneration of Greece, Germany could help in many 
ways”.952 Promoting further the already existing economic and cultural relations between 
the two countries was one o f them. This belief combined with his remark that “a good 
precursor (Wegbersiter) for economy and politics is [...] science” reveals that what was 
behind the declaration o f the international scientific collaboration, was merely the 
political and economic interests o f the Reich.
The favourable and friendly climate, according to v. Bergmann, Miessner and Zahn, 
in Greece for the promotion of Germany’s cultural-political relations with this small 
Balkan country, appears to have altered after August 1936, when Metaxas seized power 
by coup d'êtat. The dissolution o f Parliament and the outlaw of the Communist Party 
resulted in the frustration o f the left wing and communist supporters. The university and 
academic circles also reacted to this decision, which led significant numbers o f students 
to vigorous protests. In the spring o f  1937, heavy clashes occurred between left-wing and 
nationalist students, when the French Minister o f  Education Jean Zay, who was a Jew, 
gave a lecture at the philological society ‘Tamassos” on the occasion of the centenary of 
Athens University. The episode took the authoritarian regime of Metaxas by surprise, 
which underestimated, according to the German ambassador in Athens, Prinz zu Erbach, 
the size the left opposition had taken in the Greek academic circle.953 The incident was to 
Germany’s advantage, argued Prinz zu Erbach, because the German Minister o f Foreign 
Affairs, Bernhard Rust, who visited Greece shortly before his French counterpart, was 
more careful in his cultural political campaign. However, the political situation in Greece 
was regarded unfavourable for further public lectures planned to be given by other 
German prominent figures and the German ambassador suggested that the Reich’s 
cultural-political campaign in Greece should be suspended for some time.954 Such figures
September until 4 October 1936 to the Reichsminister f. Wissenschaft Etziehung u Volksbildung in 
Athens, on 16-12.1936 im BAB, R 4901/ 2996, sheet 81 (p. 2).
951 Ibid., sheets 82-83 (pp. 3-5).
952 Ibid., sheet 84 (pp. 7-8)
951 Confidential report of the German Embassy in Athens to die Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Be din on
01.06.1937, in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesandschaft Athen, Band Nr. 35.
9W Ibid
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were the leader o f  the NSDAP, Alfred Rosenberg, who was invited by the professor of 
theology and the vice president o f die Greek-German society in Athens, Nikolaos 
Louvaris, to give a public lecture at the same place, where the French Minister Jean Zay 
had lectured some months before.955 The German ambassador was worried that the 
political activists who demonstrated against the Metaxas government on the occasion of 
the French Minister's presence, would demonstrate again, if Rosenberg were to give his 
planned lecture. At the same time, Prinz zu Erbach hastened to reassure the Foreign 
Ministry in Berlin that he was not against Rosenberg’s visit, but he warmly supported the 
idea o f giving the Reichsminister a public speech, provided that the event would guarantee 
a positive impact on the Greek public.956 Therefore, the German ambassador asked the 
president of the Greek-German society, the pre-eminent surgeon Marinos Geroulanos, 
to postpone the event for the beginning of 1938, providing that the political situation in 
Greece would be improved.957
Eventually, Rosenberg did not give that lecture. Instead, he organised a big project 
on the holy mountain o f Athos after Greece’s occupation by the Nazis in 1941. The 
project was organised in the framework of the “Einsat̂ stabes 'Rosenberg* organisation, 
which was established on 7 July 1940. Its aim was to collect all the valuable material of 
the occupied countries, such as art treasures, books, archival material and the like, from 
every place that could be possibly found, i.e. museums, libraries, universities, churches, 
private institutions. Needless to say that the whole enterprise was nothing but an outspo­
ken robbery o f the treasuries o f the occupied countries.958 Rosenberg was also encour­
aged to organise the expedition to Athos by the monks o f Bulgarian and Russian clois­
955 See: German Embassy in Athens to the Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs in Berlin on 04.06.1937, in: PAAA, 
Deutsche Gesandschaft Athen, Band Nr. 35.
956 Confidential report of the German Embassy in Athens to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Be din on
01.06.1937, in: PAAA, Deutsche Gesandschaft Athen, Band Nr. 35.
957 German Embassy in Athens to the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs in Berlin on 28.05.1937, in: PAAA, 
Deutsche Gesandschaft Athen, Band Nr. 35.
958 "Abschlussbericht ueber die Taetigkeit des Sonderkommandos Rosenberg in Griechenland” on 
15.11.1941, in: BAB, NS 30/ 75, See also document Nr. 117: “Aktenvermerk von Ingrim, Leiter der 
Abteilung Referat Westen und Suedosten in der Stabs fuehrung des Fin satzs tabes Reichsleiter Rosenberg 
fuer die besetzen Gebiete, vom 6. November 1943”. On Greece see document Nr. 40: “Aus der 
Verfuegung des Quartiermeisters des Kommandanten rueckwaertiges Armeegebiet 560 vom 21 Mai 1941”, 
both documents published in: WOLFGANG SCHUMANN (Hg.), G riff nach Suedosteuropa. Neue 
Dokumente ueber die PoliriJk des deutschen Imperialismus und Militarismus gegenueber Suedosteuropa im 
Zweiten Weltkrieg, Berlin 1973, pp. 230,130 respectively.
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ters, who wrote a petition to the Bulgarian government describing that for many year the 
Greek government was trying to repress the non-Greek monk communities, thus violat­
ing the Treaty o f  Berlin in 1878 and the Sevres Treaty in 1920.959 With this excuse the 
Nazis advertised the expedition to Athos as a rescue enterprise. With the support o f the 
army, they planned to record the works of art and to collect manuscripts and official 
historical documents. The Nazis believed that the feet alone that they could do scientific 
work o f that kind and they could publish it amidst the war, was an evidence o f  New 
Germany’s magnitude.960 This was also the argument of Hans Hass, a young marine bi­
ologist who made an expedition to the Aegean Sea for scientific and cultural purposes.961 
The expedition took place from June until November 1942 and supported by the 
Keichsforscbungsrat (RFR) and the German navy {Kriegsmarine) f 62 963*It aimed at exploring the 
marine resources of the Sporades and Cyclades island-complexes and the island o f Crete, 
as well as testing his construction o f the first breathing device for swim-divers (closed 
circuit oxygen equipment) for research in undersea caves and production of full feature 
film, which launched in 1947, entitled “Menschen unter Haierf*.965 The zoologist o f the KW 
Institute for Biology in Berlin, Max Hartmann, who was at the time working in Piraeus as 
the director o f  the German-Greek Institute for Biology, and his assistant Otto Schartau
959 “Petition det Athos-Kloster Sograph und Panteleimon an die Achsenmaechte, ueberreicht in Sofia im 
Jufi 1941”, im BAB, NS 8 / 259.
960 “Abschlussberidit ueber die Taetigkeit des Sonderkommandos Rosenbeig in Griechenland” on 
15.11.1941, Part III: Arbeitsbericht, 2. Sonderstab “Athos”, in: BAB, NS 30/ 75.
961 D raft o f  a Hans Hass’ newspaper article (summer 1942) entitled “Expedition im Krieg” he was going to 
publish on a German newspaper in order to advertise the impending expedition, pp. 1, 9. The document 
can be found at the archive o f the “Han$-Has$-.Institut fur Submaiine-Forschung und Tauchtechruk” in 
Merzig in Germany, (Hans Hass Archiv, HHA), classified as HH2.1 am grateful to the director o f  die in­
stitute D ip l Ing. Michael Jung, who drew my attention to Hass’ expedition to Greece and for the relevant 
information and material he shared with me.
962 I  bid, see also: “Bescheinigung von Admiral Aegaeis (der Chef des Stabes)” to the General Director of 
the KWG, Ernst Tdschow on 24.06.1942; “Reichsfors chungs rat, Kolonialwissenschafdiche Abteilung” to 
the Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs (forwarded to the KWG) on 04.06.1942, both documents in: MPGA, Abt 
I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 1314/2 .
963 See: Short Vita of Prof. Dr. Hans Hass and a friendly response, in: h:rn: ■ .'w-M-\r-han?-
hass.de/ F.npiisch/ S h o r Vir:i/ Shr>rr Vira.hrm 1. For a German version see: hrrp:/ Arww.hans-
has S-de/Bi o graph ■ c /  Hi <) pru fie. h nr; 1.
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supported and were to participate the expedition. The two KW scientists, however, did 
not go aboard the researchship “Ostmark” due to the pressing work in Piraeus.964
Last but not least, in 1940, in the framework of promoting the image o f  Nazi 
Germany and the national socialist ideals abroad, the National Socialist Organisation for 
Issues Abroad \Auslandso7gamaüon (AO) der NSD AP\ sent a number o f prominent 
scientists to the southeastern Europe, including Greece, not only to give lectures but also 
to make contacts with the key persons of their disciplines. These scientists reported back 
on their contacts as well as on the political situation in the Balkan countries and the 
general climate towards the Reich in detail. Among the scientists who visited Greece, 
were the professor of modem German phychology and education in Munich, Dr.Kroh; 
the professor o f forestry, Dr. Werner Schmidt in Eberswalde; the professor o f radiology 
in Rostock, Dr.Boehme, the director o f the Institute for Tropical Medicine in Hamburg 
Peter Muehlens; and the director o f the department for cancer research at the university 
clinic in Berlin, Dr. Unverricht965 Their visits had a cultural propagandist^ aim with a 
view o f influencing Greece economically and politically. Invitations to the Greek 
scientists and suggestions to the German authorities to award some of them an honorary 
doctorate were also among the purpose o f their visits to Greece. Professor Schmidt, for 
example, reported that the cultural attaché of the German Embassy in Athens, Erich 
Boehringer, suggested to donate an apparatus for experiments to the Faculty of Forestry 
in Athens, on the occasion o f his visit, in the hope that the Greeks would make orders of 
more apparati.966 There were also some thoughts Germany to contribute to the creation 
and equipment of a laboratory for radiology at Athens University. This plan was 
considered o f great propagandists significance, as it would reinforce the German 
influence on the Greek science. It was underlined, however, that the donation of apparati
964 Draft o f a Hans Hass' newapaper article (summer 1942) entitled "Expedition im Krieg” he was going to 
publish on a German newspaper in order to advertise the impending expedition, In: "Hans-Hass-Institut 
für Submarine-Forschung und Tauchtechnik” in Meizig in Germany, (Unclassified Hans Hass Archive, 
HHA) pp. 1 i  The lines that give the information of Hartmann's and Schartau's participation are written- 
off by Hass. See also: Newspaper article entitled “Mit Fussflossen in die Meerestiefe. Eine neue Expedition 
des Unterwasserjaegers Hans Hass bricht auf.”, in: B.Z-Mag, 06.07.1942; Hans Hass to his manager Thea 
Schn eider-Hadern arm, Berlin on 03.08.1942, im H H A
965 See: Die Leitung der Auslands-Propaganda, NSDAP (Heinz Otto) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Be din (Herrn Gesandten Altenburg), “Veranstaltungen ¡Euer die Zeit vom 1. April bis 31 Mai 1940” 
(Anlage 4), im PAAA, R 60661.
966 Report of P ro f Dr. Weiner Schmidt entitled "Bericht ueber meine Reise im Aufträge der AO nach 
Griechenland, Rumaenien und Ungarn, 20. Mai -  9. Juni 1940, in: PAAA R 60661.
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and the creation of an institute for radiology on Greek soil would not be for the benefit 
o f either the Germans or the Greeks, if the institute were not to be directed by a German 
scientist. The reason, argued the professor of radiology, Boehme, was that the use of the 
equipment needed experienced scientists and the Greeks did not have this experience. 
Furthermore, Greece purchased in any case alsmost all o f  its technical equipment from 
Germany and an institute with German apparati under Greek directorship would not 
mean much for the German interests.967 What the Greeks mostly needed, concluded 
Boehme, was the German intellect and the German education and thus a radiology 
institute in Greece should operate under a German director.968 There is no further 
evidence, however, to what extent the above plans came into being.
967 Report o f Dr. Boehme, Rostock entitled “Bericht ueber eine Vortragsreise nach Griechenland, 
Bulgarien und Ungarn vom 22.4. bis 10.5.1940 ” to the Leitung der Anslandsorganisation der NSDAP. 
Amt Kultur, Hauptstelle Wissenschaft, on, 18.05.1940, PAAA R 60661.
968 7bid.
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6 . T h e  G e r m a n - G r e e k  b io lo g ic a l  i n s t i t u t e  i n  P i r a e u s .
6.1. The Kaiser Wilbelm-Institutefor Biolow in BerBn-Dahkm.
While the political and racial theories o f National Socialism were influencing 
every aspect o f German life, including science and research, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society 
(KWG) struggled to retain its autonomy both at the administrative and the scientific 
level. Established in 1913, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology was among the least 
politicised KW institutes during the National Socialist regime, even though the science of 
biology had been capitalised, distorted and mobilised by the ideologues and supporters of 
the Nazi movement The KW Institute for Biology, however, succeeded in appointing 
non-Nazi scientists for managerial posts at its several departments and offered protection 
to scientists who were banned from continuing their research, which was regarded as 
threat to the regime. Moreover, innovative and high-quality basic research was being 
carried out without “direct Nazi-support”, which surprised the international scientific 
community.969 Two other Kaiser Wilhelm institutes that also continued to conduct 
research untainted by the Nazi ideology were the KW Institute for Biochemistry in 
Berlin-Dahlem and the KW Institute for Brain Research in Berlin-Buch, with which the 
Institute for Biology closely collaborated. These institutes were directed by Adolf 
Butenandt and Nikolai Timoféeff-Ressovsky respectively, and together with Fritz von 
Wettstein, Max Hartmann and Alfred Kuehn, who co-directed the KW Institute for 
Biology, constituted the key players in the biological community in Berlin, as they co­
ordinated interdisciplinary projects o f  major international significance.
More precisely, Max Hartmann was appointed the director of the newly estab­
lished KW Institute for Biology in 1914, and was the oldest appointee among the group 
of scientists referred to above. His work focused on the sexuality and genetics of proto­
zoa as well as o f invertebrates and fish. During the Nazi period he continued to work on 
the same areas discovering the fundamental materials of animal fertilisation within sea 
urchin, namely thtgamone and temone, in 1939. Hartmann’s work also involved hereditary 
physiology, a discipline of political significance and, therefore, it could be easily manipu­
lated in order to receive financial support for his project. Hartmann’s interests also in­
cluded research on more complex animals, as well as on problems of conserving energy,
969 KRISTIE MaCRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika. Scientific Research in Nazi Germany. New York 1993, p. 
110.
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as formulated by Robert Meyer.970 He was also engaged in writing on philosophical topics 
in biology, such as ageing and death, both related with the conservation of energy, as he 
had done earlier in the 1920s.971 In 1939, due to the lack o f experimental material for his 
work, Hartmann became involved in organising the German-Greek Institute for Biology 
in Piraeus, which was a branch o f the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology in Berlin- 
Dahlem. He became the director o f the new branch in 1942, ensuring in this way, the 
continuation o f  his research project. It should also be noted that the prominent zoologist 
Hans Bauer carried out cytogenetic research at Hartmann’s department on the fruit fly 
Drosophila melanogasUrt which was one o f the most valuable of organisms in genetics and 
developmental biology.972 Alfred Kuehn, the other director of the KW Institute for Biol­
ogy was also engaged in this type o f research. Hans Bauer succeeded Hartmann in Berlin- 
Dahlem after the latter’s appointment as director o f the German-Greek Institute for Bi­
ology.
Fritz von Wettstein took over as first director of the KW Institute for Biology in 
1934, following the death o f the previous director, Carl Correns, a year earlier. Von 
Wettstein, who was regarded as the leading plant geneticist in Germany, continued Cor­
rens’s research project on physiological genetics in cultivated plants and also took it in 
new directions. He was not only an excellent scientist, but he also proved to be a great 
“diplomat” in dealing with Nazi authorities.973 As a non-party member and a non­
sympathiser o f  the National Socialism, von Wettstein was regarded as the only person 
who could shield the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology from Nazi-oriented projects, 
and thereby preserve its autonomy. He was also engaged in several administrative func­
tions, becoming a senator o f  the KWG and head o f  the genetics and cytology division of 
the “Agriculture and Biology” section o f  the German Research Council (DFG/RFR). It 
is interesting to note that despite the fact that the DFG/RFR was controlled and led by 
Nazis, it seems that there was some latitude for scientists without a political agenda, such 
as von Wettstein, to influence the allocation of funding for the benefit o f pure research, 
untainted by the whims of the government At von Wettstein's department, three major
970 Curriculum Vitae o f  Hartmann, around 1936, in: Archiv zur Gescfaichte der Max-PIanck-Gesellschafr 
(MPGA), A bt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1.
™ Ibid.
972 UTE D eichm ann , Biologen unter Hitler. Portraet einer Wissenschaft im NS-Staat Frankfurt/Main 
1995.P-144.
973 Macrakis cites the opinion o f two of his colleagues who described bis character and acknowledged his 
diplomatic skills. See: MaCRaKIS, Surviving the Swastika,p. 112.
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research projects were carried out: the analysis o f  the effect of genes on the plant- 
ontogenetic; the investigation of the genetic aspects in the formation o f patterns; and 
research on experimental mutation.974 Mutation research as well as the study of develop­
ing physiology o f die algae and o f  protozoa and their sexual behaviour were the major 
projects that also carried out by scientists of the KW Institute for Biology at the Zoo­
logical Station in Rovigno.975
The zoologist, Alfred Kuehn, was appointed to the post o f second director o f the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology, succeeding Richard Goldschmidt, who was forced 
to emigrate to the United States in 1935 due to his Jewish origins. When he arrived in 
Berlin-Dahlem, the focus o f Kuehn’s work was on the development physiology and ge­
netics. His research object was the meal moth, Epbestia kuebnieila, and the central prob­
lems o f his research were similar to von Wettstein’s, concerning the formation o f pat­
terns and the effect of genes.976 Kuehn and von Wettstein had worked together when 
they were both professors at the University of Goettingen leading to the joint study of 
zoology and botany, thus transcending the traditional barriers between those disci­
plines.977 In Berlin, they continued their collaboration by inviting colleagues to join forces 
in interdisciplinary projects. However, the range o f qualified non-Nazi scientists avail­
able, who could contribute to these efforts, was crucial. Von Wettstein proved to be the 
right man to form a powerful team o f  researchers that would lead the way on some areas 
of basic biological research, surpassing their competitors in the United States.
At the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology in Berlin-Dahlem, co-operation 
among scientists within different departments became an integral part of the whole re­
search process. In fact, the advancement o f biological science and particularly of genetics, 
where the Americans had taken over the lead, led the directors of the departments to 
work more closely together in order to respond to the American competition. The issue
974 DEICHMANN, Biologen unter Hitler, p. 144.
975 See file: Dr. J. Haemmeriing. deutscher Direktor des Deutsch-Italienischen Instituts fuer Meeresbiologie 
Rovigno d’Istria an den Forschungsdienst Bedin-Dahlem on 27.07.1941, in: Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAK), 
R 73/ 11422; File: Moewus Franz Dr. Berlin KWI fuer Biologie. “Untersuchungen bei Algen; 
Untersuchungen ueber die Sexualitaet von Enteromorpha-Arten 1933-1940”, in: BAK, R 73/13207; File: 
Beth Kurt. Dr. Rovigno d’ IStria/ Italien. [Entwicklungs- und Fortpflanzungsphysiologische 
Untersuchungen am Algen 1940-42. (Als wissenschaftlicher Assistant)], in: BAK, R 73/10179.
976 See: HANS-jOERG RHEINBERGER “Ephestia: Alfred Kuehns experimenteller Entwurf einer 
entwicklungsphysiologischen Genetik”, in: Dabkmer Arcbivgtspraecbe, Band 4 (1999), pp. 81-118.
977 MacRAKIS, Survivingthe Swastika, p. 113.
275
lili LI
of cultural and national prestige once again came to the fore, while the scientists at the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology were struggling to retain their autonomy and pro­
tect research from “the sins o f  the cultural ministry”.978 Although it could not be argued 
that the American advancement in science gave rise to nationalistic feeling among Ger­
man biologists, they still attempted to incite these nationalistic emotions when dealing 
with the Nazi authorities, particularly in arguing for the importance o f their research in 
the national interest.979 On a closer inspection, the type o f biological research which was 
carried out at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes was o f international interest and at the same 
time, it also seemed to be crucial for the Reich’s interests and in particular for its war 
preparations.
Within all o f the departments of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology the 
primary focus o f research was genetics. One o f the most important works that attracted 
international attention was the research on the effect of genes on the mutation of meal 
moth (Epbestta kuehnielLa). Alfred Kuehn, who was the director of the project, investigated 
how the genes affected visible qualities of the organism causing the production of hor­
mones. The organic chemist Adolf Butenandt, joint his project in 1937, the year in which 
he became the director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biochemistry, replacing Carl 
Neuberg, who had been forced to resign and emigrate to Palestine and then to the Unites 
States. Butenandt, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1939 for his work on the isola­
tion and purification of sex hormones, began to work on hormone synthesis and the re­
lation o f the hormones with cancer, when he arrived in Dahlem. Like v. Wettstein, he 
had previous experience of working together with Alfred Kuehn in Goettingen, during 
his studies. Their collaboration continued in Dahlem and their research on hormones 
focused on eye pigmentation in insects. Their work was considered to be so important 
that the Rockefeller Foundation funded their project from 1934 and it continued to do 
so until 1937, even without a request for funding.980 This was an exception to the Foun­
dation’s funding policy towards Germany, as Rockefeller had stopped supporting all 
projects at German universities and the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes in 1933, in response to 
the new totalitarian regime.981 It seems that by 1934, the institute had become a “centre
978 Max Planck to F. v. Wettstein, 13 April 1934, cited in: MacraKIS, Surviving the Swastika, p. 116.
979 P a u l  Fo r m a n , "Scientific Internationalism and the Weimar Physicists: T he Ideology and its 
manipulation in Germany after W odd War I” , in; ISIS, Vol. 64, Issue 2, (June 1973), pp. 150-180, here p. 
152.
980 D eichmann , Biologen unter Hitler, p. 64.
981 Ibid.; Macrakjs, Surviving the Swastika, p. 114.
276
i
of biology o f which the whole world would be jealous”, which would sweep away die 
"stiff American competition”, as envisaged by von Wettstein, leading an officer o f the 
Rockefeller Foundation to remark that "nowhere in the continent or England [could 
one] find chemists, embryologists, and geneticists willing to co-operate among them­
selves as these German scientists are.”982
In the 1920s, as Germany was attempting to formulate its foreign cultural policy 
in an effort to surmount other cultural nations such as the French or the American, it 
adopted their policies. It seems that also during the 1930s, some foreign models for or­
ganising cultural and scientific activities were adopted by the Germans. This was the case 
of von Wettstein’s plan to organise the research at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biol­
ogy in interdisciplinary working groups, following the model o f the Morgan School in 
America.983 Von Wettstein argued that biology and, in particular, the discipline of genet­
ics underwent some changes and the collaboration between botanists and zoologists was 
now seemed essential. This interdisciplinary co-operation had also been a feature of his 
work with Alfred Kuehn in the Goettingen years.
Together, the three scientists, the zoologist, Kuehn, the organic chemist, Butenandt, 
and the botanist, von Wettstein, created three informal working groups for virus research 
in 1937.984 Two years later, they made a proposal for the foundation of a "Branch for Vi­
rus Research o f the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes for Biochemistry and Biology” to the Gen­
eral Secretary o f the Society, Ernst Telschow.985 In 1941, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for 
Virus Research was established and the existing groups were brought into its operations. 
They had already been provided with unique and complex instruments, such as the ultra­
centrifuge and the Tilesius electrophoresis apparatus, and they also had a greenhouse for their 
experiments on virus diseases at their disposal. Their aim was to decipher the composi­
tion and structure as clearly as possible o f the chemical viruses in order to understand 
their reproduction processes. Mutations were their analytical tool. The oft-repeated justi­
982 Gted in: Macra kis , pp. 113 fit
p. n s .
984 Georg Melchers (from Wettstein’s institute) was selected for the botany department and worked on 
plant viruses, Rolf Daneel (from Kuehn’s institute) was in charge o f the zoology department and worked 
on animal viruses, and Gerhard Schramm (from Butenandfs institute) was the director of the biochemistry 
department and worked on chemical research associated with the tobacco mosaic virus. Later, in 1942, a 
fourth department for entomology was added to foe “Arimtsstaetu juer VirusfmcbMig’ led by Gem ot 
Bergold, who also was the director o f foe KWG branch for Entomology in Oppau.
985 Ibid., p. 119; D e ic h m a n n , Biologen unter Hitler, pp. 148 ff.
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fication for support for the official creation o f a “workshop for virus research” (“A r- 
bdtsstaettefuer Virusforschun£) was purported to be the American advancement in the field 
at the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research in Princeton. In 1935, the American 
biologists had succeeded in isolating and crystallising the tobacco mosaic virus and they 
claimed that the infectious virus was a protein.986 The virologists and biologists of the 
time disputed over the problem o f whether the mutation occurred in proteins or in nu­
cleic acid, both parts of the molecule. They sought to understand the molecular nature of 
the mutations, in other words, the mechanism o f evolution. This “new terrain” of re­
search required close collaboration among biochemists, botanists, and zoologists which 
would be o f great interest both for German agriculture and the chemical industry. De­
spite the “basic” character o f their research, the results could be shared with plant breed­
ers and on a larger scale with those involved in advancing the German rural economy. 
The “pilot experiments” at the laboratories of the workshop could be later carried out as 
larger practical experiments at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes for Animal Breeding in 
Dummerstorf and for Breeding Research in Muechenberg 987
The “Arbdtsstaettefuer V ’trusforscbun£\ initially received generous support from indus­
trial capital, through the I.G. Farben and the Sobering pharmaceutical company. Addi­
tional research funding came from the DFG, die Ministry for Education and the Ministry 
for Food and Agriculture, which contributed to the project at the end o f the war.988 It is 
certainly not surprising that in February 1941, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society obtained the 
sum o f  500,000 marks for further virus research and the establishment o f the institute, 
and additional 200,000 marks for the creation o f an institute for the collection and re­
search on wild and primitive forms o f  cultivated plants.989
This institute was eventually created towards the end of the war, in 1943. The 
initiative for the creation o f the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Cultivated Plants, as it was 
called, again came from von Wettstein. The idea of an institute of this kind that would be 
closely related to the Institute for Virus Research emerged from the increasing need for 
material for the mutation experiments on polyploidy. Given the importance of the 
polyploid organisms for the network o f KW institutes described above and others that
986 Ibid.
987 M a c r a k is , Surv iv ing  the Swastika, p.119.
988 DEICHMANN, Biologen iinter Hiller, pp. 74-77, 80-83 (tables), also 148 f, Macrakis, Surviving the 
Swastika, p. 120.
999 DEICHMANN, Biologen unter Hitler, pp. 148 f.
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were planned beyond the German borders, a briefly introduction to this area of research 
will now be undertaken.990
Polyploidy is the process o f genome doubling that gives rise to organisms with 
multiple sets o f chromosomes.
n sets o f chromosomes per nucleus
Diploids -------------- ---------------- ► 2n o f chromosomes
Triploids -------------- ---------------- ► 3n o f chromosomes
Tetraploids ---------------- ► 4n o f chromosomes
Polyploids ----------------► vn o f chromosomes, (v>2)
Polyploidy appears almost exclusively in the plant kingdom. It is much rarer in animals 
but it is found in some insects, fish, amphibians, and reptiles. Polyploidy is also found in 
some bryophytes and algae and these were the subjects used in the experiment o f von 
Wettstein.991 The zoologist, Max Hartmann, also experimented with marine algae in an 
attempt to understand their fertilisation process and determine their sexuality. Polyploidy 
can arise from spontaneous somatic chromosome duplication or as a result of non­
disjunction o f the homologous chromosomes during meiosis resulting in diploid 
gametes. It seems that these two explanations of the origins of polyploidy, that is, the 
somatic doubling and the unreduced gametes, were the crucial areas of interest for the 
German specialists. This kind o f polyploid (autopolyploid) involves only one species and 
it is usual in cultivated plants. Tetraploids, such as tobacco and potato, were the primary 
subjects of the experiments carried out by the scientists involved in von Wettstein’s 
mutation research project, because the tetraploid plants can breed with each other and a 
new species could be formed within one generation. Polyploidy was, therefore, 
recognised as a prominent force shaping the evolution of plants.
It can also be artificially induced in the plant-breeding laboratory by treating di­
viding cells with drugs, such as colchicinê  which inhibits cell division. Colchicine was per­
haps the only chemical that had been already used since 1937 for the production of poly­
ploidy which was resistant to extreme climatic conditions.992 It is true that many poly-
990 I am grateful to the professor o f genetics, Costas Krimbas, who helped me to understand the 
mechanism of polyploids and the relevant readings feat I was not familiar wife previously. However, fee
responsibility for any misconceptions is mine exclusively.
991 D eichmann, Biologen unter Hitler, p. 145.
992 Ibid., p. 144.
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ploids are tougher than their diploid progenitors and this is exactly what made the poly­
ploidy important for the Germans, who were looking for species that could be cultivated 
on German soil: in particular, their high ability to adapt themselves to extreme condi­
tions. The degree of ploidy often correlates sometimes with the morphological features, 
geographic distribution, or ecological preferences of a species, apart from temperature. 
O ther factors can induce chromosome doubling, such as the degree o f hydration and 
certain chemicals, including X-rays, ultraviolet radiation, mechanical injury, infection 
caused by certain viruses or mites, and genetics. The tobacco mosaic virus research was 
carried out within this framework, in which the working groups of Kuehn, von 
Wettstein, and Butenandt sought to understand the nature o f mutations through the ac­
tion o f the virus on tobacco. Timofeeff-Ressovsky’s work was also carried out from the 
same perspective at the department o f experimental genetics in the institute for Brain 
Research. He developed an influential theory o f how mutations occur by experimenting 
on the fruit fly species, Drosophila juntbris and Drosophila melanogaster.:993 His research fo­
cused on the fields of population and radiation genetics in order to study the rules of ge­
netic inheritance.
Besides the tobacco mosaic virus, research on mutations and polyploidy was car­
ried out using primitive forms of cultivated plants. The rationale was different, however, 
from the virus research. At die new KW Institute for Cultivated Plants in Tuettenhof 
near Vienna, von Wettstein and Hans Stubbe, the director of the institute, planned to 
undertake experiments on wild and primitive forms of cultivated plants in order to pro­
duce artificially polyploids that would be more resistant to the cold, drought and other 
extreme conditions. With the method o f “back-cross-breeding” of cultivated plans, it was 
hoped that the genetic mechanism, which makes certain species resistant to extreme cir­
cumstances, would be revealed. The discovery of these species provided the strategic key 
for plant breeders. Hans Stubbe was a well-known plant geneticist, whose research was 
focused on mutations with snapdragons (Antirrhinum) at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for 
Breeding Research in Muechenberg. He also worked on radiation genetics, in other 
words on the mutative effect o f X and ultraviolet rays on plants. He was one o f the best 
examples o f a scientist who promoted interdisciplinary research among the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Institutes, long before he became director o f the institute. His pioneering proj­
993 See: DEICHMANN, Biologen Unter Hitler, pp. 159-168; M a c raKJS, Surviving the Swastika, pp. 120 f, 




ect on mutation research demanded close co-operation with the physicists and physi­
cians.994 In 1936, Stubbe was dismissed from the Institute for Breeding Research together 
with two other scientists, on the grounds that they were disrupting the smooth operation 
of the institute by helping Jews and disseminating Marxist literature in the institute.995 
Stubbed Marxist political past cost him a professorial career at a German university, de­
spite his reputation as an excellent plant geneticist996 97However, von Wettstein was the 
one who protected him and ensured that he received a DFG grant, and furthermore, ap­
pointed him as a director o f the newly established institute. It should also be noted that 
the Senate o f the Society considered Stubbe for the directorial position in the German- 
Bulgarian Institute for Agricultural Research in 1941, which was a Kaiser Wilhelm branch 
established in Sofia in 1942."' However, von Wettstein's attempts to create an institute in 
Tuttenhof did not meet with the approval o f the director o f the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute 
for Breeding Research, Wilhelm Rudorf. Rudorfs institute, which was created by Erwin 
Baur in 1927, focused on the breeding o f plants that were resistant to extreme climatic 
conditions and parasites and it was incorporated into the four-year autarky plan in 1936. 
Rudorf regarded the new institute in Tuttenhof as antagonistic and he tried, albeit unsuc­
cessfully, to prevent its establishment.
The wild and primitive forms o f cultivated plants were of great interest to both 
Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes in Muechenberg and Tuttenhof and expeditions to build up 
their collections were funded by the DFG/RFR. It is noteworthy that the Institute for 
Cultivated Plants was created on the model of the institute o f the famous Russian geneti­
cist Nikolai I. Vavilov.998 His institute had become known world-wide for the rich plant 
collections while his theories o f plant genetics and plant breeding had a great influence 
on plant genetics at the time. Vavilov argued that there were “centres of origin” o f culti­
vated plants, namely specific geographical territories in which one species o f cultivated 
plants or its wild form existed in enormous varieties. He mentioned that there were 
seven major “plant pools” around the world. Two o f them were located on the American 
continent and the rest could be found in the area around the Mediterranean (the Balkans
994 DEICHMANN, Biologen unter Hitler, pp. 98 ff.
995 MaCRAKIS, Surviving the Swastika, p.123
996 For Stubbe’s political stance and its impact on his career see: Su s a n n e  HEIM, Kalorien, Kautschuk, 
FCameren. Pflanzenzuechtung und landwirtschaftliche Forschung in Kaiser-Wilhelm-Insti tu ten 1933-1945. 
Goettingen 2003, in particular, the third part o f  the book.
997 Ibid, p. 78.
998 D eichmann , Biologen timer Hitler, p. 152.
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and Asia Minor), south-west Asia (India, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Armenia, Kurdistan), the 
Caucasus, as well as in eastern China and Ethiopia.999 Expeditions to these territories had 
been undertaken since 1935, when the first “Hindukusch Expedition” took place under 
the leadership of Arnold Scheibe, the future director o f the German-Bulgarian Institute. 
Further expeditions which were organised and sponsored by the Reich’s Research Coun­
cil (RFR) were made to Tibet in 1939 and to the Balkan Peninsula during the course of 
the war in 1941 and 1942.1000
Von Wettstein envisaged the institute as the centre of a network of plant collect­
ing stations ranging “from the polar sea to the Mediterranean, from the Atlantic to the 
extreme continental region, from die seacoast to the Alps zone”.1001 The already existing 
institutes had been established by the Society in Germany and the others that were 
planned to be established in the Balkan region, namely in Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, but 
also in Spain, would make up the continental network. It was described by von Wettstein 
as an “observing network across the Mediterranean”, and moreover, as a “biological 
penetration in the Mediterranean”, which would guarantee German control over the 
plant genetic resources o f the continent.1002 The global network announced by von 
Wettstein, had to be created during the war at any cost, as the wild forms o f  cultivated 
plants were in danger in such an unstable environment
Himmler was personally interested in these expeditions and the SS became in­
volved in these activities. The expeditions were also considered to be military enterprises 
and they were supported and accompanied by the German army. Scientists, together with 
military personnel, became engaged in collecting primitive forms of plants from the oc­
cupied territories and regions where access would become more difficult in the near fu­
ture. The task was not easy however, due to the events caused by die war such as bom­
bardments and resettlements, which put the existence o f wild plants at risk. Therefore,
999 SUSANNE H e im ,  “Forschiing filer die Autarkic. Agtarwissenschaft an Kais er-Wilhelm-foshtu ten im 
Nationalsozialismus”, in: Ibid (Hg.), Autarkic und Ostexpansion. Pflanzenzucht und Agrarforschung im 
Nadonalsozialismus. Goettingen 2002, p. 156, also the footnote 39. For an early version o f  the paper in 
English see: Su s a n n e  H e im , “Research for Autarky. The Contribution o f  Scientists to Nazi Rule in 
G erm an /’, in; Ergebmse 4. Vorabdruckt aus dem Eorscbmgsprogramm “Gescbicbie der Kdser-Wtlbelm-GeseUscbaft im 
NatzonaLso^a&smus ”2001.
1000 See MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2963,2964.
1001 G ted in: HEIM, “Forschung fuer die Autarkic”, p. 159; see also: DEICHMANN, Biologen Unter Hitler, 
pp. 152 and 182 £
tore pntz von Wettstein to the General Secretary o f the KWG, Ernst Telschow, on 04.01.1941, in: MPGA, 
Abt. I, Rep. 14, Nr. 1.
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the job had to be done as quickly as possible.1003 Three major expeditions were made 
during the war, two of diem in the Balkan region and the third one to Russia, where the 
Sonderkommando SS, which organised the mission in 1943, stripped the many Soviet 
breeding stations o f their material including Vavilov’s precious collections.1004 In the Bal­
kans, the first excursion took place to Albania and northern Greece in 1941 and the sec­
ond to the island of Crete and the Peloponnese in 1942. Both excursions were made by 
order o f the High Commander o f the German Army (Oberkommando der Werbmacht, 
OKW) and sponsored by the German Research Council (RFR/DFG). Both of these 
botanical expeditions were led by Hans Stubbe.
The aim o f the first mission was the systematic collection of wild species of culti­
vated plants in Germany, which were located in the border area between Yugoslavia, Al­
bania and Greece. In the second expedition, the German specialists sought to find evi­
dence o f the origin and creation o f cultivated species, in other words the evolution ge­
netics.1005 106In the second expedition to Greece, apart from Stubbe, the members o f the 
group which visited Crete included: O tto v. Wettstein and FC H. Rechinger o f the Mu­
seum of Natural History in Vienna, K. Zimmermann from the KW Institute for Brain 
Research, and H. Behnke from the Wehrmacht The Peloponnesian group was comprised 
of R. Freisleben from the Institute for Plant Research and Plant Breeding in Halle, W. 
Rothmaler from the Botanical Museum o f Berlin, and the SS-Sturmmann, G. Niethammer 
who represented the Vienna Museum o f  Natural History. In the Peloponnese, the pri­
mary focus was on the conditions for the improvement of crops, while, in Crete, the aim 
was to make the island self-sufficient by transforming it into a huge natural laboratory. 
The rationale for these objectives was no t only to collect material for the laboratories in 
Germany but also to ensure the continuous food supply for the Wehrmachi006 in its op­
erations to Greece and also to North Africa and the Middle East Crete was o f interest to 
the Germans for another reason: the fauna and flora o f the island was so rich and unex­
plored to a great extent that the discovery of new species would put Germany in the
«»3 HEIM, ‘Tors chung fuer die Autarkie”, p. 160.
1004 See: Uwe HOSSFELD and CaRL-Gu sta f  THORNSTROEM, “ Tlasches Zupachen’. Heinz Btuecher und 
das botanische Sammekommando der SS nach Russland 1943”, in: SUSANNE HEIM (Hg.), Autarkic und 
Ostexpansion. Pflanzenzucht und Agrarfbrschung im Nationalsozialismus. Goettingen 2002, pp. 119-144.
1005 “Smbbe’s Bericht ueber die im Anftrage des OKW und des Rekhsforschungsrates durchgefuehrte 
zweite Biologische Forschungsreise nach Peloponnes und nach Kreta 1942", in: MPGA, A b t I, Rep. 1A, 
Nr. 2964/1.
1006 ¡¡¿A
leading position in plant and animal collections in comparison to other cultural nations. 
In this regard, it was reported that England only had a thirty year old collection, which 
consisted largely of fossils that had been collected by the female scientist, Bates.1007 The 
cultural political dimension o f those expeditions was very evident and Stubbe highlighted 
their cultural significance, despite the fact that the botanical excursions were fully justi­
fied by the -war-time demands alone.
Stubbe also reported that the collection o f primitive and wild species in Greece 
was o f major importance no t only for the research on cultivated plants but also for re­
search on cattle breeding. It should be noted that, traditionally, the German speaking re­
searchers were the ones that were mostly interested in the study of Greek fauna. Most 
German, Austrian and Swiss natural history museums -including the very well-known 
one in Vienna that sent delegates to Greece in 1942 expedition- had large collections 
from Greece in contrast with the French and the British museums that had acquisitions 
from other parts o f the world.1008 Apart from the systematic collection of primitive spe­
cies of domestic cattle the zoological investigation in Greece included the geographical 
mapping o f these species in order to obtain a clearer picture o f genetics and evolution in 
zoology.1009 The co-operation between the two disciplines of botany and zoology was 
again underlined in order fundamental biological problems to be successfully handled. 
Apart from the rich material from Crete’s fauna and flora that Stubbe and his group 
brought back to Germany, he made a detailed report on the island’s agricultural produc­
tion and its potential future development Some o f the most valuable collections he sent 
to Germany for the experiments at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology and its 
branches included fungi, algae, and moss, and also live insects, such as drosophila mefani- 
gaster.1010 As for the Peloponnese, the group of scientists made contact with the local di­
rector o f the German-Greek Institute for Biology in Piraeus, Otto Schartau, without re­
porting whether there had been any further collaboration between the institute and
Ibid
1008 An a s t a s io s  Le g a k is , “Recent Trends in the Study of the Greek Fauna”, in: 2e Congrès International 
sur la Zoogéographie et 1' Écologe de la Grèce et des Régions Avoisinantes, Athènes, Septembre 1981, 
[Bzoùgza Gallo-Helknica 1985 -  Volume 10 Extrait], pp. 17-20, here p. 18. I am grateful to Prof. Legakis for 
having drawn my attention to this reference.
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Stubbed groups. Nevertheless, the biggest chemical company in the country, "Chimika 
Upasmatd\ was greatly interested in co-operating with the German scientists and became 
directly involved in the expedition sending its best chemist, M. Nevros, to accompany 
the German mission.1011 The report made by Stubbe on the Peloponnese largely concen­
trated on the agricultural production o f  die region and on the means for its improve­
ment. Nonetheless, the group collected a great deal of domestic plants as well as their 
primitive forms although there is no account o f animals collected. Unfortunately, part o f 
the plant collection was destroyed soon after their return to Germany, due to “a catas­
trophe”, as Rothmaler reported, apparently meaning the Berlin bombardment by the Al­
lies,1012 In 1944 plans for another expedition to the Balkans, in particular to the mountain 
of Olympus in Greece, were made by the SS “Ahnenerbi' which would be sponsored by 
the DFG. However, the expedition was never made, as it has been described in chapter 
four, due to the stiff resistance of the Greek partisans in the region that could put the 
research group at risk. Instead, plans for an expedition to the Perinea mountains in Spain 
were discussed.1013
It was clear that the botanical expeditions in the Balkans went beyond the aims of 
pure scientific research and the collection of indigenous plants and animals. It is no coin­
cidence that both of them took place during the war when the need for supplies for the 
German army had increased. If the rationale of the Four-Year Plan was to make Ger­
many self-sufficient in raw materials and independent from foreign currency so that the 
Reich would be ready for war in four years time, Germany should also had to achieve 
self-sufficiency while the country was at war. The development of new plant and animal 
species at German labs with material from the Balkans, the reorganisation of agriculture 
and cattle breeding in Greece, the use o f chemicals for fighting vermin and fertilisers for 
accelerating crops in Crete and Peloponnese should also be seen in the context o f the 
policy o f autarky.
In spite o f the fact that the scientists managing the projects of mutation research, 
particularly, the research in polyploidy were neutral in the sense that they did not support 
National Socialism, they were engaged in a very political agenda, which combined two
1°» Ibid.
m u WERNER Ro t h m a l e r ,  “Floristische Ergebnisse einer Reise nach dem Peloponnes. Ergebnisse einer 
biologschen Forschungreise nach dem Peloponnes und nach Kreta 1942 im Auftrag des Oberkommandos 
der Wehrmacht und dcs Reichs forschungsrates. X. Mitteilung”. In: Botaniscbe Jahrbuecber, 73:4 (1944), pp. 
418-452, here p. 418 .1 am grateful to Prof. Hagen Fleischer for this source.
1011 See chapter 4.6.
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clearly controversial objectives: autarky and expansion. The support given to the 
botanical research by the DFG and the SS was justified by the Nazi concept of the 
‘expansion of German living space’ (Erwetterung des deutschen Lebensraum), which was 
initiated in 1939 with Germany’s invasion to Poland.1014 In October of the same year, 
Heinrich Himmler, who became the “Reich’s Commissar for the Consolidation of the 
German People” (Rtichscommissar fu tr  die Festigung deutschen Volkstums), ordered the 
‘Germanisation” {Germanisierung) o f the annexed territories. The concept of 'Lebensraun/ 
was adopted and scientifically justified at that time by the agricultural scientist Conrad 
Meyer who was in charge o f the section of “Agriculture and Biology” of the German 
Research Council (RFR) and supported the expeditions to the Balkans. Von Wettstein 
and FCuehn were in charge of two o f the six divisions o f Meyer’s section, including 
genetics, cytology and developmental physiology, exerting their influence upon the RFR 
for the allocation of funds in favour o f their research projects. Meyer, in contrast, was a 
higjx ranking SS official and the author of the memorandum for the “General Plan for 
the East” {Generation Ost). This plan contained a comprehensive scheme for the legal, 
economic and spatial reconstruction o f  the annexed future territories between the Oder 
River and the Ural Mountains. It was envisaged that new settlement areas for German 
farmers would be placed under the control o f Himmler during the period of 
reconstruction, and the new setders would be selected on racial grounds in line with the 
ideas o f the SS.1015
The Kaiser Wilhelm scientists went along with the above concept in order to 
convince the DFG/RFR officials to support their work. In 1942, in his application for 
the Balkan expedition, Stubbe argued:
The systematic collection and m aintenance o f  such plants [primitive strains o f  crops -  
U D  and  BMH] is priority  for the German breeding research, because the extraordinary 
diversity o f  these plans in  the h itherto  still unexplored mountains o f the Balkans an d  their ad­
aptation to  extreme living conditions guarantee the finding o f  cold-, drought-, and  para­
1014 Ut e  D e ic h m a n n , Ben n o  M u e l l e r -H il l , “Biological Research at Universities and Kaiser Wilhelm 
Institutes in Nazi Gennany” in: MONIKA R e n n e b e r g , M a r k  WALKER (ed.), Science, Technology and 
National Socialism. Cambridge 1994, pp. 160-183, here p. 176.
1015 Ibid, p. 177. See also: Ro e ssl e r  M e c h t il d , Sa b in e  Sc h l e ie r m a c h e r  (Hg.), D er “Generalplan Ost”. 
Hauptlinien der nationalsozialistischen Plannngs- und Vemichtungspolitik. Beriin 1993.
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site-resistant strains among them. These plants, with their precious qualities, plav a deci­
sive role in the breeding of generally resistant strains for the German East.1016
It seems that the plant-collecting expeditions to the Balkan peninsula were re­
garded not only as part o f the German war economy but also as a unique enterprise in 
that region that would give German science precedence over other nations, principally 
America. In the grant applications submitted to the DFG between 1937 and 1942, von 
Wettstein and Alfred Kuehn repeatedly emphasised the danger o f losing priority in all 
fields to researches in the USA. Combined with the self-sufficiency plan in the expanded 
Germany in eastern and south-eastern Europe this argument guaranteed them the much- 
needed support. Culture, science, economy, and military were all given almost equal im­
portance within the German foreign policy agenda, even during the war, in which the 
objectives wkmgsnichU£ and “ kultunvichti£ were two sides of the same coin.





The establishment o f a bilateral research centre in occupied Greece is perhaps the 
clearest case in which natural sciences were put to the service not only o f Germany’s war 
planning, but also of its foreign cultural policy in a peripheral Balkan country that was 
neither a pioneer in natural sciences nor had any significant and indigenous tradition in 
the field. Why, then, were the Germans so keen to develop scientific relations with 
Greece, which was traditionally associated with the classical culture o f antiquity? How 
did the German scientists exploit the “cultural argument” when they became involved in 
establishing an institute in Piraeus, Greece’s biggest port? What was the link between the 
institute and the Webrmachfs activity and interests in the region? What other interests was 
the research station expected to serve apart from the scientific ones? To what extent 
were the initial plans of the German scientists and the Greeks realised? Given that the 
materia] regarding the establishment of the German-Greek institute is either fragmented 
or inaccessible, the above questions will be dealt with as comprehensively as possible, 
noting that some aspects o f  the institute’s story have yet to be unfolded.
The initial plans to create a German-Greek institute for biological research date 
back to 1937-38. However, the original idea of establishing a research station for marine 
biology by the Germans on the Greek coasts was much older. Its roots can be traced 
back to 1926, when —as we saw in the first chapter - Wilhelm Kraft, a German merchant 
made a detailed proposal to the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, indicating that the southwestern 
coastline o f Peloponnese would be the best place for carrying out marine biology re­
search. Greece was regarded as an alternative base in case the KWG permanently lost its 
zoological station in Rovigno. Nevertheless, the Greek interest in a marine biological in­
stitute had not been aroused by the Germans. Aware of its significance for the state’s 
fishery and economy, Greece set up a small hydrobiologica] station just outside the capi­
tal o f Athens at Palaion Phaliron, in 1924. The station was built on the recommendations 
of the Italian ichthyologist Vinciguera, who was invited by the Greek government for 
that purpose. However, this station did not produce any work of great significance, thus, 
failing to contribute to the modernisation of the Greek economy. According to the 20- 107
1017 For an early version of this chapter see: M aria  Z aRJFI, “Das deutsch-griechische Forschungsinstitut 
fu e r Biologie in Piraeus, 1942-1944”, in: SUSa n n e  HEIM, (Hg.), Autarkic und Ostexpansion. Pflanzenzucht
u n d  Agrarforschung im Nationalsozialismus. Goettingen 2002, pp. 206-232.
6.2. The creation and operation o f the German-Greek Biolooical Institute™
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ologist, Georgios Pantazis, the main reasons for its failure was the fact that the station 
was too small for the demands o f the modem state. In addition, it was located on the 
coast with unfavourable conditions for marine studies and near to the capital, which af­
fected the quality of the water. Moreover, the limited financial support from the state and 
the lack o f permanent scientific and technical personnel, as well as the lack o f  equipment 
and a library meant that the creation o f a new hydrobiological station became a more 
pressing need.101® The existing station was affiliated to the Ministry o f Finance, which 
appointed the scientific personnel, although there was only one member o f staff, who 
acted as both its director and at the same time, the supervisor of fishery in the minis-
1019try.
In November 1935, Pantazis submitted a complete proposal to the Greek Thala- 
sography Committee, which supervised the station at Palaion Phaleron, for the transfer 
o f the old station to a new location. Pantazis, who was himself a member o f  the com­
mittee, also proposed that the station should be affiliated to Athens University, however, 
his proposal was rejected.108 9020 He seemed to be the only person at that time who was seri­
ous in promoting the creation of a new marine station and worked very hard to convince 
die Greek authorities of the importance and the necessity o f the station. As a professor 
o f zoology and the director of the university’s Zoological Museum, he was the only ex­
pert in the field who knew that a modem and efficient marine station would not only 
contribute to the country’s economy, but would also provide a boost for the Greek sci­
ence. In 1936, Pantazis took the initiative to seek private funding for the purchase of 
land suitable for a new hydrobiological station that would be affiliated to the univer­
sity.1021 He insisted on this affiliation for several reasons. Firstly, the university and, in 
particular, the Zoological Museum had scientific personnel that would be able to work at 
the station. In addition, the museum’s library would be at the disposal o f die station and
1018 Pantazis to the Ministry o f Education on 17.05.1937, in: Archive o f the Zoological Museum o f Athens 
University (AZM), File Nr. 504-719, Jan. 1937 - Dec. 1938. Also in: Pantazis to the Ministry of Education 
on 14.03.1939, in: AZM, File Nr. 720-900, Jan. 1939 - Dec. 1940.
1019 Ibid.
1020 Pantazis to the Greek Thalassography Committee on 22.11.1935, in: AZM, Hie Nr. 204-342, Jan. - 
Dec. 1935.
lrni pantazis to the Rector of Athens University on 25.06.1936, in: AZM, File Nr. 343-503, Jan. — Dec. 
1936. See also: Pantazis to the Ministry o f Education on 17.05.1937, in: AZM, File Nr. 504-719, Jan. 1937 - 
Dec. 1938; and Pantazis to the Ministry o f Education on 14.03.1939, in: AZM, File Nr. 720-900, Jan. 1939 
- Dec. 1940-
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its existing contacts on an international level would be o f  great benefit to the station. 
However, the most important reason lay in the fact that the university could guarantee 
more finances than would have been available before.1022 Unfortunately, Pantazis did not 
receive much from private contributions. Moreover, he abandoned his efforts when the 
Ministry o f Finance took the initiative to create an Institute for Environmental Fishery 
and a hydrobiological station.1023
In 1934, Adolf Meyer, a professor at Hamburg University and the director of the 
German-Dominican Institute for Tropical Research since 1939, made a proposal to the 
Greek Ministries of Education and Finance for the creation o f a “Research Institute for 
Marine Biology” on the island o f Samos. His interest in creating an institute in Greece 
stemmed from what he called “biological archaeology”.1024 Having studied Aristotle’s 
work on the observation and classification of animals, Meyer noted that it had no t been 
possible for many of the animals described by the Greek philosopher, more precisely the 
marine animals, to have been identified by the German scientists by that time. He be­
lieved that many of those animals might still be living in Greek waters and their discovery 
might provide some answers to contemporary biological problems. The arguments of the 
Hamburg scientist, in 1934, were similar to those made by the Kaiser Wilhelm scientists 
in Dahlem, particularly with regard to the primitive forms of cultivated plants and ani­
mals, and the theory about the polyploids, which led to a series of expeditions in search 
of those species. In emphasising the practical significance o f the institute, Meyer argued 
further that it would modernise the Greek fishery, industry and more generally, the na­
tional economy by providing marine products to the eastern European market, as Spain 
and Portugal did in the west and Norway in the north.1025 However, the investigation of 
die genic make-up (Lazcbgnteiide) o f  the living fish in the Aegean Sea was a precondition for 
achieving that objective.1026 It was true that Greek fishery remained backward with regard 
to other countries referred to above and Meyer underlined that this was due to the lim­
ited knowledge available about the Greek marine fauna not only to the Greek scientists 
but also to the rest international scientific community. He also stressed that it was not
1022 Pantazis to the Greek Thalassography Committee on 22.11.1935, in: AZM, file Nr. 204-342, Ian. - 
Dec. 1935.
1023 Pantazis to the Ministry of Education on 14.03.1939, in: AZM, file Nr. 720-900, Jan. 1939 - Dec. 1940.
1024 "Memorandum ueber die Schaffung ernes Forschungsimtitutes fuer Meeresbiologie auf Samos”, 
25.02.1934, in: AZM, file Nr. 1-203, Jan. -  Dec. 1934.




only the marine fauna but the fauna and flora of the whole country in general, as well as, 
that o f the southern Balkans which remained almost unknown to the scientists.1027 It is 
interesting to note that in order to get support by the German officials, Stubbe put for­
ward the same arguments in 1941 that Meyer had made some years earlier to the Greek 
authorities without managing to convince them. On the other hand, it seems that the 
complex role suggested by Meyer for the institute in Samos, as well as its structure was 
more or less the same as the plans for the German-Greek Institute for Biology estab­
lished six years later. Meyer argued that the marine station would aim to carry out re­
search on the fish biology, the biological archaeology and general scientific investigation 
of the Aegean Sea. He claimed that this triple function o f the institute, would be the first 
o f its kind. What the Zoological Station in Naples was for the west and north Europe, 
the Greek institute would be for the east, namely for the Balkans and Turkey.102* Ac­
cording to Meyer’s plans, the institute would be comprised of two departments, the na­
tional Greek section, focused on the modernisation o f  Greek fishery and therefore fi­
nanced by the Greek government, and the international one, focused on “biological ar­
chaeology” . The funds for the international department would come from several insti­
tutions, which would lease working spaces as they had done in Naples. Meyer suggested 
twenty-two foundations both German and non-German that could lease five working 
spaces in total from the future institute. Among these, he mentioned the Kaiser Wilhelm 
Society, the Nobel Institute in Stockholm, the Royal Society in London, the Rockefeller 
and Carnegie Institutes, as well as some foundations of humanities, such as the Society of 
Ancient Culture and the Kant Society o f Berlin.1029
It seems that Meyer did n o t officially delegate any German institution when he 
made the proposal to the Greek government, but rather he acted o f his own accord. 
Nonetheless, he was given support by a Greek biologist before he addressed the Greek 
ministries and this person seems to have been his link with Greece. This biologist was 
Emmanouil Sarris, who had been an assistant at the Institute for Environmental Re­
search at Hamburg University since 1933. He had not only encouraged Meyer to con­
tinue with his plan, but had also stressed the practical dimension of the project and its 
significance for modem research in Greece and the advancement of the national econ­
1027 Ibid.
1028 Ib id . p. 3.
1029 Ibid . pp. 4 £
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omy.1030 Since the late 1920s, Sams had been granted an Alexander von Humboldt scholar­
ship to study animal physiology in Hamburg. He was regarded as an extraordinarily gifted 
student and he continued to receive the grant until 1934, having already been awarded his 
doctoral degree in 1931.1031 The Alexander v. Humboldt Foundation considered him to be a 
valuable asset as he was expected to take a leading position in public life after his return 
to his own country, thus influencing the Greeks in favour of Germany. It was not sur­
prising therefore that Sams suggested working with Meyer, if the institute was estab­
lished in Greece. Sarris, like many other foreign researchers who had received a scholar­
ship in Germany, played the cultural political role he was expected to play, even when he 
was still in Hamburg.1032 Nevertheless, Meyer's proposal was rejected by the Greek 
authorities due to the fact that the Greek state was not in a position to support the proj­
ect financially.1033 In addition, his proposal was scientifically problematic. The German 
scientist was not an expert in hydrobiology (he was a professor of the history of natural 
sciences), and in addition, the station would require experienced personnel that was not 
available in Greece.1034 Furthermore, the location of the proposed station in Samos on 
the east Aegean Sea, was considered by the Greek specialists to be inappropriate for ma­
rine biological research, as the sea currents could only bring very limited and poor quality 
material to the island’s surroundings.1035
1030 Ibid . p. 2.
1031 Geschäftsbericht der Alexander v. Humboldt Stiftung fuer das Jahre 1930-1931; Geschaeftsbericht 
der Alexander v. Humboldt Stiftung fuer das Jahre 1933-1934, both documents in: Bundesarchiv Koblenz 
(BAK), ZSg. 137/ 18.
1032 In 1933/34 he published two works with the support o f Humboldt Foundation, entided: “Die 
individuellen Unterschiede bei Hunden” and- “Ausbildung statt Abrichtung swe Blindhunde”. In: 
Geschaeftsbcricht der Alexander v. Humboldt Stiftung fuer das Jahre 1933-1934 in: BAK, ZSg. 137/ 18.
1033 Meyer suggested that Greece should contribute half o f the amount needed for the institute, namely 
10,000 marks. See “Memorandum ueber die Schaffung eines Forschungsinstitutes foer Meeresbiologie auf 
Samos”, 25.02.1934, in: AZM, Fle Nr. 1-203, Jan. -  Dec. 1934, p. 4. The Greek state, however, could only 
afford the one tenth of die money needed. See: G. Pantazis, Director o f the Zoological Institute at Athens 
University, to Adolf Meyer, on 22 June 1934, in: AZM, file Nr. 1-203, Jan. -  Dec 1934.
1034 G. Pantazis to die Rector o f Athens University on 07.06.1934, in: AZM, file Nr. 1-203, Jan. — Dec. 
1934.
1035 G. Pantazis to Adof Meyer, on 22 June 1934, also: Pantazis to die Rector of Athens University on 
07.06.1934, both documents in: AZM, file Nr. 1-203, Jan. — D ec 1934.
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In 1937, this idea was raised again, this time by the Greek scientist, Konstantinos 
Tzonis, who made the proposal to the zoologist Max Hartmann.1036 Tzonis had worked 
as a researcher alongside Hartmann in his department from August 1936 until November 
1937. Hartmann, together with Fritz von Wettstein, warmly supported Tzonis proposal 
and they became involved in the negotiations for the institute on behalf of the Germans. 
Tzonis was committed to acting as their link on the Greek side. After his return to 
Greece, he contacted the Greek authorities in order to promote his plans for the institute 
in his capacity as the director o f the Institute for Chemical Biology and Cancer Research 
Centre in Athens. The climate was favourable for such discussion, given that the Greek 
President, the dictator Ioannis Metaxas, was an enthusiastic supporter o f Hitler. As well 
as Metaxas, many Greek intellectuals were also admirers o f German culture. In fact, al­
most the half o f the professor at Athens University and four fifths o f the professors at 
the Technical University had been educated in Germany.1037 This included the Governor 
of Athens, Konstantinos Kotzias, who had strongly supported the idea of the institute 
from the onset.1058 Kotzias, with whom Tzonis made contact, was an eager supporter of 
Hitler and he was regarded by the Germans as their most trustworthy person in Greece, 
a close ally and friend of National Socialism.
The contacts between the Greeks and the Germans had continued during the 
German occupation in Greece, since April 1941. Notable personalities o f  the Greek sci­
entific community as well as these from the Greek political and economic circles partici­
pated in the discussions with Max Hartmann and Erich Boehringer, the German archae­
ologist and cultural attache o f the German Embassy in Athens. These included Konstan­
tinos Georgikopoulos, the Munich educated professor o f  theoretical mechanics in Ath­
ens Technical University and the rector at the same university from 1937 until 1939; 
Konstantinos Logpthetopoulos, the professor of gynecology, who served minister of 
education and vice-president in the future first occupation government; Spiros Dontas, 
the professor of physiology and member of the Athens Academy of Sciences and since *107
toss Tzonis to Hartmann, 15.12.1937, in: MPGA, A bt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1490; see also Hartmann's “Report 
on the establishment of a Gennan-Greek research institute for biology in Athens” sent to the KWG on 
15.1.1938, in MPGA, A bt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1490; Hartmann to Ernst Telschow, General Director of the 
KWG, 26.8.1940, im MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 1 A, Nr. 2949/3.
1017 H aGEN F l e is c h e r ,  xoa E£à<mxx H  EÀXiSa vr,; /oa xr& A vnaraor^ 1941-1944.
Tójioq A’. Athens 1989, p. 118.
if»* German Embassy in Athens to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin, 12.8.1940, MPGA, Abt I, 
Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/3.
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1942 vice-president of the Academy; and Kanellopoulos the owner o f the company 
“Chemical Products and Fertilisers” (Chîmika Upasmatà).
Although the establishment o f the biological institute in Piraeus was planned as a 
bilateral project, it was only during die German occupation in Greece and after long ne­
gotiations that the institute came into being, basically as a German institution. In Octo­
ber 1940, the Italian army attacked Greece as a reaction against die German military 
presence in Romania. Hitler criticised the Italian move, however, he held a neutral posi­
tion. When the Italian army was close to being defeated by the unexpectedly strong re­
sistance from the Greeks, the German troops were forced to march into Greece, occu­
pying part o f the country. In this way, the Germans sought to prevent any damage to the 
prestige of the Axis forces’, as well as the British advance into the Balkans, which could 
put the German plans to seize the Romanian oil fields in danger. Despite their aggressive 
act, the German occupied forces reassured the Greeks that they were well disposed to­
wards the Greek people and their march was “a war against England on Greek soil”.1039 
By the end o f April 1941, the first Greek government to collaborate with the occupiers 
was formed.
The changing political situation in Greece clearly affected the foundation o f the 
planned institute in Piraeus. The establishment of the institute was enacted by a legisla­
tive decree on 22 April 1942,1040 and the final agreement between the Greek government 
and the Kaiser Wilhelm Society was signed on 31 October o f the same year.1041 Accord­
ing to the agreement, the institute would promote cultural and scientific relations be­
tween the two participating countries.1042 The research institute would be located in Pi­
raeus and it would operate under the auspices o f the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and die 
Athens Academy of Sciences. The latter however, expressed some misgivings about its 
involvement during the occupation period.1043 *Therefore, it was reported that the Greeks
1039 See: H a g e n  FLEISCHER,* “Siegfried in Hellas. Das national so zialis tische G cechenl andbild und die 
Behandhing der griechischeo Zivilbevoelterung seitens der deutschen Besatzungsbehoerden, 1941-1944”, 
in: Armin K erJCER (Hg.), Griechenland — Entfemungen in die Widdichkeit Hamburg 1988, pp. 26-48, 
here p. 30.
1040 tt)Ç Kupsgvrjoeug T7]Ç EUnSoç. (OEK) (Official Gazette), Teu^oç rigûiov, Ag. Oùlkou 103, 
30-04.1942.
1041 Contract (Vertrag) on 31.10.1942, in: MPGA, Abt I, Rep. IA, Nr. 2951/3. The contract was signed by 
Logpthetopoulos and Hartmann. There is also the Greek translation in the same file.
1042 Article 1 o f the contract (Vertrag) on 31.10.1942, in: MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2951/3.
1043 See; GEORGE SKLAVOUNOS, “Aôyoç otr̂ v AxatÔTipia to Xetjiwva 1942. «H Axaôinjûa agvyjToa»”, in:
EziÔscüprfoq T é ^ ç r Year H’, Band IE’, Issue Nr. 87-88, March - April 1962, pp. 298-299.
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sen ting the Society. The German ambassador Guenther Altenburg, and Fritz von Twar- 
dowski, who was the director o f  the cultural section o f the Foreign Ministry, would rep­
resent the Ministry.1051 In June 1943, Twardowski was succeeded by the new director, 
Franz Alfred Six.1052 Finally, Rudolf Mentzel, the president of the German Research 
Council (DFG), would represent the Ministry o f Education.1053 The German Navy would 
also have a representative on the committee and the High Commander o f the German 
Army (OKW) recommended Fritz v. Wettstein for this position.1054 According to the 
relevant Articles, the Greek government would be responsible for purchasing the build­
ings known as 'Villa Skouloudi’, for its restoration and the necessary infrastructure. The 
Kaiser Wilhelm Society, on the other hand, would be responsible for the equipment, the 
furnishing and the library acquisitions. The rest o f the expenses would be shared 
equally.1055 However, in spite o f the agreement, the Society eventually also took over part 
o f the expenses for the construction works, as the Greeks were unable to contribute fi­
nancially due to increased inflation during the war years.1056 The funds that would be 
made available by the Society for the new institute came from the Reich’s Research 
Council (RFR), the German Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Education. The RFR 
partly funded the purchase o f the scientific equipment, in particular the optical instru­
ments, the Foreign Ministry overwhelmingly supported its cultural political role and the 
Ministry o f Education agreed to support the research project.1057 The work that would be 
carried out at the institute would focus on general biology. More precisely, it would con-
1051 German Foreign Ministry to Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft on 07.06.1943 and on 28.02.1942, in: MPGA, 
A bt I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2952.
to52 German Foreign Ministry to Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft on 07.06.1943, in: MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 1A, 
Nr. 2952. About Six see: LUTZ H aCHMEISTER, Der Gegnerforscher. Die Karrieie des SS-Fuehrers Franz 
Alfred Six. Munich 1998.
1053 The Reich’s Ministry of Education (Zschintzsch) to Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft on 17.11.1942, in: 
MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2952.
1054 However, on an Aktmermerk on 28.08.1942 reported that the navy would be represented by the vice 
admiral Kurze, in: MPGA, Abt I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2950/4.
1055 Articles 3 to 6 of the contract on 31.10.1942, in: MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2951/3.
1056 In fact, the Greek government promised several million Drachmas but the release of these funds was 
constantly delayed. In 1943, the Greek authorities promised further 325 million Drachmas, however, they 
were not worth very much due to die high inflation. See: Schartau to Hartmann on 02.02.1943, 18.09.1943 
and 07.10.1943, in: MPGA, Abt. I ll, Rep. 47, Nr. 1282.
i®57 Aktennotiz Telschow’s, 16.1.1942 and Ministry of Education (RfWEV) to KWG (forwarded letter of 
the Foreign Ministry to the Ministry of Education), on 29.01.1942, both in: MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 
2949/8.
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would be temporarily represented by trie Ministry o f Education until the Academy could 
take over this role in the future.1044 It was agreed by the German Ministry of Education 
and the Foreign Ministry that the management o f the institute would be taken over by 
Prof. Max Hartmann.1045 He suggested the hiring o f two young scientists, Otto Schartau 
and Klaus Paetau, who had worked with him in Berlin and at the Zoological Station in 
Naples as his assistants. It was also recommended that Tzonis should become the Greek 
director of the institute.1046 After the promulgation of the decree for the establishment of 
the institute, Tzonis put forward his own assistant who, nevertheless, had to be sent to 
Germany “to learn something” before he could work at the institute.1047 Tzonis, however, 
never took up the position o f the Greek director, although he played an important role in 
forming the institute’s committee. He was the one who had drawn up a list o f candidates 
from the University of Athens, the Technical University and the Academy who, in his 
view deserved to become members o f the committee.1048 It was stipulated that the com­
mittee would be composed o f six Greek and six German members, apart from the two 
directors.1049 The Greek individuals who agreed to participate on the committee were: 
Prof. Spiros Dontas, a physiologist, Prof. Ioannis Politis, a botanist at Athens University, 
Prof. Constantinos Georgikopoulos, a mathematician at the Technical University, Dr. 
Stratigis, the mayor of Piraeus, and the owner o f the company “Chemical Fertilisers”.1050 *
The German members were Albert Voegler, the president o f  the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, 
who would have the chief position on the board, and Fritz von Wettstein, also repre-
1044 Abschrift aus der Niederschrift ueber die Sitzung des Senats der KWG on 24.4.1942, in; MPGA, Abt 
I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2950/1; Gruendungs statut 1.2.1942, in: MPGA, A b t I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2951/1;, 
Auszugsweise Abschrift aus der Niederschrift. Ueber die Sitzung des Senats der Kaiser-Wilhelm- 
GeseUschaft 24-04.1942, in; MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2952.
«Ws Vertrag on 1.4.1943, in: MPGA, Abt. II, Rep. IA, Bd. 1. The contract had retrospective effect, coming 
into force on 1 April 1942.
1046 See: Hartmann^  travel report (Reisebericht) on 28.07.1941 on his visit to Athens from 16.07 1941 to
23.07.1941, in: MPGA, Abt I, Rep. 14, Nr. 1.
1047 Schartau to Hartmann 3.4.1942, in: M PGA, A bt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1281. The name o f the scientist is 
not mentioned.
1048 See: Hartmann’s travel report (Reisebericht) on 28.07.1941 on his visit to Athens from 16.07 1941 to
23.07.1941, in: MPGA, Abt I, Rep. 14, Nr. 1. The list however, has no t been found.
1049 Article 10 o f  the Satzungen des Deutsch-Griechischen Instituts fuer Biologie in der Kaiser Wilhelm-
Gesellschaft on 31.10-1942, in: MPGA, A b t I, Rep. 1A, Also in Greek in: Nr. 2951/6.
io» i^er BevoUmaechtigte des Deutschen Reichs fuer Griechenland (Guenther Altenburg) to Auswae mge
Amt, Bedin on 09.01.1942, in: MPGA, A b t I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2951/1.
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sist o f two departments, one dedicated to general biology under Greek management and 
a second one focused on genetics under German management1058
The responsibilities o f  the institute’s committee included not only the promotion 
of the institute’s bilateral relations between Greece and Germany, but also its interna­
tional links with other institutions and organisations.1059 This was a clear indication of the 
role of the institute, which was expected to replace the zoological station in Naples, ac­
cording to the German scientists. This station was regarded as a model for the German- 
Greek institute, which was expected to exert international influence as the Naples station 
had done, however, this time the Germans would have more control over it. Therefore, 
the cultural-political character of the institute in Piraeus would not only be limited to the 
small territory o f  Greece but it would also contribute to the Reich’s international cultural 
policy. On a scientific level it was anticipated that the institute would be dedicated to re­
search on the fauna and flora o f  the eastern Mediterranean1060 and more precisely, on 
questions o f general biology, morphology and evolutionary physiology, on the insemina­
tion and sexual behavior o f plants and animals, as well as on heredity. In other words, it 
seems that the proposed research would follow Hartmann’s ideas. On the other hand, it 
would be an instrument o f cultural propaganda, attempting to bring Greek and German 
cultures together.1061 One o f the institute’s most important cultural contributions to 
Greek science would be the library that was due to be enriched with a large number of 
volumes and collections. Tzonis argued that by that time the only scientific library that 
was worth mentioning in this field in Greece was that of the Pasteur Institute in Ath­
ens.1062 Therefore, this pre-eminence o f the French culture was a further justification for 
the establishment of the Piraeus institute on cultural grounds. With regard to its scientific 
significance Max Hartmann argued that
“Modem biology played an important role not only due to its pure scientific theoretical
significance in today’s intellectual life. Moreover, it is the basis of medicine, as well as of
1058 Undated document entitled Aufstellung, in: MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/2.
1059 Article 14 o f the statutes of the institute on 31.101942, in: MPGA, A b t I, Rep. A l, Nr, 2951/5,6.
1060 ‘Gruendungsstatut des Deutsch-Gnechischen Instituts fuer Biologie’ 1.2.1942, in: MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 
1A, Nr. 2951/1.
1061 Letter of Dr. Tzonis translated into German on die “Zweck und Richtungen des Deutschgriechischen 
Biologischen Instituts”, 1940, in: MPGA, A b t I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/3.
1062 lud.
298
plant cultivation and animal breeding, fishery and other disciplines that day by day ac­
quire even greater practical importance.”1063
Furthermore, the German zoologist argued that Greece offered particularly favourable 
conditions for modem experimental biological research with its rich geographical mor­
phology, its significant climatic changes, and in particular, the rich variety of its coastline 
and islands, some o f which had remarkably deep waters. Tzonis also stressed these fac­
tors to the Society, which could lead to new findings and would play an important role in 
providing answers to questions about general biology.1064 Hartmann also claimed that 
evolutionary physiology and experimental heredity had their origins in Germany. In other 
countries, particularly in France, modem experimental biology was an “almost unknown 
science”.1065 The German scientist believed that the new institute would provide new 
means for Germany to challenge the cultural dominance o f  France.
Hartmann did not fail to account for the potential advantages o f the institute for 
the Greek state itself. Research on the biological link between the mainland and the sea 
would give practical assistance to the country's agriculture and fisheries, thus, boosting its 
economy. Therefore, there was an economic dimension to the institute besides the purely 
scientific and cultural one. On the other hand, the long-term presence o f German ex­
perts in Greece would influence the young scientists, who in turn would contribute to 
the advancement o f science and research in their own country, hi addition, Tzonis ar­
gued that the continuous contact between the Piraeus institute and the German biologi­
cal institutes, and moreover with non-university institutes, as in the case of the Kaiser 
Wilhelm institutes, could contribute to the education and training of Greek students.1066 
Tzonis* argument may have reflected his experience at the Institute for Biology in Berlin- 
Dahlem and he probably envisaged the biological station in Greece as part of a broader 
network o f institutes, namely the Kaiser Wilhelm ones. The concept of network- 
institutes was expressed also by von Wettstein. In his enthusiastic letter to Ernst Tel- 
schow in 1941, the general secretary o f the Society, von Wettstein laid out his plan for 
the operation of the Kaiser Wilhelm institutes abroad and in particular, for those in the 
Mediterranean. One of the most important factors underlying the aspirations o f the
10«  “Gutachten Hartmanns an die KWG”, 15.01.1940, MPGA, A b t III, Hep. 47, Nr. 1490.
1064 Ibid. See also the translated letter o f  Tzonis on die “Purpose and the direction o f  the Gennan-Gieek 
Biological Institute”, 1940, in: MPGA, A b t I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/3.
IMS “Gutachten Hartmanns an die FCWG”, 15.01.1940, MPGA, A bt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1490.
1066 Letter of Dr. Tzonis translated into German on the “Zweck und Richtungen des Deutschgriechischen 
Biologischen Instituts”, 1940, in: MPGA, A b t I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/3.
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German scientist to establish research centers in the Mediterranean, was the favourable 
climatic conditions for the study o f  numerous scientific questions that were impossible in 
the North Sea. Therefore, it would be in Germany's interest for the already existing sta­
tions in Rovigno and Naples to become part of a network o f  similar institutes, from the 
Spanish Blanes in the west to Piraeus in the east.1067 Germany’s “biological penetration to 
the Mediterranean”, as von Wettstein described it, should be intensified through close 
co-operation between all these institutes.1068 *In particular, he argued that the institute in 
Piraeus could become the centre o f biological research on the eastern Mediterranean. 
Apart from the existence o f the hydrobiological station on the island o f Rhodes estab­
lished during die occupation o f the Dodecanese since 1912 by the Italians, there was no 
other institute o f its kind in that part o f the Mediterranean. The scientific, moreover the 
cultural role o f the station on Rhodes island seemed to be very limited and fell short of 
German expectations for Piraeus. In other words, they wished to become the leading 
players in scientific experiments in the waters of the eastern Mediterranean. It was envis­
aged that the network would expand to southeastern Europe as well, including the pro­
posed German-Bulgarian Institute for Microbiology on the Greek island o f Thasos in 
northern Greece, which was annexed to Bulgaria in 1941, and the German-Bulgarian In­
stitutes for Agricultural Research in Sofia and Budapest However, the latter as well as 
the proposed institute in Thasos still only existed on paper. All of these were expected to 
be more than scientific centres. Moreover, they would be regarded as “cultural- 
propagan distic institutes”, as von Wettstein emphasised in January 1941.1060 As regards 
Greece, the German presence in the country was deemed as necessary because the Eng­
lish and French influence over the Greeks was becoming even stronger.1070 This fear was 
not unfounded because despite the fact that the Greek government closed all o f die for­
eign cultural institutes “for security reasons” in November 1940, die French and Britons 
continued to organise language courses in private houses which were tolerated by the
i«7 Wettstein to Telschow, 04.01.1941, in: MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 14, Nr. 1.
1068 Ibid.
i(»9 Wettstein to Telschow, 04.01.1941, in: MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 14, Nr. 1.
1070 Hartmann’s report from Athens from 03.121941 to 17.12.1941, in: MPGA, A b t I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 
2949/7- See also: Reisebeiicht Professor Muehlens. Griechenland (Auszug) (3-7.06.1939), in: MPGA, Abt 
I, Rep. 1 A, Nr. 2949/2. The date is not mentioned on this document
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Greek police. The French influence over Greece did not cease, even after the Nazis had 
occupied France.10'1
The cultural propaganda was used as an instrument for the dissemination o f  the 
national socialist Weltanschauung abroad, which was dominated by racial connotations. 
However, cultural policy did not simply mean racial propaganda. Although, campaigning 
for the superiority of die German intellect through the achievements and preeminence in 
science supported the racial theory, it nevertheless, was different from being engaged in 
racially oriented scientific projects. Despite the fact that all institutions, including the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Society, were obliged to become aligned with the guidelines of National 
Socialism, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology managed to retain its autonomy to a 
certain degree and to continue carrying out research as before for purely scientific pur­
poses.107 072 However, among the tactics used by its directors to secure the institute’s inde­
pendence and to continue to get the much-needed funds for the projects, was the classi­
fication of their work as Mkriegswichtig and “kulturwichtig*. The term “kriegswichtig* was 
given almost to every scientific activity, after 1939, and it was a necessary precondition 
for obtaining funding the several scientific institutions and therefore essential for their 
survival under the Nazi rule. Cultural policy was also regarded as “kriegswichtig*. The es­
tablishment of research institutes abroad as branches of the Society became a priority for 
the Institute for Biology in Dahlem, which urgently needed not only new material for its 
projects but also a favourable environment for carrying out experiments and studying 
specific scientific problems. The Mediterranean Sea offered the best environmental con­
ditions for some of the projects carried out in Dahlem. For this reason, Hartmann, to­
gether with v. Wettstein, also stressed the cultural-political role of the Piraeus institute 
not only to make a stronger argument before the German authorities but also to con­
vince the Greeks of the worthiness o f  the institute.
The assistants chosen to work in Piraeus belonged to Hartmann’s circle, thus, se­
curing the autonomy of the institute and the non-oriented research to Nazi directives. 
Tzonis, as well as all of the other scientists that Hartmann recommended to the admini­
stration of the Society, had already worked with him either in Berlin-Dahlem or at the
1071 See: H aGEN FLEISCHER, “Europas Rückkehr nach Griechenland. Kulturpolitik der Großmächte in 
einem Staat d e r Peripherie", in: HARALD HEPPNER, OLGA K a tSIARDI-HERING (Hg.), Die Griechen und 
Europa. Außen- und Innensichten im Wandel der Zeit Wien 1998, pp. 125-191, here p. 151.
1072 M acrakis, Surviving the Swastika. On biological research see chapter 6. The argument is also dis­
cussed in Ibid., “The Survival o f Basic Biological Research in National Socialist Germany” , in: Journal of the 
History of Biology 26, No. 3,1993, pp. 519-543.
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Zoological Station in Naples. It seems that the aim of his efforts to take all o f these sci­
entists with him to Greece was to continue his project, in a period which research had to 
align with the demands o f  war and racial theory. At the same time, the ^KjiegswichUgkdf 
o f the institute was used as an argument against the mobilisation of scientists.1073 Schartau 
and Paetau were also called up, but following Hartmann and Wettstein’s intervention the 
former was sent to serve in Piraeus, while the latter remained in Dahlem.
The independence o f  scientific research in the Piraeus institute was ensured by 
the Article 32 of the agreement1074 1075According to this, the directors and their assistants 
should enjoy full freedom in choosing the scientific projects and in carrying out research. 
Nonetheless, the research should be undertaken in die framework o f the institute’s ob­
jectives and within the limits o f its budget The independence and flexibility o f  the scien­
tific work at the KW Institute in Berlin seemed to give its directors the latitude to negoti­
ate financial support for the German-Greek institute, adjusting die description o f its re­
search project either to the war needs of the Reich or to its cultural propaganda policy, 
depending on the circumstances.
Soon after the official agreement, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society purchased a large 
number o f instruments, machines and other scientific equipment for the institute. 
Among this material was a microtom, a number o f  books belonging to Hartmann’s per­
sonal library and the herbarium purchased in Marseilles. The microscope that Schartau 
had in Dahlem was also made available. Only part of this material was immediately sent 
to Greece, in 1942, and the institute began to operate albeit to a limited extent. Hart­
mann was still in Germany but his assistant Schartau, who was appointed local director 
o f the institute, was engaged in military operations on the Aegean Sea and parriy experi­
menting on some biological cultures, by order o f the Webrmach£m
Between 1941 and 1942, many of the KW Institutes of a theoretical nature were 
forced to change the focus o f  their projects to be more practical-oriented, if they wanted 
to continue receiving funding and thus survive. Research on autarky and in particular on 
food autarky was a clear example o f  a project with an explicitly practical onentation and 
it was o f major importance for the war. Under these circumstances, apart from the pure 
research projects in some o f  its departments and branches, the Institute for Biology in
1073 See Hartmann's correspondence with the Oberkommande der Wehrmacht (OKW) and the KWG, in: 
MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 14, Nr. 2.
10-74 Vertrag vom 31.10.1942, in: MPGA, A b t I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2951/5,6.
1075 Hartmann to Prof. Dr. v.
Buddenbrock (Zoologsches Institut d. Universitaet Wien), 17.01.1944 in: MPGA, A bt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 47.
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Berlin also became involved in projects relating to the war and it was transformed into a 
IT-Betrieb, namely, a defence war-enterprise subject to military law.1076 It is not a coinci­
dence that two o f its branches, the Branch for Virus Research o f die Kaiser Wilhelm In­
stitutes for Biochemistry and Biology in Berlin-Dahlem and the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute 
for Cultivated Plants in Tuttenhof were created precisely at that time. The *W~Betrie& de­
velopment also affected the status o f  the Piraeus institute. Klaus Paetau’s task at the 
German-Greek institute related to cytogetetic research. He was engaged in methods to 
statistically detect critical errors which could be applied to empirical findings, more pre­
cisely, to mutation and virus research.1077 1078The significance o f these methods, Paetau ar­
gued, was that they were often used in the verification of the results of the research. In 
addition, their timely application in many cases could make possible the future planning 
of research.1074 Paetau collaborated closely with the genetic department of the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Institute for Brain Research under the management of Timofeeff-Ressovsky 
and with the botany department o f the Branch for Virus Research under the manage­
ment o f Georg Melchers.1079 He requested and received financial support for his work 
from the German Research Council (DFG) which amounted to 3,500 marks in the year 
1944-5.1080 Paetau did not go to Piraeus to carry out his research, but instead he stayed in 
Dahlem given the dangerous situation in Greece.
At the same time, die dramatic increase in inflation in Greece since its occupation 
by the Nazis, upset the entire economy. From the German side there were some con­
cerns about whether the construction o f the available building should be continued or 
n o t As the continuation of the construction of the institute was under threat and the de­
livery o f the equipment from abroad became increasingly difficult, the Society requested 
the assistance of the Webrmacbt. In return, it placed the institute in Piraeus at the service 
of the Webrmacbt to a certain degree. More precisely, the institute contributed to the ma­
rine science projects carried out by the scientific staff of Prof. Walther Wuest, the curator
1076 Wettstein to Hartmann, 26.01.1942, in: MPGA, A bt III, Rep- 47, Nr. 1575.
1077 See File: Paetau Klans. Institut fuer Biologie Berlin-Dahlem, in BAK, R 73/13518.
1078 Application o f Paetau, “Antrag auf Erteilung eines Forschungsauftrages und Einreihung in die 
Dringlichkeitsstufe”, 19.07.1944, in; BAK, R 73 / 13518-
«*» Ibid
uwo Rudolf Mentzel (Ministerialdirektor DFG) and Meyer (Leiter der Fachsparte “Landbauwissenschaft 
und allgemeine Biologie” der DFG) to Klaus Paetau on 15.06.1944, in: BAK, R 73/ 13518.
303
o f the SS Research Group “Das Abnenerbf*.im  It is interesting to note that the Piraeus 
institute, as well as the German-Bulgarian Institute for Agricultural Research and the 
proposed institute for Microbiology on Thasos also served or were expected to serve 
military purposes and the Military High Command (OKW) together with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministries of Education and Nutrition, warmly supported their 
creation.10®2 The involvement o f these ministries and the OKW indicated the circum­
stances in which the above institutions operated, as well as the interests they were ex­
pected to serve due to their location in southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterra­
nean.
Between 1942 and 1943, Otto Schartau was sent by order o f Admiral Conrad to 
Greifswald and Kiel to follow seminars on oceanographic methods. After his return to 
Greece, he participated in research on the Aegean Sea for oceanographic studies on be­
half of the OKM.108 2083 In November 1943, he became involved in four-day excursions for 
the same purpose as well as for the “settlement of some urgent issues”.1084 The excur­
sions were due to last approximately one and a half months. However, these kind of 
studies are not reported in the available documents. What is certain, however, is die in­
terest of the High Commander o f Marine (OKM) in the salt content variation across the 
Aegean water and the reason for these variations.10®5 It was already known that the tem­
perature and salt variation on seawater could affect the operation o f radar and conse­
quently, the detection of submarines.1086 During this period, die oceanographic studies 
were expanded throughout the whole Aegean Sea, from Salonika in the north to Crete in 
the south and the island o f Limnos in the east.1087 It is likely these studies were also 
linked to the detection o f  English submarines that were causing great damage to the 
German marine. In an official note o f March 1943, Admiral Conrad and the vice-admiral 
Kurze considered that the institute o f  Piraeus was extremely important on account of the
1081 Schartau to Hartmann, 02.02.1943, in: MPGA, A bt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1282; <<Tekgrarrun junker. 
Diplogenna A then" 20.04.1944, in: PAAA, R 27302. I am grateful to Prof. H. Fleischer for the latter 
reference.
1082 Telschow to the Ministry o f Finance, 16.10.1942, in: MPGA, A b t I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2953/2.
1083 Schartau from Bedin to Hartmann on 15.05.1943, MPGA, A bt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1282.
1084 Hartmann to Telschow, 22.11.1943, in: MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2953/3.
1085 Unsigned letter, presumably o f  Schartau to tbe General Administration o f die KWG, 18.12.1943, in: 
MPGA, A bt I , Rep. 14, Nr. 1
1086 See: Schartau from Piraeus to Hartmann on 30-10-1943, in: MPGA, A b t III, Rep, 47, Nr. 1282 and 
Hartmann to P ro f  Dr. W. v. Buddenbrock, 17.01.1944, in: MPGA, A b t III, Rep. 47, Nr. 47.
1087 Schartau to Hartmann 26.08.1944, in: MPGA, A bt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1282.
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impact of the work of German Navy.1088 Regardless of the type of research the OKM 
conducted on the Aegean, Schartau reported that it also was important for Hartmann’s 
project in February 1943.1089 Additionally, Telschow underlined that “we want to help the 
Troops Armament Office (Heereswaffenamt), as it help us too.”1090 Within this co-operative 
atmosphere, the OKM gave permission for the urgent transportation o f the electrical 
material for the institute, putting its construction underway.
In Greifswald, Schartau prepared a series o f lectures, which would be given to 
the Wehrmacht soldiers by order o f the Defence-Plan Officer (Wehrhetreuungsoffî iei) after 
his return to Athens.1091 These lectures were also planned for young academics o f the 
university in Vienna, to which all universities in south-eastern Europe were affiliated 
(Patenuniversitaet). The topics that Schartau would discuss ranged from general zoology 
and biology, to comparative anatomy o f the vertebrates, the theory of cells and seminal 
cells, as well as to problems of sex determination, heredity and the theory of origin. The 
lectures took place in Piraeus in the presence of two prominent professors from the Uni­
versity o f Vienna, Wofgang v. Buddenbrock-Hettersdorf and Fritz Knoll.1092 The lectures 
were continued until 1944 and were given not only to soldiers and students, but also to 
Wehrmacht officers of the occupation forces in Greece. They were also attended by repre­
sentatives from the German Embassy, Walter Wrede, the director of the German Ar­
chaeological Institute in Athens, who also "was the local leader of the NSDAP in Greece; 
some Wehrmacht teachers; and the director of Lufthansa in Greece, Starke. Schartau did 
not make a record of any o f the Greek attendants apart from the Minister of Education, 
Nikolaos Louvaris, and the architect of the institute, Dragoumis, in whose garden the 
events took place.1093 Schartau also referred to issues relating to mental characteristics,
1088 Aktennotiz 04.03.1943, in: MPGA, A b t I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2953/3.
iw  Schartau to Hartmann, 02-02.1943, in: MPGA, Abt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1282. Schartau wrote: “on tine
matter itself, I cannot openly write you, but it is o f  great interest for us”.
los« Telschow to Forstmann, 0Z11.1942, in: MPGA, Abt I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2960/5.
1091 Schartau to Telschow, 04.04.1944, in; MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2953/4.
1092 Schartau to Hartmann, 5.4.15)44, in: MPGA, A bt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1282. Buddenbrock was specialised 
on hormonal physiology and the change o f  matter (Hormon- und Stoffwechselphysiologie) in inverte­
brates. Knoll was a professor o f botany and the rector at the Vienna University. He received financial sup­
port from Frit2 v. Wettstein to study the morphology o f fruit and to reorganise the botanic garden o f  Vi­
enna. O n Knoll see: SEBASTIAN MEISL, “Wiener Universitaet und Hochschulen”, h r Wien 1938, Son- 
derausstdlung des Historischen Museums der Stadt Wien. Wien 1988, pp. 196-209.
1053 Schartau to Hartmann on 5.4.1944 and 07.10.1943, in: MPGA, A bt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1282.
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heredity, as well as philosophical issues, such as the question o f free will.1094 1095It appears 
that the German-Greek Institute was expected to become the cradle of modem biology 
in southeastern Europe, offering young scientists an opportunity to be introduced to the 
new developments in the field, and Schartau’s lectures were apparently the first step in 
this direction.
Even under the protection and auspices o f the Webrmacht; the further construc­
tion of the institute and, apparently, its operation was hindered by the residents o f Pi­
raeus. Perhaps the most serious incident was the occupation o f the building demanding 
its use as a quarantine hospital for infectious diseases. In February and March 1942, the 
Greeks strongly resisted the efforts o f  the Germans to use it as a biological institute in­
stead o f being used for urgent health facilities. This opposition was initiated by the Greek 
authorities o f Piraeus and found support among the Police Commissioner, the president 
of the Chamber o f Commerce o f Piraeus and the Public Prosecutor (Staatsanwali) of Pi­
raeus, while the German Kommandatur tolerated it.1093 According to Schartau this was a 
clear attempt to sabotage the establishment of the institute, however, he believed that the 
use of violence, even though it might provide an immediate solution, would jeopardise 
the instituted future in the long-term. In  addition, he did no t want the Germans to be 
blamed if some infectious disease broke o u t1096
Tzonis did not get directly involved in any o f the negotiations, because, according 
to Schartau, he did not want to make any enemies.1097 The problem was solved by finding 
another building for the Greeks. The whole affair, however, delayed the restoration and 
expansion works even further. The next “challenge”, as Schartau characterised it, was to 
find construction materials and food supplies for the workers. In dealing with the first 
issue, he eventually received support from the German army and marines, while the 
Greek government ensured the necessary food supplies at first, which they failed deliver 
later. The Kaiser Wilhelm Society took on h e  responsibility, in h e  end, of providing
iop4 The theoretical and philosophical issues that troubled Hartmann have already been mentioned. Perhaps 
the most interesting o f those was the question o f immortality. In  1943, in his letter to Qaus Schilling, who 
was director o f the malaria institute at the concentration camp o f  Dachau, Hartmann expressed his desire 
to be able to dedicate his research exclusively to philosophical problems in the near future, particulady to 
the “methodological principles o f  natural sciences”. See: Hartmann to Schilling, 23.11.1943, in: MPGA, 
Abt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 46.
1095 See: Schartau s correspondence from Athens to  Hartmann, in: MPGA, A b t III, Rep. 47, Nt. 1281.
i°96 Schartau to Hartmann on 03.04.1942, in: MPGA, A bt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1281.
1097 Schartau to Hartmann on 25-03.1942, in: MPGA, A bt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1281.
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food for the workers.1098 Nevertheless, the general delay in making the institute opera­
tional had not been resolved. One and a half years later, the scientific equipment that had 
already been purchased was still in Germany. In the end, it was transported to the bio­
logical research institute in Lunz am See in southern Austria, without ever reaching its 
final destination.
After Schartau’s death on 2 September 1944,1099 the funding for the institute was 
permanently stopped and the building was abandoned. A month later, the German 
troops retreated from Athens. Shortly afterwards, the institute was taken over by the 
Academy o f Sciences in Athens. Spiros Dontas became the new director of the institute, 
however, due to the lack of finances and personnel, it did not start operating until 1947. 
For some years after the Germans left the institute, Hartmann continued to receive in­
formation about its fate through Anton Kanellis, a former researcher at the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Institute for Brain Research, who had known Klaus Paetau very well.1100 Kanel- 
lis was still in Germany when the Red Army marched into Berlin and he returned to 
Greece after a long and adventurous journey in 1945. It is interesting to note that Kanel­
lis, as well as his mentor in Greece, the zoologist George Pantazis, refused to work at die 
institute.1101 Pantazis had excused himself by claiming that he was already too busy to 
carry out scientific work at the institute. Dontas himself played a very limited role only 
taking responsibility o f the completion o f the construction o f  the building. Discussions 
about whether Hartmann should take charge of the institute again continued until 1949. 
He was informed by the Greeks that his involvement would remain open until the politi­
cal landscape in Greece was more stable after the end o f the civil war following the 
country’s liberation.1102 Both Dontas and Pantazis, who eventually became member of 
the institute’s new committee, hoped that Hartmann would take over as director in the 
future.1103
In 1946, the only scientists who were reported to have worked at the institute 
were the Greek Minister of Education, Nikolaos Louvaris, whose role is not mentioned, 
and the French hydrobiologist, G. Bellock. A small ship, named the “Glcrfke”, was con­
verted into a research vessel and in 1946, carried out three oceanographic cruises in the
1098 Schartau to Hartmann on 29.04.1942, in; MPGA, A bt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1281.
icw was killed while flying from Athens to Germany, when his plane was shot down above Serbia.
1100 In 1948, Paetau immigrated to the USA.
uoi Kanellis to Mrs. Hartmann, 30.06.1946, in: MPGA, A bt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 727.
1102 See: Hartmann's correspondence with Kanellis, in: MPGA, A b t III, Rep. 47, Nr. 727.
1103 Kanellis to Hartmann, 15.11.1946, in: MPGA, A bt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 727.
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Aegean under the direction o f the already existing small hydrobiological station in 
Palaion Phaliron and also under the guidance of Bellock. The latter carried out hydro- 
biological research for about a year in the framework of the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA), which provided international humanitarian assistance 
to the post-war countries.1104 The purpose o f the research, however, was not reported. In 
1947, after the unification o f the Dodecanese islands with Greece, the already existing 
hydro-biological institute on the island o f Rhodes was incorporated into the Piraeus in­
stitute. The new institute created as a result o f the above consolidation remained under 
the Academy’s control until 1960, which published the institute’s scientific minutes for 
some years. In 1965, it was incorporated into the newly established “Institute for 
Oceanographic and Fishery Research” (Ivomooro Qx£avayga<ptxow m i Aksoztxcov E qsovojv, 
IQKAE), which only started its operations in 1970. In 1985, having expanded its re­
search scope, the IQKAE was renamed “National Center for Marine Research” (Edvixo 
Ksvzqo QaXdaaicu; Egevvat;, EK 0E), under the jurisdiction o f  the General Secretariat for 
Research and Technology o f the Greek Ministry of Industry, Energy and Technology.
no* Kanellis to Mrs. Hartmann, 30.06.1946, MPGA, Abt. I ll, Rep. 47, Nr. 727.
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6.3 . Prof. D r. M a x  Hartmann.
Despite the fact that the exact scope of the scientific work that was expected to 
be carried out at the institute o f Piraeus cannot be found within the fragmented material 
and sources available, some assumptions about the scientific role o f the institute could be 
made using related documents. The fact that the director of the institute, Max Hartmann, 
sought to establish an organisation that would provide favourable conditions to continue 
his experiments on fertilisation and sexuality o f the lower organisms, clearly indicates the 
future role of die Piraeus institute envisaged by the German zoologist.
Before focusing on biology, Max Hartmann’s early studies were concerned with 
forest science. His teacher was Richard Hertwig, however, the person that influenced 
him the most was Fritz Schaudinn, the famous biologist who discovered the cause o f 
syphilis. Hartmann soon became friends with Schaudinn who stimulated the former’s 
interests in protozoa research.1103 From 1914 onwards, following his appointment as di­
rector o f  the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology, Hartmann dedicated himself to re­
search on the unicellular organisms, namely the protozoa and algae, and the problem of 
ageing and death, as well as to the issue of fertilisation and sexuality. His contribution to 
these areas earned him a place among the leading German biologists. Hartmann was also 
one o f the few biologists who had great knowledge o f  large areas o f biology and he was 
the author o f the classic textbook “AUgemdne Biologf, published between 1925-1927, and 
the editor of two o f the leading zoology journals, i.e. “Zooiogscher Jahrbuechtf' and the 
“Archiv fuer Protistenknndi\ He also had a great interest in the question of energy conser­
vation, and moreover, its philosophical dimension. The issues o f  ageing and death, with 
which Hartmann also dealt, were directly related to the issue o f energy conservation 
problem.105 106
Closely related to these issues was the significance o f sexuality in fertilisation, 
which had troubled Hartmann throughout his career.1107 In a lecture on death and repro­
duction at the University of Giessen, held in 1903, he gave his first public account o f the
1105 Curriculum vitae o f Max Hartmann 1936: MPGA, Abt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1.
1I(* Ibid.
1107 M a x  H a r t m a n n , “Autogamie bei Protisten und ihre Bedeutung fuer das Befmchtungsproblem”, in; 
Arcb. f. Proüstenkmde 14 (1909), pp. 264-334. For a detailed and complete list o f  Hartmann's biological and 
other publications see: HENG-AN CHEN*, Die Sexualitaetstheorie und "Theoretische Biologie” von Max 
Hartmann in der ersten Haelfte des zwanzigen Jahrhunderts. Stuttgart 2003, pp. 277-285.
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complex problem of sexuality and fertilisation.1108 The phenomenon of fertilisation with­
out the joint action of female and male, i.e. vegetative reproduction or parthenogenesis, 
was already known to biologists. What was not known, however, was the process o f this 
type of reproduction, which took place not only in vegetables but also in the animal 
kingdom. During the fertilisation process one can normally distinguish between the fe­
male and the male gametes. The gynogamones (Gynogamone), as the former are called, are 
usually bigger, less active and less numerous during their gender fusion, while the latter, 
the androgamones {Androgamone), are smaller, more active and more numerous than their 
female partner. However, it often happens that the partners cannot be distinguished 
from each other either from their form or from their behaviour and in this case they are 
called isogametes. Explaining the process o f fertilisation in organisms in which female and 
male partners were indistinguishable continued to trouble the biologists during Hart­
mann’s days. Before Hartmann, August Weismann and Otto Buetschli had made efforts 
to understand the cytological process o f  fertilisation. Weissmann had argued that the re­
production process is formed through mutation and because it eventually leads to a fu­
sion o f the hereditary properties o f a male and a female gamete, this process becomes 
more selective. This was the Amphimixis theory or the theory o f semen-plasma mixture 
(’Kdmplasmamischungslehn) which was criticised by Hartmann for providing a physiological 
explanation o f fertilisation and the result o f it and not the mechanism o f the reproduc­
tion itself.1109 Until mid-1920s, the other dominant hypothesis of the reproduction 
mechanism was the “rejuvenation hypothesis” (Veijuengungshypothese) supported by 
Buetschli. Hartmann himself had contributed to the debate with his experiments on 
Eurodina alga, which lasted ten years, by stopping fertilisation without causing physiologi­
cal decrease or any other regulation in genes.1110 *Some biologists tried to transfer this 
process o f parthenogenesis occurred on plants to animal protists}nx Despite some suc­
1109 Max HARTMANN, Tod und Fortpflanzung. Eine biologische Betxachtung, (oeffentlicher 
Habilitiationsvortrag an der Universitaet Giessen, 1903). Munich 1906.
1109 M a x  H a r t m a n n , “Ueber relative Sexualitaet bei Ectocarpus sUkulosus* Ein expenmen teller Beitrag zur
SexuaUtaetshypothese der Befruchtung.” in: Die Natumissenschaften, Heft 26 (1925), pp. 975-980, here: p. 
975. 
m o ¡ML
m i The term “ProtistiP or “PrvQstf’ was used to describe a variety of single o r simple mulhcelluar eukaryotic 
creatures, which means that their genetic information, the DN A , is endosed in a nucleus inside the cell. All 
protists live in moist environments. According to the traditional classification, they were broadly divided 
into the animal-like protists or “Protozoa” and plant-like protists o r “Algae”. However, they are not plants,
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cessful experiments, it was clear that the "rejuvenation hypothesis’* could not be general­
ised and another explanation for the reproduction process had to be found. Hartmann 
maintained that sexuality and fertilisation did not occur independently from each other in 
separate phylogenic groups but were instead the two facets of the same process. He ob­
served that this joint action was closer to the forgotten “hypothesis of sexuality** (Sex- 
ualitaetsbypotbese) which could provide biologists with the solution to the fertilisation 
question. This hypothesis had been originally formulated by Otto Buetschli between 
1887 and 1889, who had argued that in general every promt and sex cell is in some way a 
hermaphrodite or bisexual and at the same time has all of the male and female poten­
cies.1112 According to this theory, the predominance of the male or female tendencies de­
pended on one or more factors and could potentially occur any time without previous 
ageing.1113 *15One o f the most important factors or preconditions that had to be applied in 
order to confirm the theory, was the relative sexuality of the reproductive cells. The 
“relative sexuality-distinction** (relative sexuelle Differen%erung), which states that the gender 
differentiation of the germ cells is not absolute in all cases but relative in many of them, 
had been argued by Hartmann in 1909.11u According to him, only the relative sexuality 
could explain the fusion of female cells in parthenogenesis. The problem, however, was 
that the right experimental material had to be found to confirm this hypothesis in prac­
tice. After long year experiments with sweet water algae and fungi, Hartmann found the 
organism that he was looking for in the gulf of Naples in 1925. The experiments were 
carried out at the Dohm Zoological Station and the material used was the brown alga 
named Ectocarpus siliculo$us}ns Hartmann considered that the Ectocarpus from Naples and 
not from any other place, would provide the best test case for confirming the theory of 
relative sexuality which would be guaranteed easier and with a higher degree of certainty
animals or fungi, but they aze similar to them that scientists believe ptotists paved the wav for the evolution
o f early plants, animals, and fungi.
im  H a r tm a n n , "Ueber relative Sexualitaet bei Ectocarpus sükulosu/’, p. 975.
1113 Ibid, pp. 975 f.
n u  M a x  H a r tm a n n , “Autogamie bei Protisten und ihre Bedeutung fuer das Befruchtungsproblem”, in; 
Arch. f. Eroüstenkmde 14, (1909), pp. 264-334.
1115 M ax HARTMANN, “Untersuchungen ueber relative Sexualitaet I. Versuche an Ectocarpus siäcuksuf',irr  
Biologisches Zentralblatt, 45, (1925), pp. 449-467; Ibid., "Ueber relative Sexualitaet bei Ectocarpus uhcvlosus. Ein 
experimenteller Beitrag zur Sexuahtaetshypothese der Befruchtung.” in: Die SatunisstHsebafteu, Heft 26, 
1925, pp. 975-980.
in comparison to other objects o f experiment.1116 With these experiments, Hartmann 
proved the theory o f sexuality in practice that had been first put forward by Buetschi in 
1887, thus taking the problem o f  reproduction one step further. Despite Hartmann was 
still not in the position in 1925 to explain the exact nature o f the sexuality, he made clear 
that “sexuality was the deepest cause o f  any kind o f fertilisation”.1117 *19
During the following years, he tried to prove the theory of sexuality in more 
complex organisms, such as the lower vertebrates, fish and the amphibians. The results 
of his research culminated in the discovery of the most basic animal reproduction mate­
rial in sea-urchin in 1939.111S Together with Richard Kuhn of the KW Institute for Medi­
cal Research in Heidelberg, who analyzed the chemical texture o f the material, Hartmann 
named his new discovery gamone and termone}n9 He described them as chemical sub­
stances or a group o f substances which causes a fusion o f cells that determine the gen­
der.1120 Hartmann also argued that the determination o f the chemical basis of the fertili­
sation process on protozoa, marine algae, and sea urchins could possibly lead to the pro­
duction of gamone and termone through experimentally controlled mechanisms. Although 
the project o f  the German zoologist was clearly linked to the hereditary physiology, 
which was o f major interest to the Nazis, he underlined that it was only possible to study 
the physiological and behavioral peculiarities of the reproductive material on lower ver­
tebrates, fish and amphibians and no t on higher vertebrates, mammals or even hu­
1116 Max HaRTMANN, ‘‘Sexualitaetsprobleme bei Algen, Pilzen und Protozoen. (Eine kritische Darstellung 
im Anschluss an einem Bericht von RALewin)”, [Duplikat] in: Biologisches Zentralblatt; 74 Heft 5 /6 , (1955), 
pp. 1-23, hete: p. 8.
1117 H a r tm a n n , “Ueber relative Sexualitaet bei Ectocarpus ääcufosuf’, p. 979.
im  MAX H aRTMANN, O t t o  Sc h a r t a u , “Untersuchungen ueber die Befruchtungsstoffe von Seeigpln I”, 
in: Biologstbes Zentralblatt, 59, (1939), p p . 571-587; M a x  H aRTMANN, KURT WALLENFELS, 
“Untersuchungen ueber die Befruchtung? Stoffe von Seeigeln II”, in: Biologisches Zentralblatt, 60, (1940), pp. 
398-423.
1119 M a x  H a r t m a n n , O t t o  Sc h a r t a u , R ic h a r d  K u h n , K u r t  W a l l e n f e l s , “Ueber die Sexualstoffe 
der Seeigel”, in: Natunissenscbaßen, 27, 1939, p.433; Max  H a r t m a n n , “Die stofflichen Grundlagen der 
Befruchtung und Serualiataet im Pflanzen- und Tierreich. I. Die Befruchtungsstoffe (Gamone) der 
Seeigel” , irr Natunissenscbaßen, 28, (1940), pp. 807-819; M a x  H a r t m a n n , OTTO SCHARTAU, RICHARD 
KUHN, K u r t  W a l l e n f e l s , "U eber die WechelWirkung von Gyno- und Androgamonen bei der 
Befruchtung der E ier des Seeigels” , in: Natunissenscbaßen, 28, (1940), p.144; Max  H a r t m a n n , “Die 
Befruchtungsstoffe Gamone der Seeigel”, in: Forschungen und Fortschritte, 17, (1941), pp. 119-122.
1120 Hartxnann to  Paetau 10.07.1939, in: MPGA, A bt HI, Rep. 47, Nr. 1107; see also DEICHMANN, Biolo­
gen unter Hitler, p. 143.
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mans.1121 It is also clear that Hartmann did not try to sell his project to the Nazis by 
linking it to the racial theory. Nevertheless, he managed to convince the authorities that 
his project was important for the ongoing warfare and he continued to receive financial 
support for his project during the war years, and also for the establishment of the Ger- 
man-Greek Research Institute for Biology in Piraeus, where he apparently planned to 
continue the research that he had began to undertake by that time with his fellow work­
ers and students in Berlin and Naples.
However, what was the significance o f the protist research? Hartmann like the 
other biologists at the KW Institute in Berlin-Dahlem, carried out basic research. How­
ever, the practical application o f his investigation seemed to interest the Nazis, particu­
larly during the war. Among the major problems that Germany had to deal with were the 
food self-sufficiency for its population and the army and the infectious diseases that 
threatened its forces. The most serious disease was malaria, which was regarded the 
number one threat to the Wehrmacht in territories such as the Balkans and Greece. It was 
also known that some fungus-like protists, like water moulds (oomycotd) could wipe out 
whole crops putting the population at the risk of starvation. On the other hand, some 
animal-like protists are parasites and many of these protists, like plasmodium, cause dis­
eases such as malaria. "Plasmodium spends part o f its life cycle in mosquitoes and the other 
part in human hosts, where it spreads infection and ruptures blood cells in large num­
bers. Some other protists cause parasitic diseases, such as trypanosomes that cause sleeping 
sickness. Therefore, the discovery o f how die reproductive system of protists worked 
was of great importance in the fight against infectious diseases. In the early years of his 
career, as director of the protozoa department o f the “Robert Koch” Institute for Infec­
tious-Diseases from 1905-1914, Hartmann focused on this kind of protozoa in his re­
search. Having received an invitation from the Brazilian government for the establish­
ment of the department for protozoa at the Oswaldo Cruz Institute, he spent about nine 
months in Rio de Janeiro, where he had carried out research on pathogenic protists.1122 
The results of his fruitful years in Brazil were published in a series o f works during 1910 
and 1911. Hartmann also published some important work on pathogenic protists and 
bacteria with Peter Muehlens, one of the future leading experts on malaria in the Balkans, 
as well as with Claus Schilling, the director o f a department at the “Robert Koch” Insti-
1121 Max Hartmann to A. Meyer, director o f the University gynaecological clinic in Tuebingen, on 
04.05.1942, in: MPGA, A bt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 45.
n— Curriculum Vitae o f Max Hartmann 1936, in MPGA, Abt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1.
313
"nun.......
tute for Infectious-Diseases and the director o f the Malaria Research Station at the con­
centration camp in Dachau since 1941.1123
Despite the tact that since mid-1920s, Hartmann’s research focus had shifted to 
the determination of sexuality, the Nazis did not seem to lose interest in his project. On 
the contrary, the Reich’s Research Council (RFR) provided him with 24,000 marks in 
funding for genetic research for the period 1940-1945, while he had only received 1,800 
marks during 1934-1939. From 1940 until 1945, he was supported with additional 8,320 
marks for physiological research.1124 The German-Greek Biological Institute in Piraeus, 
due to its clear sea water in front o f  the institute’s building was regarded as the ideal place 
for Hartmann to continue his research on sea-urchins, which would be the next stage of 
his experiments with regard to relative sexuality. Nonetheless, these plans were never re­
alised because o f the intensification o f the war. Some plans, however, that linked to this 
project were realised, despite some delay. In the winter of 1944, Hartmann together with 
Kuhn and Otto Schartau, the local director of the German-Greek Biological Institute, 
planned to carry out systematic research on the definition o f the reproduction material in 
trout, which met with great success.1125 The project was due to take place at the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Hydro-biological Station in Lunz but the research was postponed due to Schar- 
tau’s death.1126 Hartmann’s research first on protozoa, then on sea-urchins and finally on 
fish, may have encouraged some Nazis to go further by using humans as objects o f ex­
periments. Hartmann himself, however, repeatedly stated that he did not believe his the­
ory could be methodologically tested on higher vertebrates. It is worth noting, however, 
that in 1944, the SS Research and Study Organisation “Das Ahnenerbe” began a project on 
the sex determination on animals and in particular on humans under the management of
1123 M ax  H a r t m a n n , P e t e r  MUEHLENS, .“Untersuchungen ueber Bau- lind Entwicklung der 
Zahnspirochaeten”, im Zscbr Hjgg. u. Infektionskrankheiten, 55, (1905), pp.92-109; M aX HARTMANN, C laus 
SCHILLING, Die pathogenen Protozoen und die durch sie verursachten Krankheiten. Zugleich eine 
Einfuehrung in die allgemeine Protozoenkunde. Ein Lehrbuch fuer Mediziner und Zoologen, Berlin 1917. 
On Schilling's role in Dachau see: Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB), NS 21/912,920.
iU4 u t c  DEICHMANN, Biologen unter Hitler. Portraet einer Wissenschaft im  NS-Staat, Frankfurt/Main 
1995, p. 81.
1125 M a x  HARTMANN, “Befruchtungs Stoffe bei Fischen (Regenbogenforelle)”, im Naturtvissenscbaßen, 32, 
(1944), p. 231.
1126 Hartmann to Telschow on 22.09.1944, im MPGA, A b t I, Rep. 1A, Nr, 2950/6. Graf Medern 
succeeded Schartau.
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Wolfgang Abel, a professor o f anthropology and the director of the Institute for Racial 
Biology at Berlin University.1127 The experiments had no serious result
See: BAB, NS 21/902.
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6.4. The G reek Protagonists. Resistance or collaboration?
Although the Greek scientific community was, in general, well disposed towards 
the Germans, after the country’s occupation by the Nazis “very few Greeks were willing 
to convert their old or new sympathies into concrete collaboration”.1128 Ibis was largely 
due to the famine during the first winter o f occupation in 1941-2 that decimated the 
Greek population, and the Nazi atrocities that occurred in response to the growing 
Greek resistance. Many germanophile Greeks preferred not only to refrain from any col­
laboration with the occupants, but also from joining the resistance movement Nonethe­
less, the Greek interest for the promotion of cultural and scientific relations with Ger­
many still remained strong. What did the Greeks expect to achieve from cultural and sci­
entific interaction with the Germans? What kind of needs did they expect to satisfy with 
the newly established institute in Piraeus and to what degree did it fulfil their expecta­
tions?
It seems that the biological institute was very important for the Greeks in the in­
terests o f the advancement o f applied sciences in the country. This was underlined both 
by Tzonis and Nikolaos Louvaris, the Minister of Education in the third collaborative 
government. The Germans understood how much the institute meant to the Greeks and 
they emphasised this in their dealings with them in order to commit them into support­
ing the institute financially.1129 However, as a result o f  the poor economic situation, these 
commitments and promises were never fulfilled. After the harsh winter of 1941-42, dur­
ing which thousands of people had died o f starvation, the scientific advancement of the 
country was no longer a priority and the only concern of Greeks was survival. The posi­
tion towards the Germans had changed in comparison to the summer of 1940. Accord­
ing to Hartmann, the main reason was the fact that many laboratories in Athens Univer­
sity had been occupied by the German troops.1130 Characteristic was the speech o f  
George Sklavounos, a professor of anatomy and member of the Athens Academy of Sci­
ences, referring to Hartman’s proposal to the Academy to represent the Greek side. In an 
unequivocal and ironic tone, Sklavounos expressed the reasons for the Academy’s refusal 
to become involved in the institute’s affair. He argued that the economic situation of the
Fleischer, xa: r^aonxa, p. 118.
1129 Schartau to Hartmann, 07.10.1943, in: MPGA, A bt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1282. Louvaris promised Schartau 
to fund the institute with an additional 100 million drachmas, after he visited the building in Piraeus.
1150 These were the new institutes of theoretical medicine, anatomy, pharmacology and pathology.
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country, the condition o f the libraries (which had largely been destroyed), the use o f uni­
versity institutes as canteens for the German troops, and above all, the problem of star­
vation were the main reasons that forced the Academy to refuse any collaboration with 
the Germans.1131 However, officially the Academy stated that it was only postponing its 
co-operation, not refusing to become involved. I t is also interesting that Sklavounos, 
stated that one o f its prominent members, Spiros Dontas, had refused to co-operate with 
the German scientists, an assertion that contradicts the information recorded in the 
documents- Dontas was not the only one who had initially signed Hartmann’s written 
proposal to the Academy, but he also convinced his colleagues to represent the Greek 
membership o f die institute.1132 After the Academy’s withdrawal, however, Dontas to­
gether with the botanist Ioannis Politis, who also was its member, seemed to act on their 
own without representing the Academy, reassuring Hartmann that they would participate 
in the institute’s committee “without fail”.1133
Dontas was one o f the most important figures in die institute’s affair. As a re­
spected member of the Greek scientific community, he was able to make contact with 
key individuals in the country’s political, economic, and academic circles and to influence 
them to a certain degree in favour o f  the institute. After his appointment as a professor 
of general physiology in 1916 at Athens Medical School, Dontas went to Germany and 
the Netherlands for further education- In the following years, he managed to climb up 
the academic hierarchy holding top positions o f seemingly different disciplines. In 1925, 
he became a professor of experimental pharmacology and in 1927, a professor o f physi­
ology. In 1931, he was unanimously elected as a member o f the Academy of Sciences and 
in 1943, he became its president Nevertheless, his co-operation with the German scien­
tists did not prevent him from resisting the Nazi occupants and participating in the 
Committee for the “Rescue of the Greek Jews”. As president of the Academy, Dontas 
signed the historical petition against the persecution of the Greek Jews, drawn up by the 
Archbishop o f Athens, Damaskinos and submitted it to the president of the occupation
U31 GEORGE SKLAVOUNOS, “Aöyo? orrjv AxaS^nia to Xstpiwva 1942. «H AxaSr^at agvrjrai»”, in; 
EmdsdiQfjOT} Tsxwfc, Year H*, Band IE ', Issue Nr. 87-88, March - April 1962, pp. 298-299.
1132 Letter signed by Dontas and Harunann to the Academy of Sciences in Athens on 21.07.1941, in 
MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 14, N r.l; Auszug aus einem Schreiben von Herrn Professor Hartmann (to Telschow) 
on 28.07.1941, in: MPGA, A bt 1, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/6.
1133 Bericht ueber die Verhandlungen von Prof. Dr.M.Hartmann ueber das deutsch-griechische Institut fuer 
Biologie in Athen vom 3. bis 17. Dezember 1941, in: MPGA, A b t I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/7.
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government FC Logothetopoulos.1154 Dontas was a friend of Logothetopoulos, however, 
their relationship appears to have changed during the occupation years.
The prominent botanist Ioannis Politis was the most relevant Greek scientist to 
the Kaiser Wilhelm projects, apart from the zoologist George Pantazis, who did not get 
involved in the establishment o f institute. Politis supported the idea not only in its first 
phase but also during the war years. He was educated in several countries and he studied 
in the most important European universities of the time. After completing his basic 
studies in Athens, he visited several Italian universities in Rome, Naples and Pavia, where 
he received his Doctorate, in 1911, Meanwhile, he visited the universities o f Paris and 
Berlin between 1907 and 1908. Since 1917, Politis lectured in the major Greek institu­
tions for natural sciences, namely the Forestry School, the Athens University and the 
Technical University. As soon as the Academy of Sciences was established in 1926, he 
was elected an ordinary member and became its president in the academic year 1949- 
1950. He was also a member o f  the Greek Thalassography Committee and the Institute 
for Cancer Research. In short, he participated in a number of significant scientific organi­
sations and committees in Greece, which indicate that he was able to influence the lead­
ing figures in the scientific community o f  Greece.
Politis was a specialist in both the land and marine flora of Greece and he pub­
lished several studies largely in Greek and French but also in Italian, English and Ger­
man. Before the creation of the Piraeus Institute he had published works similar to those 
the KWG scientists concentrated on and were of great interest for the Nazis. Already by 
1925, he had published on the sea algae of the Athos peninsula in northern Greece and 
in 1927, on the sea algae of the island o f Syros.* 1135 The fauna and flora of the island of 
Crete, which became particularly important for the German Four-Year-Plan, was also 
part of Politis* investigation. Since the Middle Ages, the island had attracted western 
botanists, including French, as well as Italian, Britons, Hungarians and Germans. The 
German contribution and in particular that of the director of the botanic garden of Ath­
ens, Heldreich, seemed to be the most important by the middle of the nineteenth cen­
1334 The petition dates on 23 March 1943 is included in the commemoration minutes tided “50 Years after 
the Holocaust of the Greek Jews 1943-1993'’, Central Council o f Greek Jews, 17 March 1993. Athens War 
Museum.
1135 Io a n n is  P o l it is ,, «Ouxn, Oakaocta tt£  Xegoovfaoo t o o  A0w», Ezunrymitoj Ezcrrjgts 2%oX. $>yooc 
Ma&rjp. Etuot. Topioc A. 1925; Ibid., «Ouxr OaXaooia t t j s  vrooo —uooo», ilgcctma AxaSrjpiac A&rpxjjv (1927) 
2  480-484.
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tury.1136 Nevertheless, until 1930, all o f the researchers had only focused, according to 
Politis, on the spermatophytes, neglecting the study o f sporophytes, species which belonged to 
the algae of the Cretan coastline, which had been the object o f research o f  the Greek sci­
entist since 1926.1137 In 1933, he published further on the sporophytes of the Attica coast, 
where he registered over five hundred species of fungi and algae, four hundred o f  which 
had not been previously observed on the Greek coastline.1138 Politis undoubtedly had a 
useful role to play in assisting Hartmann and his group in carrying out their research in 
Piraeus. After the war, Politis and Dontas became members o f the committee o f the 
newly renamed “Hydrobiological Institute in Piraeus”. In 1947, the institute launched the 
journal "Practica o f the Greek Hydrobiological Institute of Athens Academy of Scienceƒ*. During 
this period, he chose to focus on plant cancer and issues relating to heredity.1139
The key person, however, who brought the Kaiser-Wilhelm Society and Hart­
mann into contact with the Greek authorities was a scientist who did not hold any high- 
ranking post in the academic or political life of Greece. Working next to Hartmann at his 
institute in Berlin-Dahlem, Kostantinos Tzonis carried out a series of experiments in the 
field of general biology. In particular, he dealt with questions o f heredity and evolution as 
well as with the genotypic sex determination. He also experimented with new methods in 
order to find a way of dealing with the above problems.1140 In his experiments with the 
marine worm, Dinophilus cpatris, Tzonis hoped to detect the factors that affected the non- 
hereditary determination of gender. He proved that the influence of potassium and mag­
nesium ions upon the worm suspend sexual behavior. A second series o f successful ex­
periments he carried out on the worm, Eudorina elegans. In these experiments, he investi­
gated the process o f cell increase and cell division, a fundamental question in the physi­
ology of reproduction, which was related to the issue o f potential immortality, which was 
of great interest o f Hartmann. Tzonis* work included electro-taxis, electro-narcoses and 
electro-metan arcoses experiments in lower crabs and myriopodes in order to test the
1136 “Tlegt tt£ ©ot/áoacc; XAwgiSo; trq Nr¡aou Kg t̂ric”, ngccypaxsiai AxahTjpâ  A&rjváv, Tó(io<; B 
(3) 1932, pp. 1-30.
1137 Ibid
1138 IOANfNts POLITIS, «ilepi v\<; ©aXaaoiac XXwpiSo? trie Araxric», Tlgaypiazdai ttjz Axa6r¡fiiac Adrjrxiw, 
TófiO<;r(l),(1933), 1-44.
1139 Ibid, “Avdnrcu&c; óyxwv em tpurwv ex 8taia@ax% TT1? ava7üvor¡^” Aváwnov sx xmTIgcocaxdiv xrjcAxaSrffihc
Afojvúv, tójkx; 22"*, 1947. (A6rpa 1951); Ibid, ‘‘K^QOvopaxótrji; xaa twv OQymxwv ovtwv” Tlgaxim.
AxaS. AOtjvojv, 24: (nacv7ryuQt)oi ZuveSeta 29.12.1949), pp 67-85.
1140 Hartmann to S. Dontas on 29.10.1937, in: MPGA, A bt III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1490.
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sensitivity of organisms of the same species towards different levels of electricity. In 
these experiments, he observed the organisms in a stationary position while under narco- 
ses and occasionally he carried out small operations.1141 The material for those experi­
ments came from the Kaiser Wilhelm Hydro-biological Station at Lunz am See, in south­
ern Austria.
Tzonis was a scientist from an interdisciplinary background. He began his studies 
at the National Technical University o f Athens and after two years o f studying electrical 
engineering, he turned to the life sciences. He was enrolled in the Medical School of Ath­
ens University and in 1933 he was awarded his Ph.D. In the same year, he went to Aus­
tria and he was enrolled in the Faculty o f Philosophy at Vienna's University and later at 
the University of Graz. In Graz, he received a second doctoral degree from the Depart­
ment of Natural Sciences in 1936, where he specialised in biology. During die following 
two years, he worked next to Hartmann and when he returned to Greece, he ran the 
laboratories of biological and biochemical research at the Greek Institute for Cancer Re­
search. As a student at Athens Technical University he became active in left-wing poli­
tics.1142 143*In 1939, Tzonis failed to be appointed professor of general biology at Athens 
University after receiving only one vote1145 and his political activism cost him his post at
1141 KONSTANTIN TZONIS, „Gleichstromnarkose bei Insekten", in: Mitteilungen aus der Biologischen 
Versuchsanstalt der Akademie der Wissenschaften, Zoologische Abteilung Nr. 235, Sonderabdruck aus dem 
Akademischen Anzeiger Nr. 17 des Jahrgangs 1935 (Sitzung der math.-naturw. Klasse vom 27. Juni 1935); 
KONSTANTIN T z o n is , W. Baar,  „Elektrotaxis und verwandte Erscheinungen bei niederen Krebsen", in: 
Estratto da uRadiobialogia Generalis" 4, (1936), pp. 33-39; Ibid., „Elektrotaxis, Elektronaxkose, 
Elektrometanarkose und Elektroypnose bei Myriopoden (Tausendfüßler)" in: Zeitschrift fuer Vergleichende 
Physiologie 23, (1936), pp. 247-253; Und., „Elektrometanarkose bei Fischen", in: Mitteilungen aus der 
Versuchsanstalt der Akademie der Wissenschaften, Zoologische Abteilung und der Biologische Station in Lunz, 
Nr. 272, Sonderabdruck aus dem Akademischen- Anzeiger Nr. 23 des Jahrgangs 1937 (Sitzung der math.- 
naturw. Klasse vom 2. Dezember 1937). I am grateful to Prof. Alex Tzonis for providing me with the 
reprints o f the above papers.
1142 Encyclopaedia 'HAioc, entry Konstanrinos Tzonis. The information is confirmed by the son o f K. 
Kotzias, Panagiotis Kotzias (informal interview on 23 August 2000, in Athens), as well as by Tzonis’ own 
son, Alexandras Tzonis. According to the latter’s account, his father was a member o f  the Greek 
Communist Party (KKE), as well as a member o f the Agrarian Party (Informal interview on 20 July 2000, 
in Athens).
1143 Dean of the Department of Physics and Mathematics, J. Trikalinos to the Rector o f Athens University
on 25.02.2939, in: Historical Archive o f  Athens University (IAPA), 1-1 Appointments o f  Professors
(Atogtopoi xaöyjyrjTwv. npojri]pu§<; nXrpojoewc E$@<i>v xat aXXe; Aia5txaoie?), 1938-1939. According to his
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the University o f Saloniki, from which he was dismissed in 1946. Soon afterwards he 
worked at several food companies in Greece continuing his political activities along. With 
some other prominent scholars -also educated in Germany- he became involved in 
launching die journal “A vta io?  dedicated to the post-war reconstruction of Greece in 
1945. Among those scholars were Professor Nikolaos Kitsikis from Athens Technical 
University and the mathematician Nikolaos Kritikos, who had refused to get involved in 
the German-Greek Institute. Tzonis also became the president of die Greek-Soviet 
Friendship Society. However, due to the constant threat o f unemployment, he returned 
to Berlin around the early 1960s and by 1964, he was working as a professor at the 
physiological institute o f Humboldt University.* 1144 In 1959, Tzonis also became involved 
in the establishment of a Greek-GDR committee, which aimed to facilitate cultural ex­
change between the two countries.1145
Tzonis seemed to have three major interests including electrodynamics, cancer 
research and the production o f  industrial food.1146 In Austria and Berlin, his research was 
focused on cancer, and in particular the experiments with the elecro-narcosis method 
aimed at preventing the mitosis procedure, which is the way in which cancer develops. 
Needless to say that Tzonis* interests were closely related to some of the most important 
projects carried out at the biological institute in Berlin-Dahlem, namely the research on 
mutations and polyploidy, as well as food autarky. However, his contacts with leading 
Greek personalities within the political and economic circles seemed to be more impor­
tant than his scientific expertise. Despite the fact h a t  he held radically opposing political 
beliefs, he got on very well with K. Kotzias, who was fond o f  the young Greek scientist 
Tzonis also knew FCarolos Fix, the Bavarian owner o f  the biggest brewery in Greece. It 
had been proposed that Fix should become a member o f the institute's committee, how­
ever, this proposal was abandoned on the basis of his German descent.1147 His place was
son, Alex Tzonis, he was not elected due to his political beliefe. (Informal interview with Alexandras 
Tzonis on 20 July 2000 in Athens).
1144 Aktenvermerk Gen Kiehne ueber ein Gespraech mit Pro£ Dr. Tzonis am 12.8.1964 in der 5. AEA, on 
20.08.1964, in: Politisches Archiv des Auswaertigen Amtes (PAAA), M£AA/ A 1975.
1145 Jahresanalyse 1959 Hauptreferat 204 / Griechenland, on 19.01.1960, in: PAAA, M£AA/ A 12490-1 am 
grateful to Pro f Hagen Fleischer who drew my attention to this and the above mentioned document
1146 Informal interview with Alexandras Tzonis on  20 July 2000, in Athens.
1147 Bericht ueber die Verhandlungen von Prof. D&MHartmann ueber das deutsch-griechische Institut fuer 
Biologe in Athen vom 3. bis 17. Dezember 1941, in: MPGA, A b t I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 2949/7, also irr A b t I, 
Rep. 14, Nr. 1.
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eventually taken by the industrialist Aggelos Kanellopoulos. As a professor o f biology in 
Saloniki from 1942 onwards, Tzonis remained in contact with Hartmann, even although 
this contact became more low-key. Despite the fact that he had contributed to the 
establishment o f the institute and he would later become its director, he remained in the 
background after the German invasion. Schartau attributed this change of attitude to die 
influence o f other Greeks who became less well disposed towards Germany.1148 
However, even without being influenced, Tzonis —as with many other scientists- had 
good reason to keep his distance from the Germans due to the Reich’s repressive policy 
that turned the majority of the Greek population against them. Schartau also reports that 
it was also very likely that Tzonis was afraid of being accused by his compatriots o f 
collaboration with the Nazis after the end o f the war.1149 In spite of the tense situation in 
Greece and his active role in the resistance movement, Tzonis’ interest in the 
establishment o f the institute was not diminished. In 1944, he visited Schartau in Piraeus 
and he again expressed that he was ready “to share in it”.1150 His political activity, 
however, does not seem to have interested the German scientists, as the establishment of 
the institute was o f  the utmost importance to them.
Whereas Dontas, Politis and Tzonis tried to resist the Nazi occupation of their 
country in one way or another, other individuals were less discreet in expressing their 
sympathies to the Germans during the occupation and chose to co-operate openly with 
them. One of these figures was the gynaecologist, fCostantinos Logothetopoulos. As a 
Minister o f Education and vice-president during the first occupation government, he 
gave his complete support to the German biological project in Greece. Although he may 
not appear to have played a role in Hartmann’s proposed investigations on the Piraeus 
coast, Logothetopoulos was one o f the most important links between Greece and 
Germany. His affiliation with Germany and the German culture can be traced back to 
the beginning o f  the century, when he was student of medicine at the University of 
Munich. After graduating, he started his career at the Obstetric and Gynaecological 
Clinic o f Munich, where he remained until 1910. In that year he returned to Greece and 
established a small surgical gynaecological clinic in Athens. As a professor at Athens 
University, he played a leading role in the creation o f several hospitals and institutions
1148 Schartau to Hartmann, 06.03.1942, in: MPGA, A bt III, Rep. 47. Nr. 1281.
1145 Ikd
1150 Schartau to Hartmann, 26.08.1944, in: MPGA, Abt. Ill, Rep. 47. Nr. 1282.
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among which included the first Institute for Cancer Research in 1924. Through his 
efforts, the Medical School was founded at the University1 o f Saloniki, which began to 
operate in 1942.1151 However, his contribution to modem gynaecology in Greece was 
overshadowed by his collaboration with the Nazis. On 7 April 1943, Logothetopoulos 
was removed from office and in 1945, he was sentenced to life imprisonment, although 
he had already escaped to Austria.
Konstantinos Louvaris was another scientist who was involved in politics and 
held a post in the Greek government as Minister o f Education in Metaxas regime for a 
short time in 1936 and in the third occupation government between 1943-44. He had 
also been educated in Germany and he pursued his studies in theology and philosophy in 
Leipzig. In 1936, he was awarded the title of honorary doctor of philosophy o f  the 
University of Heidelberg. In 1945, he was convicted of collaboration with the Nazis, 
nevertheless, his conviction was overturned in 1948.
The political figure, however, that played the most important role in establishing 
the Piraeus institute was undoubtedly the Governor of Athens, fCostantinos Kotzias. 
During the First World War, he studied law in Germany and his admiration for German 
culture remained undiminished even during the Nazi occupation in Greece. He was a 
very influential man with a genuine interest in the promotion o f  science. During his term 
of office as mayor of Athens from 1934 onwards, he attempted to create a zoological 
garden in Athens in collaboration with the zoologist Pantazis in 1938, but his efforts 
were not successful. He did succeed, however, in allocating a building site for the estab­
lishment of the Model Hygienic Organisation, which was initiated by the director o f the 
Rockefeller Foundation in Greece, M.C. Balfour.1152 Similarly, while he was still mayor, 
Kotzias used his influence to secure the purchase o f the building “Villa Skouloudi” in 
Piraeus, which would house the German-Greek institute. Despite his evident sympathy 
for the Nazis, Kotzias took refuge in the United States in August 1941, a few months 
after the invasion of German troops into Greece.1153 After Greece’s liberation, 
surprisingly enough, he continued to exert influence upon his compatriots. His interest in 
the reform of the national public health system, devastated by the war and famine, again 
came to the fore. During his stay in the United States, Kotzias approached the American
1151 See: http://w w w jnedautii.gr/depts/aing/gr/lustoryJitin
1152 K o n s t a n t in o s  k o t z ia s , “rtauQoaoçia Ôtà tyjv Arffootav Yyeiav” , [“Crusade for Public Health”], in: 
Axaè/jpàïxq Iarpaq, *Eroç 11,3 (97), (1947), pp. 217-220, here 217.
1153 See: EXXïjvixô, AoyotêxvuîÔ xoc Icrroçxxô Aqx&° (Greek Archive for Literature and History, ELL\), 
Kostantinos Kotzias. File Nr. 2, Correspondence 1940-1945, Subfile 2.2 [1941].
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authorities and discussed a closer cultural and scientific relation between the two 
countries in the future.1154 In 1946, he contacted the Unitarian Service Committee 
through his son George Kotzias,115S who was working at the Rockefeller Foundation at 
that time, in order to encourage American doctors to visit Greece and to help with the 
rehabilitation o f the health services in Greece.1156 It is interesting to note that in spite o f 
the official statements related to the scientific and cultural objections of the German- 
Greek institute, it was clearly envisaged by Kotzias as an instrument to serve the racial 
ideology of the Nazis. In 1940, for example, expressing his support for the establishment 
o f the research station he underlined that its “racial-political tendency” had yet to be 
classified.1157 This statement reflected rather his own perception of the nature and 
purpose o f a biological institute on Greek soil, given the fact that he sympathised the 
Nazi ideology and was a devoted follower. From the available documents, however, this 
assumption cannot be confirmed by the German scientists.
Even though the above figures played a leading role in the creation o f the 
institute in Piraeus, it is interesting to highlight some o f the prominent scientists that 
were less active in the institute’s affair and remained, or preferred to remain, on die 
sidelines, or were completely absent from the whole undertaking. The personalities that 
were approached by the Germans to discuss the establishment of the institute included 
prominent figures in either the scientific or in the political life of Greece who were 
educated in Germany. Before die German occupation o f Greece, almost all o f the 
German-educated scientists admired the German culture and intellectual heritage, despite 
the fact that most of them disapproved of National Socialism. However, after 1941 
things had changed as resistance movement had been organised at universities and many 
professors also joined forces with this movement. The resistance of professors at the 
Technical University of Athens was more explicit, while some of its most prominent 
scientists became involved in left-wing parties or other organisations. This was the case 
of Nikolaos Kitsikis, who became the first president of the Greek-Soviet Friendship 
Society in the post-war era, and Nikolaos Kridkos, a professor of mathematics at Athens
US4 KONSTANTTNOS KOTZIAS, “Ot Ajiegodrvot Iatgoi et; TTjv EXXiSac”, (“American Doctors in Greece”], 
in: Axaôtjpcüxfi Iarpixt}, F ro ; 12,2 (102), (1947), pp. 111-113, hete 111.
1155 Georgos Kotzias later invented the D D opa for Parkinson’s disease.
1156 K o t z ia s , “Ot Ap^çtxàvot latgot et; ttjv EAXriSa”, p. 111.
us7 German Embassy in Athens to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, 12.08.1940, in: MPGA, A bt I, Rep. 1A, 
Nr. 2949/2.
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Technical University and the Dean o f  the same university in 1941. Kritikos had also been 
approached by Hartmann to participate in the work o f the institute’s committee, 
however, he refused on the grounds o f  political developments after German occupation. 
He excused himself that he was too busy, however, he latter confessed to Hartmann and 
the German Culture Attaché in Greece, Erich Boehringer, that it was “morally 
impossible” for him to participate in planning of the institute.1158 After the liberation, he 
became a member of the National Council o f the Political Committee o f National 
Liberation (nEEA) and the National Liberation Front (EAM).1159 Kritikos had studied 
advanced mathematics in Athens, Goettingen, Munich and Zurich, where he was 
awarded his doctoral degree. Since 1913, he had worked at Athens Observatory, first in 
the Meteorology Department and latter in the Seismology Department; which he was in 
charge of from 1937 until 1942. In 1923, he was sent to Goettingen and Hamburg to 
work next to some of the biggest names in the field, such as Wiechert in Goettingen and 
Zieharht in Hamburg. He was among the few scientists allowed to visit Hamburg’s 
marine observatory (Seewarte), amidst Germany’s scientific boycott at a time when all 
military, naval and air activity o f the country was under the strict control o f the Allies.1160 
In 1937, Kritikos went to Munich and Vienna on a scholarship from the Greek 
University to leam about the new developments in crystallography.1161
Another striking example o f the absence o f a prominent scientist from the 
institute’s planning was the zoologist, Georgios Pantazis. As he had been educated in 
Germany, Pantazis was very well known in the German scientific community. He held 
the post o f the professor of zoology at Athens University from 1933 onwards and he 
became director o f the Zoological Museum in 1934. He had studied medicine in Athens 
and Leipzig before going to Munich on a Greek private scholarship to study natural 
sciences. Completing his education, he worked as assistant for three years at the
i15» Ibid. ‘
1159 Both Kritikos and Kitsikis, according to Alex Tzonis, were close friends with Kostantinos Tzonis. 
(Informal interview with Alexandras Tzonis on  20 July 2000, in Athens).
1160 Report o f N. Kritikos to Athens Observatory, in 1923, in: undated file: “Apxeto npoowaxou toa 
Aorepooxorcrioo” (Archive o f Observatory's Personnel) in: Archive o f  Institute for Environmetal Research 
and Viable Development -  Meteorological Institute of Athens Observatory in Penteli [EEPVA]. The above 
valuable archive has not yet been classified. However, full access to the documents was made possible 
thanks to the generosity of the Director o f  die Meteorological Institute, Dr. Michalis Petrakis and his 
scientific assistant Mrs. Dimitra Vouta.
1161 Historical Archive of Athens University (LAPA), 1-1 Appointments o f Professors (Aio@ta[ioi 
xa0r]Y^TWv. riQOxr]£o2it<; rUrpidoeo*; ESqgjv xm cxXXei; AiaSixotote;), 1937-1938.
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laboratory- o f  hygiene and microbiology at Athens University as well as at the Biogenetic 
Institute and the Institute Pasteur in Paris. Pantazis was awarded another grant from the 
Bavarian Academy o f Science for research at the Zoological Station in Naples and the 
Rockefeller Foundation for research on medical entomology in Greece, which proves 
that he was a very-well known and respected scientist However, he did not have a role in 
the formation o f the committee o f the institute, despite the fact that he was the only 
professor o f  zoology in Greece at that time, as well as a member o f the Greek 
Thalassography Committee and a specialist in mosquito research. Why then, was he 
excluded from an institution directly related to his scientific interests and the interests o f 
the Kaiser Wihlem Society? In March 1942, Pantazis was approached by Otto Schartau, 
Erich Boehringer and Tzonis to become the sixth member of the committee. His 
acceptance was expected to be confirmed, as he was well disposed towards the Germans, 
he was German-educated and a member of the presiding committee of the German- 
Greek Society in Athens.* 16162 Nevertheless, the negotiations with Pantazis were not 
successful on the grounds that Pantazis and Tzonis did not understand each other very 
well.1163 It was only after the end of the war that Pantazis got involved, when the institute 
came under the auspices o f the Athens Academy o f Sciences. In 1952 he became the 
scientific director o f the newly established hydrobiological institute.
Despite the fact that the institute was linked to the chemical industry —and indeed 
the largest chemical company o f Greece “Chemical Fertilisers” of Charilaos & 
Kanellopoulos was represented at the institute’s committee- and in general, it was 
expected to serve the chemical interests of Greece, it is striking to note the absence o f 
one o f the most eminent Greek chemists at the time, Leonidas Zervas. His name was no t 
even mentioned during the time o f  negotiations between the German and Greek 
scientists, even though he had been educated in Germany, had worked at the Kaiser 
W'ilhelm Institute for Leather Research in Dresden, and was married to a German 
woman. At the time when the discussions were taking place, he was a professor of 
organic chemistry at Athens University, leaving his post at the University of Saloniki 
when the Greek government asked him to teach in Athens in 1939.1164 Zervas had
1162 Otto Schartau from Athens to Max Hartmann on 14.03.1942, in: MPGA, A bt III, Rep- 47, Nr. 1281.
1161 Schartau from Athens to Hartmann on 03.04.1942, in: MPGA, Abt- III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1281.
U64 MICHAEL Sk o u l LOS, “H Ê eXt̂ r) Tr£ Xijpetag onto noveaurrrijjuo A0r]V(Lv” [“The development of
Chemistry at Athens University”], in: GEORGIOS VlaCHAKJS (ed.), H  lotoptxr E&Ai?r4 Xrjietoc; cmn(v
EUaSot. Tlgccaixi riavEAArviou Zujiitootoo 14-15 Oxrußgtou 1994, "Evojcm, EXXrvuv X r^x ü v / Union O f
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studied chemistry for two years at Athens University before interrupting his studies to go 
to Berlin in 1921, where he completed his doctorate in 1926. His early work focused on 
carbohydrates. After his time in Berlin, he went to Dresden, where he was appointed as 
an assistant to the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Leather Research until 1929. From 1929 
until 1934 he was in charge o f the department of organic chemistry, under the 
management of the German-Jew Max Bergmann. In 1932 Zervas published a joint paper 
with him on an innovative technique for the synthesis o f peptides, a type of proteins that 
were regarded as the key to understanding the phenomenon o f life. Even though their 
hypothesis, namely that the genetic code is contained in proteins, was later proved false 
and the focus o f research moved to the study o f the nucleic acids from which a protein is 
formed after die war, the impact o f the “carbobenzoxy method”, as Bergmann’s and 
Zervas" discovery became known, was enormous. Soon after the Nazis came to power, 
Bergmann immigrated to the United States where he set up a new post at the Rockefeller 
Institute for Medical Research. A year later, in 1934, Zervas followed his mentor and 
friend to the United States. In 1937 Ioannis Metaxas appointed him as professor of 
organic chemistry in Saloniki going outside the normal election procedure.1165 During the 
occupation period he joined the resistance participating in the National Democratic 
Liaison (EAEZ) and was subsequently jailed by the Italians for his involvement.
The reason why such a brilliant scientist, as well as other eminent Greek 
scientists, who could have contributed not only to the creation of the institute but also to 
its reputation, were absent from this important scientific undertaking, which was 
supported and promoted by a country in which they were -at least intellectually- 
associated, remains in question. The fragmented documents, and in many cases the lack 
o f evidence, only allows us to make some hypotheses o f  why the most prestigious 
research centre in Germany, die KWG, relied upon the assistance of Tzonis, a lesser 
well-known and a younger scientist at the beginning o f  his career to promote the 
establishment o f a biological institute in Greece. The fact that a Greek scientist, who was 
Hartmann’s assistant, took the initiative to revive an old idea for the creation of a 
German research centre in Greece was, o f course, well-received by die Germans. 
Naturally, they took advantage o f the opportunity to present their proposal to the Greek 
authorities through Tzonis. However, they were not aware o f the extent o f Tzonis’
Greek Chemists. A0r^a 1996 [The historical development o f Chemistry in Greece. Pracdca o f  Pan- 
Hellenic Symposium 14-15 October 1994, Athens 1996], pp. 195-204, here 202.
1165 Daily Newspaper «Ta Nsa», Thursday 14 October 1999. "Leonidas Zervas”, by C  Krimbas.
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contacts in Greece or how much influence he could exert upon his compatriots, in order 
to find support for the future institute. The absence of some of the most eminent 
scientists in Greece in the negotiations, is largely due to their exclusion from Tzonis’ 
network. In addition, it was vital for the smooth operation of the institute that all of the 
Greeks involved would be willing to collaborate with each other. Furthermore, the 
Germans did not seem to be much interested in finding out the top Greek scientists 
whom they could work with, due to the pressing need to continue their research in the 
framework of the projects of Berlin-Dahlem, regardless of co-operation from eminent or 
less prominent Greeks. Finally, it should be stressed that many Greeks, including those 
who had been educated in Germany and were well-disposed towards the Germans 
before the war, were particularly disappointed by the Reich’s invasion and occupation of 
Greece, a feeling which was later transformed into resistance. Their refusal to participate 
in a German or German-organised institute, as was the case of Kritikos, certainly 






In 1938, Werner Lorenz, the director of the Mediation Office for the German 
People (Letter der Volksdeutscken Mittelstelle) and president of the Association of Bi-national 
Unions and Institutions (“ Vemnigung %wschenstaatilicber Verbaende und Einricbtungen e.V.”)„ 
announced that the purpose of bilateral institutions was the promotion of understanding 
among peoples and the fulfillment o f mutual interests.1166 This turned out to be mere 
rhetoric, as the Reich’s plans for self-sufficiency in raw materials, food and currency, 
which had been announced about a year previously, were patently inconsistent with such 
a declaration.
The ‘promotion of understanding among people’, however, had been acknowl­
edged in the Weimar years, as Germany struggled to maintain anything it could of its 
damaged image abroad, following its defeat in the First World War. Germany blamed its 
miserable situation on the winners o f the war, and on France in particular, and tried to 
correct its image abroad by introducing itself to people '«ho had been influenced by what 
Germany saw as French-orchestrated anti-German propaganda. In other words, Ger­
many sought to have foreign countries understand its own culture by making them fa­
miliar with it, by adopting an organised foreign cultural policy. Science was among the 
“feinere MitteP used by Germany in order to achieve this goal.
However, national pride and the fervent wish o f a state to gain international rec­
ognition and to expand its influence abroad is not far from what could be defined as ‘na­
tionalism’. The end of the World War I and the signing of the peace agreement left Ger­
many no space for flag-waving exercises, when seeking to “solidify sentiments o f national 
allegiance and to mobilise against foreigners”.1167 This practice had been dominant in the 
period o f the formation of the nation-state and ended with the outbreak o f  the Great 
War. Cultural nationalism had already been intermingled with political nationalism. The 
peace agreement created socio-political conditions, in which nationalism became “pri­
marily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be
1166 M itteilungen d e r  “Vereinigung zwischen staa tlich e r V erbaende u n d  H inrichtungen e.V .”  gpz.: Lorenz. 
SS-O bergruppenfuehrer, P re s id e n t d e r  “V erein igung zwischen staa tliche r V erbaende un d  E inrichtungen”  
01.11.1938, in: PAA A , R  61274. T h e  d ocum en t w as classified as “confidential” (Vertraulich!).
1167 E lisa b eth  C r a w fo r d , N ationalism  and  internationalism  in  science, 1880-1914. F ou r studies o f  the 
N obel population , Cambridge 1992, p. 28.
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congruent”.1168 Within these conditions German scientists developed nationalist feelings, 
which seem, however, to go beyond the interests o f their nation. Being excluded from 
almost all international organisations and being blocked from international activities, die 
Weimar Republic regarded its culture and science as the only means to regain its lost 
reputation as a strong military and economic power and so once again to take a “place in 
the sun”. Scientists were a “sort o f organised army” in the service of the nation, as 
Hermann von Helmholtz had put it, in 1862.1169 This was particularly true when the na­
tion was at war and was to find its ultimate expression during the Nazi era. .
Nevertheless, the impact o f the World War I not only strengthened the national­
ist feeling; it brought to the fore the notion of ‘internationalism’. The ideological belief, 
however, that governments and peoples could act constructively together, particularly in 
order to abolish war and conflict, proved to be selective in its application, leaving Ger­
many outside the world community. This contradiction turned out to be o f Germany’s 
benefit The continuing scientific achievements in many disciplines not only invigorated 
confidence in German science, but also challenged the international scientific commu­
nity. Many scientists in the international scientific community started to contact their 
colleagues in Germany, giving the country the chance to organise exchange programmes. 
In addition, these scientists exerted pressure on those monitoring the implementations of 
the Versailles Treaty to loosen their control over the exchange o f scientific knowledge to 
and from Germany. At the same time, the idea of ‘internationalism’ as a constitutional 
element of scientists, position towards science in general, made the German scientists 
seek communication and co-operation abroad for the sake o f science itself. In 1926, for 
example, Prof. Eduard Spranger, in his essay on Germany's contribution to international 
science argued that his country was traditionally interested in advancing science for the 
enrichment o f the intellectual wealth o f the whole o f  humanity rather than for Germany’s 
individual concern.
[The] achievements [of science] are therefore the common property of mankind [...] We 
only have to consider what would have happened to the new discoveries in physics and 
chemistry, if these sciences were to have been pursued as the secret scientific property of 
each individual nation, as was the case in the days of old Alchemists! [...] German sci­
ence has always been particularly aware of the necessity of such survey, that is to say, the
1168 ERNEST CEULNER, N ations and nationalism , L ondon  1988, p.l, cited  in; Crawford, N ationalism  and 
internationalism , p. 29.
1169 G te d  in: CRAWFORD, N ationalism  and  in ternationalism , p . 35.
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necessity of a general organisation. In consequence, Germany's organs of reference were 
always internationally present, and were valued and utilised by almost all nations.1170 
Spranger particularly stressed the major German reference works and contributions to 
learned journals in natural science, which added most to international scientific knowl­
edge. Some o f  those works, like the “New Annual for Mineralogy, Geology and Palae­
ontology” [ccNsuss Jabrbuch fuer Minéralogie, Geohgie und Palaeontobgii*], dated back to the 
very beginning of the nineteenth century. Despite declarations made by German intel­
lectuals for the promotion of “idealistic” and “unselfish” competition,1171 nationalist ele­
ments in the “ideology of scientific internationalism”, as Paul Forman labelled it, were 
always present in their writings.1172 173These elements seemed to be stronger among the 
Geistesivissenscbaftler, which regarded themselves as “the champions of true intemational-
'  1173ism .
It seems that, no matter how conscious the mission of German science might 
have been before World War I, the political and economic circumstances in the Weimar 
period gave a new context to the old issue o f scientific universality. The new institutional 
forms, like the German Academic Office for Foreigners, the Humboldt Foundation, the 
DAAD, and so forth, all had the same aim: to develop international scientific collabora­
tion for economic and political purposes. No matter how effective those organisations, 
the most powerful instrument at Germany's disposal for ‘internationalising* its science 
was the scientific and research centres and their branches abroad. Research was one o f 
two dimensions in Germany’s scientific life. Ih e  requirement that research should be 
separated from teaching in German scientific centres was first discussed at the beginning 
o f the twentieth century and finally institutionalised in 1911, with the establishment o f 
the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. Research was considered equally important for both human 
and natural sciences, and it “reflected the greatness and the essence {die Groesse und das 
Wesen) o f the German nation”.1174 I h e  German Reich had over die previous hundred 
years, created a considerable number o f  research institutes abroad, thereby adding to the
1170 E d u a r d  Sp r a n g e r ,  D eutschlands A n ted  an der In tem ationalen w issenschafthchen A rb e it 
(Germ any's w o r t  fo r  international science), L eipzig  1926, p. 15-
1171 Ibid. p. 33.
1172 P aul F o r m a n , “Scientific Internationalism  and the W eim ar Physicists: T he Ideology and  its m anipu­
lation in G erm any after W odd  W ar I” , in: IS IS , VoL 64, Issue 2 , (1973), p p . 150-180, here p . 152.
1173 Ib id
11,4 G e o r g  Sc h r e ib e r ,  Die N o t d e r  deu tschen  W issenschaft und  der geistigen Arbeiter. G eschehnisse 
und  G edanken zu r Kulturpolitik des D eu tschen  Reiches. Leipzig 1923, p . 9.
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state’s international prestige. This kind o f  power was now threatened by Articles 297 and 
299 of the Versailles Treaty. The archaeological institutes in Rome, Athens and Cairo, for 
example, which for years had been centres o f German and international science, were 
struggling to survive and save indigenous science from death.1175 The Zoological Stations 
in Naples and Rovigno, Italy found themselves in a similar situation. The Weimar Re­
public was determined to maintain the operation o f  these and other institutes abroad, 
funding them with money from the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry o f Foreign 
Affairs.1176 However, this was not an easy task. However, the Germans took the view that 
world could ill-afford to dispense with German science. This was a “poor consolation”, 
as Heilbron, the cultural director of Foreign Ministry, remarked, since the Allies were 
determined to establish an “international club” without Germany.1177
Nonetheless, it was not rare for scientists to highlight the essentially nationalistic 
foundations and functions o f scientific internationalism by emphasising the participation 
of the nation in the scientist’s feme, which advanced not only science but also the na­
tion’s interests.1178 During Hitler's regime, this practice became common place, as scien­
tists in the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes, for example, were seeking financial support for 
their projects. In 1935, Secretary General Friedrich Glum stated that “the KWG does not 
need a special justification for being joyfully at the disposal o f  the new Reich o f Adolf 
Hitler and thus to contribute to the work of reconstruction o f  our German Vaterland’.1179 
Similarly, his successor, Ernst Telsdiow, assured die German army some years later the 
aid o f which was essential for the establishment o f  the German-Greek Biological Insti­
tute in Piraeus that “we want to help the Troops Armament Office (Heereswaffenamt), as it 
help us too.”1180 Both the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and the institute in Piraeus were re­
warded for their services to the Reich, not only financially but also securing their free­
1175 U ndated  d o cu m en t with rem arks o n  ch a p te r  14 (“D ie d eu tsch en  A uriand-F onchungs institu te” pp. 73 
ff.) o f  SCHREIBER'S work: “D ie N o t der deu tschen  W issenscahft u n d  d e r  geistigen A rbeiter”  ibid., in: 
PAA A , R  65520.
1176 In  1923 the F oreign  Ministry funded  829.352 Marks the institutes in  R om e and A thens and 9.180.000 
M arks the institute in  N aples alone! SCHREIBER: Die N o t der deu tschen  W issenschaft, p . 74.
1177 N o te-le tte r o f  M in. D irec to r Friedrich H eilb ron  to  P ro f. D r. Schreiber, on 31.10.1922, in: PAAA, R 
65519.
1173 FORMAN, “ Scientific Internationalism ” , p . 152.
1179 G te d  in: UTE DEICHMANN, BENNO MUELLER-HlLL, “Biological R esearch at Universities and Kaiser
W ilhelm  Institu tes in  N azi G erm any”, in: MONIKA RENNEBERG, M a r k  WrALKER (eds.) Science, 
Technology, and  N ational Socialism. C am b rid g e / N ew Y ork 1994, pp. 160-183, here 175. 
nso T elschow  to  F orstm ann, 02.11.1942, in: M PG A , A b t I, R ep . 1A, N r. 2960/5 .
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dom to administer their affairs autonomously and, to a great extent, to conduct their own 
research programmes.
Back to the 1920s, the support and promotion o f the German science and culture 
was n o t only a national enterprise aiming at the Republic’s industrial and economic 
growth or its people’s welfare. It became, in addition, an integral part of the state’s for­
eign policy agenda as the state sought to strengthen its ties with the international scien­
tific community and, if possible, to exercise cultural, political and economic influence 
abroad. In other words, Germany tried to exert intellectual and material influence,1181 par­
ticularly after its admission to the League of Nations. One could argue that if the major­
ity o f the 1925 organisations were mainly designed for intellectual influence, the Notge- 
meinschaftt and later the German Research Council (DFG), was primarily focused on the 
advancement of German natural sciences and research. The purpose of publicising sci­
entific achievements abroad was to awaken, even to provoke, foreign interest in German 
science. During the interwar yean the Germans realised that their cultural presence 
abroad should not be confined to the foundation of language schools or to the creation 
o f  philological and archaeological societies and institutes. Moreover, they argued that it 
should have a practical and applied character, and this could be achieved with the estab­
lishment of research and experimental centres that would serve the economic and mili­
tary interests of the country, in other words, to exert material influence. Nevertheless, 
basic science was not neglected, as it was regarded an inherently international activity.
After 1926, a number of forms o f scientific internationalism were included in the 
German Kuiturpoltrik, which was being shaped at that time. These forms were the inter­
national societies and congresses for scientists, co-operation between individual research­
ers or between research laboratories and institutes, and, of course, collaboration between 
governments. All o f them, as Paul Forman interestingly remarks, “monopolised the in­
ternational relations of other nations by artificially multiplying bilateral ties”.1182 This 
meant in practice that governments were more interested in fabricating their prestige by 
influencing the scientific community and foreign governments, rather than in promoting 
the ideal o f international co-operation. This cultural nationalism, as one could call it, is
1-181 See undated  d o cu m en t Akademie zu r w issenschaftlichen E rfo rsch u n g  und zu r Pflege des 
D eutsch tum s. D eutsche Akademie. E infuehrung  in der Plan d e r  D eutschen  Akademie (Vertraulich!), im 
B A B  R 43 1 / 81 1
1132 P aul  Forman, “Scientific Internationalism", p. 151
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not far from cultural imperialism or “cultural synchronisation”.11®3 It was no coincidence, 
therefore, that Germany signed bilateral cultural agreements with a number of Balkan 
countries as well as with its allies from 1936 onwards.* 1184
Nevertheless, it seems that such agreements went beyond ‘cultural synchronisa­
tion’. This cultural alignment that the Nazis tried to impose on the Balkans, and more 
precisely on Greece, went hand in hand with the political synchronisation o f these coun­
tries, which had to be prepared to be put in the service o f German rule after the end of 
the war. Economic and political influence are among the major goals of cultural infiltra­
tion, that is, “to capture markets for cultural commodities and to establish hegemony by 
shaping popular consciousness”.1185 I f  this one-way traffic o f  cultural products was rela­
tively restrained under the Weimar Republic, on the grounds that the isolation made 
Germany more receptive to foreign intellectual -in particular, scientific- goods, under the 
Third Reich, the one-way nature of German cultural communication became overt. For 
south-eastern Europe, the trend in uni-directional communication was to take on new 
tones, as the National Socialists considered the region to be underdeveloped and thus, it 
was very likely to become dependent on Germany’s science and technology, and hence, 
its economy. It must be underlined, however, that the real dependent partner in this rela­
tionship was Germany itself, as the natural resources o f the Balkans became essential for 
Germany’s war economy. The German systematic penetration into this region and its 
efforts to dominate its cultural life, were the forerunners to its economic exploitation.
Conclusively, can we talk about German imperialism in the Balkans? If  we accept that 
imperialism exists in different periods in various forms and changes in the forms of im­
perialism encountered are the result o f  changes in the relationships between powerful 
and non-powerful states, then it seems legitimate to view German cultural nationalism, as 
it has been formed under democracy and dictatorship, through the lens o f cultural impe­
rialism. It would be misleading, however, to identify cultural imperialism with cultural 
policy. Cultural expansion is a complex phenomenon that belongs to the domain of po­
litical economy. Cultural policy supports this kind o f expansion in a way that is not di­
rectly related to economic practices but rather takes the guise o f noble ideals, such as co­
1185 T h e  term  has been  coinded by  C. J . H am elink. G te d  u r  ANNABELLE SREBERNY-Mo h a m m a d i, “T he 
Many Cultural Faces o f  Im perialism ” , in: PETER GOLDING, PHIL HARRIS (eds.), Beyond Cultural Im peri­
alism. G lobalization , C om m unication  and th e  N ew  In ternational O rd e r. L ondon 1997, pp. 49-68, here p. 
49.
1184 See chap ter 4.3.
1185 G te d  in: GOLDING, H arris (eds.), B eyond Cultural Im perialism , p. 6.
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operation, strengthening of ties, rapprochement and the promotion of friendship, and 
contributes to the prestige of the power that is in a position to give. “The one who gives, 
dominates”, remarks Braudel and the kind o f domination is what relates cultural policy 
with political economy. This relation is, however, dynamic, depending on the time pe­
riod, the social and political circumstances and the role of individuals, -in our case, of 
scientists.
During the time from the Weimar Republic up to the end o f National Socialism, 
German cultural policy, or cultural propaganda, had neither the same goals, nor were 
they pursued in the same way, despite the fact that in both periods the means used for 
cultural policy-making were more or less the same. In the Weimar Republic, the goal of 
this policy was mainly to correct Germany's image abroad and to boost its national pres­
tige particularly vis-à-vis France. Science was assigned the political mission of taking the 
country out o f the isolation and helping it to rejob the btemational community, more 
precisely the economic market When Hitler came to power, he used the existing cultural 
propaganda mechanism. Unlike the Weimar Republic, in which only two Mbistries (For­
eign Affairs and Education) were involved b  the country’s foreign cultural policy, the 
Third Reich bvolved a number of institutions b  propagating German culture abroad. 
These bcluded the Mbistry of the Interior, Am t Rosenberg, the Abnenerbe Office of the 
Reich sfuehrer SS and the National Socialist Organisation for Issues Abroad \AusIandsorgam- 
sation (AC) derNSD AP\.
During the war years, southeastern Europe was the main target for the Reich’s cul­
tural political plans. This cultural rapprochement was due to Germany’s war-time eco­
nomic and political bterests b  the region, which was regarded by the German more or 
less as a future colony. The number o f  scholarships to students and professors as well as 
visits by German scholars b  the region were bcreased. In the early years of National So­
cialism, the cultural role of natural sciences, unlike humanities, was margbalized. With 
the announcement o f the Four-Year Plan, natural sciences, together with technology 
came to the fore, however, not so much as essentially cultural tools, but rather as the b -  
struments that could set the military machbe b  motion and make it triumph. The cul­
tural-political role o f science was regarded at that time as complementary. War needs 
forced the Nazi authorities to look eastwards for raw materials and other resources, such 
as agricultural goods, which could make Germany self-sufficient but would also provide 
the country with territories essential for the expansion of its Lebensraum. The eminent 
botanist FConrad Meyer, then professor at Berlb University, emphasised the fundamental
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importance of the concept of Ltbensraum for Germany’s future in a lecture on planning 
and reconstruction in the occupied eastern territories, in 1942.1186 In the same vein, bota­
nists and geneticists at Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes emphasised the importance o f their 
mutation research, particularly on polyploidy, for the fast breeding of new crop strains. 
Botanical expeditions to Russia and south-eastern Europe for the collection of primitive 
forms o f plants that could be cultivated in Germany, were therefore essential and were 
funded as part o f the political agenda o f  the expansion o f the German living space.
In addition, scientists at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology argued for the es­
tablishment of research institutes o f practical importance beyond Germany’s borders that 
would promote research in botany and genetics. In other words, these institutes would 
help them seek the best techniques for transplanting commercially viable species, and, by 
extension, to transform agriculture in territories that were planned for future conquest 
Thus, in war-time, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society established in 1941 the German-Bulgarian 
Institute for Agriculture in Sofia and the German-Greek Institute for Biology in Piraeus. 
Despite the fact that the war prioritised applied research, pure research continued to be 
promoted, as it was particularly this kind o f research that had contributed and continued 
to contribute in Germany’s prestige. The institute in Piraeus was one such case in which 
purely scientific interests were dominant. Nevertheless, both von Wettstein and Hart­
mann classified the project planned there as kriegsmchtig, in order to receive support dur­
ing war-time. At the same time, they also characterised it as kulîttranchûg. One might then 
wonder; if the Kriegswicbtigkrit argument was tactical but sufficient, optimising the chances 
of survival in a period when institutes pursuing theoretical research had stopped receiv­
ing financial support, then why the German scientists should have emphasised the cul­
tural-political importance of their undertaking? It seems that, even though the declaration 
of a project as important for the war enterprise, -in other words, of having an immediate 
and practical application-, was a necessary and sufficient condition for financial support, 
its cultural political importance did no t leave the Nazis indifferent. Interestingly, the Kul- 
turmcbtigkeit o f the German-Greek Institute in Piraeus was mentioned more often by 
Hartmann and von Wettstein than its Kriegsnichtigkdt. Scientists, observes Diana Crane, 
have virtually no power, as “they control neither economic nor political resources. In­
stead, they exert influence based on expert knowledge”.1187 There are some issues, how­
1186 G te d  in: DEICHMANN, MUEIAER-HILL, “Biological Research’', p . 176.
1187 D ia n a  C r a n e , ‘T ransna tional N etw orks in  Basic Science”, in; In tern a tion a l O rganisation, V ol. 25, Nr. 3 
(1971), pp . 585-601, here 587.
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ever, that come into question and which are difficult to tackle. How was the cultural 
propaganda role of science perceived by scientists and by the regime? Did both o f  them 
share the same interest in promoting German culture through science? What kind of re­
lationship was developed between scientists who could dictate the cultural political sig­
nificance of science and the members of the regime who could make use of it? “Scientific 
prestige is notoriously difficult to elaborate”, remarks correctly Lewis Pyenson.1188 It 
seems, however, reasonable to say that science was a way of making foreign policy, no 
matter if and to what extent it achieved the goals of this political agenda.
As for the German regime, its eagerness to establish scientific bases abroad, at 
that particular time was closely related to its political and military plans. On the one hand, 
the research institutes in the Balkans seem to have been regarded as tangible proof of a 
political sphere o f influence, whether on the other hand, they were expected to serve 
military interests, as the course o f the war shifted the focus of research to projects of pre­
eminent importance, such as malaria and agricultural research. The exploitation of natu­
ral resources was another reason for Germany to acknowledge cultural-political creden­
tials to science, as its advertising abroad could attract young scholars to its universities, 
who could pave the way for Germany to material success, when they returned to their 
home countries. This was the purpose o f granting diem scholarships and this was what 
the German argument that Greece ■would benefit from the establishment o f the institute 
in Piraeus implied. Exerting cultural influence on the Balkan youth was nothing else than 
educating and training them in the Reich. The case of the German-Greek Institute, how­
ever, was more complex. Although the research project planned for Piraeus was never 
really carried out there, the establishment of the institute does not constitute a bureau­
cratic incident, as one might argue. On the contrary, it is largely an indicative example of 
a number of interests that the national socialist cultural propaganda abroad aspired to 
meet through the instrument of science. More precisely, according to its founding char­
acter, the role o f the institute was scientific as well as cultural-political. Von Wettstein 
and Hartmann wanted the biological institute in Piraeus to replace the Zoological Station 
in Naples, which was of the utmost importance to German research but it was no longer 
under German influence. In addition, the fact that Hartmann’s closest fellow-workers, 
who had also spent some time in the laboratories o f the Naples’ station, were going to 
staff the institute in Piraeus, is indicative of his plan to draw the institute’s research line
1138 LEWIS Pyenson, Cultural Imperialism and Exact Sciences. German Expansion Overseas 1900-1930. 
New York 1983, p. 316.
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according to his own interests and independently o f the National-Socialist directives. 
Nevertheless, he did acknowledge the cultural-propaganda role of the institute and 
maintained, together with von Wettstein, that “biological penetration” was also cultural 
penetration. This was a point o f view that was to find fertile ground in Greece. While in 
November 1940, the Greek government decided to close all foreign cultural institutes for 
security reasons,1189 the negotiations for the establishment o f  an institute with the pur­
pose to “strengthen the cultural and scientific relations” between Greece and Germany 
continued with undiminished pace.
The institute turned out to play an additional role during the war and the focus 
of research was shifted to military projects. To die extent that the institute operated at all, 
it was largely used for marine observations for the German Navy. Given its geo-strategic 
position on the Aegean Sea, biological studies no longer had priority. Schartau, the local 
director, was almost entirely engaged in oceanographic studies and not in biological re­
search. In return for services rendered, the Oberkomando der Marine (OKM) promised to 
assist with the building of the institute. Both the OKM and the Wehmacbt provided the 
institute with the necessary construction materials, facilitating their transportation either 
from Germany or from Bulgaria, where they were cheaper to buy. Without die army's 
contribution the existence o f the institute would have been impossible, even though it 
did not manage to produce the scientific work for which it was designed. Perhaps it is 
not too bold to conclude that the varying interests between the Wehmacbt and the biolo­
gists in Dahlem were not in conflict, but were put in a hierarchy forced by the war. In 
addition, the situation in Greece was turned out to be rather hostile for the realization of 
von Wettstein’s and Hartmann’s plans. The German occupation and the brutality of the 
Wehmacbt against the Greek population, in reprisal for the deeds of the Greek resistance, 
which was dominated by the communist organization EAM/EAAS, incurred the peo­
ple’s hatred for the Germans. It should be noted, however, that Hartmann saw the whole 
situation as transitional and continued to hope that after the end of the war considerable 
scientific progress could take place at die institute.1190
1189 HAGEN Fl e is c h e r , “Europas Rueckkehr nach Griechenland. Kulturpolitik der Grossmaechte in 
einem Staat der Peripherie”, in: H a r a ld  HEPPNER, O lg a  K aTSIARDI-He r in G (Hg.), Die Griechen und
Europa. Aussen- und Innensichten im Wandel der Zeit, W en 1998, pp. 125-191, he re p. 151. 
liso ‘'Die weitere klaening der phaenotypischen Geschlechtsbesrimmung interessierte mich sehr. Ich hoffe, 
dass nach Ende des Krieges in Athen die Fragen an den W uennenn ebenfalls gute Fortschritte machen 
werden.” Hartmann to Dr. Franz Moewus 17.01.1944, in: MPGA, Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 47.
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One question, however, is still tantalizing; to what extent did the scientific rela­
tions between Germany and Greece constitute an attempt at cultural policy, propaganda 
or export perse? “The export and expansion of science”, notes H. W . von der Dunk, “can 
be reduced to two main factors: pure scientific interest, [...] and the national interest to 
promote national culture”.1191 If  we accept his view, then it is safe to say that our fulfils 
these criteria, with military, political and commercial interests all arraying in a loose or 
strong connection with them, depending on certain social and political environments. 
Transcending culture -broadly defined- national borders, is without fail a natural phe­
nomenon as well as a necessary and imperative undertaking. It is, however, a phenome­
non fraught with hidden or ‘invisible* dimensions, which, when unveiled, bring to light 
the inherent complexity of the situation.
1191 H.W . v o n  der DUNK, “Commentary on the paper of Lewis Pyenson”, in: R.P.W. VlSSER, Bos,
L .G  Pa lm , H .A.M . SNELDERS (eds.), New Trends in the History o f  Science. Proceedings o f  a conference 
held at the University o f  Utrecht, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 279-282, here 280. The paper he is referring to  is 
entitled: “Pure learning and political economy: science and European expansion in the age o f  imperialism”, 
published on the same book, pp. 209-278.
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wehrwissenschaftliche Zweckforschung).
- NS 21/902: Forschungen ueber Geschlechtsbeeinflussung bei Tieren zur Lenkung
der Zuchtfolge 1944-45.
NS 21/910: Dr. Eduard May. — Entomologische Forschung: Uebertragung von 
Krankheiten durch Insekten Bd. 1. 1942-1943 April.
NS 21/912: Dr. Kurt Ploetner. -Malaria-, Polygalforschung u.a.m. (Versuche im KL 
Dachau). Hierin: Fortsetzung der Arbeiten von Dr. Rascher 1944.
NS 21/920: Prof. Dr. Claus Schilling. —Malaria- 1942-1945 (1946) Forschung (Ver­
suche im KL Dachau).
343
il” r l-U!|ij!i)i)M|i|WM....WWWBW,
Einsat^stab Reichskiter Rosenberg (ERR).
-  NS 30/75: Abschlussbericht ueber die Taetigkeit des Sonderkommandos Rosen­
berg in Griechenland 15.11.1941.
Rdchsforschungsrat. Findbuch Teil II. Return from Library o f Congress ‘Tublication Board 
Files”.
R 26 I I I / 174: Personal and administrative files o f Prof. Menzel, Haus der deutschen 
Forschung, May 1943-Jan.l945.
R 26 III/186: Correspondence re: funding for scientific research.
R 2 6 III/231: Correspondence, SS-Ahnenerbe, Sept. 1942-Nov. 1944.
Reichskanzlei.
R 43 1/812: Wissenschaftliche Anstalte.
Suedosteurapa -  Gesellschaß in Wien.
R 63/1: Satzung. Auftrags- und Ernennungsschreiben, auch Einverstaendniserklae- 
rungen beteiligter hoeherer Dienststellen. (1940-44). Niederschrift ueber Gru- 
endungsversammlung des Vereins “Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft” am 8. Februar 1940 
in Wien.
R 63/2: Gliederung und Forschungsprogramm.
R 63/5: Bd. 2. u.a. Suedost-Agrarinstitut (1941-1944). Suedost-Seminar (1942-44).
R  63/14: u.a. Mit der Suedosteuropa-Gesellschaft berbundene Institute.
- R  63/27: u.a Konstituierende Sitzung des Beirats der Gruppe “Emaehrung und 
Landwirtschaft”, 25 Maerz 1942.
R 63/28: u-a. Zweite Tagung der Gruppe “Emaehrung und Landwirtschaft”, der 
SOEG, 30 Nov. -  1 Dez. 1942.
R 63/33: u.a. Liste der von Hauptgeschaeftsfuehrer Heinrichsbauer auf seiner Bal­
kanreise April 1940 aufgesuchten Personen.
R  63/37: Pistor, Puhl. SOEG — Pistor betr. kulturelle Beziehungen Deutschland — 
Griechenland (1939-1944). Hierin:Vorschlaege Pistor zur Errichtung einer ost- 
maerkischen Wrirtschaftsstelle fuer Suedost.
R 63/49: Satzung (Entwurf) und Arbeitsprogramm fuer das Suedostagrarinstitut des 
SOEG (Juni, Dez. 1941).
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R 63/74: SOEG-Suedost-Agrarinstitut der SOEG an der Hochschule fuer Bo­
denkultur (Hausmann) betr. Zusammenarbeit von Hauptgeschäftsstelle und Institut. 
Hierin: Arbeitsprogramm fuer die landwirtschaftliche Abteilung des Suedost- 
Agrarinstitutes.
R  63/84: Juli — Okt. 1942. U.a. Bauxitgruben und Aluminiumwerke im jugoslawis­
chen Raum, in Rumaenien und Griechenland
R 63/106: SOEG-Hervay betr. Vertretung der SOEG in Griechenland. Hierin: 
Wirtschaftliche Lageberichte aus Griechenland (Febr. 1942 —Juni 1944).
R 63/114: Deutsche Handelskammer in Griechenland an SOEG betr. “Deutsch­
griechische Wirtschaftsnachrichten” Hierin: Anschriften wichtiger Firmen und Ein­
richtungen in Griechenland.
R 63/174: u.a. SOEG -  Auslandsamt der Dozentenschaft und Hochschulen in Wien 
betr. auslaendische Gaeste. Hierin: Jahrearbeitsbericht des Auslandsamts der 
Dozentenschaft der deutschen üniversiateten und Hochschulen (Okt 1941 — Sep. 
1942).
R 63/175: Deutsche Akademie, Deutsches Auslandsinstitut SOEG -Deutsche 
Akademie betr. Ausbau der kulturellen Suedostarbeit, 1942.
R 63/252: Vertrauliche Ablage der SOEG. u.a. Lagebericht Griechenland (Jan.
1944).
R 63/253: Griechenlandsreise Stadler (April 1944).
R 63/262: u.a. Geschaeftsbericht der Gruppe “Emaehrung und Landwirtschaft” der 
SOEG 1942.
ReicbsTninisteriumf. Wissenschaft'Erhebung u. Volksbildung.
R 4901/932: - und Preussisches Ministerium f. WEV. Berliner Hauptarchiv. 
Betrifft: Forschungsinstitute. Jan. 1938-Sept. 1942.
R 4901/2740: Internationale Kongresse und Tagungen. u.a. VIII Congrès Interna­
tional de Haute Culture médicale (Franzoesich-griechischer Aeztekongress) in Athen 
7-21.9-1936.
R 4901/2819: Geographen Tagung Wien 1943. U.a Reisebericht Dr. Hugo 
Hassinger nach dem Suedosten.
R 4901/2935: Internationale Kongresse und Tagungen. Internationaler Kongress 
fuer vergleichnde Pathologie in Athen 1936.
R 4901/2996: Tagung des Internationalen Statistischen Instituts in Athen 1936-37.
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- R 4901/10526: Betrüb Auslandsangelegenheiten Griechenland. Bd. 1 vom Nov.1936
bis Aug. 1941. - • '
R 4901/15115: Deutsches Wissenschaftliches Institut in Athen. Enthaelt nun Akten­
notiz Hans Dittmers ueber die Schliessung des DWI Athen. 1944.
R 4901/15141: Abordnung des Prof. Dr. Rudolf Fahmer, Heidelberg an den 
Lehrstuhl fuer Germanistik der Universitaet Athen 1938-1945.
Deutsches A.uslandsmssenshaßliches Institut. <
- R  4902/2090: Griechenland. Kulturpolitik 1936-1943.
- R 4902/2096: Griechenland. Landwirtschaft 1939-1942.
- R 4902/11204: Deutsch-Griechische Kulturbeziehungen 1942-1943. .
!. ' .  "= J : i . i r ■
Reichsverbandes der deutschen Hochschulen.
- R 8088/733: Allgemeines ueber Auslandsinstitute. Apr. 1925.
- R 8088/770: Wiederaufnahme wissenschaftlicher Beziehungen zum Auslande 1922-
26. - . - . •
- R 8088/796: Zulassung auslaendischer Studenten in Deutschland 1920-25.
R 8088/800: Dachorganisaiton zur Betreuung auslaendischer Studenten in Deutsch­
land 1926-27.
ÎG-Farbenindustrie.
- R 8128/A 421: Die Chemiewirtschaft Griechenlands und wichtige Unternehmen der 
chemischen Industrie. Nov. 1940.




- R 57 n e u /1025: Hamburg. U.a. Deutsch-Griechische Gesellschaft Hamburg. U.a. 
Deutsch-Griechische Gesellschaft.
R 57 n e u /1063: u.a. Athen, la. Griechisch-Deutsche Gesellschaft
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Notgemänschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft! Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.
R 73/48: u.a. Sammlung Laitenberger betr. Akademischer Austausch und auswaer- 
tige Kulturpolitik 1932-1945. Vgl. auch ZSg. 137.
R 73/10179: Beth Kurt. Dr. Rovigno d* Istria/ Italien. “Entwicklungs- und 
Fortpflanzungsphysiologische Untersuchungen am Algen 1940-42. (Als wissen­
schaftliche Assistant)”.
R 73/11095: Freisieben. R. Institut f. Pflanzenbau u. Pflanzenzuechtung Halle /  
Saale. “Bearbeitung d. Balkansortimente 1938”,
“Arbeiten zur Erzeugung polyploider Rasse bei Kulturpflanzen 1938”.
R 73/11422: HaemmerlingJ. Deutsch-Italienisches Institut fuer Meeresbiologie 
Rovigno d’ Istria “Genetische und strahlungsbiologische Untersuchungen bei Ace- 
tabularia 1939”.
- R 73/11757: Hoffmann Walter. Institut fuer Zuechtungsforschung Muechenberg /  
Mark “Durchfuehrung einer Expedition in d. zentrale Gebirgsmassiv d. Balkans zur 
Sammlung von Wildformen unserer Kulturpflanzen 1936-1941”.
R 73/12697: Leuchs Kurt Prof. Dr. U. Wien. Geologisches Institut. “Geologische 
Untersuchungen in Suedosteuropa und Vorderasien 1941”.
R 73/13207: Moewus Franz Dr. Berlin KWI fuer Biologie. “Untersuchungen bei Al­
gen; Untersuchungen ueber die Sexualitaet von Enteromorpha-Arten 1933-1940”.
R 73/13257: Muehlens. Institut fuer Schiffs- und Tropenkrankheiten Hamburg.
R 73/13518: Paetau Klaus. Institut fuer Biologie Berlin-Dahlem. “Aufarbeitung frue- 
herer cytogene tisch er Untersuchungen und statistisch-fehlerkritischer Methoden und 
Anwendung auf empirische Befunde vor allem in der Mutations- und Virusforschung 
1944”.
R 73/13529: Panzer Wolfgang Prof. Dr. U. Heidelberg. Geographisches Institut. 
“Studienreise nach Kreta 1924-1942”.
R 73/14290: Schilling Claus. Berlin “Arbeiten ueber Malariaschutz 1932-1944”.
R 73/15057-8: Stubbe Hans. Institut fuer Kulturpflanzenforschung Wien “Expedi­
tion in d. zentrale Gebirgsmassiv d. Balkans zur Sammlung von Wildformen unserer 
Kulturpflanzen 1935-1943”




R 73/15655: Wettstein Otto von. Dr. Wien. Naturhistorisches Museum. “For­
schungsreise zum Aegaeischen Meer zur Sammlung von Material fuer das Naturhis- 
torische Museum ueber W'aldzeigen (1941-1943)”.
R 73/16860: Schulze Joachim Heinrich Dr. U Jena, Geographische Anstallt “Geo- 
morphologische siedlungs- und wirtschaftsgeographische Untersuchungen im gri­
echischen Thrakien 1932”.
ZSg 137/16: Bd. 1: Akademische Auslandsstellen (Akas) — ohne Hamburg.
ZSg 137/18: Bd. 3: Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung und Deutsches Studienwerk 
fuer Auslaender.
Politisches Archiv des Auswaertigen Amtes. Berlin (PAAA)
- M fA A /A  12470.
- M fAA/ A 1975.
R 27302: Sonderbevolmaechtigter S.O. Telegramme Belgrad -  Athen 02.1944 - 
09.1944.
R 60057: Dto. in Griechenland 1921-1937.
R 60598: Kult W: (Wissenschaften). Intus: liste  schaedlichen und unerwuenschten 
Schriftums. U.a. Deutsche Kongress-Zentrale. Bd.2.1935-1937.
R  60608: Kult Gen: Geheime Verschlusssachen des Ref. Kult Gen (Geheim!) u.a. die 
Rede von Twardowskis anlaesslich der Tagung der Kulturreferenten im August 1942. 
R  60661: Inf. Balkan: Balkanreisen. Rednereinsatz auf dem Balkan u. Berichte ueber 
die Eindruecke 1940.
R  60662: Inf. Balkan: Propaganda im Balkanraum sowie Kulturberichte des Ges. 
Kirchhaltes betr. Bulgarien u. Rumaenien 1939-1944.
R  61147: Deutsche Kulturpolitik im Auslande. Deutsche Kulturpropaganda: Gri­
echenland, 1930.
R 61191: Auslaendische Kulturpropaganda: Griechenland, 1929.
R  61270: Zwischenstaatliche Gesellschaften u. Institute. Allgemeines. Bd. 1, 1939- 
1940.
R 61271: Zwischenstaatliche Gesellschaften u. Institute. Allgemeines. Bd. 2,1939- 
1940.
R  61272: Zwischenstaatliche Gesellschaften u. Institute. Auslandswerk. Bd. 1, 1938- 
1939.
348
R 61273: Zwischenstaatliche Gesellschaften u. Institute. Auslandswerk. Bd. 2, 1938 
1939
- R  61274: Zwischenstaatliche Gesellschaften u. Institute. Auslandswerk. Bd. 3, 1938 
1939.
R 61280: Handakte von Twardowski: Verzeichnis der zwischenstaatlichen Gesell­
schaften und Verbaende (Maerz 1940).
R  61415: Deutshe Kulturvertraege, allgemein Band 1,1939.
- R 64028: U.a DAAD, Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung, Taetigkeitsbericht der 
Akademischen Auslandsstelle, 1933.
R 64037 (MF. -N r. 7323-7327): U.a DAAD, Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung, 
Taetigkeitsbericht der Akademischen Auslandsstelle, 1933.
R 64064: Hochschulwesen und Studium in Griechenland, Bd. 1:1927-1933.
R 64064: Hochschulwesen und Studium in Griechenland, Bd. 2:1933-1936.
R 64200: Deutsche Lektoren und Sprachkurse an auslaendischen Hochschulen: Gri­
echenland 1929-1937.
R 64279 (MF. 7556-7557): Gedenkfeiern der Universitaet Athen 1937-1938.
R 64287: Deutsche Wissenschaftliche Institut im Ausland 1930-1945.
R 64394 d: Fahmer Rudolf, Prof. (Leiter des DWI Athen)
e: Grimm, Rudolf Dr. (Abteilungsleiter des DWI Athen) 
k: Meyer Kurt, Dr. (Lektor in Griechenland)
q: Zeller, Eberhard Dr. (Generalsekretaer und Abteilungsleiter des DWI
Athen)
R  64570: Zoologische Station in Neapel, 1914-1923.
- R  64572: Zoologische Station in Neapel, 1914-1925.
R  64573: Zoologische Station in Neapel 1925-1926.
R 64575: Berliner Aquarium, Mikroskopisches Aquarium und Zoologische Station 
des Berliner Aquariums in Rovigno 1901-1926.
R  64677: Vortragsreisen von Albert Einstein 1920-1924.
R  64680: Vortragsreisen von Prof. Peter Muehlens 9.1923 -  1.1926.
R  64794: Humboldt Stiftung 3.1925 -  8.1925.
- R  64795: Humboldt Stiftung 8.1925 -  121925.
R  64853: U.a. Aufzeichnung des Legationssekretaers Clodius ueber die kulturellen 
Beziehungen zwischen Deustchland und Griechenland 1.1921 -  6.1926.
- R 64981: U.a Georg Karo. “Der geistige Krieg gegen Deutschland” 1924-1926, 
“Denkschrift der Reidiszentrale fuer naturwissenschaftliche Berichterstattung” vom 
29.1.1925. “Die deutsche Wissenschaft und das Ausland”.
- R  65401: Buchausfuhr aus Griechenland nach Deutschland und umgekehrt 1.1921 -  
1.1927.
- R  65519: Notgemeinscaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft 1922 —1927.
- R  65520: Notgemeinscaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft 1922 —1927.
R  65521: Notgemeinscaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft 1922 — 1927.
R  65522: Notgemeinscaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft 1922 —1927.
- R  65711: D t  Buchausstellungen im Ausland 1936, Bd. 17.
R  65806 (MF. 7869-7871): Zoologische Station in Rovigno/ Institut fuer Meeres­
biologie 1927-1931.
R  66599: Deutsche Kulturpolitik. Griechenland 1938.
- D eutsche Gesandtschaft Athen N r. 22: Griechenland: Heer und Flotte, Band 2, 
1936.
D eutsche Gesandtschaft Athen N r. 32: Deutsch-Griechische Beziehungen 1933- 
1939.
- D eutsche Gesandtschaft Athen N r. 35: u.a.: Vortragsreisen nach Griechenland. 
D eutsche Gesandtschaft Athen N r. 50: Geheimakten. Band 1,1937. Film-Nr. 
3880 H /  E.046888-047031.
D eutsche Gesandtschaft Athen Nr. 54: Deutsch-griechische Handelsbeziehungen: 
Lieferungen von Triebwagen, Eisenbahn- und Strassenbahnmaterial fuer den gri­
echischen Staat, 1933-1938.
D eutsche Gesandtschaft Athen N r. 63: Kulturpolitik: Schulen, Presse, Verschie­
denes, Wissenschaft, 1935-1939.
Archiv zur Geschichte der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft. Berlin-Dahlem (MPGA^
Deutsch-Griechisches Institut fuer ’Biologe,
- Abt. I, Rep. 14, Nr. 1: Planung, Gruendungu. Kriegswichtigkeit (1940-1942).
- Abt. I, Rep. 14, Nr. 2: Planung, Gruendung u. Kriegswichtigkeit (1942-1943).
Generalvervaltung derKWG.
- Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 317: Stiftung Nikolaos Louros. 1.11.1930-1932.
- Abt. I, Rep. 1A, Nr. 1235: Zoologische Station in Rovigno 1919-1920. Hauptakten.
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- Abt. I, Rep. IA, Nr. 1240: Zoologische Station in Rovigno 1922. Hauptakten.
- Abt. I, Rep. IA, Nr. 1243: Zoologische Station in Rovigno 1925-27. Hauptakten.
- Abt. I, Rep. IA, Nr. 1314: Zoologische Station Neapel. Hauptakten 1941-1944.
- Abt. I, Rep. IA, Nr. 2949: Deutsch-Griechisches (Forschungs) Institut fuer Biologie 
der KWG. Hauptakten 1940-1942.
- Abt. I, Rep. IA, Nr. 2950: Deutsch-Griechisches (Forschungs) Institut fuer Biologie 
der KWG. Hauptakten 1942-44.
- Abt. I, Rep. IA, Nr. 2951: Deutsch-Griechisches (Forschungs) Institut fuer Biologie 
der KWG. Satzung und Vertrag 1942-1943.
- Abt. Ij Rep. IA, Nr. 2952: Deutsch-Griechisches (Forschungs) Institut fuer Biologie 
der KWG. Kuratorium 1942-1943.
- Abt. I, Rep. IA, Nr. 2953: Haushaltsplan, Jahresrechung 1941-1945.
- Abt. I, Rep. IA, Nr. 2960: Deutsch-Bulgarische Forschungsstelle fuer Mikrobiologie 
auf Thasos. Hauptakten 1942-43.
- Abt. I, Rep. IA, Nr. 2963: KWI fuer Kulturpflanzenforschung. Hauptakten 1939- 
1943.
- Abt. I, Rep. IA, Nr. 2964: KWI fuer Kulturpflanzenforschung. Hauptakten 1942- 
1943.
Generalverwaïtung derMPG.
- Abt. II, Rep. IA, Bd. 1: Personalia Hartmann, 1937-43.
Nachlassse und Deposita.
- Abt. III, Rep. 47: Hartmann Nachlass.
- Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1: Biographisches Material 1936.
- Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 45: Korrespondenz u.a. mit Fritz, v. Wettstein u. A. Meyer, 
1942.
- Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 46: Korrespondenz u.a. mit Claus Schilling, 1943.
- Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 47: Korrespondenz u.a. mit Franz Moewus, Dr. v. 
Buddenbrock, 1944.
- Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 727: Korrespondenz mit Antonis Kanellis, 1944-1949.
- Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1107: Korrespondenz mit Klaus Paetau, 1935-1942.
- Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1281: Korrespondenz mit Otto Schartau, 194Z
- Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1282: Korrespondenz mit Otto Schartau, 1943-44.
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Abt. III, Rep. 47, Nr. 1490: Korrespondenz mit Spiros Dontas u. Konstantinos 
Tzonis, 1937-1941.
Abt. II I , Rep. 47, Nr. 1575: Korrespondenz mit Fritz, v. Wettstein, 1941-42.
Hans Hass Archiv in: “Hans-Hass-Institut für Submarine-Forschung und Tauchtechnik” 
Merzig- (HHA)
Note: The archive is in a filing process, 'which is due to be finished by summer 2006.
GREECE!
Imogixo Aoyeio T7rouo^fou EfiirreoixAv. A6r]va./ Historical Archive of the Greek Min­
istry of Foreign Affairs. Athens (IAYE1
- A /3 /I I ,  1929: p.a. Xyeaeig TeppaviaQ — EXXaSoi; (a.o. Relations between Germany- 
Greece)
- A / l l / 1 ,1934: EXXr]vo-yspp.avuteg ayeaeig (Greek-German relations)
- A / l l / 3 , 1935: EXXrjvo-yepjxavtxs«; oyeaeic; (Greek-German relations)
- A /11/4,1938: repjxavia ei'anepoa) koXluxt] (German foreign policy)
- A /10/3,1939: Auxtpopa (Miscellaneous)
- 2 6 /1 / 1940: p.a. A' noXiturii. Teppavia. Xop^yriorj UTtotpotpiwv aeTEXX^ve; (a.o. A’ 
Politics. Germany. Granting scholarships to Greeks)
Aoyeio IvortrouTOu 'Eneuvotc nep/ocXXovTtxric xoct. BiAoiprc Avamj&;c. AOnva-nevteXT). / 
Archive of Institute for Environmetal Research and Viable Development in Athens. 
Penteli (EFVA).
Unclassified and undated/lie: “Apyeto npoawTtixou too AatepoaxoTteiou” (Archive of 
Observatory’s Personnel)
Aoyeio Z^oApyucou Envarmnnloo xoti Mouosioi) too navem grr/ou A6r]vAv. /  Archive of 
the Zoological Laboratory and Museum of Athens University, (AZM).
File Nr. 1-203, Jan. -  Dec. 1934. Period G. Pantazis.
File Nr. 204-342, Jan. - Dec. 1935. Period G. Pantazis.
File Nr. 343-503, Jan. — Dec. 1936. Period G. Pantazis.
File Nr. 504-719, Jan. 1937 - Dec. 1938. Period G. Pantazis.
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File Nr. 720-900, Jan. 1939 - Dec. 1940. Period G. Pantazis. 
File Nr. 901-1190, Jan. 1941-Dec. 1948. Period G- Pantazis.
EXlrjVtxo- AoyoTEYVLxo v.xi IoTogtxo Agyeio. A6r]vg. /  Greek Archive for Literature and 
History. Athens (ELIA).
Kostantinos Kotlas: File Nr. 2, Correspondence 1940-1945, Subfile 2.2 [1941].
Published records
Ig e r m a k v
Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin.
Jahresverzeichnis der an den Deutschen Universitaeten und Technischen 
Hochschulen erschienenen Schriften. Years 1920-1945-
GREECE
IoTQQixo Agyeio navemotr][i£ou AOiqvüjv. /  Historical Archive o f Athens University 
(LAP A)
IlguTavixoi Aoyot (Rectors’ Speeches) 1924-25, 1932-33,1933-34,1935-36.
AgysEo riQü)ToxoXA,ou, 1-1 Aiogtapoi xaOrjyrixwv. npoxrjgu&q nX^pcjosax; E8oo>v xat 
aXXeg AtaSixaoie; (Appointments o f Professors) 1934-35, 1936-37,1937-38,1938-39. 
EjistyoEc; riavemoxr|puou AOtjvcüv (Year-book of Athens University) 1938-1939, Ath­
ens 1939.
noocxTixa AxaSr]fitac AQrvtbv. /  Minutes of the Academy o f sciences in Athens 
LuveögEa rrt; 25 Magxiou 1933, *Exog 1933, Topoq 8oq.
ZuveSgia tt£  16 Magxioo 1933, E iog 1933, Topog 8og.
Egm^ieotc xnc FCuSsovfoecjjc rrc EXlatfioc. / Official Gazette o f the Greek Government 
fPEFO
Teox°S ngtlrcov, Aq. O uXXoo 69, 23.02.1938.
- Teuxoq I1 q<I)xov, Aq. <PuU.ou 31,24.01.1939.
- Teux°? neobxov, Ao. OuXkoo 31, 20.10.1939.
- TeOx°? nptoxov, Ag. <t>u\Xo'j 31,14.12.1938.
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Teuyoc; Ilgw Tov, Aq. <X>ü\Xod 57,14.02.1939. 
Teuyog I I qüjtov, Aq. O ljaXou 103, 30.04.1942.
Interviews
Alexandras Tzonis, July 2000, in Athens. 
Panagiotis Kotzias, August 2000, in Athens.
World W ide W eb Sites
http: /  /his torv.san diegio.edu/ gen /  text/ versaillestreaty /  all440.htm! 
h ttp ://www.hans-hass.de/F.ng-lisch/ Short Vita/ Short Vita.html 
ii ttp: / Avww.h ans-h ass .de /Biograph ie /Biografie.h tm 1 
http: /  Avwvv .med.auth .or/ dcpts / amg/gr /history fitm
Encyclopaedias and  D ictionaries
- BENZ, WOLFGANG u.a. (Hg.), Enzyklopaedie des Nationalsozialismus. Muenchen 
1997.
- BLACKBURN, Simon, The Oxford Dictionary o f Philosophy. Oxford 1994.
- E n c y c lo p a e d ia  "H X ick;” .
Oxford Dictionary of English, (Revised edition), 2005.
- The New International Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary o f the English Lan­
guage and Encyclopaedic Edition, 1998.
B ooks and articles
ALMGREN, BIRGITTA: Illusion und Wirklichkeit. Individuelle und kollektive Denk­
muster in nationalsozialistischer Kulturpolitik und Germanistik in Schweden 1928- 
1945. Stockholm 2002.
ALTER, PETER (Hg.): DAAD 1925-2000. Spuren in die Zukunft. 1) Der DAAD in 
der Zeit Geschichte, Gegenwart und Zukünftige Aufgaben 14 Essays. Koeln 2000 
- ALY, GOETZ; HEIM, SUSANNE: Vordenker der Vernichtung. Auschwitz und die 
deutschen Plaene fuer eine neue europaeische Ordnung. Hamburg 1991.
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ASH, MITCHELL G.: “Scientific Changes in Germany 1933, 1945, 1990: Towards a 
Comparison”, in: Minerva 37 (1999), pp. 329-354.
BACKES, KLAUS: Adolf Hitlers Eifluss auf die Kulturpolitik des Dritten Reiches: 
Dargestellt am Beispiel der Bildenden Künste. Doctoral thesis Rup recht-Karl- 
University. Heidelberg 1985.
BaRBIAN, JAN-PIETER: ‘“Kultruwerte im Zeitkampf. Die Kulturabkommen des 
‘Dritten Reiches’ als Instrumente nationalsozialistischer AussenpoUtik”, in: Archivfuer 
Kulturgeschichte, Band 74 (1992), pp. 415-459.
BASTIAN, TILL: Furchbare Aerate. Medizinische Verbrechen im Dritten Reich. 
Muenchen 1995.
BEER J. D.,: The Emergence o f the German Dye Industry. Urbana 1959.
BENNING, WILLI (Hg.), Festschrift fuer Klaus Betzen. Athens 1995.
BERGER, STEFAN: “Social History vs Cultural History. A German Debate”, in: The­
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Btßktcov xai OfioXoyoû evci>c; KaXktaruv Ecprj^spiöojv’. Oi roxXaieq auXXoyet; tou 
EÖvixou MsTooßtou noXuxsyveiou. AÖriva 1995. [Ethniko Metsovio Polytechneio 
(ed.), Tibrary o f needed books and admittedly best Journals’. The old collections of 
the Metsovio National Technical University, Athens 1995].
ETZKOWTTZ, HENRY; LEYDESDORFF, LOEr: T he endless transition: A  ‘Triple He­
lix” o f University — Industry — Government relations’, in Minerva 36 (1998), pp. 203- 
208.
FLEISCHER, H agen : Steppa x a t ' Eßacmxa. H EWaÖa xrj<; Karo^ns xaci vrfc 
Avricrracryjg 1941-1944. Tö^og A*. Athens 1989, [enlarged Greek edition of die origi­
nal: Im Kreuzschatten der Maechte- Griechenland 1941-1944. (Okkupation — Kol­
laboration - Resistance). Frankfurt a.o. 1986].
FLEISCHER, HAGEN: “Siegfried in Hellas. Das nationalsozialistische Griechenland­
bild und die Behandlung der griechischen Zivilbevölkerung seitens der deutschen 
Besatzungsbehoerden, 1941-1944”, in: Armin Kerker (Hg.): Griechenland -  Entfer­
nungen in die Wirklichkeit. Hamburg 1988, pp.26-48.
358
- FLEISCHER, HAGEN; SVORONOS, NlKOS (ed.): EU aöa 1936-1944. Aixraiogia -  
Katoyr] “  Avriataor,. ITgaxTixä A’ AieÖvo’jg ZuveÖgiou EÜYXgovriq loTOßi*?* AÖrjva 
1989 [Greece 1936-1944: Dictatorship-Occupation-Resistance. Proceedings o f the 1st 
International Congress o f Contemporary History. Athens 1989].
FLEISCHER, H a g e n : “Schwert und Olive”, in: Willi Benning (Hg.): Festschrift filer 
Klaus Betzen. Athens 1995.
FLEISCHER, HAGEN: “Europas Rückkehr nach Griechenland. Kulturpolitik der 
Großmächte in einem Staat der Peripherie", in: Harald Heppner/Olga Katsiardi- 
Hering (Hg.): Die Griechen und Europa. Außen- und Innen sichten im Wandel der 
Zeit Wien 1998, pp. 125-191.
FLITNER, MICHAEL: Sammler, Raeuber und Gelehrte. Die politischen Interessen an 
pflanzengenetischen Ressourcen 1895-1995. Frankfurt 1995.
FORMAN, PAUL: “Weimar Culture, Causality and Quantum Theory, 1918-1927: Ad­
aptation by German physicists and mathematicians to a hostile intellectual environ­
ment.” in: Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 3 (1971), pp. 1-115.
FORMAN, PAUL: “Scientific Internationalism and the Weimar physicists: the ideology 
and its manipulation in Germany after World War I.” in: Isis 64 (1973), pp. 151-180. 
FREEMAN C.: "Economics o f  Research and Development”, in: Ina Spiegel-Roesing 
and Derek De Solla Price (eds.): Science, Technology and Society. A Cross- 
Disciplinary Perspective. London, California 1977, pp. 223-275.
FUCHS, MAX: Kulturpolitik als gesellschaftliche Aufgabe: Eine Einfuehrung in Theo­
rie, Geschichte, Praxis. Opladen 1998.
- GEERTZ, CLIFFORD: The Interpretation of Cultures. New York 1973.
- GOLDING, PETER; HARRIS, PHIL (eds.): Beyond Cultural Imperialism. Globaliza­
tion, Communication and the New International Order. London 1997.
- GRUETTNER, MICHAEL: “Wissenschaft”, in: Wolfgang Benz u.a. (Hg.), Enzyklopae- 
die des Nationalsozialismus. Muenchen 1997, pp. 135-153.
-  HABER, FRITZ L.: T he poisonous cloud: chemical warfare in the First World War. 
Oxford 1986.
HABER, Fritz  L : The Chemical Industry During the Nineteenth Century: A Study 
of the Economic Aspects o f Applied Chemistry in Europe and North America. Lon­
don 1958.
- HACHMEISTER, LUTZ: Der Gegnerforscher. Die Karriere des SS-Fuehrers Franz Al­
fred Six. Munich 1998.
359
t
HAMMERSTEIN, N o t k e r  Die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft in der Weimarer 
Republik und im Dritten Reich. Wissenschaftspolitik in Republik und Diktatur 1920- 
1945. Muenchen 1999.
HARNACK, ADOLF von: “Vom Grossbetrieb der Wissenschaft”, in: Preussische Jahr- 
buecber 119 (28.1.1905), pp. 193-201.
HARTMANN, MAX; M IEHLENS, PETER: “U ntersuchungen  ueber Bau- und 
Entw icklung d e r  Z ahnsp irochaeten” , in: Zschr. Hyg. u. Infektionskrankheiten, 55 (1905), 
pp.92-109.
HARTMANN, M a x : Tod und Fortpflanzung. Eine biologische Betrachtung, (oef- 
fentlicher Habilitiationsvortrag an der Universitaet Giessen, 1903). Munich 1906. 
HARTMANN, M a x : “Autogamie bei Protisten und ihre Bedeutung fuer das Befruch- 
tungsproblem”, in: Arch.ft Protistenkunde 14 (1909), pp. 264-334.
HARTMANN, MAX; SCHILLING, CLAUS: Die pathogenen Protozoen und die durch 
sie verursachten Krankheiten. Zugleich eine Einfuehrung in die allgemeine Protozo­
enkunde. Ein Lehrbuch fuer Mediziner und Zoologen. Berlin 1917.
HARTMANN, MAX: “Ueber relative Sexualitaet bei Fctocarpus siliculosus. E in  experi­
menteller Beitrag zur Sexualitaetshypothese der Befruchtung.” in: Die Naturwissen­
schaften, Heft 26 (1925), pp. 975-980.
HARTMANN, MAX: “ U ntersuchungen  u eb e r relative Sexualitaet. I. V ersuche an Ecto- 
carpus siliculosui\ in: Biologisches Zentralblatt, 45 (1925), pp. 449-467.
HARTMANN, MAX; SCHARTAU, OTTO: “Untersuchungen ueber die Befruch­
tungsstoffe von Seeigeln I”, in: Biologisches Zentralblatt, 59 (1939), pp. 571-587. 
HARTMANN, MAX; SCHARTAU, OTTO; KUHN, RICHARD; WALLENFELS, KURT: 
“Ueber die Sexualstoffe der Seeigel”, in: Naturwissenschaften, 27 (1939), p. 433. 
HARTMANN, MAX: "Die stofflichen Grundlagen der Befruchtung und Sexualiataet 
im Pflanzen- und Tierreich. I. Die Befruchtungsstoffe (Gamone) der Seeigel”, in: 
Naturwissenschaften, 28 (1940), pp. 807-819.
H a r t m a n n , M a x ; Sc h a r t a u , O t t o ; K u h n , R ic h a r d ; Wa l l e n f e l s , K u r t :
“Ueber die Wechelwirkung von Gyno- und Androgamonen bei der Befruchtung der 
Eier des Seeigels”, in: Naturwissenschaften, 28 (1940), p.144.
HARTMANN, MAX; WALLENFELS, KURT: “Untersuchungen ueber die Beffuch- 
tungsstoffe von Seeigeln II”, in: Biologisches Zentralblatt, 60 (1940), pp. 398-423. 
HARTMANN, MAX: “Die Befruchtungsstoffe Gamone der Seeigel”, in: Forschungen 
und Fortschritte, 17 (1941), pp. 119-122.
360
HARTMANN, M a x : ‘‘B efruch tungssto ffe  bei Fischen (R egenbogenforelle)”, in: 
Naturwissenschaften, 32 (1944), p. 231.
HARTMANN, MAX: “Sexualitaetsprobleme bei Algen, Pilzen und Protozoen. (Eine 
kritische Darstellung im Anschluss an einem Bericht von R.AXewin)”, [Duplikat] in: 
Biologisches Zentralblatt,, 74, H e ft 5/6 (1955), pp. 1-23.
HARWOOD, JONATHAN: Styles o f Scientific Thought. T h e  German Genetics Com­
munity 1900-1933. Chicago 1993.
HAUSHOFER, K a r l : “Die Geopolitische Lage Deutschlands”, in: Karl Lange, Ernst 
Adolf Drey er (Hg.): Deutsche Geist. Kulturdokumente der Gegenwart Erster 
Jahresband 1933: Der Ruf. Leipzig 1933, pp. 79-87.
HAUSHOFER, KARL: “Erdkunde, Geopolitik und Wehnvissenschaft”, in: Muenchener 
Universitaetsreden, Heft 28 (1934), pp. 1-15.
HAUSHOFER, KARL: Wehr-Geopolitik. Geographische Grundlagen einer We­
hrkunde. Berlin 1941.
HAUSMANN, FRANK-RUTGER: Deutsche Geisteswissenschaft’ im Zweiten
Weltkrieg. Die ‘Aktion Ritterbusch’ (1940-1945). Dresden-Muenchen 1998. 
HAUSMANN, FRANK-RUTGER: ‘Auch im Krieg schweigen die Musen nicht*. Die 
Deutschen Wissenschaftlichen Institute im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Goettingen 2001. 
HAUSMANN, FRANK-RUTGER (Hg.): Die Rolle der Geisteswissenschaften im Dritten 
Reich 1933-1945. München 200Z
HEADRICK, DANIEL R.: The tools o f empire technology and European imperialism 
in the nineteenth century. Oxford 1981.
HEIM, SUSANNE: “Research for Autarky. The Contribution of Scientists to Nazi 
Rule in Germany**, in: Ergebnisse 4. Vorabdrucke aus dem Forschungsprogramm 
“Geschichte der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesetlschaft im Nationalsozialismus’* 2001.
HEIM, SUSANNE: Autarkie und Ostexpansion. Pflanzenzucht und Agrarforschung im 
Nationalsozialismus. Goettingen 2002.
HEIM, SUSANNE: “Forschung fuer die Autarkie. Agrarwissenschaft an Kaiser- 
Wilhelm* Instituten im Nationalsozialismus”, in: Susanne Heim (Hg.), Autarkie und 
Ostexpansion. Pflanzenzucht und Agrarforschung im Nationalsozialismus. Goettin­
gen 2002, pp. 145-177.
HEIM, SUSANNE: Kalorien, Kautschuk, Karrieren. Pflanzenzuechtung und land­
wirtschaftliche Forschung in Kais er-Wilhelm-Instituten 1933-1945. Goettingen 2003.
361
HEINEMANN, MANFRED: DAAD 1925-2000. Spuren in die Zukunft 2) Fakten und 
Zahlen zum DAAD. Koeln 2000.
HEPPNER, HARALD; Ka TSIARJDI-He r i n G, OLGA (Hg.): Die Griechen und Europa. 
Außen- und Innensichten im Wandel der Zeit. Wien 1998.
HERF, JEFFREY: Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Wei­
mar and the Third Reich. Cambridge 1984.
HERING, GUNNAR: “Aspekte der Kulturpolitik des Metaxas-Regimes (1936-1940)”, 
in: Reinhard Lauer, Peter Schreiner (Hg.): Die Kultur Griechenlands in Mittelalter 
und Neuzeit’. Bericht ueber das Kolloquium der Suedosteuropa-Kommission, 28. -  
31. Okt. 1992. Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Goettingen. Phil.- 
Hist. Klasse, 3 Folge, Nr. 212. Goettingen 1996, pp. 285-321.
HISS, HANS: “Autarkie und Weltwirtschaft”, in: Zeitschrift fiter Geopolitik, Jahrgang 5, 
Heft 4 (April 1928), pp. 302-306.
HORKHEIMER, MAX; ADORNO, T h e o d o r * D ialectic o f  E n lig h ten m en t N ew  Y ork  
1972.
H O S S F E L D , U W E ; T H O R N S T R O E M , C A R L -G U S T A F : ‘“Rasches Zupacken’. Heinz 
Bruecher und das botanische Sammelkommando der SS nach Russland 1943”, in: 
Susanne Heim (ed.): Autarkie und Ostexpansion. Pflanzenzucht und Agrarforschung 
im Nationalsozialismus. Goettingen 2002, pp. 119-144.
JACOBSEN, HANS-ADOLF: “Auswaertige Kulturpolitik als ‘geistige Waffe’. Karl 
Haushofer und die Deutsche Akademie (1923-1927)”, in: Kurt Duewell, Werner Link 
(Hg.): Deutsche Auswaertige Kulturpolitik seit 1871: Geschichte und Struktur. 
Koeln 1981.
KALAFATI, ELEN!: «O Q o k o ;  xcov 8(OQed)v cmq o ö y /.q 6 t y [OT[ tr\<; ßiß/Uo0rpa]<; tou 
E.M .n. (1836-1950)», in: EOvtxo Metaoßio riokutsyveLo (ex8.) ‘BißXioOfpcr) xcov 
Avayxaiouvrtov BtßXtwv xat O ̂ okoyou pivax; KotXXiottov EtprifiepiScov’. Ot 7caka:e; 
aukkoye; tou EOvtxou Metooßtot) rioXure^veiou. AOfjva 1995, pp. 13-40 [“The role of 
the donors in the creation of the Metsovio National Technical University’s library 
(1836-1950)”, in: Ethniko Metsovio Polytechneio (ed.), Tibrary of needed books and 
admittedly best journals’. The old collections of the Metsovio National Technical Uni­
versity. Athens 1995].
KARL-FÜSSEL, H EIN Z: Deutsch-amerikanischer Kulturaustausch im 20. Jahrhundert. 
Frankfurt a.M. 2004.
362
KARO, Ge o r g : “Der Krieg der Wissenschaft gegen Deutschland”, in: 
SuedcLMonatshefte, (Mai 1919), pp. 162-168.
KARO, GEORG: Der geistige Krieg gegen Deutschland. Halle 1925.
KATER, M ic h a e l  H.: Das “Ahnenerbe” der SS 1935-1945. Ein Beitrag zur Kultur­
politik des Dritten Reiches. Muenchen 2001.
KAUFMANN, DORIS (Hg.): Geschichte der Kais er-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft im Nation­
alsozialismus. Bestandaufnahme und Perspektive der Forschung. Goettingen 2000. 
KERKER, A r m in  (Hg.): Griechenland — Entfernungen in die Wirklichkeit. Hamburg 
1988.
KERKHOF, KARL: “Die internationalen naturwissenschaftlichen Organisationen vor 
und nach dem Weltkriege und die Deutsche Wissenschaft”, in: Internationale 
Monatsschrift, XV, 3 (Jan.-Feb. 1921), pp. 225-242.
KERKHOF, KARL: Der Krieg gegen die deutsche Wissenschaft Eine
Zusammenstellung von Kongressberichten und Zeitungsmeldungen. Wittenberg 
1922. :
KERKHOF, KARL: Internationale wissenschaftliche Kongresse und Organisationen 
1922-1923. Berlin 1923.
KERKHOF, KARL: “Das Versailles Diktat und die deutsche Wissenschaft”, Monatshefte 
fuer Auswaertige Poätik, VH, 11 (Nov. 1940), pp. 836-850.
K L O O S T E R H U IS , JÜ R G E N : Friedliche Imperialisten: Deutsche Auslandsvereine und 
auswaertige Kulturpolitik, 1906-1918. Frankfurt a.M cl994.
KOHL, ULRIKE: Die Präsidenten der Kais er-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft im National­
sozialismus Max Planck, Carl Bosch und Albert Vogler zwischen Wissenschaft und 
Macht Stuttgart 2002.
KOTZIAS, KONSTANTINOS: “ZraüQoepogia 8ia tr]v A r^oaiav  Yyeiav”, in: Ambppäixrj 
laigtpcrj^xoq, 11: 3 (97) (1947), pp. 217-220.
K O T Z IA S , K O N S T A N T IN O S : “Ol A jjL ep ix ivo i IotTgot eig rr\v E X L x8a” , in :  Axaörjpaixrj 
Iazpixrj, Exog 12: 2 (102) (1947), pp. 111-113.
KOUGEAS, S.B.: EvxuTtawsii; ex Poujjuma;. A7t6o7taa[ia ex tou r]ji£QoXoyiou tyjc; 
MeyiATjq EAXaSog. [“Impressions from Rumania, by S.B. Kougeas. Abstract of the di- 
ary of Great Greece”], 1925.
KOUTSOUKOU, FEDRA: Die deutsche auswaertige Kultur- und Sprachpolitik in Gri­
echenland 1933-1944. Thesis to be defended at the Technische Universitaet Berlin in 
January 2006.
363
KRIMBAS, COSTAL: “Leonidas Zervas”, in: the Daily Newspaper «Ta Nsa»> Thursday 
14 October 1999.
KROHN, CLAUS-DIETER: “Deutsche Wissenschaftsemigration seit 1933 und ihre 
Remigrationsbameren nach 1943”, in: Ruediger vom Bruch, Brigitte Kaderas (Hg.): 
Wissenschaften und Wissenschaftspolitik. Bestandsaufnahmen zu Formationen, 
Bruechen und Kontinuitaeten im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts. Stuttgart 2002, 
pp. 437-452.
KRUSPIG, WALTERiwDeutschland und die Weltwirtschaft”, in: Carl Lange, Emst 
Adolf Dreyer (Hg.): Deutscher Geist 1935. fCulturdokumente der Gegenwart. 
Zweiter Jahresband 1935: Gestaltung des Reiches. Leipzig 1934.
KUUSISTO, SEPPO: Alfred Rosenberg in der Nationalsozialistischen Aussenpolitik 
1933-39. Helsinki 1984.
LAITENBERGER, VOLKHARD: Akademischer Austausch und Auswaertige Kultur­
politik. Der Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst, DAAD, 1923-1945. Goettin- 
gen 1976.
La n g e , KARL; D reyer ERNST-ADOLF (Hg.): Deutsche Geist. Kulturdokumente 
der Gegenwart. Erster Jahresband 1933: Der Ruf. Leipzig 1933.
LANGE, KARL; D r e y e r  ERNST-ADOLF (Hg.): Deutscher Geist 1935. Kulturdoku­
mente der Gegenwart Zweiter Jahresband 1935: Gestaltung des Reiches. Leipzig 
1934.
LATOUR B.; WOOLGAR S.: Laboratory Life: the Social Construction o f Scientific 
Facts. London 1979.
LATOUR, BRUNO: Science in Action: How to Foliow Seientists and Engineers 
Through Society. Open University Press 1987.
Lauer, REINHARD; SCHREINER, Pe t e r  (Hg.): “Die Kultur Griechenlands in Mit­
telalter und Neuzeit”. Bericht üeber das Kolloquium der Suedosteuropa- 
Kommission, 28. -  31. O k t 1992. Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften 
in Goettingen. Phil.-Hist. Klasse, 3 Folge, Nr. 212. Goettingen 1996.
LEGAKIS, ANASTA$IOS:“R ecent Trends in the Study o f the Greek Fauna”, in: 2e 
Congrès International sur la Zoogéographie et T Ecologie de la Grèce et des Régions 
Avoisinantes, Athènes, Septembre 1981, \BioIogia GaÜo-Heîlenica 1985 — Volume 10 
Extrait], pp. 17-20.
LERNER, PAUL: Hysterical Men: War, Neurosis and German Mental Medicine 1914- 
21. Doctoral thesis, Columbia University 1996.
364
LUDWIG, K a r l -HEINZ: Technik und Ingenieure im D ritten  Reich. Duesseldorf 
1974.
L U D W IG , K A R L -H E IN Z : “Technik”, in: Wolfgang Benz u .a .  (Hg.): Enzyklopaedie des 
Nationalsozialismus, München 1997.
MacLEOD, ROY: “Secrets among Friends: The Research Information Service and the 
‘Special Relationship’ in the Allied Scientific Information and Intelligence, 1916- 
1918 ”, in: Minerva 37 (1999), pp. 201-233.
MACRAKIS, KRISTIE: ‘‘Wissenschaftsfoerderung durch die Rockefeller-Stiftung im 
T)ritten Reich*. Die Entscheidung, das Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut fuer Physik finanziell 
zu unterstuetzen, 1934-39”, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaß (Sonderdruck), 12. Jahrgang, 
Heft 3 (1986), pp. 348-379.
MACRAKIS, KRISTIE: “The Survival o f Basic Biological Research in National Socialist 
Germany”, in: Journal of the History o f Biology 26, No. 3 (1993), pp. 519-543.
MACRAKIS, KRISTIE: Surviving the Swastika. Scientific Research in Nazi Germany. 
New York 1993.
MACRAKIS, KRISTIE: “The ideological origins o f institutes at the Kaiser Wilhelm Ge­
sellschaft in National Socialist Germany”, in: Monika Renneberg, Mark Walker (ed.): 
Science, Technology and National Socialism. Cambridge 1994, pp. 139-159.
MAIER, HELMUT: “‘Wehrhaftmachung’ und ‘Kriegswichtigkeit’. Zur Ruestungstech- 
nologischen Relevanz des Kaiser-Wilhelm-Instituts fuer Metallforschung in Stuttgart 
vor und nach 1945”, in: Max-Planck Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Wissenschaften 
e.V. (Ergebnisse 5: “Geschichte der KWG im Nationalsozialismus”) 2002.
MARSCH, ULRICH: Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft. Gruendung und 
fruehe Geschichte 1920-1925. Frankfurt/Main 1994.
MAZOWER, M A RK  H  EXXaöa xai r] Oixovopocrj K giot] xou MeaoJtoXepoo. A6f]va 
2002 (trans.) [Greece*and the Inter-War Economic Crisis. Oxford 1991].
MAZOWER, M A RK  E xtjv EAAtiöa xou XixXep. H  epT te ip ia  xr\<; Kaxoyfj!;. A6r;va 1994, 
(trans.) [Inside Hitler’s Greece. The Experience o f Occupation, 1941-1944. New Ha­
ven 1993].
MAZOWER, M A RK  The Balkans. (2000), Phoenix Press 2001.
McMURRY, RUTH EMILY; LEE, MUNA: The Cultural Approach. Another Way in 
International Relations. New York/London 1947 (Reissued in 1972).
MEHRTENS, HERBERT: “Kollaborationsverhaeltnisse: Natur- und Technikwissen­
schaften im NS-Staat und ihre Historie”, in: Christoph Meinel, Peter Voswinckel
365
(Hg.): Medizin, Naturwissenschaft, Technik und Nationalsozialismus. Kontinuitaeten 
und Diskontinuitaeten, Stuttgart 1994, pp. 13-32.
MEINEL, CHRISTOPH; VOSWINCKEL, PETER (Hg.): Medizin, Naturwissenschaft, 
Technik und Nationalsozialismus. Kontinuitaeten und Diskontinuitaeten. Stuttgart 
1994.
MEISL, SEBASTIAN: “Wiener Universitaet und Hochschulen”, in: Wien 1938, Son- 
derausstellung des Historischen Museums der Stadt Wien. Wien 1988.
MEISSNER, RENATE: H eÖvixooooioXtcmw} Fegpavia xa: y| EXAdSa xata zy\ Stipxeia 
xr)g peta^ocqg SiXTotTOQiag, in: Hagen Fleischer, Nikos Svoronos (ed.): EXXaSoc 1936- 
1944. AixiaxoQta — Karoy?) — Avrlotaart. ngaxtixa A* Aiedvoug Eoveßgiou £6YX0OV7|g 
Iatopiotg. A6r]va 1989, pp. 50-58. [Greece 1936-1944: Dictatorship-Occupation- 
Resistance. Proceedings of the 1st International Congress o f Contemporary History. 
Athens 1989].
MERKER, REINHARD: Die bildenden Künste im Nationalsozialismus: Kulturideolo­
gie, Kulturpolitik, Kulturproduktion. Koeln cl983.
MOMMSEN, WOLFGANG J.: Grossmachtstellung und Weltpolitik. Die Aussenpolitik 
des Deutschen Reiches 1870 bis 1914. Frankfurt a.M./Berlin 1993.
MUENCH, INGO von (Hg.): Gesetze des NS-Staates. Dokumente eines Unrechtssys­
tems. Paderborn 1994.
PARTSCH, KARL JOSEF: Die Zoologische Station in Neapel — Modell internationaler 
Wissenschafts Z u sam m en arb e it. Goettingen 1980.
PAUL, DIANE; K r im b a s , COSTAS:“N ikolai V . T im ofeeff-R essovsky”, in: Scientific 
American, ,  V ol. 266, N o . 2 (1992), pp. 86-92.
PELT, MOGENS: Tobacco, Arms and Politics. Greece and Germany from World Cri­
sis to World War 1929-1941. Copenhagen 1998.
PICKERING, ANDREW (ed.): Science as practice and culture. Chicago 1992.
POLITIS, IOANNIS: «®'J7cr\ öoXaooia nqg Xfigoovriaou to o  A0o»>, in: E îoxrjfiovtxq 
Ezsvjgig Z'/oL Oootx. MaOrjp. Emox. T o p o g  A  1925.
POLITIS, IOANNIS: «Ouxrj OaXaaaia irjg vrjaou E uqou», in: Tlgaxam AxabrtpiiaQ 
A0rjva)v2 (1927), pp. 480-484.
POLITIS, IOANNIS: “IlcQt Trig ©aXdaawcg XXtOQiSog trig Nroou Kortr^c”, in: 
ilgayjuaxsiat xrjg Axabr^iag A Brjvcov, Topog B (3), (1932), pp. 1-30.
POLITIS, IOANNIS: «Tleoi trig OaXaoaiag XXcjgiÖog trg Attix^g», in: flgayuaxEicu xTj$ 
A?caörijjiagAdrjvx!üv,T6\xo<;T{\), (1933), 1-44.
366
- POLITIS, IOANNIS: “ KXr @ovopuxoxr;;  zai xtov ogyavixtöv ovxcov” in: Tlgoxrixd
AxaÖ. Aßr/v&v, 24 (1949), pp. 67-85-
POLITIS, IOANNIS: “AvaTtxu^t; oyxov esu (puicbv ex Öiaxapa^Trg vr\q, olvolttvot̂ ” in: 
AväroJtov ex tojv TipaxTixcov rrjgAxafypiaQAdrjvcbv, xöfioc 22** (1947), A9r;va 1951. 
PYENSON, LEWIS: Cultural Im perialism  and Exact Sciences. German Expansion 
Overseas 1900-1930. New York 1985.
PYENSON, LEWIS: “Pure leaming and political economy: Science and European ex- 
pansion in the age of imperialism”, in: R.P.Wr. Visser, H.J.M. Bos, L.C. Palm, HJLM. 
Snelders (eds.): New Trends in the History o f Science. Proceedings o f a Conference 
held at the University o f Utrecht, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 209-278.
PYENSON, LEWIS: Empire o f reason: Exact Sciences in Indonesia, 1840-1940. Leiden 
1989
- PYENSON, LEWIS: “Why S c ie n c e  may serve p o li t ic a l  e n d s :  Cultural im p e r ia l is m  a n d  
th e  m is s io n  t o  c iv iliz e ” , in :  Beliebte %ur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 13 (1990), p p .  69-81.
- PYENSON, LEWIS: Civilizing Mission: Exact Sciences and French Overseas Expan­
sion, 1830-1940. Baltimore 1993.
- Re n n e b e r g , MONIKA; W a l k e r , MARK (ed.): Science, Technology and National 
Socialism. Cambridge 1994.
RHEINBERGER, HANS-JOERG: “Ephestia: Alfred Kuehns experimenteller Entwurf 
einer entwicklungsphysiologischen Genetik”, in: Dahlemer Archivgespruecht\ Band 4 
(1999), pp. 81-118.
- ROESSLER, MECHTILD; SCHLEIERMACHER, SABINE (Hg.): Der “Genaralplan Ost”. 
Haupdinien der nationalsozialistischen Plannungs- und Vemichtungspolitik. Berlin 
1993.
ROTHMALER, 'WERNER: “Floristische Ergebnisse einer Reise nach dem Peloponnes. 
Ergebnisse einer biologischen Forschungreise nach dem Peloponnes und nach Kreta 
1942 im Auftrag des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht und des Reichsfor­
schungsrates. X. Mitteilung” in: BotanischeJahrbuecher, 73:4 (1944), pp. 418-452. 
SCHREIBER, GEORG: Die Not der deutschen Wissenschaft und der geistigen Ar­
beiter. Geschehnisse und Gedanken zur Kulturpolitik des Deutschen Reiches. Leip­
zig 1923.
SCHREIBER, GEORG: Deutsche Medizin und Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wis­
senschaft. Geschehnisse und Erlebnisse deutscher Medizinalpolitik und Kulturpoli­
tik. Leipzig 1926.
367
f j a  i J  S3K«
SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, BRIGITTE: Deutsche Wissenschaft und Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit 1914-1928. Ein Beitrag zum Studium kultureller Beziehungen in 
politischen Krisenzeiten. (Dissertation), Genève 1966.
SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, BRIGITTE: “Challenge to Transnational Loyalties: Interna­
tional Scientific Organisations after the First World War”, in: Science Studies, 3 (1973), 
pp. 93-118.
SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, BRIGITTE: “Science, Technology and Foreign Policy”, in: 
Ina Spiegel-Roesing and Derek J. De Solla Price (eds.): Science, Technology and So­
ciety. A Cross-Disciplinary Perspective. London, California 1977, pp. 473-506. 
SCHROEDER-GUDEHUS, BRIGITTE: “Internationale Wissenschaftsbeziehungen und 
auswaerdge Kulturpolitik 1919-1933. Vom Boykott und Gegen-Boykott zu ihrer 
Wiederaufnahme”, in: Rudolf Vierhaus, Bernhard vom Brocke (Hg.): Forschung im 
Spannungsfeld von Politik und Gesellaschaft. Geschichte und Struktur der Kaiser- 
Wilhelm- /Max-Planck-Gesellschaft. Stuttgart 1990, pp. 858-885.
SCHULZE, WINFRIED: Der Stifterverband fuer die Deutsche Wissenschaft 1920- 
1995. Berlin 1995.
SCHUMANN, WOLFGANG (Hg.): Griff nach Suedosteuropa. Neue Dokumente ueber 
die Politik des deutschen Imperialismus und Militarismus gegenueber Suedosteuropa 
im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Berlin 1973.
SCURLA, HERBERT: Die Dritte Front. Geistige Grundlagen des Propagandakrieges 
der Westmaechte. Berlin 1940.
SKLAVOUNOS, GEORGE: “Aôyoç ött]v Axaör^ta to  Xeipwva 1942. «H Axaörjpta 
apvrjxai»”, in: Ssttdeûjçrjarj Téjtyqç, Year H ’, Band IE ’, Issue Nr. 87-88, (March — April 
1962), pp. 298-299.
SKOULLOS, MICHAEL: “H eÇè/aîp'} Tr,ç X r^ria; crto riavsTuairgio A6r]v<l)v” [“The 
development o f Chemistry at Athens University”], in: Georgios Vlachakis (ed.): H 
IaroQLxrj E ^ sXlÇt] t ï]ç Xr;(xetaç orrjv EXXàôoc. n p o o m x à  navsXXrtviou LugTtoaioo 14-15 
Oxtüjßoiou 1994, Evwor] EXXrywv Xr]puxwv. A0?]va 1996 [The historical development 
of Chemistry in Greece. Minutes o f Pan-Hellenic Symposium 14-15 October 1994, 
Union O f Greek Chemists. Athens 1996], pp. 195-204.
SPENCE RICHARDS, PAMELA: “The Movement o f Scientific Knowledge from and to 
Germany under National Socialism”, in: hiinerva, Vol. XXVIII, Number 4 (1990), pp. 
401-425.
368
SPENGLER, OSWALD: D er Untergang des Abendlandes. Umrisse einer morphologie 
der Weltgeschichte. (Ungekuerzte Sonderausg.). Muenchen (1923), 1981. 
SPIEGEL-ROESING, INA; DE SOLLA PRICE, DEREK J. (eds.): Science, Technology 
and Society. A Cross-Disciplinary Perspective. London, California 1977.
SPRANGER, EDUARD: Deutschlands Anteil an der Internationalen wissenschaftlichen 
Arbeit. (Germany’s work for international science). Leipzig 1926. 
SREBERNY-MOHAMMADI, ANNABELLE: “The Many Cultural Faces o f Imperialism”, 
in: Peter Golding, Phil Harris (eds.): Beyond Cultural Imperialism. Globalization, 
Communication and the New International Order. London 1997, pp. 49-68.
STEGER, FLORIAN; JaNKRIFT, Kay P. (Hg.): Gesundheit -  Krankheit Kulturtrans­
fer medizinischen Wissens. Köln: Bohiau Verlag/Köln 2004.
STERN, FRITZ: The Failure of Illiberalism. Essays on the Political Culture of Modem 
Germany. New York 1992.
STRATMANN, FRIEDRICH: Chemische Industrie unter Zwang? Staatliche Einfluss­
nahme am Beispiel der chemischen Industrie Deutschlands 1933-1949. Stuttgart 
1985.
STRAUSS HERBERT A.; BUDDENSEEG, T iLMANN; D U E WELL, KURT (Hg.): Emigra­
tion: Deutsche Wissenschaftler nach 1933, Entlassung und Vertreibung. Berlin: 
Technische Universitaet Berlin 1987.
SZOELLOESI-jANZE MARGIT: Fritz H aber 1868 bis 1934. Eine Biographie. 
M uenchen 1998.
SZOELLOESI-jANZE MARGIT: “Der Wissenschaftler als Experte. Kooperationsver- 
haeltnisse von Staat, Militaer, Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft, 1914-1933”, in: Doris 
Kaufmann (Hsg.:) Geschichte der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft im Nationalsozialis­
mus. Bestandaufnahme und Perspektive der Forschung. Goettingen 2000, pp. 46-64. 
THIERFELDER, FRANZ: Der Balkan als kulturpolitisches Kraftfeld. Zwischenstaatli­
che Propaganda und geistiger Austausch in Suedosteuropa. Berlin 1940.
THOERNER, KLAUS: Deutsche Suedosteuropaplaene, 1840-1945. Dissertation sub­
mitted at the University o f Oldenburg 1999.
TODOROVA, MARIA: Imagining the Balkans. Oxford Univ. Press 1997.
TRISCHLER, HELMLTH: “Wachstum — Systamnaehe -  Ausdifferenzierung. Grossfor­
schung im Nationalsozialismus”, in: Rnediger vom Bruch, Brigitte Kaderas (Hg.): 
Wissenschaften und Wissenschaftspolitik. Bestandsaufnahmen zu Formationen,
369
Bruechen und Kontinuitaeten im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts. Stuttgart 2002. 
pp. 241-252.
TSCHERMAK, ARMIN von.: “Die Zoologische Station in Neapel”, in: Meereskunde, 8 
Jahrgang, 2 Heft. Berlin 1914.
TWARDOWSKI, FRITZ von: Anfaenge der deutschen Kulturpolitik zum Ausland. 
Bonn, Bad Godesberg 1970.
TZONIS, KONSTANTIN: „Gleichstromnarkose bei Insekten“, in: Mitteilungen aus der 
Biologischen Versuchsanstalt der Akademie der Wissenschaften, Zoologische Abteilung Nr. 
235, Sonderabdruck aus dem Akademischen Anzeiger Nr. 17 des Jahrgangs 1935 
(Sitzung der math.-naturw. Klasse vom 27. Juni 1935)
TZONIS, KONSTANTIN: „Elektrotaxis, Elektronarkose, Elektrometanarkose und 
Elektroypnose bei Myriopoden (Tausendfüßler)“ in: Zätschrift fuer Vergleichende 
Physiologie 23 (1936), pp. 247-253.
TZONIS, KONSTANTIN; BAAR, W .: Elektrotaxis und verwandte Erscheinungen bei 
niederen K rebsen“ , in: Estratto da “Radiobiologia Generalis”4 (1936), pp. 33-39.
TZONIS, KONSTANTIN: „Elektrometanarkose bei Fischen", in: Mitteilungen aus der 
Versuchsanstalt der Akademie der Wissenschaften, Zoologische Abteilung und der 
Biologische Station in Lunz, Nr. 272, Sonderabdruck aus dem Akademischen 
Anzeiger Nr. 23 des Jahrgangs 1937 (Sitzung der math.-naturw. Klasse vom 2. 
Dezember 1937).
UZUNOGLU, Ö ZD EN : Tuerkei’, in: Wolfgang Benz e t  al. (ed.): Enzyklopaeidie des 
Nationalsozialismus. Munich 1997.
VAVAKOVA, BLANKA: “The New Social Contract Between Governments, Universi- 
ties and Society: Has the Old One Failed?” in: Minerva 36 (1998), pp. 209-228. 
VIERHAUS, RUDOLF; BROCKE BERNHARD vom (Hg.): Forschung im Spannungsfeld 
von Politik und Gesellschaft. Geschichte und Struktur der Kais er-Wilhelm-/Max- 
Planck-Gesellschaft Stuttgart 1990.
VIERHAUS, RUDOLF: “In  Grossbetrieb der Wissenschaft Adolf von Hamack als 
Wissenschaftsorganisator und Wissenschaftspolitiker”, in: Rudolf Vierhaus, Ver- 
gagenheit als Geschichte. Studien zum 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Goettingen 2003, pp. 
423-445.
VIERHAUS, RUDOLF: Vergagenheit als Geschichte. Studien zum 19. und 20. 
Jahrhundert. Goettingen 2003.
370
VlSSER, R.P.W.; BOS, H.J.M.; PALM, IX .; SNELDERS, H.A.M. (eds.): New Trends in 
the History o f  Science. Proceedings o f a conference held at the University of Utrecht 
Amsterdam 1989.
VLACHAKIS, GEORGIOS (ed.): H  laxoguct] E£eXi£r] tr(g Xr^eia;; crrr,v Ekka8a. 
rigaxttxa naveAA.r]viou Sufjutoaiou 14-15 Oxtwßptou 1994. ’E vwotj EAArjvuv Xrjfitxcov. 
AOf.va 1996 [Hie historical development of Chemistry in Greece. Practica o f  Pan- 
Hellenic Symposium 14-15 October 1994. Union o f Greek Chemists. Athens 1996]. 
VOLKMANN, HANS-ERICH: Oekonomie und Expansion. Grundzuege der NS- 
Wrtschaftspolitik. Ausgewaehlte Schriften. Muenchen 2003.
WALKER, M ARK: German National Socialism and the quest of nuclear power 1939- 
1949. Cambridge 1989.
WEINBERG, Alvin M.:“Criteria for scientific choice”, in: Minerva 1: 2 (1962), pp. 
158-171, reprinted in: Minerva (Classics) 38 (2000), pp. 253-269.
W ENDEL, GUENTER: Die Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft, 1911-1914: Zur Anatomie 
der imperialistischen Forschungsgesellschaft. Ost-Berlin 1975.
WIELAND, THOMAS: ‘“Die politischen Aufgaben der deutschen Pflanzen zuechtung’. 
NS-Ideologie und die Forschungsarbeiten der akademischen Pflanzenzuechter”, in: 
Susanne Heim (Hg.): Autarkie und Ostexpansion. Pflanzenzucht und Agrarforschung 
im Nationalsozialismus. Goettingen 2002, pp. 35-56.
WIEN, MARKUS: Markt und Modernisierung Deutsch-bulgarische Wirtschaftsbezie­
hungen 1918-1994 in ihren konzeptionellen Grundlagen. Thesis submitted at the 
European University Institute. Florence 2005.
WIPPERMANN, W OLFGANG: “Ideologie”, in: Wolfgang Benz u.a. (Hg.): Enzyklo- 
paedie des Nationalsozialismus. Muenchen 1997.
WULF, STEFAN: Das Hamburger Tropeninstitut 1919 bis 1945: Auswaertige Kultur­
politik und Kolonialrevisionismus nach Versailles. Berlin 1994.
ZARIFI, MARIA: “Das deutsch-griechische Forschungsinstitut fuer Biologie in Pi­
raeus, 1942-1944”, in: Susanne Heim, (Hg.): Autarkie und Ostexpansion. Pflanzen­
zucht und Agrarforschung im Nationalsozialismus. Goettingen 2002, pp. 206-232. 
ZlEG FELD , HILLEN A.: “Deutscher Lebensraum”, in: Karl Lange, Emst Adolf 
Dreyer (Hg.): Deutscher Geist 1935. Kulturdokumente der Gegenwart Zweiter 
Jahresband 1935: Gestaltung des Reiches. Leipzig 1934, pp. 63-73.
ZlEROLD, KURT: Forschungsfoerderung in 3 Epochen. Deutsche Forschungsge­
meinschaft. Geschichte — Arbeitsweise — Kommentar. Wiesbaden 1968.
371

tam ikW Ì^ÌàM M UM KirtiUwijM iifiìiì^Laìéiiii'llIJiìiiaiitrtHtTUUàiiii
i
1 f f
Î


